Elements Of Power

F-35 Stores Testing: An Observation

2012-02-20T22:30:00.000-06:00

...Or Two
H/T Solomon at SNAFU! for first pointing these out.

High resolutions pics available at ARES blog, but I believe (just an opinion here) ARES was more concerned with getting out the pics than getting the details down. The ARES article mentions:

It's not too evident on these images, but the AIM-9X pylons have an unusual outward kick that mounts the launch rail at an angle to the pylon, presumably to provide adequate clearance from neighboring stores.

That could be part of it, but since we're speculating, I think a major reason might have more to do with the proximity of the AIM-9X (or other store) to the Flaperon edges.

Even if there wasn't a physical clearance problem, there might have been potential for some interesting acoustic environments generated locally. You could have the weapon causing buffet of the wing and flaperon or vice versa - maybe even affecting weapon release envelopes.
Who knows? It could even have a signature benefit from the side (I doubt it though).

I held off mentioning this because I was certain one of the local 'experts' at Ares would have caught the missile/control surface proximity, but it's 40 comments in and 'no joy'. Maybe they're focusing too much on 'clever' and not enough on 'smart'. Heck, ol' Bill even dumps on a commenter positing the possibility of multiple AMRAAMS on some of the pylons (possible if not practical or desirable) with a crack about the commenter forgetting the 'nuclear laser' option.
The pylons proximity to the flaperons does seem to have raised some (ahem) 'concern' in the comments.

While they appear to be longer (vertically) than the F-18 E/F's (excellent pics here), they also appear to be more streamlined than the F-18E/F pylons. The two inboard pylons appear identical, and such interchangeability would be a logistical advantage over many previous aircraft (like the F-18E/F). I suspect the F-35's pylons are lower drag installation than the F-18's because they look 'cleaner', but couldn't prove it either way without some design data.

AR Project: A Functional Device

2012-02-18T18:49:00.001-06:00

I have been scouring the web, several catalogs, and near weekly editions of Shotgun News these past few months trying to find a really 'good deal' to tip the balance either way in deciding to buy or build my 'upper'. I've also been picking the brains of a co-worker that has experience building up ARs in trying to decide the final approach and configuration.
I finally decided that I would go with a built up upper instead of piece parts, and that for the type of shooting I will be doing I should go for a 16" barrel in other than the full-bull stainless steel variety. There were several reasons on the barrel decision, not the least of which is that for the kind of light conditions in which I plan to use this weapon, I really wanted a flash suppressor-- and that the heavy stainless barrels that would fill the bill were either way too expensive or on perennial back-order.

I went to Cheaper Than Dirt today looking for one particular A3 Upper but found that the retail store had 2 of another model I had considered, but had not selected before, because the model had been listed as 'out of stock' according to the online catalog. I bought one.

It is a DPMS 5.56, 16" light barrel assembly with A2 flash hider, low profile single rail gas block, and complete with bolt/carrier assembly and charging handle. The in-store price was a little steeper than the catalog price, but still par for other sources, and as far as upper assemblies go, the main lesson I've learned in this project is the 'bird in the hand' maxim is in effect.

This build needs only the few bells and whistles I still want. Some of them I would have tried to pick up today if CTD hadn't been such a freaking zoo (the checkout lady told me that it was always this way on 'rainy' Saturdays).

Remaining Checklist Items: Free Float Quad Rails, Flip-up sights, Sling (type TBD, leaning towards 3 point), Optics/laser (TBD), and possibly a vertical foregrip and ambidextrous charging handle.

So close.....

Han Shot First

2012-02-17T15:54:00.002-06:00

Culture Wars? It's On!

Bill Whittle on PJTV

Excellent Afterburner video from PJTV up at You Tube right now.

While the 'Evil Child-like Socialists' in power, their codependent Hollyweird sycophants, and the 'entitled' parasites falsely claiming to be "the 99%" are waging open war against American civilization, it is nice to see some 'push back'.

Bill Whittle, once again, does not disappoint, and while I generally agree with Solomon at SNAFU! about the downsides of 'Act Of Valor',Whittle points out a 'positive' for the movie that cannot be denied. His observations about the making of 'Act of Valor' may not be precisely 'correct' but they are forgivable in the greater scheme of things.

I may get one of those 'Han Shot First t-shirts myself.

LRS-B: The Next-Next Generation Bomber!

2012-02-15T22:22:00.003-06:00

Old School Long Range Strike (Click on Pic For Larger)

Work kept me from catching this story earlier. News slowly coming out about the new Long Range Strike platform in the works isn't substantial enough yet for me to determine if I should call it a 'great idea' or a waste of time in the continuing saga of fielding a new long range strike asset. How I think of it will depend largely on the unrefueled range and payload numbers if it is like the 'LRS-A' in all other respects.
Phil Ewing at DoDBuzz 'disappoints' in this observation (emphasis in original):

By relying on proven technologies and by planning to evolve the aircraft over time as threats evolve, similar to the B-52 legacy fleet, the up-front acquisition costs will be reduced significantly from the B-2 experience. The average procurement unit cost is anticipated to be about $550 million in FY 2010 dollars for a fleet of 80–100 aircraft. The Air Force plans to utilize an executive-level, highly streamlined, stable oversight structure to manage the program, and keep requirements manageable, tradable [sic] and affordable. Funding in FY 2013 is $0.3 billion and totals $6.3 billion from FY 2013 – FY 2017.

Hey Phil? About that 'doing things differently' angle. If we would have bought 80-100 B-2s, in the first place the unit acquisition cost would have been far less than those "$550M" in 2010 dollars, and probably much less than that even in then-year dollars. CBO numbers for only 26 B-2s in the early 90s was $540M per plane. Northrop offered to sell the AF only half as many (40) B-2Cs in 2001 for a fixed price of $545M/aircraft.

End Note:
Right behind an almost pathological ignorance (perhaps often feigned?) of the Logical Fallacies, the thing that bugs me the most about the state of the news media today is the absolute lack of (again, perhaps feigned?) awareness as to how math or economics are actually applied within the topics on they write so breathlessly.

[minor cut/paste errors corrected 2/17]

Airpower is Developed, Sustained, and Provided by an "Air Force"

2012-02-15T20:39:00.000-06:00

Composite Photo of a Aerospace Power Dead End, a.k.a. A-10 N/AW

In thread over at SNAFU!, we find one commenter 'Lane" advocating the wet dream of 'Army über alles' types everywhere, i.e. the disbandment of the Air Force. I've invited him to read a couple of my older posts Space Force? and Space Coast Guard? and have posted this to give him an opportunity to make his case a little better than he did over at Solomon's.

Thoughtful arguments (beyond 'because', 'because I say so', and 'there was this one time in band camp' please) for disbanding the AF are welcome, but will be countered even more thoughtfully. I predict and forewarn that IF I get any response, my most common references in countering will involve "Goldwater-Nichols" and the words 'Train and Equip'.

Oh!.. and please leave the 'we have x number Air Forces' B.S. for use as sound bites on some space limited I-hate-AF thread. The Army has trains and it isn't a railroad, and some say it has more floating assets than the Navy and no one claims it is a 'Navy'.

If serious discussion on Airpower isn't your thing, then I refer you to a light-hearted romp on the subject of service roles and missions. See Harry Harrison's "Navy Day" ..........

The Army had a new theme song: "Anything you can do, we can do better!" And they meant anything, including up-to-date hornpipes!

Just got back from Washington DC.

2012-02-04T14:30:00.004-06:00

Mmmmmm... 'Defense Cuts'

(So good to be back in America)

Fifth-Gen Kalashnikov

2012-01-29T09:11:00.000-06:00

Seems more of an evolutionary 'tart-up' job than revolutionary and 'next-gen'.

Though in the old days, incorporation of Picatinny rails in the design would have been considered a Counter-Revolutionary 'gulag' offense. Oh, they would have copied them, they just would have named it something else.

Hat Tip: The Unwanted Blog

Making 'Global Hawk' Brand Defense Sausage

2012-01-28T16:29:00.001-06:00

Narrative Building in lieu of say, actual Defense Planning

RQ-4 Global Hawk Preflight at 0-Dark Hundred Hours

Exhibit 1
June 14, 2011. A Secretary of Defense Acquisition Memorandum released following a review of the Global Hawk program. The memorandum states:
1. “…the continuation of the program is essential to national security.”
2. “…there are no alternatives to the program which will provide acceptable capability to meet the joint military requirement at less cost.”

Exhibit 2.
January 27, 2012. Air Force To Cut 10,000; Global Hawks Get Warehoused

Hmmmm….

So what is the only thing that has ‘changed’ that could have caused such a shift in the Global hawk fortunes in the interim?

Oh yeah - A fatally-flawed world-view was fraudulently packaged into a document posing as a National Defense Strategy and unleashed to provide ‘cover’ for a ton of stupidity that we will experience between now and the end of the current Administration with which we are now plagued.

2013 can’t come soon enough.

BTW: Someone must have telegraphed the ‘Narrative’ early. Senator John Hoven of North Dakota (Where the Global Hawks were to be based) was calling for the Global Hawk to continue back in December ’11.

DoDBuzz Debuzzed, With A 'Major' Tool Running Amok in the Threads

2012-01-26T23:41:00.000-06:00

I'm going hammer and tong (see comments to this article) with a poser (On Airpower & CAS in this case) going by the handle 'major.rod' over 'CAS Myths' and after I came back to the thread today I find he dropped another steaming 'pile' a day or two ago. Suddenly DODBuzz isn't letting me respond to this guy's idiotic comments. DOD Buzz won't even let me post the following as a 'Reply' to one of my own comments:

Wow. Slow but persistent eh? The list of people not smart enough to stop digging before now is short, but you just made it longer. And hey… that's fine by me. The more false claims concerning CAS myths and my series on them plucked from thin air (falsehoods easily verified by anyone who bothers to read the series no less) are brought up and the longer you sustain your refusal to take up the challenge to identify any ONE specific point that was 'flawed' in the series to support your vacuous critique (that I will decompose with great amusement) the more you’re exposed.I'm sure if we cast about looking for your trail elsewhere on these boards, I'd see more of the same. Hu(y)bris? That’s a mighty awful 'projection' problem ya got there! Which reminds me: Thanks for proving my CAS Myths 'Stainless Steel Trenching Tool’ point. Though not nearly as eloquent as others, you've been at least a little more entertaining.

So Really: What is in this post with which DODBuzz takes exception? I suspect their 'filters' are on a little too tight. It couldn't be anything else.....?

I've been considering going around the web and collate all the times I've gone head to head over CAS misperceptions and myths with ardent ground force (usually Army, and usually one hitch junior enlisted) troops who seem to involve a lot more emotion and a lot less thought into what they simply KNOW is true, and even when you can show them that what they believe isn't 'true' they still take offense over the Centralized Control/Decentralized Application of Airpower. (They tend to hate the use of capital 'A' in Airpower as well). I'd then use the collated data in a post for future FAQ reference so I don't have to make the same explanations over and over again disambiguating fact from opinion, what was said or implied vs. what was read into what was said that was 'wrong'.

Maybe also some mind experiments would help as well? Something like:

Resolved: Given an unlimited number of funds, all the services could have all the Airpower assets they desired to ensure everyone had what they need or want whenever they wanted it.

Problem: Since this is 'reality' and we don't have unlimited funds, how would you organize your Airpower capabilities to best make use of the limited resources? How would you prioritize those resources? How would you deal with the consequences of those priorities?

This would make some people's heads explode. Fun to watch.

F-35 Tail Hook Risks? Meh.

2012-01-19T21:38:00.002-06:00

Other than using the word ‘blame’ in the headline to draw the reader’s eye there’s a pretty good piece at the Navy Times on the F-35 tail hook ‘issue’.
While I don’t know who made the “claim” mentioned within this excerpt, this seems to contain a series of reasonable observations:

Richard Aboulafia, an analyst at the Teal Group, Fairfax, Va., said the claim that the F-35C could never land on a ship was always highly dubious. ''They turned the YF-17 into a carrier plane, why couldn't they correct carrier-hook problems here?'' he said. ''This does not appear to be a killer problem.'' Flight testing is designed to uncover and fix problems with a new aircraft, Aboulafia said. ''This is the kind of problem that might come out during the flight testing of a carrier-based plane,'' he said.

Lest someone think arresting gear functionality should have been a ‘slam dunk’ out of the box, “History” has shown it more to be something that has to be worked out with every plane. See this excellent blog for a pretty decent survey of past designs and challenges.Even if the 'first round redesign' doesn’t provide the final ‘answer‘ to the problem, it will probably provide more data to support further tweaking of the arresting gear. But if the problem isn’t fixed the first time, I can almost guarantee there will be near-instantaneous 'doomsayer' claims that something much more draconian/costly/delaying 'will have to be done’. I am just mentioning it now so you can get some ear protection before the caterwauling commences. I'd wait to get the data from the next round of tests, and get excited only if the data told me I should.
PS: I’d discuss the technical challenges of successful arresting gear development in more detail, (beginning with the fact that when it comes to an aircraft system interacting with the ship system what we are talking about is essentially a chaotic meta-system) but most people’s eyes would glaze over before I was finished. OK, I admit it, since I deal with this kind of stuff from 9 to 5 it would be no fun for me either. The article linked above covers what may be the critical bits in this case anyway.
Just think about ALL the variables that might be involved and you’ll get the idea.

Nice short F-8 tail hook...but a loooooong way back from the landing gear. Image from Wikipedia Commons

Why The Public is So Poorly Informed...

2012-01-08T13:16:00.001-06:00

(~~about~~ on just about da** near everything)

It is the convergence of the Chump Effect with the Gell-Mann Amnesia Effect.

Providers and Consumers: there's plenty of 'blame' to go around.

H/T Instapundit.

Sweetman Goes "All In" on F-35 QLR

2012-01-02T21:00:00.000-06:00

I think maybe he is trying to 'nag' his way onto the F-35 program.
(But it's just too much fun watching him flail around)

Bill Sweetman has his spleen vent set to ‘Full Snark Mode’ in an ongoing series of posts that tail-twist the F-35 program over the F-35 Quick Look Report and what (he thinks) 'it all means’ from the Ragin’ Hedge Baby from the Shires© perspective. I noticed that in the manner of Brave Sir Robin said gadfly decided to go deep (as in shovel ready) on this topic while the Aerospace industry in general is in its ‘end of year’ hiatus. I have had more important things to do (and kill) than negative memes over the Christmas break, so I haven’t given too much attention to the uninformed ruminations of itinerant journolistas, their codependent Non-State-Actor friends, or the rest of the merry Anti-JSF tribe until tonight.

I hit the ARES blog looking for details on the latest Saudi/F-15 deal before I head back to work tomorrow and what do I find? Yeah…. another Sweetman ‘piece’ taking a swipe at the F-35 and ‘its supporters’ titled: “F-35 Proponents Say The Darndest Things”. No snark there eh?
The article is as full of the simplton-ian analysis we’ve come to expect from the source, but what really caught my eye was the closer:

So where do all these tales come from? Check out an Australian government audit report, released on December 20. In its discussion of Australia's JSF program (p261), it notes that one of 11 "major challenges" to the project, on the same level as dealing with schedule and cost changes, is to

"appropriately manage JSF misinformation in the media".

Do they mean correcting misinformation, or maintaining misinformation at an appropriate level?

Since Mr. Sweetman is apparently at a loss (in more ways than one) as to what the Australian GOVERNMENT AUDIT (i.e. outside the JSF program) report means, let us use a suitable example of media misinformation to help correct misinformation and perhaps clarify for Mr. Sweetman to what the Australian Government seems to be referring.

Let’s see. How about a corrective rewrite of of Bill Sweetman’s “Why the QLR is News” piece, so that it is a little less ‘misinformative’? (Corrections and new content in Blue)

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There is no faster way for an adept flack to ~~kill~~ take 'cheap shots' at a ~~story~~ program than to conflate a ~~the~~ "nothing really new on the technical front” report into a “this program is as bad as we wished” gambit. We've seen a good deal of that in the six days since the Quick Look Review report escaped from its cage.
A typical story might use a report that quotes an unattributed analyst as saying that:

"the F-35 was turning out to have the same schedule, cost and technical issues suffered by most aircraft programs, including Boeing's new 787 Dreamliner. 'It's not a pleasant picture, but it's far from a terminal one either'."

and diminish the impact of said quote by adding something like:

If "most programs" had the Dreamliner's issues, this would be one depressingly incompetent industry to work in. And the 787's problems so far have translated into strategic failure: The goal was to bury Airbus in the mid-market, but the old-school A330 is still alive and kicking, while Airbus outmaneuvered a distracted Boeing in the narrow-body segment.

Notice the overt obfuscation of the main “same schedule, cost and technical issues suffered by most aircraft programs” point by focusing on an alleged Dreamliner failure? So what if the final Dreamliner story is yet to be written? It would appear that it is apparently within “someone’s” journalistic license to ‘beg the question’ even when employing misdirection.
Using evidence in hand, and avoiding unsubstantiated speculation, a disinterested observer would have to conclude that the JSF problems are not ~~may or may not be~~ terminal, and he or she would be cautious concerning a report that was built upon largely antiquated data and not assert that ~~but~~ the idea that a major take-away from the first full year of flying (F-35s this year have flown twice as many sorties as the program had notched up a year ago) is that the production ramp-up needs to be stopped is something new, and not normal. After all, greater concurrency has been seen more often since at least WW2.
For the F-35, it's ~~also~~ not news that a critical report leaked as ‘fast’ as it did. ~~That~~ Such a leak in this day and age can just as readily be ~~usually~~ an indication of a malcontent in any of the program office, test, operational, or competing (F-18?) communities rather than evidence of any high-level dissent. It could even be evidence of political hardball coming from the office of the Acting Undersecretary’s office (After all, it was, Jame G. Burton, one of the less famous and perhaps less capable but slightly more honorable of the so-called ‘reformers’in the 70s-80s who observed (to paraphrase) ‘Acting’ Something-secretaries tend to very much want to be permanent Something-secretaries.
Most ~~Some~~ of the press coverage to-date misses the point of the report’s incomplete nature on the subject of concurrency,and instead the coverage seems to be focusing on building a narrative which is asserts there is an unusual and ~~the~~ looming collision between discovery in flight and fatigue testing and planned production increases .
If one desired to build a narrative around the meaning of the QLR supporting a ‘negative’ POV, they might focus on the report’s concerns that Ggiven the status of testing, and the lag time in developing and implementing fixes, the report concludes that there is:

"a high risk that rework and retrofit costs... will continue to be realized across the entire LRIP production flow" - including LRIP-9 deliveries in 2017. Those aircraft are due to be ordered just after high-angle-of-attack flight tests are completed, and while second-lifetime fatigue tests are still under way.”

While the previous is 'true' (to a point), informed and balanced reporting would also note that the QLR does not take into consideration the risks and associated costs of NOT proceeding as planned and the threats those risks pose to the program. It is not as if the fact that the technical aspects of a program pose far less total cost risk to a program than programmatic aspects is not well known. The largest drivers have been shown to be #1: quantity changes (22 percent), #2: requirements growth (13 percent), and #3: schedule changes (9 percent).
Competent reportage would take into consideration what is missing from the QLR and what the impacts of following the recommendations might afflict on the program. The QLR recommends changing quantities and schedule, two of the three largest cost drivers? Where is the reportage asking the hard questions on that apparent conflict?

A cynical member of the press might attempt to counter the fact that the ~~The~~ ‘play-down’ reports ~~also~~ invariably note that the report did not recommend terminating production. Such an approach might employ a snark-laden false allegory such as:

That's the good-news story? "Hi, dear, how was the check-up?" "Fantastic! I don't have Ebola yet!"

When a truer, albeit far less entertaining, one might read:

“That's the good-news story? "Hi, dear, how was the check-up?" "Doc says I have to work on things but nothing that we don't think we can work out."

Of course, why bring up the allegory at all if it doesn’t support the negative meme drivng a story in the first place?
Let's look at ~~that~~ the wording in detail (page 7). The QLR team separated the program issues into four categories. Category I: "Areas where a fundamental design risk has been identified with realized consequences sufficient to preclude further production."
They didn't find any, but those with bias, or insufficient technical backgrounds and experience might brush this point off by asserting something akin to:

"it would have been a damning indictment of program management if they had. For a team of outsiders to walk in and, in 30 days, discover an unfixable problem sufficient to terminate the program on the spot would point to ineptitude at best."

When in reality, a problem of that magnitude on a program as far along as the F-35 is more often as plainly obvious to an experienced program manager as the nose on any obdurate journalist’s face.
As noted above, the categories were set by the QLR team on the basis of what they found. Also, the team's original charter was not to determine whether the program should be whacked, but to investigate concerns about testing delays, and concurrency costs.
It would be beyond the pale, but alas I fear not beyond the limits of some in the aerospace trade press to read into the QLR something that is not there: to create a ‘absence of evidence is evidence of something’ argument. Perhaps by contriving a question similar to:

So if they didn't find any Category I issues, why is there a Category I at all - except to provide the program's defenders with a soundbite?If anyone has a brilliant alternative answer to that question, I'm all ears.

But you may ask “Certainly, no journalist, not even one apparently having an axe to grind on this particular topic, would fail to grasp that when one organizes information, the FIRST step is to create the categories for what you MIGHT find and THEN categorize what is found, as it is found, by the predetermined categories?”

Apparently not.

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"Happy New Year" indeed

Merry Christmas To All GIs Everywhere

2011-12-25T14:10:00.000-06:00

(Bumped: Originally posted Christmas Eve 2007 & time hasn't changed a thing)

Just after Thanksgiving every year I start thinking about how Christmas in the military can be a little different than the average American’s. Maybe it is because when you join up, you gain another family to think about: and you think about them every year, whether we’re at war or at peace.
I get particularly sappy about it I guess, because I worked my first 10 Christmas Eves and Days.
My first Christmas Eve with my new family was when I was still in Basic Training. We were far enough along in the program that on “non-training” days we had some liberty in the immediate area of our WWII-era barracks (only the wusses were in the 1000-man dorms at that time ~wink). We actually built a Christmas tree of sorts, out of 7-Up and Coke cans on a picnic-type table while waiting our turn to call home from an adjacent bank of payphones. I spent my first Military Christmas Eve sitting around the aluminum can tree exchanging family Christmas traditions and stories.
My second Christmas was when I learned about “SP Augmentees”. I spent 12 hours guarding a stateside bomb dump with a brick (radio) and an empty M-16. The single guys pulled ‘the duty’ on Christmas Eve and Day so the married guys could be with their families and the married guys who “didn’t party” pulled the duty on New Year’s Eve and Day. It was a ‘win-win’ for everyone. For the next eight years it was usually the same thing. In Alaska and Iceland, the Godless Soviets liked to exercise the Air Defense Intercept Zones on holidays -- So we’d spend Christmas building, fixing, and hauling weapons to the flight line or, if we were lucky, we’d just spend all night plowing and re-plowing the road between the munitions storage and alert facilities IN CASE the Bears came to town. Now in the end we weren’t getting shot at, and we were always pretty thankful for that. But we knew it could have been different any time some world leader cleared his throat or tripped over his own feet.
The public tends to forget how close we came to Armageddon several times over the length of the Cold War, if they ever noticed at all, and the American Military is what lets them get away with such poor situational awareness and a peculiar forgetfulness. As our brothers and sisters now serving can attest, a lot of the Public doesn’t really like to think too much about how dangerous the rest of world is, and some of the less gifted in the populace actually think it isn’t that dangerous of a world at all.
Thank you to all of those now serving EVERYWHERE for joining and becoming part of the continuum: forever protecting the appreciative and the oblivious alike and without reservation. May you have a most merry and memorable Christmas with many, many, more to come.
(original photo was ABC News)

Success! Thanks Again For Everything Brother B!

2011-12-21T22:48:00.001-06:00

I'd like to thank the fine folks at B&L Outfitters at the Clairette Bar and Grill once again for hosting me on my hunts this season, and for setting the standards so high while providing brotherly encouragement.
A couple of old adages about hunting have certainly applied this year.

First: If you're going to hunt, Hunt! The deer don't have a schedule and nothing beats persistence and consistency. Yesterday I did the AM and PM hunts and was still exhausted at 4AM today when the alarm went off. I almost slept in based upon what happened yesterday, but today, the ebbing moon rose an hour later this morning (new moon on Christmas BTW) and there was a little more cloud cover which gave me the edge moving to the blind. Yesterday, all the deer were jumpy due to high winds. In the morning I had some of the 'local girls' show up, then a forked-horn I've come to think of as Decoy Boy would show up to chase them. The doe would run away and then come back, then Decoy Boy would come back. All through the morning hunt. They were even looping behind me and coming in from different directions. The old doe did not like my blind, and stomped and huffed a couple of times, but she was more concerned with Decoy Boy, and then it was as if she forgot about me. Afternoon session was much the same, only Decoy Boy came in first. Normally what has happened in the PM is his running-buddy, a marginally-legal, "barely-8" point (Eastern Count) would soon follow. Not last night. Last night Decoy Boy moved off quickly and was hanging in the bushes until the doe showed up, and then it was the AM session all over again, until it got too dark to shoot. I had to sit it out to keep from being busted until the Decoy Boy finally moved off. This AM was also projected to be colder and calmer, so I dragged myself out of bed, knowing full well adage number two still applied, but also knowing that the deer weren't going to parade past at midday either.

Second: They call it "hunting" and not "shooting" for a reason. It's a good thing I like the 'hunt' as much as, if not more than, the 'kill'. Because there is a whole lot of the former and little of the latter even if you are lucky AND you're doing it right. In my younger days, I tended to focus on the finish and would feel disappointed when it didn't 'happen'. This year (and the last season about three years ago), I could have and did get 'skunked' (i.e. struck out) and still felt the season was worthwhile, and worth remembering. I saw deer almost every session, knowing there was the right one (or three-four) cruising my Brother's ranch and surrounding area. This AM, before it was really light enough to count points on an antler, a big buck came in and didn't like my blind (my setup worked better for afternoon light. I think what he REALLY didn't like was the steam of my breath rising in the still air. I could see his breath coming out of him easier than I could see him. He was traveling with two other bucks, and he feinted into the clearing a couple of times, raised a false alarm flag but didn't spook. Those three bucks slinked through the brush on the other side of the clearing and I got one look at the big guy's head when he paused to check my way once. Perhaps longer, higher tines on his rack, but they were also lighter in color and weight.
I thought that the AM session was going to end early on that note, when 2 then 3 then 4 doe moved in front of me, coming from the same direction as the earlier bucks. They were only on the scene a short while with the old doe casting evil looks my way and being the most cautious about moving into the clearing, when out stepped.....

The Chocolate 8 Point.

He's shown up on the trail cameras quite a bit, and considering it is a drought year, he was remarkably heavy-bodied. And I've always been impressed with his rack color, weight, and shape, but the real kicker was the mass and length of his brow tines.

Gnarly Baby!

With all the doe and this buck present I had to be painfully careful getting into firing position. I elected to only project my barrel out of the blind and scope the buck through the blind screen (still blew a small hole in the screen though ).

I dropped him in his tracks, but still don't understand how I could have missed my aimpoint as much as I did. I sighted in the new scope on this rifle with only 9 rounds, and the last 3 holes in my target you could cover with a nickel. Some of the error could be from having a live target and my excitement, but not all of it. I think it could be due to the fact I was using a shooting stick for the very first time (but not the last!) and I didn't secure my foregrip well enough. It would bother me a lot more if my poor aim had resulted in a prolonged death of the animal, but as the shot dropped him in place, I'm extremely pleased with the result.

BTW: I also learned that field dressing a deer is not the same as learning to ride a bike. If it has been more than 2 decades, you should probably have someone on your shoulder to knock the rust off.

Update 12/25/11: After reviewing game camera films, and a snapshot my Brother's neighbor took on Dec 7th, I've determined that this buck was the same one as in the first encounter that morning, and that he had just double-backed into the field of fire once his does came up and he thought the coast was clear. I'm always amazed at how different the deer appear in different light and backgrounds. I'm also convinced now that this is the same buck I watched for 20 minutes behind some brush back on the evening of the 8th and never gave me an opportunity to take a high percentage shot.
Later Note: made some typo and grammar corrections on 28Dec11.

F-35: STILL Just a Typical "High-Tech" Program

2011-12-07T22:00:00.001-06:00

But the point seems to gets lost on the casual observers, the Druids and the 'droids. I wonder if pictures would help them understand?

I've been considering for some time doing a graphic or series of graphics that would show the comparable development milestones and the fielding of technical capabilities of the F-35 and the planes it is slated to replace or other 'successful' legacy programs . I think this would help get the point across to the illiterate, innumerate, and just plain lazy. Of course it won't do a thing for the 'Haters', but they're more manageable without their chorus of enablers.

This is actually more time consuming than just iterating the facts in words, but points can be more compelling when graphically shown. For example, when someone trots out the F-16XL as a 'simple' replacement for the F-16, do they know exactly how different the two designs are?

F-16 Block52 vs. F-16XL

The recent Admiral Venlet Vent-let has stirred much of the "hater" noise making the last few days and graphics, a timeline perhaps, might prove handy to point to in the future when beating down hysteria over the next gasping F-35 factoid-of-doom that comes up.

Constructive and serious suggestions as to the design(s) to get the point across are welcome.

F-35 and the "Crackpots of Doom"

2011-12-02T20:08:00.001-06:00

Skip the breathlessly headlined Bill Sweetman "Article of Doom" for now (it will make it just that more entertaining if you go back to it) and go to slightly less 'vapourous' article he linked to as the source at AOL (I know! Whooda' guessed AOL was still around?).
There are many parts of the original article that I find most interesting, given the responses to it in the blog comments I've seen so far.
In no particular order:
But slowing production would help reduce the cost of replacing parts in jets that are being built before testing is complete, Venlet said. Although fatigue testing has barely begun -- along with "refined analysis" -- it's already turned up enough parts that need to be redesigned and replaced in jets already built that the changes may add $3 million to $5 million to each plane's cost.
The price of the F-35, being built by Lockheed Martin Corp. in three variants, has averaged roughly $111 million under the most recent Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) Lot 4 contract.
So now the unit retrofit mod costs estimates are 50-70% lower than the previously "feared" $10M/unit costs that were 'estimated' only three months ago? Hey! That's 'Crack-ing' GOOD news! And since the LRIP contract costs to-date have BEAT predictions, that means that even with the retrofit costs, it looks like the the total unit costs are coming in at or near program predictions and are still nowhere near the widely circulated B.S. CAPE estimates.
But doesn't this 'Cracks of Doom' thing kind of' support the assertion that the F-35 is the (to quote a Sweetie*) "most incompetent and wasteful fighter program in history"? Umm - no.

*A member of the 'Sweetman' Tribe

Nor are the weaknesses surprising in the world of fighter jets, he added. The discoveries are "not a quote 'problem with the airplane,'" Venlet said. "It's a fighter made out of metal and composites. You always find some hot spots and cracks and you have to go make fixes. That's normal.
Gee. I wish I had known that. Oh yeah. I do. The article doesn't go into the 'why' this is so, but it is simple enough. For performance reasons you have to make the plane's structure as light as possible and it is always easier to put weight in where it is needed than take it out. Structural tweaks are usually a mix of both in the end, with the emphasis on adding structure for durability.
When Vice Adm Venlet is claimed to be calling for 'slowing down' F-35 production. In what "way" is it meant?
Venlet declined to say how much he thinks production should be slowed. Earlier plans called for the Pentagon to order 42 F-35s in fiscal 2011, but that was cut to 35 and more recently it was dropped to 30. Previous plans, which Venlet's comments and the unprecedented pressure to cut the defense budget make clear will change, had been to ramp up orders to 32 in fiscal 2012, 42 in fiscal 2013, 62 in fiscal 2014, 81 in fiscal 2015 and 108 in fiscal 2016 before jumping to more than 200 a year after fundamental fatigue and flight testing is done
.The Admiral is concerned about the steeper ramp up that exists as a result from Congress cutting the buys on the front end? Surprise! (Not.) (Think of trying to climb a flight of stairs where the first 5-6 steps have been lowered but the rest still lead to the top floor). This approach has risk advantages and it has risk disadvantages (as from time to time I've had to expand upon for the some of the more obtuse among us), and must say that I disagree with the idea from a 'risk' and 'total cost' POV. I disagree because I believe it is better to aim high and possibly fall a little short 'sooner' than to aim lower and only possibly hit your target 'later'. The reason being is that the near term risks are always better known than those that might transpire in the future. Vice Admiral Venlet knows this as well, so what would REALLY drive him to consider it?
This next bit is the most bothersome part for me.

Venlet also took aim at a fundamental assumption of the JSF business model: concurrency. The JSF program was originally structured with a high rate of concurrency -- building production model aircraft while finishing ground and flight testing -- that assumed less change than is proving necessary.
"Fundamentally, that was a miscalculation," Venlet said. "You'd like to take the keys to your shiny new jet and give it to the fleet with all the capability and all the service life they want. What we're doing is, we're taking the keys to the shiny new jet, giving it to the fleet and saying, 'Give me that jet back in the first year. I've got to go take it up to this depot for a couple of months and tear into it and put in some structural mods, because if I don't, we're not going to be able to fly it more than a couple, three, four, five years.' That's what concurrency is doing to us." But he added: "I have the duty to navigate this program through concurrency. I don't have the luxury to stand on the pulpit and criticize and say how much I dislike it and wish we didn't have it. My duty is to help us navigate through it."
I find it hard to accept this passage as written. The second paragraph containing the quote is harmless (though kind of emotional for a PEO of a major weapon system program) as it stands, but the first paragraph that prefaces it smells of willful misdirection. Most people would read the passage as Venlet is asserting 'concurrency' was a miscalculation. But more likely the passage should be read as estimates of the amount of change that would be needed as the program progressed was a miscalculation. Why do I believe this? Because 'concurrency' itself has been analyzed and studied to death (Though Congress uses it as an effective bogeyman). I'm certain Venlet wanted to deliver the first jets in final configurations, but certainly he has the training and background to be aware of the realities in the job. I wonder what, if anything, the author of the original article is leaving out?
The AOL article closer has the bottom line:

"The question for me is not: 'F-35 or not?'" Venlet said. "The question is, how many and how fast? I'm not questioning the ultimate inventory numbers, I'm questioning the pace that we ramp up production for us and the partners, and can we afford it?"
"Can we afford it?" Ah! There's the rub. It strikes me that from earlier in the article there's a kernel of what might be the 'real' cost problem.
"We negotiated the LRIP 4 contract with a certain amount of resources considered to pay for concurrent changes," Venlet said. "We were probably off on the low side by a factor of four. Maybe five. And we've discovered that in this calendar year, '11, and it's basically sucked the wind out of our lungs with the burden, the financial burden."

That is most interesting in the sense that the comment relates to what was 'budgeted' and not what was 'estimated'. Remember this chart? (It's in some of the linked material above as well.)

I suspect the budget shortfall has as much to do with how the costs have been amortized across fiscal years as it has to do with the fact that the contracts were negotiated for amounts less than even the JSF projected cost curve. Notice when this chart was made, the LRIP 4 jets were to cost approximately $128M in the end. Use the dollar figures provided in the AOL article: $110M plus $3-$5M for the retrofits. What is 'missing' from this equation? The LRIP 4 share of the weight reduction effort? [I cannot let an opportunity pass to also remind readers, once again, that even WITH all the "costs" being thrown about so carelessly, the totals to date STILL more closely track the lower internal program estimates than any other estimate and the B.S. CAPE estimates are still the outlier by far.]

This whole 'slow the ramp up' story IMHO is a narrative constructed to explain constraining the program more for reasons of immediate budgetary convenience than anything else. The program's successes this year may have brought about the need for the narrative.

"Cracks of Doom"? Heh. The 'beat' goes on......

AR Project: Lower Complete

2011-11-20T19:19:00.001-06:00

I got a great deal on a mil-spec UTG Pro 6-position collapsible stock, and buffer tube assembly. My initial thinking was that it would be "suitable" at least until I decided on one of the more 'robust' options, but when it arrived I found it of impressive quality (AND made in the USA). Right now, I think I'll keep it.

To install the stock, I needed an M4 stock wrench. Several phone calls later and after dropping by 'Cheaper than Dirt' (CTD) first, I found none available and all on 'backorder'. I was also looking for some spare piece parts, and those were unavailable at CTD at the moment as well. The catalog desk rep at CTD recommended I order the parts through Rock River Arms - and it was a good tip. I ordered the parts AND the wrench at what were the lowest prices that I'd seen (wrench was 6 bucks!) and the shipping via USPS was trivial. The magazine is a Magpul 5.56 20 Rd, picked up at the Carswell JRB BX gun shop (no sales tax).

Next Decisions:

1) 16" or 20" stainless steel bull barrel?

2) Buy or build the upper? Dollar wise, it's very close. May come down to what bells and whistles I 'need' vs 'want'

Poser Update: DT is aware of the problem

2011-11-20T18:51:00.001-06:00

A DT/Military.com rep has contacted me: they're doing what they can.
The person responsible for managing the 'back-end' of the Military.com blogs is aware of the troll who has posed as me and is making sue DT is doing what it can to contain the outbreak'. I don't want to mention details because that could be counterproductive.

I know they're only able to do so much and I know what their limitations are. I also understand that they can't provide me with the little troll's e-mail and IP address, but I still wish they could - as I have access to certain...ahem,,,'technical' capabilities that I wouldn't mind employing in a just cause.

The 'troll factor' was a minor contributor to my getting out of a side web-design business I had in the 90's [main reasons being 1) the unreasonableness of small business demands for the $: the smaller the business, the more unreasonable the demands, and 2) getting stiffed by the same small businesses].

Of Imposters and Living Life

2011-11-11T23:44:00.001-06:00

Well, yesterday an impostor using my handle trashed the Marine Corps at Defense Tech in the opening comment. I made a couple of comments in the last couple of days in different places but nothing about the Marine Corps Birthday. [An odd honor of sorts I suppose, having the trolls take a personal interest in you.]

So while the troll with no life is trying to smear my good name, I'm on vacation and was again out at my Brother's ranch yesterday and today (got back tonight). Last night, the 'local girls' were out early.

It was a cloudless, gorgeous evening last night (tonight we had high clouds).

Tonight, the two older doe were out so early that there was only a few feet of shadow on the oat field, and I had to move the two early birds off just to get to my stand. They came back later with three friends and moved down the field in front of me. I kept watching the top of the field and pretty soon (almost too dark) a nice buck came out. He scraped the ground and ran his antlers into some low branches and proceeded to move towards my position almost on a bee line.

He's that spot at the top of the field (sorry about the poor quality, but it was so dark I had the camera on 'aperature priority' and had to snap a quick one so I could have my rifle ready before he got too close.). He veered straight down the field towards the doe such that his line took him even to my position. As he approached, I decided he was the same pretty boy I saw last Saturday night pacing a doe in the same place, only tonight I could ID him as the non-typical 10-point (Eastern count) that has been showing up on my Brother's game cameras.

He looks like an 'eight' but he has nice little double brow tines. Nice buck, but next year (if he makes it) he might be a 'great' buck --his peak is yet to come. This guy worked his way down in front of me no more than thirty yards out. About the time he pulled even the wind from behind me picked up, and he caught some of my scent. He couldn't locate me, but he knew he didn't like me very much and after giving me a left view, a front view, and a right view, he decided to pull out fast - back to whence he came. It was a great show tonight. Thanks Brother B!

P.S. I'm looking for something more along the lines of a mature 'Hard Eight' or another mature buck that's showing up in the cameras. Meet Mr. Midnight:

DT, Winslow Wheeler and 'Manufacturing' Problems

2011-10-24T19:09:00.000-05:00

Defense Tech is 'moderating' a comment of mine I tried to post on this thread. The last time they did this my comment disappeared into the Ether. I suspect it is an administrative thing where they don't like a .com, or an acronym vs. malevolence (how petty would it be otherwise?), but no matter-- I saved a draft first. I tried to post:

Stop the presses! Winslow Wheeler has discovered that theentire logistics support package for the F-35B was not prepositioned on theWasp. Someone tell Winslow that the WASP is cruising about 80 miles from F-35Bhome base in Pax River and that this is NOT a supportability test. Then ask himexactly DoubleU Tee Eff is his point? Iwould also suggest the unattributed 'author' of this piece refer to earlierMil.com articles that note the 2 weeks was the shortest(!) expected period expectedfor this round of shipboard trials and that the WASP was booked for muchlonger. Are 'we' now beating up programs for accomplishing tasks slightlyslower than the fastest possible time?
And this is what I got:

Update at 2005 Hrs: My guess is is that ol' Winslow Wheeler just couldn't let positive news get out on the F-35 without a little caviling. This fey attempt at shaping the budget battlefield is pathetic in light of the real story:

Bloomberg: The F-35B short-take off and vertical landing version finished three weeks of tests on the Marine amphibious assault ship USS Wasp, achieving “all planned flight envelope test points,” Joseph DellaVedova, a spokesman for the Joint Strike Fighter program, said in an e-mail. “We’ve been pleased with the initial sea trials” and the aircraft “performed to predictions.”

Update 25October2011: Eventually my comment appeared at DT sometime today with the original time tag from last night.

AR Project: It Has Begun

2011-10-22T14:45:00.000-05:00

As I've noted elsewhere, I've never been a huge fan of the AR-15/M-16 family of rifles. Not because of the issues (largely mythical or self-inflicted) surrounding the AR, but because my experience was only with full-stocked M-16s on active duty. Aside from the fact that we qualified on some pretty worn-out armory queens every year, I never liked how the M-16 'fit' me. My attitude towards the ARs started changing some when a friend stuck behind the Moron Curtain in the People's Republic of Kalifornia let me try on his custom AR with an adjustable stock. Hey! - for once it didn't feel like I was holding a 2x4.
I couldn't rationalize buying/building one though just to have a .223, and I already have (almost) enough rifles in the larger calibers for hunting so I couldn't see shelling out the bucks for one.
Then the .300 Blackout round came to town. Suddenly, I could have a rifle to take to the range all year and shoot on the 'cheap' and just either swap out the barrel or more likely the 'upper' and take the same weapon hunting.
So today I went shopping for a 'lower' at the Ft Worth Gun Show. I had a goal to get a populated Mil-Spec 'lower' for under $200. I succeeded thanks to the folks at the SOG Armory table. I also got quite a few leads on the rest of the parts that I'll need as I go along.

No hurries and no worries on this build. I'm not looking to create the UberAR, just a useful one. Anyway, my deer rifle for this year is re-stocked, re-scoped, all 'snapped in' and Good to Go.

F-35B: an 'Audacious Display'

2011-10-18T19:49:00.000-05:00

Dave Majumdar with Defense News reports:
"In an audacious display of confidence, the U.S. Marine Corps and the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program office demonstrated short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) tests of the F-35B Lightning II to reporters onboard the amphibious assault ship Wasp on Oct. 18."

Sorry Ladies!
Audacious? I suppose in some people's minds. I'd say the opening of the article smokes the 'no news is bad news' angle I've read in the comments at other sites. The rest of the article pretty much debunks darned near every negative speculation I've heard or read about the plane on the 'major' websites and their peanut galleries. Oh! What shall we EVER fret over next?

Lucky

2011-10-16T22:25:00.000-05:00

Or: How I flew on C-130B 57-0526 to the very end and lived to tell the tale.

Going through the web looking for planes I flew on, tested, or supported-- and C-130B S/N 57-0526 at the Hill AFB Museum came up on the search engine.

   I have mixed feelings about this bird, which had a pretty unusual history-- even before my unit flew it. On the one hand, over the years it always got us home. On the other hand, I’m lucky it didn’t kill me and the rest of the crew in the end. I flew on the last test missions the bird ever flew, and then we flew it back to Hill AFB from Edwards AFB. After we brought it home it went into heavy depot maintenance. It never really came out, though it took a while for the powers that be to decide to pull it from service permanently.
   We took the plane to Eddy because we had done yet another modification to the plane and successful Performance and Flying Quality (P&FQ) testing was necessary before we would be allowed to use it under anything but the most benign flight conditions. I was Safety Observer and Flight Test Engineer in the 'backend'. My palletized crew station was positioned at the left paratroop door where I would have an unobstructed view of the ‘tufted’ shape we had hanging on an outer pylon, normally used to launch ‘stuff’. There was also a very large turret-shaped blister that was to be a camera fairing installed above and behind my station. My job was to run the backend test cards and observe and note the tuft behaviors as well as any unusual buffeting or other evidence of turbulent flows at all the different test points. I seem to remember two days of preparation and one very long flying day to hit all our test points. The reason we had to go to Eddy is that was where the Pacer aircraft were (A-37 on this mission). It was supposedly less hassle for us to go down to the Flight Test Center and coordinate use of the Pacers and crews than vice versa.
   The ‘downside of this arrangement was that our (the 6510th) Wing Commander required us to use a local (Eddy) Test Pilot instead of one of our own on the reasoning that the local pilot would be most familiar with the local airspace, The fact that our test pilots flew down to Edwards (our parent organization) nearly every week seemed to escape the logic of the Wing King. The day of the mission we flew innumerable "Tower Fly Bys" (No top Gun BS: just like this video only slower and tighter) at different airspeeds while cinetheodolites tracked us on the ground, then we moved to higher altitudes for the ‘fun’ stuff. At varying airspeeds we followed the test card that took us through (among other things) Max Q rudder kicks, and other maximum control deflections to test the effect of the stability of the aircraft with those new large and unusual shapes glommed on to the left side. I dutifully recorded my observations (which probably helped me from getting airsick) throughout the mission. The rest of the backend of the C-130 was empty, as the Loadmaster had the good sense to sit up on the flight deck during most of the gyrating. As my station was just in front of the ramp, I was getting wild rides left and right and up and down as the pilot intentionally tried to add in energy and make the deviations as wide as possible before releasing the controls and observe the natural damping effects of the design return the plane to a stable flight condition. So far, it was a pretty long and boring mission.
   We returned to base, and when we entered the pattern, I could see the B-2 (in those days it was deep in flight test) beginning to move out onto the taxiway from its South Base facilities. Our ‘local’ test pilot landed a little longer than he wanted to, but no problem right? Heck, Edwards has one of the longest paved runways in the world! Except this runway was only as long as the turnoff the local Golden Arm wanted to make, and he leaned on the brakes- Hard. I’m on headset of course, and all I hear in short succession is our Pilot calling our ‘Easy!’, then ‘Load!’ The Loadmaster immediately chimes back “I’m on it”. He swings down off the flight deck and checks the inside of each wheel well using his gloved hand pressing against each side. The Load looks at me shaking his head and tells the flight deck. “Yeah we've got hot brakes”.
   The pilot informs the tower and then we sit and wait right where we are lest a fire breaks out. We have to wait for enough time to pass to be safe enough for the Fire Crews who come up to clear us for a taxi in. The B-2 in the meantime, turns around and goes right back to South Base because its mucho-expensive range-time window will close before he will get there. We eventually taxi in and are ‘welcomed’ by our superiors with the question: “How in the hell does a C-130 get hot brakes on a 15000 foot runway?” The ‘local boy’ has to do the Mea Culpa.
   We blast out for home later (I think it was the next day), and the next week C-130B 57-0526 goes into the depot, conveniently for us right there at Hill (Depot was moved from Kelly to Hill during the early BRAC rounds). I don’t think the plane was even finished in the teardown during the next week when we get word that the plane will never fly again for fear that the entire tail will fall off. There was "massive" hidden corrosion all around the bulkhead immediately aft of the paratroop doors (where my crew station was and where the ramp attaches). They told us it is the most severe case that had ever been seen. And I got to spend the week before as part of a crew trying to make it come apart.
Lucky.

Occupy Fort Worth A Total Bust So Far

2011-10-14T23:30:00.000-05:00

Or: 'Dude! If you are bald or gray ditch the ponytail - you're creeping out the children!
First - I'm not going to dive into the cognitive dissonance required for people to blame 'Wall Street' over the housing bubble bust or the crap economy the last couple of years, yet do not Grok the link between the Crony Capitalists and the Socialist-Left Democratic Party--Whom they SHOULD be blaming for most of our problems (with a relatively minor role played by the Quislings of the irritatingly clueless Republican Establishment). I'm going to write a blurb here about the people involved in this 'Occupy' farce. A farce which I believe that when all is said and done, will be shown to have been blown all out of proportion, and someday someone will admit as having had the express purpose of furthering the Leftist subversion of America.

About 'Occupy Fort Worth'

So few people have showed up for this 'epic fail', the local newspaper was able to put a story up with pictures identifying by name what looked like a significant number of people (who weren't minors) who showed up. Article with photos here.

The cross-section was cliche. They had freshly-minted college grad 'filmmakers', angst-ridden musicians, full-bore vegans, retired 'teachers', and my favorite: Geriatric Hippies. I believe I've made it quite clear what I'm most looking forward to on the Hippie Question.

Geriatric Hippie 'Jack Smith' (If that is his real name)

(Crop of Star-Telegram/Rodger Mallison Photo. Find Original Here)

Outside enclaves of idiocy in Dallas, Houston, and most of Austin, Texas has an acute shortage of the type of people who have either the time or inclination to gather and bi*** about how unfair life is. This is true mainly because MOST people understand life IS unfair. From what I can tell of this so called 'movement' to date, it is largely populated by people who made life choices that didn't turn out as well as they thought they should have. Tough. There are some involved who ARE victims of fate, I'm sure - and creating a narrative to explain away misfortune is a human tendency and therefore understandable. Just don't expect the rest of us to buy into whatever story you built around your misfortune to cope with it. I'm more interested in being supportive of friends who are in dire straits and are working through the situation without giving up. My sympathy extends as far as your willingness to help yourself. Can't find a job where you live and there are jobs elsewhere? MOVE. Don't have the skills needed? Get them. I know people that are doing both and they're not wasting time at the park looking for handouts.

Same Old Scum Protest....UAVs?

2011-10-09T20:46:00.000-05:00

This time at the Smithsonian Air & Space Museum.

They're pretty much the same sh**head losers that pop up at all the anti-this-or-that "protests" organized in support of the far left and DNC (but I repeat myself) policies. This time, they got 'maced' trying to penetrate the confines of the museum with their 'protest' paraphernalia. Seems the museum has an exhibit about military unmanned air vehicles (UAVs), and the scum took offense. The museum had to close because some of it got inside, so I wonder how many tourists had their day or vacation ruined because of the petulant little sh**s? Way to build support there morons!

My biggest beef is with the press who 'somehow' fail yet again to mention one of the biggest drivers behind this foolishness: INTERNATIONAL A.N.S.W.E.R.

Who is A.N.S.W.E.R.? Per discoverthenetworks.org , they are/are about:

Anti-war front group for the Marxist-Leninist Workers World Party
A major organizer of the massive anti-Iraq war rallies of 2002 and 2003
Opposes embargo against Communist Cuba
Supports convicted cop-killer Mumia Abu-Jamal

...frickin' COMMIES fer crying out loud. How.... 'last century'.

If you jerk any of these 'groups' chains they all go back to the same small set of leftards, whackos, and losers. It is not as if these morons keep it a big secret from the press - all they'd have to do is read the freakin' signs!

But the mainstream media seems to try to downplay the angle to the American public, and you have to pick through the more obscure (read 'local') materials to find any photos showing those signs
(photo WJLA):

The two on the left want to 'feel' good about themselves and the two on the right just want to get laid. All four are 'tools', in more definitions than one.

You will still be hard pressed to find any references to the groups behind this idiocy in any actual texts of accompanying articles.

The one UAV on exhibit that the losers are probably most upset about is the direct descendant of a development program we (my unit) was involved with in the 1980's, Project Amber:

It was a brilliant design by Abe Karem ( I won't comment on the crowd he hired to build and integrate it.) and I'm proud to have played a very small role in it. The concept's strongest point was a phenomenal endurance that screamed 'surveillance missions'. I also will not comment as to how the follow on design was brought into the world by a privately held company that until that point had nothing to do with aircraft of any type.

One last shot (also from WJLA) of the Smithsonian yesterday. Visitors are leaving the building, having had their time at the museum ruined by the self-absorbed and hopelessly stupid 'activists.'

Dad: I don't know Son, I suppose it could have been human.

I've got a trip to DC coming up. Hope these A**hats have moved on to their next bath by then.

F-35B Performed First At-Sea Takeoff Today

2011-10-04T20:51:00.003-05:00

After slacking off all night. (Just kidding!)

Today,the aviation world is abuzz over the F-35 landing on the USS WASP yesterday. Solomon at SNAFU! had the first pics and video that I saw (link here and the above photo from same) later in the same day it happened.
Today, Av Week's ARES blog leads their story on the milestone with "NEW VIDEO UPDATE: F-35B Finally Lands on the Wasp!" .

Also today, Defense News reports the F-35 made the first STOVL takeoff. ~~No video of the event...yet.~~ 10/05 Update! Video here.--lots of takeoff and lamding angles.

But I wonder....will the ARES blog lead the story with "F-35B Finally Takes Off off the Wasp?" Depends on the editorial guidance (again?) I suppose.

Dead Terrorists & Stupid Politicians: Anwar al-Awlaki Edition

2011-10-01T14:30:00.000-05:00

Updated and Bumped!
News reports today have now added a third significant 'kill' to the list of 'al-Qaida' operatives:
One "Ibrahim al-Asiri"

"--Top bomb maker Ibrahim al-Asiri 'killed' in triple hit drone strike Anwar al-Awlaki killed by same unit that took out Osama bin Laden
--Al-Awlaki first American on 'kill or capture' list
--Linked to 9/11 hijackers and the Fort Hood shooter
-- Officials say al-Awlaki planned to use WMDs on the U.S.

Read more.

100% confirmation would be nice, but I'll take what we can get.

Original Post:
My wife was going across the TV dial looking for news with details about the good guys winning one and killing Anwar al-Awlaki (earlier video of the loser in action here). Lo and behold! Gary Johnson (s*) was just on Fox News (video) claiming this is the first time we have killed an ‘American Citizen’ instead of giving him ‘due process’. (*Sack of Sh**)

NOT in war, you Effing Idiot!

From the AP Report:

In a significant new blow to al-Qaida, U.S. airstrikes in Yemen on Friday killed Anwar al-Awlaki, an American militant cleric who became a prominent figure in the terror network's most dangerous branch, using his fluent English and Internet savvy to draw recruits for attacks in the United States…..

Blah Blah Blah….‘Civil liberties groups’ have questioned the government's authority to kill an American without trial. Blah Blah Blah….’

…The 40-year-old al-Awlaki was for years an influential mouthpiece for al-Qaida's ideology of holy war, and his English-language sermons urging attacks on the United States were widely circulated among militants in the West.But U.S. officials say he moved into a direct operational role in organizing such attacks as he hid alongside al-Qaida militants in the rugged mountains of Yemen. Most notably, they believe he was involved in recruiting and preparing a young Nigerian who on Christmas Day 2009 tried to blow up a U.S. airliner heading to Detroit, failing only because he botched the detonation of explosives sewn into his underpants.

Yemen's Defense Ministry said another American militant was killed in the same strike alongside al-Awlaki — Samir Khan, a U.S. citizen of Pakistani heritage who produced "Inspire," an English-language al-Qaida Web magazine that spread the word on ways to carry out attacks inside the United States. U.S. officials said they believed Khan was in the convoy carrying al-Awlaki that was struck but that they were still trying to confirm his death. U.S. and Yemeni officials said two other militants were also killed in the strike but did not immediately identify them.

Washington has called al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, as the branch in Yemen is called, the most direct threat to the United States after it plotted that attack and a foiled attempt to mail explosives to synagogues in Chicago.

Good. A traitor who was a key enemy operator and recruiter gets his due on the global battlefield and we get a traitor enemy propagandist as a bonus. Hey! That’s like a ‘50% off all Terrorists’ sale!Yea!
Go Modernity! Boo Dark Ages!

Johnson is one of those ‘Republicans’ who are more correctly described as ‘Business -Friendly libertarians’. Think ‘Ron Paul’… only more self absorbed and insufferable.

Graphic based on October 2008 AP File Photo/Muhammad ud-Deen)

F-35 to Begin Sea Trials Next Week

2011-09-29T20:50:00.000-05:00

Defense News Reports:
"They start on 3rd October, and should last only two weeks," said Lt. Gen. Terry Robling, the Marine's deputy commandant for aviation. "But we have the USS Wasp for six weeks in case there are some anomalies."

Looking forward to the reports, videos and pics.

(Photoshop/Artist Concept)

Centennial of Naval Aviation #2

2011-09-29T19:56:00.000-05:00

Historic U.S. Navy PN-9 Seaplane, Circa 1925
Bumped: Find a new comment from a Grandson of the designer.

Here are some crops of another never-before-seen (or published) photograph that are presented in honor of the Centennial of Naval Aviation (Copyright Mine 2011)

The photo was taken by my Grandfather in 1925 in Hawaii while in port with his ship, the USS Langley. It had the simple caption “Navy Seaplane PN-9” in his Langley ‘Memories’ album. Note the evidence of repair on the upper wing

The ‘tail’ number was clearly visible, so I performed a quick search on the internet, and was surprised to find it was quite a famous AND one-of-a-kind seaplane.

BuNo A6878

From a 'Navy.mil' PDF file (p 681) :

The last PN-8 was converted by the Naval Aircraft Factory to the PN-9, a one-of-a-kind aircraft. It had redesigned tail surfaces and revised engine nacelles with large nose radiators. This aircraft set a world distance record for seaplanes in September 1925 when it flew from San Francisco to Hawaii under the command of Commander John Rogers. While it had to sail the last 559 miles after running out of fuel, the 1,841 miles covered by air was recognized as a new world seaplane distance record.

Crew: 4
Range: 2,550 miles
Power Plant: Two geared 475 hp Packard 1A-2500
Weight:
Empty - 8,995 lbs
Gross - 18,125 lbs
Dimensions:
Wing area - 1,217 sq ft
Wing span - 72 ft 10 in
Length - 49 ft 2 in
Height - 16 ft 6 in
BuNo: PN-9 A6878

From a photo taken after the aircraft had been towed into port, we can tell that my Granddad’s photo was obviously taken after many repairs have already been made. This is what the plane looked like when it reached Hawaii:

Rodgers' PN-9 After Ordeal, Source: State of Hawaii

The crew had been given up as lost after an extensive search. Rodgers and the rest of the PN-9 crew were able to monitor the radio without being able to transmit their location the entire time. They listened in as the searchers first coordinated their efforts and then decided to call off the search. They were ‘frustrated’ to say the least as they listened as the search unfolded. The Langley and the crew were part of the search effort. When Rodgers and his crew overheard that it was the opinion of the Langley’s aviators that the PN-9 and crew were ‘lost’… I imagine that made Rodgers and crew a little bit ‘more’ than just frustrated.

Rodgers’ navigation skills and the ability to ‘sail’ the seaplane using the fabric removed from the lower wings as sails brought them within a few miles of landfall when they were finally seen by a US submarine. They were towed past treacherous shoals and received a hero’s welcome both in Hawaii and eventually back on the mainland.

This same plane was apparently used to make another long distance flight attempt, and again forced to set down in the water (Caribbean) with its crew adrift. Again, it was found and the crew rescued but this time, it was seen as too risky to tow to safety and was sunk in place as a hazard to navigation. An unlucky, yet weirdly lucky bird if there ever was one.

Further Reading:

A 1925 ‘Flight’ article here.

Much more about the flight and the crew’s epic journey here, including many photographs and links to news articles of the day.

DDG-1000: US Surface Stealth News

2011-09-26T19:34:00.000-05:00

I was wondering why there hadn't been any actual DDG-1000 "Zumwalt" photos on the web even though there were discussions about how much of it was complete. I should have known they were doing the bulk of the buildup indoors, since they are using the modular construction approach not unlike carriers (too big to do all inside) and submarines (that are built up under shelter).
Defense News has the words and a photo.

Photo: GD/Bath Ironworks

So Far... So Good

The message is almost TOO positive:

"We're on time, we're on budget. We're within budget," Capt. James Downey declared during an interview earlier this month. "We're hitting the milestones within the program."

The Zumwalt's astounding completion level of 60 percent at keel-laying - once one of the earliest moments in a ship's construction - is a byproduct of the modern, modular building methods, Downey said.

"The ship is built in modules," he explained, including ever-larger elements known as ultra units. "When the first ultra unit is complete, that's when keel-laying is."

The forward midbody module, which includes the guns, weighs more than 4,000 tons - larger than a littoral combat ship, Downey said. The modules feature a high degree of outfitting, including smaller details like wiring, pipes, and control consoles to main and auxiliary propulsion engines and missile launchers.

As the ultra units are joined together, the Zumwalt will rapidly take on more of its ultimate shape. The composite deck structure, weighing more than 1,000 tons and now more than 75 percent complete, is expected to be barged from Mississippi to Maine in late spring, and the Zumwalt is scheduled to be launched in July 2013. Initial delivery is set for 2014, with completion of the combat system to follow in 2015.

Getting all the systems in all the modules to work well with each other will be the hard part, but they've done a lot of advance work already:

A DDG 1000 power plant at the Navy's Land-Based Test Site in Philadelphia conducted a successful, full-scale power test in May.
"We tested the complete propulsion system in local control," Downey said. "It pretty much passed with flying colors," although some test equipment needed upgrading. "We made no changes to any of our [ship] equipment."
The advanced induction motor (AIM) - heart of the integrated power system - "has performed very well," Downey said. "It met all the requirements at land-based testing. It exceeded the requirements."
Officers and crew of the DDG 1000 have already been reporting for duty, Downey said, with several members spending time this summer underway on British Type 45 destroyers, which also use AIM engines.
"We're learning what to expect out of the system," Downey said. "It's good for them to see a working system out at sea."
Tests of BAE's 155mm advanced gun system and its associated long-range land-attack projectile also have progressed "very well," Downey said. Two successful live-fire tests were held Aug. 30 at White Sands Missile Range, N.M., against live targets, which were hit at a range of 45 nautical miles. The round, he said, is hitting targets within "40-ish inches" of where it's aimed, against a requirement of 20-30 meters.

Sounds promising. May the program realize every advantage and avoid every pitfall. Maybe we can get the Luddites that capped the program at three units to reverse the decision.

UAV as Satellite Backup

2011-09-26T18:51:00.000-05:00

Without passing any judgement on the technical approach, the idea of having an unmanned high flyer communications network in case our space assets are neutralized is a good one for two reasons:
1. The obvious one: We'd have a backup.
2. The less obvious one: It lowers the military utility, and therefor the likelihood of someone bothering to neutralize the space assets in the first place,

Inside the Pentagon: JSF Faces Potential $3 Billion Bill To Reconfigure Early Production Aircraft

2011-09-23T23:47:00.000-05:00

...and it is NOT as big a deal as you might think, and is certainly less than the JSF-Haters fantasize.

50th F-35 Center Fuselage Delivery Ceremony

20 July 2011 (Northrop Grumman Photo)

'Inside the Pentagon' reports on 'outside' estimates to bring LRIP F-35's to Production Baseline Standard (link Subscription Required-- sorry). The 'Teaser' at link contains the bottom line:

DefenseAlert - 09/16/2011 The Defense Department is facing a potential $3 billion bill to modify early production Joint Strike Fighter aircraft to final configuration, roughly an additional $10 million for each fighter jet that is not accounted for by Pentagon unit-cost estimates, according to the Senate Appropriations Committee.

This is the same Committee using 'Concurrency' as a red herring to recommend holding back the F-35 production ramp up discussed here. In fact, this 'story' is part and parcel with the 'concurrency' angle. Other tidbits:

...The Senate panel, in a report accompanying its mark of the Pentagon's fiscal year 2012 spending bill, estimates this cost by comparing the Air Force's experience developing the F-22 with the F-35.

..."Based on F-22 experience, a common configuration modification for the Joint Strike Fighter program would cost approximately $10 million per aircraft resulting in a $1.67 billion to $2.29 billion modification program," the Senate panel's report states

...These costs are in addition to the $771.2 million in additional costs -- disclosed this summer by the Pentagon -- to reconfigure the first three F-35 production lots. Combined, the Senate panel estimates the total retrofit bill could reach $3 billion.

So, before the 'Oracles of Doom!' (Mainstream Aero Blogs and Boards) get a hold of this story and blow it into another 'F-35 Nightmare' fable, let's consider what these costs "mean" within context of the estimates and the actual costs of aircraft delivered to-date:

Remember this chart from a Canadian briefing? (I first used it here in discussing the earlier $771M cost upper for weight reduction)

Look at the LRIP 3 Contract Settlement and the LRIP 4 Contract values on the chart. What is the first thing you notice? That's right, adding the $10m+ costs to retrofit the LRIP 3 & 4 aircraft will bring the total production costs in line with the LOWEST cost estimate curve plus or minus a small percentage.

Any bets at least one mush head out there on the defense boards will add the "new mod costs" to the highest estimate cost curve line to make even more outrageous cost claims? What are the chances that the Congressional estimates for the mods are high in the first place, given the crude F-22 parallels used?

And remember the earlier $771M was to cover the weight reduction effort. A Total Ownership Cost perspective was taken in discussing that change.

Was Lockheed Martin 'lucky' or 'good' in bringing the costs in so low on initial production that they can essentially include the mod program and still keep close to the lowest cost curve?

Deliver Us from Beancounters: Learning Curve Edition

2011-09-22T23:08:00.000-05:00

Learning Curves and Production Breaks
Dancin' with 'Engineering_Economist' a.k.a. to me as 'EngeCon' again at Defense Tech, and again the DT comment limits prevent material responses (by design I'm sure - which is understandable on a couple of levels) to outrageous posts so here we are again.

This thread is related to my last post, so I don't mind expanding on the point here at all.

(Note: Ignore the Ad Hominem parts of the comments I repeat here, they are only included because I didn't want to be accused of selective editing)

At the DT thread below a post about the Senate Appropriations Committee recommending a two year extension on the current F-35 LRIP production rates, I made the comment:

No doubt in the future, if it is found that the costs of running a fighter factory in first gear for two more years exceeds the total lifecycle cost (or APUC for that matter) impacts that would have been incurred if the conventional alternative (of proceeding with increasing production rates and retrofitting fielded early aircraft) had been followed, that the good Senator (D-Hi) will be the first to admit the strategy was wrong and that he and the other Senators will be the ones to blame for the cost increases. I know that on the other hand, if such a delay does actually save total costs (vs, just playing a convenient ricebowl to plunder for the short term) and has no negative impact on the same costsI will be happy to publically proclaim I was 'wrong'

I won't bother with the preliminary back and forth and the early Ad Hominem but the thread rapidly got to EngeCon posting:

that wasn't even an ad homenim. i asked a question and expressed an opinion. once again the communication process has broken down. also according to learning curve theory it doesn't matter if the lot quantity increases, as long as there is not a production break. so no matter how much you misapply learning theory, you can't blame this on the Senate. the learning effects will not be achieved for a variety of other reasons, such as the unstable production configuration and inevitable obsolescence. there are probably some great introduction to logic and proof classes at your local community college which might give you an appreciation for axioms of math, science, and engineering. i'm sure if we keep repeating the educational process with you, sooner or later something may stick.

The only thing worth noting in this comment was the part about 'Production Break' and 'Learning Curve'. This was funny: A guy trying to 'count coup' while demonstrating a lack of in depth knowledge of the point he was trying to use to refute my argument. I followed with:

Re: Fallacious Ad Hominem – I take the general and to-date unsupported “your obfuscated, hubristic, and biased views” as a personal (not to mention unsupported to the point of nonsensical) attack.
Re: ‘Production Break’ observation. Interesting, but your offhand dismissive use of the term indicates you probably have no idea that a ‘Production Break’(as the term relates to Learning Curves) does not have to be temporal or complete. In fact, your answer reeks of a ‘numerical’ and not ‘operational’ awareness of ‘Learning Curve’ [ I would note that it comes over as arrogance in your own ignorance, but that would mean bringing up “Hybris” again and I’ve noted how that seems to have rankled you some. So I won’t mention it. ] Now go back and try to conceptualize how many of the five categories of ‘Production Breaks’ as identified within the Anderlohr Method are relevant to an operation on the scale of the F-35 and the planned expansion to the manufacturing effort (scope) and speed (production rates). Hint: All of them are relevant.
Re the rest of your poor scratchings: Infantile projection

I don't know why, but I expected EngeCon to at least do a little research on the "Anderlohr Method" before he came back, but nooooooooo:

what is your reference for definition of the term 'production break'? then show how what has happened in the past or in the future indicates that a production break has or will occurr. Congress is not at fault for any production breaks. i understand the frustration in the Appropriations process, but in the F-35's case, Congress has faithfully appropriated billions of dollars into this caper per year, and the program should still be expending dollars that were obligated in past years. the whole experience is ANOTHER lesson in how foolish the concurrency approach is. you need to prove you are ready for production, via a MS C decision, before starting LRIP. what's the status of that DAB to rebaseline the program??

Aside from the obvious fact that EngeCon hasn't gotten the latest word on Concurrency yet, and aside from attempting to shift the discussion back to the Milestone BS meme he so desperately clings to at the end...there's not much here. I obliged him with a reference, and would have posted at DT all of what I'm about to post here, except it would have had to be broken into about 6-7 unconnected comments, subject to cherry picking. In 'replay' what I wrote at DT was:

Have you noticed that you often begin with challenging an assertion by asking for ‘support’, then attempt to preemptively refute (poison the well) any support provided in response? And before you have ANY idea what the response will be? Interesting. I assumed you would have just Googled up the ‘Anderlohr Method’. From the second or third hit on my computer: https://acc.dau.mil/adl/en-US/30391/file/5384/Learning%20Curve%20Workshop%20Production%20Breaks.pdf

RE: MSC/DAB & other formalities. I'll refer readers to our earlier dance :http://elementsofpower.blogspot.com/2011/07/deliver-us-from-bean-counters.html

What I WANTED to post in addition to the link was the actual categories of "Production Breaks":

My comments in brackets []; feel free to cavil away.

George Anderlohr…. divided all learning lost, by anorganization, due to a break in production, into five categories:

"1. Personnel Learning: In this area , the physical loss of personnel, either through regular movement or layoff, must be determined. The company's personnel records can usually furnish evidence on which to establish this learning loss. The percentage of learning lost by the personnel retained on other plant projects must also be ascertained. These people will lose their physical dexterity and familiarity with the product and the momentum of repetition." [From my next door neighbor who works on the F-35 production line, I know that LM is (again) already shuffling key people around into less desirable (read: dirty or at night) work because the production ramp-up is being delayed (again). They are trying to retain the experience and skills of as many less-senior but more ‘F-35 experienced’ line workers as they can--in anticipation of possible layoffs which, given it is a unionized workforce, would otherwise be ‘out the door’ as the more senior ‘protected’ mechanics and electricians are retained.]

"2. Supervisory Learning: Once again, a percentage of supervisory personnel will be lost as a result of regular movement. Management will make a greater effort to retain this higher caliber personnel, so the physical loss, in the majority of cases, will be far less than in the area of production personnel. However the supervisory personnel retained will lose the overall familiarity with the job so that the guidance they can furnish will be reduced. In addition, because of the loss of production personnel, the supervisor will have no knowledge, so necessary in effective supervision, of the new hires and their individual personalities and capabilities. [We should suspect this will particularly affect those people who were involved in planning the ramp up of production itself, some of whom will start the replan, and others who will now go fight other fires]

"3. Continuity of Productivity: This relates to the physicalpositioning of the production line, the relationship of one work station toanother, and the location of lighting, bins, parts, and tools within the workstation. It also includes position adjustment to optimize the individual needs.In addition, a major factor affecting this area is the balance line or the workin process build-up. Of all the elements of learning, the greatest initial lossis suffered in this area." [How much additional production infrastructure had LMand (hundreds of?) suppliers already put into place to support the coming rampup and will now have to work around it or set it aside? How much will have to change (do over) if theprofile of the ‘ramp up’ has to change (steeper or slower – still a change)?How much more expensive will it be to work through the ramp up in later years,for all the categories and for all the suppliers?]

"4. Methods: This area is least affected by a productionbreak. As long as method sheets [now computerized work instructions- see below]are kept on file, learning can never be completely lost. However, drasticrevisions to the method sheets may be required as a result of a change fromsoft to hard tooling." [ not just ‘soft’ to ‘hard’ tooling – any tooling changedriven by scale. BTW I disagree with this being ‘least affected’. The effect isdependent upon the availability of people who understood the intent of theinstructions when they were written.]

"5. Special Tooling: New and better tooling is a major contributor to learning. In relating loss in the tooling area, the major factors are wear, physical misplacement and breakage. An additional consideration must be the comparison of the short run or so called soft tooling to long run or hard tooling and the effect of the transition from soft to hard tooling." [Unlike relatively simple manufacturing products, like a microchip or even some F-35 subsystem components, scaling up the tooling for high rate production involves more than just cloning a production line or station. Scaling up the F-35 production will involve reconfiguring and rearranging new tooling. I believe the process of transitioning to full rate tooling has already started with LM subs (remember reading about it in the last year someplace). Will they have to change their processes again to efficiently use the tooling at the lower rate?]

'The definitions presented by Anderlohr have been modifiedand expanded, since 1969, to accommodate today’s manufacturing environment. Forexample, some of today’s modern factories operate in a “paperless environment”where method sheets are no longer used. However, these factories normallyproduce all of their shop instructions on computer files, these computer filessometimes have the same “ability” to get lost as their paper counterparts. Thereforethe Methods portion of learning may deal with these computer files (i.e. lostfiles, changes to files due to new equipment, etc.)."

Thus it is shown that when the term 'Production Breaks' is used in reference to 'Learning Curves' within the "Anderlohr Method" (the most widely used application in aerospace as far as I know) it does not just mean cessasion and restart of activity, but applies to any disruption in the current production system that renders prior knowledge ineffective of less effective for future application. As
1. the current F-35 production system had a plan and was executing to that plan, and
2. must now change their execution to meet the next plan's objectives, and
3. that the people and equipment they were putting in place must now change,
new learning will have to begin again or be refreshed.
As the learning curve will now be applied/achieved in later years, the curve can be expected to cost more 'then' than 'now'. If the production rate ramp up under the delayed plan is different from the previous plan, that too will require new knowledge and understanding of the impacts and used to develop the new plan.

Like I said: Cavil away!

Congressional Bloviation On The 'Concurrency Bogeyman'

2011-09-19T23:30:00.000-05:00

There's no 'There' there...
I was initially going to post on this when it wasfirst announced, then I decided to just let this latest F-35 development liewhere I thought it belonged (in the ‘Political Doublespeak ‘roundfile’) becausethe major blogs and newsoutlets weren’t giving it much play. I moved on to other interests, but shouldhave anticipated that the more inflammatory of the pundit perches were merelysaving up for a weekend rabble-rouser squawking. Defense Tech, in an unattributedpiece started the red-meat varmint call early last Friday. The post itself was onthe whole quite innocuous -if incomplete - but it was the rhetorical “we’ll seewhat happens next” at the end that calls out to the innumerate and the ignorantalong with the casual observers to proffer uninformed opinions en masse. Thiswould be, of course, perfectly acceptable as long as they are offered AS opinions. The problem with much of the DT/Military.Com crowd these days is thattoo often opinions and personal preferences offered are masquerading asabsolute statements of fact without any specific evidence of same. Heck, we’relucky if they even bother with a fallacious argument, and when they do, if one pointsout the argument is fallacious it will result in fallacious ad hominem thrownback reflexively. ( I'll check out the responses to my comment at DT after I get this up, but as I have noted before, JSF 'haters' are woefully short oflogicians (link).

The WHOLE story and nothing but....
To quote the actual (and corrected) statement (link here)

"We recommend a $695 million reduction to the Joint Strike Fighter program. We continue to stronglysupport this program and believe that the F-35 is showing progress since it wasrestructured last year. However, excessive concurrency in development andproduction still exists. The test program is only 10 percent complete, yet therequest continues to ramp up production of aircraft in fiscal years 2012 and2013. We recommend maintaining production at the fiscal year 2011 levels fortwo more years in order to limit out year cost growth. For each aircraft webuild this early in the test program, we will have to pay many millions in thefuture to fix the problems that are identified in testing.

Instead of employing a teaser ‘let’s see whathappens next’ approach, how about we ask ourselves ‘What might this (Senatedecision and rationale offered) really mean?”

I. Decomposingthe Appropriations Committees’ Recommendations
Note: Readers may skip this section and proceeddirectly to Part II if they desire, and revisit this section if they havequestions as to my summary of the Committee’s core argument. In fact, unless you are predisposed for classical rhetoric, I STRONGLY recommend it.

We can accept the statement at face value or assumethere is deviousness and deception involved. Being a ‘Theory Y’ kind of guy, I would normally tend to look at a statementand first take it that Senator Inoue and the Committee really mean what isstated. But are their assumptions andreasons given correct? Can we assess their logic and find it sound?

The Explicit…

First, let’s summarize what it is explicitly stated:

1. The Appropriations Committee recommends a $650Mreduction to the JSF program budget.
2. The Appropriations Committee asserts that theF-35 program concurrency is “excessive”.
3. The Appropriations Committee continues “tostrongly support” the Joint Strike Fighter program.
4. The Appropriations Committee believes the programhas shown “strong progress” since last year.
5. The Appropriations Committee recommendsmaintaining the current production level at 35 aircraft per year for two moreyears (2012 & 2013) for the express purpose of “limiting out year costgrowth”.
6. The Appropriations Committee asserts that eachaircraft built “this early” in testing will require “many millions in thefuture to fix the problems that are identified in testing”

…and The Tacit

The above is rather straightforward, and normallynot worth reiterating. I only took the trouble of identifying these explicitstatements to help differentiate between what is expressed -- and what is‘presumed’ or ‘implied’. What presumptionsand implications should we feel confident in deducing from the explicitstatements? I assert that until contrary information is available, thefollowing may also be seen as contained within the Committee’s statement.

I assert thatwe can safely deduce, given the totality of the Committee’s statement, that:

A. All or the significant portion of the budget reduction is coming out of the proposed production budgets for 2012 and 2013. We should note here that the 2013 reduction could be reversed (or increased) next year, but that probably would not have a significant effect on the actual production because the dollars taken out now for 2013 will affect long-lead procurement items and you cannot accelerate their acquisition by simply turning on the ‘money tap’ again.
B. The Committee believes that this delay in ramping up production will reduce “excessive” program concurrency.
C. The Committee believes that reducing program concurrency will save the program “millions of dollars”.

We can further deduce from the above that IF the Committee believes it makes economic sense to delay production, they must believe the savings from not having to retrofit the aircraft somehow exceeds the cost of maintaining the inefficient utilization of manufacturing resources for two years, and increased costs of production in the out years. This must include the adverse impacts onhundreds if not thousands of suppliers, large and small. Of course, if some of those suppliers are having difficulty meeting engineering and/or production schedules (typically a small minority in any program) they will benefit from such a delay (and there are simpler and more certain remedies for such problems other than slipping the entire program).

II. The Senate Appropriations Committee’s Central Argument

Thus we see from all of the above that the Senate Appropriations Committee’s expressed rationale for cutting the F-35 budget rests solely on the following argument:

“High-concurrency programs involve having to ‘fix’ early production articles and the costs incurred in these programs can be minimized (i.e. monetary savings will be realized) by stretching out the production to make the program less concurrent.”

To evaluate this claim, I em>WAS going to proceed with a scholarly investigation of literature dissecting the pros and cons of program concurrency, its relationship to cost overruns and schedule delays. I assumed getting to the bottom of the story would be complicated.
It is not.
It is simple.
In spite of well over two decades of fear-mongering by detractors, 'Concurrency' in and of itself has been shown to be nothing to fear - only managed.

All you need to know to judge whether or not theSenate Appropriations Committee action made sense is found in the following few documents. You can look at others, but you wont find much difference among the earlier work and the last reference is the latest and most complete research on the topic.

ConcurrentWeapons Development and Production, CBO, August 1988 (link)

In this study, the CBO went looking for the adverse effectsof ‘concurrency’ and came away ….somewhat contrite (emphases mine):

This study examined concurrency, cost growth, and schedule data for 14 major weapons systems that were developed during the 1970s and have been subsequently produced and deployed. The systems include a variety of types of weapons from each of the military services, and all of them have been reviewed by the Defense Systems AcquisitionReview Council (DSARC). The analysis showed that no strong relationship exists between concurrency and schedule delay (see Summary Table). A statistical regression analysis found that only a couple of percentage points of the variation in schedule delays are explained by concurrency. A modestly stronger relationship exists between concurrency and cost growth: approximately 14 percent of the variance in cost growth is explained by concurrency. (Page vii-iix)

The report noted all the changes that have occurred in years leading up to the report that reduce concurrency and its ‘effects’ –tenuous linkages or no – but that didn’t stop the authors from suggesting MORE limitations for Congress if they so desire:

Given the ambivalent statistical evidence concerning the effects of concurrency on costs and schedules, and the fact that current laws and regulations limit its use, the Congress may wish to take no further action regarding concurrent programs as a group. On the other hand, in view of recent problems with certain programs, the Congress may wishto have more information on high-priority programs that are employing concurrency (Page xi).

BTW: No data or detailed discussion of methodology was included in the report so it would be hard to really get your teeth in the study to judge its completeness and efficacy.
Then we get to Congressional testimony in May 1999 by Frank C. Conahan, Assistant Comptroller General, National Security and International Affairs Division of the GAO (link here):
Within, Mr, Conahan insists problems with 5 of 6 then-‘highly concurrent’ programs were related to concurrency (without any supporting rationale as to why concurrency is a problem) and took a swipe at the then-emerging DDG-51 program. His ardor was as palpable as his data was invisible. It drips with the fear that somebody must be doing something wrong someplace therefore the standard GAO response of 'more oversight' gets an entire section.

But there simply MUST be something to this concurrency thing, right? Well people kept looking. A team of analysts from CNA reportedin the Defense ATL magazine (link) late last year:

Our results (located at [link fixed by me], based on examining 28 programs across all Services, are very similar to those of the Congressional Budget Office and RAND [example] studies with one surprising exception: While from a purely statistical point of view we found that the relationship between both planned and actual concurrency and cost growth was very weak, in both cases, there seems to be a “sweet spot” of about 30 percent concurrency. That is, programs that plan on spending 30 percent of RDT&E funds while concurrently spending procurement funds actually experience the lowest average cost growth. Similarly, those programs that actually do spend about 30 percent of RDT&E funds while concurrently spending procurement dollars, even when not originally planned, also experience lower cost growth. Furthermore, programs with planned or actual levels of concurrency below 30 percent experienced higher cost growth than those with higher levels of concurrency. In other words, lower levels of planned or actual concurrency were actually worse than higher levels of concurrency. This is the complete opposite of what many in the acquisition community believe. We speculate that lower levels of concurrency may expose the program to higher levels of external changes.

At the end of the AT&L article, the authors DonaldBirchler, Gary Christle, and Eric Groo close with the following:

What to Do About Concurrency?
So far, no conclusiveevidence exists that concurrency (no matter how it is defined) is generally aproblem. This does not mean that concurrency is never a problem. But most likely,concurrency leads to cost and schedule growth under very particularcircumstances. What these circumstances are is not very clear just yet. Nor isit clear why in our study, the sweet spot for concurrency is somewhere aroundthe 30 percent mark. What is clear is that there are definite advantages toconcurrently designing and building a weapons system that most program managerstake advantage of, to some extent or another.
The [1988] CongressionalBudget Office study advised that “Congress may wish to take no further actionregarding concurrent programs as a group,” given the very weak relationship betweenthe concurrency and cost growth. Instead, the office argued that Congressshould simply ask that DoD develop a consistent measure for concurrency to bepublished in a program’s acquisition report and then monitor programs to seehow they are performing relative to their planned level of concurrency. Morethan 20 years later, this advice still seems to be appropriate.

Alas, I fear the CNA team’s sensible findings and advicewill go unheeded – as long as the “Concurrency’ Bogeyman serves as a usefultool in the quiver of bloviating politicians.

Senators! – this time I’m talkingto you!

Centennial of Naval Aviation #4

2011-09-17T12:39:00.000-05:00

1920s Naval Parachute Demonstration

Here's some views (click on all to enlarge) of an interesting photo of a parachute jump circa 1925/26 over Naval Air Station North Island in San Diego. The photo, like those posted earlier, comes from my Grandfather's USS Langley Memories book, but I'm sure he acquired vs. actually taking the photo. It seems to have been quite popular among the fleet to swap ships photos, and I would assume this photo may have been taken from a squadron plane that would be assigned to North Island or the Langley. The caption only read 'Parachute jump San Diego', but confirming it was North Island was easy: see the Wikipedia photo of North Island (ostensibly in 1925) with the USS Langley tied up in the background as a bonus.

Closer examination of the photo shows the parachutist isn't so much as heading towards the base as he is probably just swinging widely in a pendulum back-and-forth:

Even closer examination illustrates that this early parachute rig is either still 'un-twisting' at the risers or that this early rig provided absolutely no control to the wearer. If the latter is true, the jumper was completely at the mercy of fate after the ripcord was pulled. (Too bad about the scratch in the original.)

Here's a scan of the full photo as it sits in my Grandfather's album with no Photoshop (other than sizing):

DefenseTech Challenge Thread

2011-09-13T21:00:00.000-05:00

Updated and Bumped!
(warning: what follows will be dry as dust unless you enjoy logic and tautology.)

I had a somewhat whimsical response to my challenge from a ‘JoeC’:

It's bad management because it's not on time or on budget and, so far, it doesn't work! I'm not sure what else you need in order to be convinced.

Of which, given the ground rules were clearly stated, prompted my reply:

Invalid Claim! [;-) (and you provide no definition of, much less evidence supporting 'doesn't work')

Then Joe C. responded with:

"Doesn't work" meaning it was banned from flying until recently. That fits my definition of "doesn't work"! :)

I work in software, so I'm well aware of how people tend to underestimate the time it takes to get things done. We're all very optimistic creatures at heart, I guess. I think some of that is what's going on in the F-35 program. It's also a result, as I've said before, of our Pentagon always wanting the newest, shiniest, most advanced toy instead of being satisfied with an incremental upgrade.

Since under the conditions I laid down in the challenge were not met, I could have just let Joe C’s wistful comment (including the outrageous unsupported claim concerning 'shiniest' jab) lay where it was, but I sensed this person was new to the discussion (i.e. probably not even a past lurker) and seemed somewhat naïve on the subjects of advanced technology and acquisition thereof. So I gave him some prompting so he would possibly go try to disprove, discover, or perhaps reply with more detailed questions, with a little hint as to the difference between aerospace and ‘other’ software development (my typos corrected):

Do you know what TRLs are? I ask because buying a weapon system isn't like buying a commercial product. EVERY weapon system sufficiently advanced to be worth developing and fielding with an expected operational life of 20-30-40 years requires the same effort and hits pretty much the same kinds of hurdles (depending on technologies involved). The F-35 program is actually doing better than a lot of its 'successful' predecessors, especially since it is really delivering 3 weapon systems in one. The only difference here is F-35 brand sausage is being made under a spotlight and rice bowls are threatened. The decision to first launch and then develop a new weapon system has been most definitely "requirements-pull" since the end of the Cold War so if an 'incremental' advancement was all that was needed, that is all that is pursued. Biggest problem with the incremental over existing is that on the modern battlefield, if you aren't low observable and connected, you are dead. As to 'software development' if we developed software like the commercial sector, we'd only need half the airbases - because most planes would just make smoking holes enroute to the next base. Kind’a hard on the Beta testers.

Thus I’d call the response to my challenge to this point ‘tepid’ at best. But shortly thereafter it got somewhat more interesting. A commenter after my reply, one ‘halcyon_ 33p’, decides to add two comments [I assume the DT space limitations probably drove the breaking of ‘one’ into ’two’ ]

SMSgt Mac,

So are you stating that because the F-35 is doing better than a lot of it's 'successful' predecessors there is no problem here? I notice you put successful in quotes as if you don't believe these unnamed predecessors were successful. If they weren't successful than even if the F-35 is better how does that serve as an argument that everything is fine with the F-35. Sounds like you are making the argument that because bad isn't worst, than it is good. If they were successful during deployment does that justify all the problems in development? Is it possible for a bad process to still produce viable results? I think all of this "history as a standard" and "Not worst, therefore good" argument stuff fails to take into account that the political climate is completely different today and that is the real deciding factor in this projects survival.

SMSgt Mac,

Your pro-F-35 arguments suffer from the following fallacies. I've included single line summaries of many of your arguments. IF you feel I am unfairly summing up your arguments please direct me to evidence that I am not being fair to you.

Appeal to Tradition - this is the way military projects always work http://www.nizkor.org/features/fallacies/appeal-to-tradition.html

Biased Sample - Because the F-35 program isn't as bad as these projects it is great http://www.nizkor.org/features/fallacies/biased-sample.html Appeal to novelty -- The F-35 is the greatest best thing therefore it must continue

http://www.nizkor.org/features/fallacies/appeal-to-novelty.html

Burden of Proof -- Detractors must prove the F-35 is not the best plane in the world for it's job http://www.nizkor.org/features/fallacies/burden-of-proof.html

I responded:

Given the space limitations on DT, I will Fisk your post at my place and let you know when it happens here (No earlier than Sunday- late). It would be earlier, but I have other pressing commitments this weekend. Kudos for the attempt and willingness to be specific and avoid logical fallacies, but unfortunately you employed several above. As a prequel -- think about the phrase 'it does not follow' as it may apply to what you've posted.

I will deal with halcyon’s comments above by repeating below with my response/observations inserted in [bold blue brackets]. But first I note that I came back last night to find that ‘halcyon’ had decided to add (in split posts):

Thanks for the reply, and I have great respect for your service, however since I am only summarizing your arguments and asking you to clarify I think you will have a very difficult time proving that my logic is not sound. Asking you to clarify your position and pointing out your logical fallacies can only be right or wrong, not a logical fallacy. I haven't even started to argue against your points. Only point out that many of your arguments don't hold up to the standard you have selected. The only point I have made here that might be considered an argument is that you are not taking into account the current political climate which is very different from 20-30 years ago. There is no logical fallacy there-- I haven't even asserted my own opinion. In fact logic will not help you in understanding the current political climate.
….

By the way in your post can you please answer my challenge that if I have misrepresented your position you provide evidence to show this. I am a clarity over agreement kind of guy. I don't care if we agree but I really don't want to slime you.

I will deal with the remains of this last response after I have dealt with ‘halcyon’s first assertions.

Note: for clarity I refer to the first two of 'halcyon’s' posts above as Part 1, and this last bit above as Part 2. I am completing this response before revisiting the original thread lest ‘halcyon’ added more that I would need to add below.

Ready? As promised, let the Fisking begin!

Responses to Part 1:

SMSgt Mac,
So are you stating that because the F-35 is doing better than a lot of it's 'successful' predecessors there is no problem here? [No, I am saying that not only do the challenges that the F-35 program has encountered to-date NOT rise to the level sufficient to label the F-35 as ‘failed’ , ‘doomed’ or any other of a number of terminal adjectives in criticisms of the program so carelessly slung about in the comments (and some articles) in Military.com, but that the technical and programmatic challenges to date are not even unique AND that the difficulties to date are not even remarkable for an advanced high performance fighter aircraft, and less than what many might consider ‘successful’ predecessors] I notice you put successful in quotes as if you don't believe these unnamed predecessors were successful [No, it was in quotes because ‘successful’ without explanation is a fairly abstract concept that may mean different things to different people]. If they weren't successful than even if the F-35 is better how does that serve as an argument that everything is fine with the F-35. Sounds like you are making the argument that because bad isn't worst, than it is good. If they were successful during deployment does that justify all the problems in development? Is it possible for a bad process to still produce viable results? [You thus begin down a slippery slope to create a ‘strawman’ argument as a prop in an attempt to make an argumentative point in what will follow. Read on.] I think all of this "history as a standard" and "Not worst, therefore good" argument stuff fails to take into account that the political climate is completely different today and that is the real deciding factor in this projects survival. [I wouldn’t know, I have never used this argument. If you are implying that I am using this argument, I would only point out that that if I am asserting the F-35 is doing better than many of its ‘successful’ predecessors, that “it does not follow” that I am claiming anything more, including anything to do with your ‘strawman’. (However I will note that as far as political climate goes: what is old is new again.)]

SMSgt Mac,
Your pro-F-35 arguments suffer from the following fallacies. I've included single line summaries [Strawmen Alert! Read on.] of many of your arguments. IF you feel I am unfairly summing up your arguments please direct me to evidence [Weak and transparent attempt to shift the Burden of Proof – more on this topic below] that I am not being fair to you.

Appeal to Tradition - this is the way military projects always work http://www.nizkor.org/features/fallacies/appeal-to-tradition.html

[Strawman!--Perhaps based upon an ‘It does not follow’ assumption that because I note the programmatic and technical challenges are met as well or better as successful programs?
In any case, considering my long-running and public beef with programmatic problems are with the status quo in how programs are funded and fiddled with and micromanaged by forces outside the program proper, I am hardly ‘appealing to tradition’ in that case.

Considering I do not comment on programmatic decisions unrelated to external forces (very few exist) that I am not in an informed position to question or comment or have public domain information in hand, call me ‘neutral’ in that respect.

Considering that my comments on technical challenges merely note they always occur in developing advanced systems is based upon the usually self-evident point that if they are ‘advanced’ they will have unknowns, many unknowable-beforehand elements involved, and that these challenges are to be expected as unavoidable.

Remarkably, no one has ever questioned this point online before. Perhaps an excerpt of a paper and presentation I gave at a symposium about two years ago on the subject of conceiving, developing and implementing a Failure Modes and Effects Test (FMET) program for an advanced development program will help:

It does not require much imagination to perceive that perhaps complexity in any one of the three software, hardware, and operational/environment factors have the potential to fuel the complexity of the other two, and that this often results in an even more rapid increase in complexity of the overall system. Given that the overall complexity of modern systems already preclude the possibility of ever having enough time or money, even with automation, to test for 100% coverage 1 , the importance of bounding the scope and effort of an FMET test program will only become more important as systems become even more complex.

1 Automated Software Testing, Dustan Rashka & Paul, 1999, pp.35-36, Addison-Wesley ]

Biased Sample - Because the F-35 program isn't as bad as these projects it is great http://www.nizkor.org/features/fallacies/biased-sample.html

[You’ve created another ‘Strawman’ based upon an ‘it does not follow’. I refute the assertion that F-35 is as its critics claim, ‘failed’ (or other euphemism for same). You take what is essentially my pointing to evidence to the contrary, including noting its successes and comparative relationships to past successful programs , and substitute (quoting the Nizkor page here) “a distorted, exaggerated or misrepresented version” of my position or substitute with an assertion that I say “that it is ‘great’”.]

Appeal to novelty -- The F-35 is the greatest best thing therefore it must continue http://www.nizkor.org/features/fallacies/appeal-to-novelty.html

[And you create yet ANOTHER ‘Strawman’. This time, I can only suspect it is based upon my consistently noting that the F-35 has the critical technologies (as identified by the users- the Services) of low observability and connectivity among other things, that existing aircraft and potential competitors do not, or similar supported assertion, and convert it into “a distorted, exaggerated or misrepresented” (this time an ‘overly simplistic’) “version” of my position.]

Burden of Proof -- Detractors must prove the F-35 is not the best plane in the world for it's job http://www.nizkor.org/features/fallacies/burden-of-proof.html

[Well, you ALMOST got this one right. Instead of employing the ‘best plane in the world’ Strawman , had you typed: “Detractors have the burden of proof and must prove fielding the F-35, as the current program of record, is not the best solution for its missions”. You would have accurately described my position on 'burden of proof'.

Now, let us address whether or not is it reasonable for me to require the critics to satisfy the burden of proof. Using Nizkor as our guide:

In many situations, one side has the burden of proof resting on it. This side is obligated to provide evidence for its position. The claim of the other side, the one that does not bear the burden of proof, is assumed to be true unless proven otherwise. The difficulty in such cases is determining which side, if any, the burden of proof rests on. In many cases, settling this issue can be a matter of significant debate. In some cases the burden of proof is set by the situation. For example, in American law a person is assumed to be innocent until proven guilty (hence the burden of proof is on the prosecution). As another example, in debate the burden of proof is placed on the affirmative team.

By either standard, the “Burden of Proof” in my challenge is on the CRITICS of the F-35 (plane and program).

The legal standard would have to be applied metaphorically: Is the F-35 ‘guilty’ or ‘innocent’ of (fill-in-the-blank)? Since on the Military.com boards I never see anyone viewing F-35 as ‘succeeding’ and ‘guilty’, the burden of proof would have to be on those who see the F-35 as ‘failing’ and ‘guilty’.

By the more appropriate ‘debate’ standard (for that is what we are engaged in - albeit too often poorly), when I posited the question: “How about one of you (or all of you) working from the philosophical position that the F-35 suffers from 'bad management' actually cite an example of same?” I am CORRECTLY placing the “burden of proof” on those who "affirm" that the F-35 suffers from same.

I dissect and dismiss criticisms of the F-35 with reasoning (why the criticisms are lacking), or I make assertions supported by fact (burden of proof!). If what I type does not fall into either of those categories, you will see caveats, such as ‘I believe’, ‘as far as is known’, ‘I’m fairly certain’ etc. Barring copy-paste errors or typos, and with the possible exception of the occasional hyperbole for shock value, you will NEVER see an assertion made by me that cannot be backed up by a hard fact or verified by a reader themselves if they are willing to do the research.]

Responses to Part 2:

Thanks for the reply, and I have great respect for your service, [I’m wondering now how new you are to these boards. My active duty service is FAR in the past and other than the core program management experience and initial knowledge concerning advanced weapon system development it gave me, not very relevant to the discussion at hand] however since I am only summarizing your arguments and asking you to clarify I think you will have a very difficult time proving that my logic is not sound [Hopefully, not true by now.] Asking you to clarify your position and pointing out your logical fallacies can only be right or wrong, not a logical fallacy [Sure, if only you could have succeeded AND avoided employing logical fallacies in attempting doing so.] I haven't even started to argue against your points. [re-read this post again if you still believe what you typed afterwards. Repeat as necessary] Only [attempted, and failed to] point out that many of your arguments don't hold up to the standard you have selected. The only point I have made here that might be considered an argument is that you are not taking into account the current political climate which is very different from 20-30 years ago. There is no logical fallacy there-- I haven't even asserted my own opinion. [You just did, I am almost curious. Were you around 20-30 years ago?] In fact logic will not help you in understanding the current political climate [Another opinion, unsupported by fact- I’ll let it go] .….By the way in your post can you please answer my challenge that if I have misrepresented your position you provide evidence to show this [See all of above]. I am clarity over agreement kind of guy. [We should get along swimmingly then] I don't care if we agree but I really don't want to slime you. [I am kind to those who are kind].

Any bets on whether or not we will be entering the realm of Argumetum ad nauseum very soon? I won't go there, as alas I have bigger fish to fry...and that work pays much better returns.

---------------------------------Original Post Below this Point------------------------------------------------

There's a post up at DefenseTech calling for opinions as to whether or not the F-35 can be 'turned around'. This an obvious case of working from the philosophical position that the F-35 NEEDS turning around (begging the question). I laid down a gauntlet that I doubt will be picked up by very many, but it could prove interesting if my challenge is accepted instead of subjected to the usual furious 'thumbing down' given comments that do not follow a certain 'groupthink' guide. I wrote:

A modest proposal. How about one of you (or all of you) working from the philosophical position that the F-35 suffers from 'bad management' actually cite an example of same?
Please post as a separate post instead of a reply. It is a long weekend and if the F-35 is as poorly managed as those asserting it is, we should be able to run up the count to a new DT record for our hosts!
There are only three criteria for a claim to warrant a response other than "Invalid Claim!":
1. Single sentence description of the "bad management" decision/action.
2. Identification of those responsible (names are best) for the "bad management" to at least a) the Government (DoD office or equivalent and higher) or Corporate/Industry leadership level responsible--for 'actors' OUTSIDE the program, and/or b) Identification of those responsible (position or name) WITHIN the program.
3. Single sentence description of WHY it was a bad management event/action.

Valid claims will be evaluated/critiqued using only three sources: RAND's "Sources of Weapon Systems Cost Growth", DAU's Defense Acquisition Review Journal peer-reviewed papers, and the NIzkor Project Logical Fallacies website.

Enjoy!

We'll see if anyone takes up the challenge.

BTW: Contrast the DT piece with Dave Majumdar's facts-only story on an F-35 structure fix at Defense News with what will no doubt soon be breathlessly announced with Wagnerian 'doom' music in the background at AvWeek, Military.com, and elsewhere.

Libyan Rebel Leader Admits to Al Qaeda Ties

2011-09-04T19:48:00.000-05:00

H/T Instapundit

A Libyan 'Rebel Leader' admits to Al Qaeda Ties? I'm shocked! Shocked I say!
Ok, not really...
Hey Rubes! Told ya! (Which should have been a 'Captain Obvious' call)

Oh Those 'Tricky' Cost Numbers

2011-08-28T22:33:00.004-05:00

(I await the day that Flight Global gets their ‘captcha’ feature worked out.)

In two back-to-back posts, Steve Trimble channels that doyen of defense malcontents, one Winslow Wheeler, yet AGAIN, on a defense topic near and dear to my heart: O&S costs. Using data acquired ‘somehow’ by Mr. Wheeler (now, ask yourself: where might a “I-know-defense-better-than-the-DoD”-cawing magpie who worked decades inside the Congressional Staffer Club ‘might’ have gotten a hold of such information, if real? You get three guesses…), DEWLine presents graphics representing data we are not provided, and data I suspect that no one in Flight Global was qualified (who was also available) to interpret. In short, other than for its shock! value effect on the innumerate, the information is worthless as presented, and while it may raise a question or two, it answers NONE of them.

DEWLine blog notes:

Writing about "costs" is always tricky. Numbers can vary dramatically depending on what gets included. In this case, we're talking about operational costs. This includes operations costs, including fuel, parts and maintenance, as well as interim contractor support and manpower. It excludes modifications funded by procurement accounts. The total cost number is divided by the total number of flight hours flown by the fleet, and that is the operational cost per flight hour.

Steve Trimble nails the part about costs being ‘tricky’. It may be even said to be ‘trickier’ than he realizes. Here is the complete list of general O&S cost categories, with areas with the largest potential for huge confounding factors noted in red :

1.0 MISSION PERSONNEL
1.1 Operations
1.2 Maintenance
1.3 Other Mission Personnel
2.0 UNIT-LEVEL CONSUMPTION
2.1 Pol/Energy Consumption
2.2 Consumable Material/Repair Parts
2.3 Depot-Level Reparables
2.4 Training Munitions/Expendable Stores
2.5 Other
3.0 INTERMEDIATE MAINTENANCE (EXTERNAL TO UNIT)
3.1 Maintenance
3.2 Consumable Material/Repair Parts
3.3 Other
4.0 DEPOT MAINTENANCE
4.1 Overhaul/Rework
4.2 Other
5.0 CONTRACTOR SUPPORT
5.1 Interim Contractor Support
5.2 Contractor Logistics Support
5.3 Other
6.0 SUSTAINING SUPPORT
   6.1 Support Equipment Replacement
   6.2 Modification Kit Procurement/Installation
   6.3 Other Recurring Investment
   6.4 Sustaining Engineering Support
   6.5 Software Maintenance Support
   6.6 Simulator Operations
   6.7 Other
7.0 INDIRECT SUPPORT
7.1 Personnel Support
7.2 Installation Support

Aside from the plentiful catchall ‘Other’ categories, there is quite a bit more in this list than “operations costs, including fuel, parts and maintenance, as well as interim contractor support and manpower”. I think Mr. Trimble may want to revisit his ‘list’.

If one views the graphics provided with an eye towards ‘what is different’ between ‘comparable’ weapon systems, it should lead one to consider WHAT is driving these differences? Without the actual data in hand I am left with these questions:

RE: WC-135W O&S Increase in 2006. I have a feeling there is no mystery here, but how much did this spike have to do with preparation/upgrade/equipping then forward deploying the WC-135W forward to monitor the NoKo's nuclear testing debut?

RE: VC-25 O&S increase in 2009. As overseas deployment of AF One involves a major logistics planning and execution overhead, how much of the 2009 bump was due to President Obama visiting more countries that year than a lot of Presidents do in four years? It is not as if no one noticed. Or were there upgrades on the bird that went into PDM that year? How much of the increased cost came from transitioning to a new support contract with Boeing Wichita?

RE: That 'Wild' B-2 O&S increase from about 2004. Yes, 2004. The charts ‘smoothing’ function combined with cyclical cost events tend to mask what could be the costs of implementing an upgrade program in PDM. What percentage of these ‘increases’ are (primarily) related to implementing the challenging yet wildly successful AHFM upgrade? I ask, because the ‘curves’ appear to strongly mimic the PDM AHFM upgrade implementation timing. I suspect some of the 2010 B-2 data also has all the costs involved to get the bird that caught fire in Guam in 2010 back home. Expect future depot costs to show up in the out-years for other upgrades.

Side question: How much does the B-52 still benefit from having the Attrition Reserve fleet collocated (if it is still) that enables the collocated operational wing to rotate hard-broke birds off the operational books for maintenance and rotate fresh birds from the Attrition Reserve pool into the unit?

RE: F-22 and V-22 O&S costs. This is my favorite. How much of the drop in F-22 O&S comes from the learning curve and Performance Based Logistics since the airplane went IOC late in 2005? And shouldn’t any numbers before IOC be excluded? How much of the rise in V-22 O&S comes from the fact that it is a little more expensive to operate in Iraq and Afghanistan than CONUS?

These are just a few of the most obvious questions raised, but I would be remiss if I did not also warn the reader against the world-class ‘chartsmanship’ contained in the DEWLine graphics. I particularly enjoy the use of the ‘smoothed’ line function that make ‘Highs’ seem ‘higher’, ‘Lows’ seem ‘lower’, and the swings between the two seem more dramatic. The use of line vs column is a minor nit, but it promotes the idea that the data is continuous instead of in discrete annual snapshots. Most egregious of all is the use of non-zero baselines which amplify the differences in the data within each chart.

If I had to offer one piece of advice to the Flight Global crew it would be to stop hauling the mail for Winslow Wheeler and CDI. Winslow may look like the Tech-savvy engineer of the future Montgomery Scott (i.e. “Scotty”) on Star Trek, but to these eyes (ie IMHO) he operates more on the level of Harcourt Fenton Mudd.

F-89 : A Much Underappreciated Weapon System

2011-08-16T20:51:00.002-05:00

I 've been fascinated with the F-89 Scorpion for years. Partly because of its history with the 57FIS, my old F-4E outfit in Iceland, and my late Father-In-Law having flown the F-89 in the same unit 20+ years earlier. Part of my fascination is because it was an all-weather fighter/interceptor and was so different than any of its day-fighter contemporaries such as the F-86 and F-94, which are far better known (especially the beautiful F-86). But the F-86s and F-94s did not actively serve on the front lines for the United States nearly as long as the F-89 did, which really only was pulled from Air Defense duties after the F-101s, F-102s, and even the F-106s were active in numbers. Finally, the last interesting thing about the F-89 was how advanced and complex it was compared to its contemporaries, yet it has been labled as not being very 'innovative'.

I will expand on the topic later, but for now, what I want the reader, especially one who has never seen an F-89 in person, to take away from this post is just how BIG the F-89 actually is. Here is a scale graphic comparing the F-89 to the perhaps better-known jets developed closest to the same timeframe:

Another comparison can be shown illustrating the relative sizes of the F-89 and the F-102 and F-4 - the planes that replaced the Scorpions between 1960 and 1982 in the 57FIS.

And for the younger among us who haven't seen an F-102 or F-4 with a good scale reference, here is the F-89 as compared to the F-22:

The F-89 was truly unique, and had an amazing, if largely unknown operational service history.

F-35 Jobs & Logical Fallacies

2011-08-13T00:49:00.002-05:00

Steve Trimble has a little blurb up on the Commerce Dept numbers for F-35 job creation and closes with the following:

"This doesn't mean that 127,000 people will suddenly lose their jobs if the programme goes away. Using the same methodology, Lockheed warned two years ago that 100,000 jobs would be lost if F-22 production was not extended. The F-22 line is scheduled to shut down next year, but Lockheed is actually adding jobs in Marrietta, Georgia, as other programmes, including C-130J, C-5M and F-35 ramp up."

Trimble is better than this.

"It Does Not Follow"
This makes absolutely no sense. The first sentence is not supported in ANY way shape or form by the rest of the paragraph.

I am dying for Flight Global to fix their 'Captcha' widget. I'm a direct approach kind of guy and this feels too much like skulking around behind someone's back. But if I were "Emperor of the World", Columbia and all other J-Schools would have to have a series of courses on Logical Fallacies and not just as a section in the odd Technical Writing class,

There are some serious aspects to this story not brought up by Mr. Trimble, or for that matter anyone I am aware of, but I'm tired and it is late. Maybe later.

Question of the day

2011-08-12T20:25:00.001-05:00

Here.
(The comments were great.)

Answer: Yes. Yes it is.

Full disclosure: I am of the school that the best choice is the one you are most likely to have with you.

Another F-35 and V-22 'Two-fer'

2011-08-09T21:27:00.001-05:00

First, 'Hat Tip' to Steve Trimble at DEW line for a link to a V-22 editorial that, aside from the same sort of minor technical faux pas that kept me from buying the Editorialist's book 'new', drives home the point that the Marines know Best Value when they see it.

Then, direct from Steve Trimble: "F-35 grounding explained by Australian Aviation". Factual. Attributed quotations, Snark-free. Hope some other blog folks are taking notes.

Bipartisanship Ain't What It Used to Be: F-35 & V-22 Edition

2011-08-09T00:09:00.001-05:00

“The word bipartisan means some larger-than-usual deception is being carried out”
In this case, it includes the article 'covering' the claim.

I had a bifurcated response to Steve Trimble’s latest post “The vast bipartisan conspiracy against F-35 & V-22”

My first response focused on the use of “Bipartisan”:
In my head I replayed Inigo Montoya: ” You keep using that word. I do not think it means what you think it means.”

Then I remembered a favorite George Carlin quote: “The word bipartisan means some larger-than-usual deception is being carried out”

After I really studied Trimble's post, I decided the latter response was most applicable.

Within his post Trimble iterates (Warning: English-English spelling ahead):
“Our review of eight budget reduction proposals by a hodge-podge of centrist, leftist and libertarian think tanks reveals a startling insight: All of them agree that two military aircraft programmes should be terminated or scaled back, and all of them agree those two programmes should be the BellBoeing V-22 and the Lockheed Martin F-35.”

My next thought was someone needed to tell Mr. Trimble that the opposite of ‘leftist’ isn’t ‘libertarian’. Do you see what is missing from that “centrist, leftist and libertarian think tanks” list? That’s right: “Conservative”. If we are talking spectrum of priorities on ‘defense thinking’ conservative is to ‘approve’ as leftist is to ‘disapprove’ as to libertarian is to ‘ambivalent’. [A ‘centrist’ BTW is just voting ‘present’.]

I won’t pick the nit that ‘bipartisan’ involves ‘two parties’, and only bing it up to prevent any grammar police showing up in the comments and counting coup.

ONLY after leading us down a fabulous ( in the 3rd and 4th definition of the word) definition of ‘bipartisan’ at the end of his post does Mr. Trimble mention the ‘on the other hand’:
There remain some -- such as the Heritage Foundation, American Enterprise Institute and House budget committee chairman Rep Paul Ryan -- who oppose any significant budget cutbacks beyond those already identified in former Secretary of Defense Bob Gates',,,

Ah! The ubiquitous ‘some’ of the more conservative bent finally appear.

Now…..About the ‘substance’ of that list of ‘bipartisan’ groups:

1. RE: Fiscal Commission co-chairs?
AKA “Democrat Tool and a RINO Fool.” Those findings weren’t exactly embraced ‘bilaterally’ were they? Wasn’t Paul Ryan on the Commission as well? I’d say he is a lot more representative of the ‘conservative’ half of the ‘bipartisanship’ here.

2. RE: Debt Reduction Task Force plan?
The one from the so-called “Bipartisan Policy Center” founded in 2007 “by former Senate Majority Leaders Howard Baker, Tom Daschle, Bob Dole and George Mitchell”?
Yeah THAT Tom Daschle and THAT George “I’ve been trying to slash the military for decades” Mitchell. Call this RINOs and Radicals Part II

3. RE: Galston-MacGuineas Plan
Well this is one I’d never heard about, but as I suspected, it is just repackaging the ‘same-o sam-o’ ideas from the ‘same-o same-o’ people.

MacGuineas is an apparatchik of the New America Foundation, a leftard organization masquerading as ‘moderate’. It is where ‘Progressives’ go when they don’t want to be seen as such. Note that at the NAF link we find a story where George Mitchell above used a BS poll to try to pressure Israel into giving up even more concessions that they were willing to make in the 'peace' talks with Palestinians.

Galston is now a Brookings (left-leaning and used to be farther left) Institutition operator, currently working on “designing a new social contract and the implications of political polarization” and (of course) is also a Clintonista.

4. RE: Center for American Progress?
Oh C’mon! they’re a front for the Democratic Party

5. RE: Cato Institute.
Libertarian. They like defense as long as it is cheap or free and runs towards believing America should have a passive voice in the world. If they were stronger on defense, I could be a Libertarian, but if they were, then they would be good Conservatives.

6. RE: Roosevelt Institute.
“Carrying forward the legacy, values, and spirit of Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt” . I especially 'enjoyed' their ‘campus network’ page: “A national student initiative that engages new generations in a unique form of progressive activism that empower young people as leaders and promotes their ideas for change”.
Oooooo ‘big’ ideas. Ask them about The Forgotten Man.
sheeesh - frickin' 'retreads'.

7. RE: Economic Policy Institute
Another Leftard organization posing as ‘non-partisan’. Ask George Soros how much they cost.

8. RE: Sustainable Defense Task Force
OK, this one comes from the Project For Defense Alternatives, which given their record, translates into Project For Alternatives TO Defense. Who is the ‘task force’ (besides the basically one-half of a two-man PDA shop of Carl Conetta) ?

Carl Conetta, Project on Defense Alternatives
Benjamin H Friedman, Cato Institute
William D Hartung, New America Foundation
Christopher Hellman, National Priorities Project
Heather Hurlburt, National Security Network
Charles Knight, Project on Defense Alternatives
Lawrence J Korb, Center for American Progress
Paul Kawika Martin, Peace Action
Laicie Olson, Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation
Prasannan Parthasarathi, Boston College
Miriam Pemberton, Institute for Policy Studies
Laura Peterson, Taxpayers for Common Sense
Christopher Preble, Cato Institute
Winslow Wheeler, Center for Defense Information

Recognize any organizations we have already covered? It is easier to list the ones we haven’t. How about that eternal weapons program denouncer Winslow Wheeler? And I just KNOW I want ‘Peace Action’ on the front lines of defense recapitalization (Not).

PS. If that d***ed 'captcha' feature of Flight Global worked with modern security software, I would have commented at the post.

F35B Agitprop ala Sweetman

2011-08-02T21:55:00.002-05:00

Bill Sweetman ran what I would characterize as an ‘opposition propaganda’ piece yesterday (Ares Blog: A Cat is Not a Dog). He bemoaned the Marine’s touting of the F-35B program as their 21st Century solution for the “Air” half of their Future Air-Ground Task Force as “propaganda”:

“The Marine propaganda offensive in support of the F-35B, carried on through events like last Friday’s media visit to Patuxent River, and through Marine-friendly websites, pounds relentlessly on the advantages of short take off and vertical landing.
It has to, because that’s the only respect in which the F-35B is not inferior to the F-35A and F-35C. Avionics are identical. The weapon load and range are less and it is (according to the UK) the most expensive of all the versions.“

Sweetman was taking what turned out to be a fairly gratuitous swipe at the F-35B’s raison d’être. Gratuitous, because he immediately changed the subject for the rest of the post with an awful(ly) lightweight critique of the ‘LHA/D-as-aircraft-carrier’ idea. I won’t dwell too much on what turned in to the main thrust of his agitprop in this post. Instead, I’d like to focus on his ‘damning with faint praise’ sucker-punch on the B’s STOVL capability as quoted above.

Comparing the F-35B STOVL to the CTOL (A) or CV (C) Models is a Red Herring.
The relevant comparison is the one that was NOT made by Mr. Sweetman: that of comparing the capabilities the F-35B brings to those of the plane it is replacing – The AV-8B. Could that have been because the disparity in total performance between the F-35B and AV-8B is the greatest of all in the F-35 vs. ‘legacy’ comparisons, with the F-35B blowing away the AV-8B ? In combat configuration the F-35B is supersonic, low observable, network-centric warfare capable, AND easy to land vertically for starters. The AV-8B is… ‘none of the above’.

About that ‘most expensive’ assertion Mr Sweetman then makes (and cites the UK as the source). We’ll assume that is true from a unit cost POV, but how do you account for the net equivalent combat power of a B model with forward basing vs. an A or C model staged more remotely?
Fortunately, this is an easy one to answer. The difference is found in the Sortie Generation rate KPPs of the three variants: The F-35B, as it is planned to be operated, will be capable of generating 4 sorties/day in a surge which is 33% more ‘surge’ sorties per the specification than either the A or C model as they are planned to be used. In a sustained operating environment the B model will be providing 50% more sorties per aircraft per day than the CTOL (F-35A) or CV (F-35C). The Marines, by operating ‘forward’ get a lot more 'Bang' out of their F-35 'Buck' than if they operated an A or C model from the big deck carriers or a main operating base farther from the fight.

This ‘forward operating’ capability advantage is not simply hypothetical. From an Armed Forces Journal article last year, as object lessons we find three conflicts with instances of the Marines exploiting ‘Forward Basing’ (emphasis mine).

Desert Storm
During Operation Desert Storm in 1991, shore-based AV-8B Harriers initially operated from a 10,000-foot runway at Sheik Isa Airbase in Bahrain. This resulted in a 45-minute transit to Kuwait with in-flight refueling, yielding a 30-minute time on station. The aircraft then moved to King Abdul Aziz Airstrip, a 4,000-foot asphalt runway 90 miles from Kuwait. With the addition of a flight line made of AM-2 matting, this forward operating base (FOB) housed 60 AV-8Bs for eight months. It was often referred to as “the soccer stadium” since the Marines set up headquarters and billeting in the adjacent stadium; from there, the transit to Kuwait was reduced to 20 minutes, yielding the same 30-minute time on station without aerial refueling. This reduced the burden on tanker aircraft, increased sortie generation rates and allowed these aircraft to be more responsive to ground forces.

Operation Iraqi Freedom
During the first phases of the war in Iraq in 2003, Marine Harriers were the first aircraft to conduct sustained operations from an airfield inside Iraq and the only tactical air aircraft to conduct combat operations from a road. In the first two weeks of the conflict, Marines established an FOB on the remains of the Iraqi airstrip at An Numinayah, just 60 nautical miles south of Baghdad. Damage to the runway rendered it unusable to other tactical fixed-wing aircraft. The FOB at An Numinayah facilitated forward positioning of aircraft to stand ground alert as well as a forward arming and refueling point for Harriers supporting combat operations in and around Baghdad. Eliminating the need for Harriers to reserve fuel for a lengthy return flight to ships or bases in Kuwait, the FOB at An Numinayah allowed the AV-8Bs to extend time on station without placing a logistical burden on aerial refueling assets. With an airfield in such close proximity to the forward edge of the battle area, Harriers stood a credible ground alert and reduced response times from one to two hours to less than 15 minutes.

Operation Enduring Freedom
The war in Afghanistan is the most recent example of the effectiveness of STOVL operations. In the last year, Marine AV-8Bs have routinely operated from FOB Dwyer, a 4,300-foot expeditionary airfield built by the Marine wing support squadrons. Just a few miles from the town of Marjah, FOB Dwyer was constructed to facilitate rapid logistical support and fire support for Marines operating in the southern Helmand River valley. Launching from their main base at Kandahar, Harriers recovered to Dwyer after completing a time on station and were able to quickly rearm and refuel while talking to ground commanders. A basing option in such close proximity to the supported unit enabled longer times on station and rapid ordnance reload capability, in addition to reducing the burden on airborne refueling assets.

Basing AV-8Bs at FOB Dwyer during the fight for Marjah resulted in 65 percent of their sortie duration being spent on station. In comparison, aircraft based at Kandahar spent 55 percent of their sortie duration on station while aircraft operating from a carrier spent only 25 percent of sortie duration on station. Over the service life of an aircraft, the real benefit of STOVL aircraft is more time in support of ground forces with less time in transit to and from the fight.

As they say on the big blogs, read it all here.

In the meantime, the Marines will keep leaning (and basing) forward.

Centennial of Naval Aviation #3

2011-07-30T15:31:00.000-05:00

1926 'Bare Base' Naval Operations
Here's a post for the "maintainers". I know it might be hard to believe for some, but Hawaii was once a 'frontier', where all the trappings of modernity were not available when and where they might be needed. This must have presented challenges, especially when dealing with the 'high tech' of 1920's aviation. 85 years ago, this was what 'bare base' operations looked like:

Photo taken by my Grandfather, Machinist's Mate on the USS Langley, taken in 1926 while the Langley was operating out of Hawaii. The caption in the photo album reads: "Naval Aviation Camp".
It is actually printed backwards in the original print. I flipped the image for this post.

Here's an interesting detail I extracted from the original (click to enlarge):

Nice 'hangar'-- (and check out the living quarters in the background).

-Photos Copyright SMSgt Mac at www.elementsofpower.blogspot.com

Debunking The Close Air Support Myths: Part 6

2011-07-27T18:27:00.014-05:00

CAS, the Air Force, and the A-10
Part 6: A-10s 'Forever' ?
(scroll down for links to Parts 1-5 and 'Sidebars)

As noted previously, the A-10 design was from the very start designed to be operated in a ‘permissive environment’. This limitation had been a concern of AF planners since the A-10’s inception, and its vulnerability to weapons larger than those it was designed to encounter became more of a concern with the advent and proliferation of Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADs) such as the SA-7 (and successors) as well as increases in numbers and types of larger mobile systems that filled the gap between short range low-altitude MANPADs and longer-range high-altitude fixed site systems (SA-2/3s and successors). Before the A-10 was even out of flight test, evidence that the battlefield was getting a lot nastier was seen in the 1973 Arab-Israeli ‘October War’:

Egyptian SAMs (SA-2s, SA-3s, and SA-6s) along with 23-mm ZSU23-4 antiaircraft cannons destroyed some 40 Israeli aircraft in the first 48 hours of the war, or 14 percent of the frontline strength of the IAF.3 In contrast, only five Israeli aircraft were destroyed in air-to-air combat during the entire conflict. Coupled with the high number of aircraft lost to ground-based air defenses in Vietnam, the results of the October War prompted some analysts to ask whether tactical aircraft had outlived their usefulness on the modern battlefield.(link)

Air planners saw the world’s Integrated Air Defense Systems (IADs) evolving at an alarming rate and anticipated that flying low-and-slow would soon be a poor survival strategy.
Other developments were also occurring that would influence AF attitudes and decisions concerning future CAS capabilities:

1. Israeli successes with the F-16 in the Osirak Reactor Strike (air-to-ground) and the Bekaa Valley (air-to-air) “reenergized proponents of fast multi-role fighters”.

2. The emergence of the Army’s Air-Land Battle doctrine which “envisioned a faster and freer-flowing battlespace without a traditional battle line”. This was a doctrine that clearly favored use of a faster aircraft and operations that were less reliant on air-ground coordination.

3. The discovery that the A-10’s structural design life was significantly less-than-specified, and that would require remedy either via an extensive and expensive modification program and/or replacement of much of the A-10’s structure or the development of a replacement aircraft far earlier than anticipated.

All these factors contributed to the Air Force considering an A-10 replacement that was a ‘fast mover’ and viewing an F-16 variant as a good candidate for that replacement. Making aspersions that the Air Force ‘doesn’t want to do Close Air Support’ because it has sought (and seeks) to perform the mission using resources more survivable than a relatively ‘low and slow’ platform such as the A-10 says more about the ignorance of what is necessary in performing the CAS mission by those making such accusations than anything else.
If one were to make a list of all the things that the A-10 brings to the battlefield that make it a good CAS platform, none of them are directly dependent upon the ability to fly ‘low and slow’ : its ability to fly low and slow enables it to provide timely and effective CAS in many cases...in a highly permissive environment, but timely and effective CAS can be provided in any number of different combinations of weapon systems and tactics See here and here for examples.

General Chuck Horner, the 'Air Boss' in Desert Storm, gets to have the last word on whether the A-10 or an A-10 'like' platform qualifies as the 'best' CAS tool in the future (LINK):

Q: Did the war have any effect on the Air Force's view of the A-10?
A: No. People misread that. People were saying that airplanes are too sophisticated and that they wouldn't work in the desert, that you didn't need all this high technology, that simple and reliable was better, and all that.
Well, first of all, complex does not mean unreliable. We're finding that out. For example, you have a watch that uses transistors rather than a spring. It's infinitely more reliable than the windup watch that you had years ago. That's what we're finding in the airplanes.
Those people . . . were always championing the A-10. As the A-10 reaches the end of its life cycle-- and it's approaching that now--it's time to replace it, just like we replace every airplane, including, right now, some early versions of the F-16.
Since the line was discontinued, [the A-10's champions] want to build another A-10 of some kind. The point we were making was that we have F-16s that do the same job.
Then you come to people who have their own reasons-good reasons to them, but they don't necessarily compute to me-who want to hang onto the A-10 because of the gun. Well, the gun's an excellent weapon, but you'll find that most of the tank kills by the A-10 were done with Mavericks and bombs. So the idea that the gun is the absolute wonder of the world is not true.

Q: This conflict has shown that?
A: It shows that the gun has a lot of utility, which we always knew, but it isn't the principal tank-killer on the A-10. The [Imaging Infrared] Maverick is the big hero there. That was used by the A-10s and the F-16s very, very effectively in places like Khafji.
The other problem is that the A-10 is vulnerable to hits because its speed is limited. It's a function of thrust, it's not a function of anything else. We had a lot of A-10s take a lot of ground fire hits. Quite frankly, we pulled the A-10s back from going up around the Republican Guard and kept them on Iraq's [less formidable] front-line units. That's line [sic] if you have a force that allows you to do that. In this case, we had F-16s to go after the Republican Guard.

Q: At what point did you do that?

A: I think I had fourteen airplanes sitting on the ramp having battle damage repaired, and I lost two A- 10s in one day [February 15], and I said, "I've had enough of this." ....

The Air Force Tried to Give the A-10 to the Army?
One of the most recent episodes fueling the “Air Force Doesn’t like CAS” myth often pops up in real and virtual discussions on the subject as a form of 'proof' or evidence is the simplistic claim that “the AF tried to give the A-10 to the Army”. This argument has its roots in a singular event after Desert Storm, when General Merrill McPeak, shortly before his retirement as Air Force Chief of Staff, proposed a radical change in DoD and Service responsibilities based upon his particular view of “roles and missions”. The A-10 ramifications were collateral damage in the scheme of things. It was McPeak's view that such a restructuring would reduce redundancy and exploit each Service’s strengths to the most effective level.

Per 'Learning Large Lessons' (p.197), McPeak asserted:

In my view, modern land warfare can be seen as containing four “battles”—the rear battle, which includes all the base and supporting elements; the close battle, in which the main opposing ground forces engage one another; the deep battle, which includes hostile territory well beyond the line of contact; and the high battle, the arena of air and space combat. . . . The rear and close battles should be the responsibility of a ground forces commander, an Army or a Marine Corps officer. His forces should be capable of relatively autonomous operations—they should be capable of engaging the enemy in the friendly rear and immediately in front of them, without a lot of outside help. True, the ground commander has a deep and abiding interest in what goes on overhead in the high battle or over the horizon in the deep battle and he may even have some capability to get into these fights. But, his forces are not the most effective for the high or deep battle. Air assets provide the best, most often the only capability to operate in these parts of the battlefield. . . . [T]his approach to dividing battle space provides a logical starting point for identifying unnecessary overlap and duplication. If you accept the scheme I just laid out, it follows that the commander with responsibility for the close battle does not require systems or capabilities that reach across the boundaries into the deep and high battles. If there are such systems in the field or on the drawing board, they might be good candidates for retirement or transfer to another service. Alternatively, the commander with responsibility for the deep battle does not need forces that are configured for direct support of close combat operations. If there are any, they too could be transferred out.

McPeak called for the Army to give up the ‘deep battle’, the Air Force to give up ‘close battle’, and called for, among other things, the other services to get out of ‘space’ operations. His proposal (thankfully) went nowhere with the other services nor anyone else in the Air Force. Thus, the ‘give CAS to the Army’ was the idea of one man – now long gone and most definitely ‘not missed’, as part of a complete realignment of service roles and missions, essentially dictated by geography of the battlespace.

There were very large problems with inter-service cooperation and conflict that McPeak saw and was trying to solve. The challenge was real, but his solution would have created as many problems as it would have solved, even without entrenched interests subverting such an effort (and there would be). Desert Storm experience, if it did nothing else, clearly exposed the Army’s parochial and incorrect view that Airpower is nothing more than a support element. When in reality it should be viewed as a maneuver element.
Updated and expanded references 7/28: Some excellent papers on differing Airpower-as-manever-or-support views (large .pdf files at links):

Thunder and Lightning: Desert Storm and the Airpower Debates (1995)
Airpower and Maneuver Warfare (1994)
Integrating Joint Operations Beyond the FSCL (1997) (Army POV with AF POV Intro)
Unity of Effort: Crisis Beyond the FSCL (1999) (Army POV on resolving ambiguities in Joint Doctrine)

Conclusions

Thus we have found:

1. The Air Force supports the CAS mission better now than when it was part of the Army.

2. The Army was the primary antagonist in creating inter-service friction over CAS post-WWII and in it's Army-Centric way of war it continues to generate friction to this day.

3. CAS is a mission NOT a platform.

Post Script:
There were a lot of sub-topics we could have pursued and I was/am tempted to further explore the effects of organizational culture and tendencies of the services on the CAS debate, but I fear that will drive the discussion down a ‘rabbit hole’ from which there may be no return. There are also some interesting dynamics now changing the Army’s way of fighting that could lessen the perceived friction between the services, but I am content to simply monitor them for the present time. I could have also expanded greatly on what makes up 'Effectiveness' for a CAS mission. Finally, the Marines insistence on being the primary provider of CAS as an organic USMC function is another topic for another time.

Update 7/27/11@~19:45hrs: Added part of a response that Gen Horner made in the Q&A above that had been dropped in copying the file from a word document to Blogger.(Now the answer makes sense.)

Part 1: The “Big Two” Close Air Support (CAS) Myths
Part 2: Those "not so good old days”
Part 3: Vietnam and the Rise of the “No-CAS Air Force” Myth
Part 4: Origins of the A-X Program
Part 5: Defining a New CAS Platform: the Evolution of the A-10
CAS Myths Sidebar: The A-10 and the 'Cult of the Gun'
CAS Myths Sidebar: Army-Air Force Views on CAS and Airpower

CAS Myths Sidebar: Army-Air Force Views on CAS and Airpower

2011-07-27T08:01:00.001-05:00

(scroll down for links to Parts 1-6 of CAS Myths and another 'Sidebar')

The current (IMHO myopic) Army view of airpower persists in relegating the AF to a permanent supporting force, and is highlighted by an incident just before the Desert Storm ground campaign kicked off (boldface emphasis mine):

A few days before the ground war commenced in February 1991. . . he [General Schwarzkopf] met with his subordinate commanders to discuss the land offensive. General Horner explained his Push CAS modus of flowing airplanes to the battlefield twenty-four hours a day (rather than keeping them idle while sitting alert). When General [Frederick] Franks ignored what Horner had said and demanded that VII Corps be allotted hundreds of CAS sorties per day (whether needed or not), the airman angrily disputed the allocation of air power in that manner and reiterated his Push CAS procedures. Horner believed it important for unity of command to let his anger show as he vehemently rejected Franks’s claim for so much unfocused air power. He remembered his outburst having no effect: “Everyone looked at me and said, ‘Well, he fell on his sword; isn’t that quaint.’” General [Walt] Boomer jumped in and requested as many dedicated sorties for his Marines, and General [Gary] Luck joined the “run on the bank” and demanded as many CAS flights for his XVIII Corps. The ground commanders argued for their sorties, but after a while Schwarzkopf called a halt to the debate, reminding all present, “You people don’t understand. It’s all my air, and I’ll use it any way I please.” “That ended the argument,” Horner recalled, “and we maintained centralized command.” The CINCCENT [commander in chief of Central Command] depended upon his JFACC to ensure that all the ground commanders received adequate air support.

But having failed to divide Airpower into subordinated chunks prior to the ground war, after the ground offensive kicked off Army ground commanders insisted on placing their Fire Support Control Lines so far ahead of their forces that it hindered the Air Force’s ability to engage interdiction targets once the ground war started (source: Revolution in Warfare: Airpower in the Persian Gulf, Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen (1995), pp. 133–134 and partially cited in “Learning Large Lessons”):

FSCL, Coalition aircraft could attack only under direction from ground or airborne controllers. This procedure could cost time to coordinate the actions and required suitable weather conditions and the presence of a controller to execute the attacks: far less weight of fixed-wing air power could be brought to bear under such circumstances. . . .

Because the FSCL definition said little about coordination of weapons employment beyond the FSCL the corps commanders considered supporting fires beyond the line as “permissive,” requiring no further coordination. That is, they resisted any restrictions on employing missiles or helicopters beyond the line and saw attempts to include such strikes in the ATO as efforts to put their organic firepower under JFACC control. To avoid JFACC control, XVIII Airborne Corps advanced the FSCL well north of the Euphtates River on 27 February and thus reserved an area for attack helicopter operations unconstrained by any requirement to coordinate with the JFACC. The effect of this was to hamper air power’s ability to destroy escaping Iraqi ground forces until the FSCL was finally pulled back after several hours.
Corps commanders at times set the FSCLs for their respective corps at different distances. which sowed confusion and complicated air-ground coordination. This practice continued until Gen Horner established a Desert Storm operation-wide FSCL that approximated the distance that corps commanders could effectively engage the enemy with their indirect fires including the MLRSs.

The Army POV of the FSCL and its placement was of course quite different and focused on the limitations imposed on them prior to the kickoff of the ground war:

....[b]ecause the Air Force absolutely would not fly short of the FSCL before G-Day, we kept the FSCL in close to facilitate air attack of division and corps high priority targets. This caused two problems. Every [artillery] fire mission or AH-64 [attack helicopter] attack beyond the FSCL had to be carefully and painstakingly cleared with the Air Force. Even counterfire required this lengthy process. Equally bad, air sorties beyond the FSCL were completely the domain of the Air Force. VII Corps could nominate targets beyond the FSCL, but could never be sure they would be attacked.

Two points of view. One takes into account the entire battlespace and the other is centered on the individual corps forces. The corps commander's focus on their responsibilities is perfectly understandable..to a point. I leave it to the reader to decide which POV holds the greater effectiveness and potential for victory.
Part 1: The “Big Two” Close Air Support (CAS) Myths
Part 2: Those "not so good old days”
Part 3: Vietnam and the Rise of the “No-CAS Air Force” Myth
Part 4: Origins of the A-X Program
Part 5: Defining a New CAS Platform: the Evolution of the A-10
Part 6: A-10s 'Forever' ?
CAS Myths Sidebar: The A-10 and the 'Cult of the Gun'

CAS Myths Sidebar: The A-10 and the 'Cult of the Gun'

2011-07-26T22:39:00.004-05:00

The A-10 and the 'Cult of the Gun'
(scroll down for links to Parts 1-6 of CAS Myths and another 'Sidebar')

The AGM-65 Maverick missiles launched by A-10s were one of the most effective weapon combinations in Desert Storm. This point should come as no surprise within the A-10 community, but again we are fighting against human notions and human emotions. During TASVAL 79, where the A-10's fundamental operational concepts and tactics were born, 57TFW (Tactical Fighter Weapon Center) pilots initially tended to prefer attacking with the GAU-8 gun over the AGM-65 Mavericks. The short story is: They DIED...alot. TASVAL scenarios were very intense: realistic fluid battlefronts, and real and simulated threat systems that drove nap-of-the-dirt maneuvering, usually pop-up engagements, and coordinated attacks either with a four-ship A-10 flight, or a similar force working with Army attack helos. Towards the end of the deployment, experienced pilots would advise the replacement pilots to press with the Mavericks against the Air Defense first, use their missiles up THEN press with the gun. When they followed the old hands advice they lived. When they followed the 'Cult of the Gun' they were the only A-10 drivers 'killed'.

I never knew for certain if the 'lessons learned' from TASVAL had been carried forward until Douglas Campbell wrote about it in his (~95%) definitive book on the history of the A-10 "The Warthog and the Close Air Support Debate". His book has the first references I've ever read of TASVAL (other than an Army Mental Health paper on the extraordinary divorce rates among Army participants at Fort Hunter Liggett) and confirms the lessons DID go forward.

But though the lessons went forward, so did the Cult of the Gun. Using the 'Gun' is visceral. I had conversations on this topic with my late Father-in-Law who flew the first F-4Es in SEA out of DaNang. He flew with the 4th TFS 'Fuujins' , then with the 366th TFW "Gunfighters". His favorite air to mud configuration was 20mm centerline and 2 more 20mms on the wings on top of his 20mm cannon in the nose. He likened the satisfaction of attacking with the gun to reaching out and touching the target.

I believe some of the same feeling he conveyed can be found in this C-Span Video interviewing Eric 'Fish' Salomonson and his wingman John 'Karl' Marks (Segment starts about 1:30 into the clip). These pilots 'killed' 23 tanks (and 10 damaged) flying three missions in one day. I remember watching this video the first time it aired. The 'pool' reporter asks some hilariously stupid questions at times so the whole video is pretty entertaining. At first I thought that the kill mix was 12 'gun' and 11 'missiles' because Salmonson mentions he had a 'bad Maverick' (~7:41) on the last sortie, but less than 10 seconds later he's asked about the mix and Salomonson tells the reporter the ratio was 17 kills with the Maverick and 6 kills with the gun. Keep that in mind as you watch the pilot's reaction at the ~11:20 mark when the reporter asks what it looks like when 'a Maverick hits one of the tanks' and listen to their comments: "huge explosion", "turret blew completely off", "spinning through air" etc. Then about the reporters ask (about the ~21:17 mark) about the effect of 'the cannon' and get in response: "not quite as big a boom", just "see flashes", "usually a little bit of a delay if it does light off"... etc ,,and then about 30 seconds of commentary on how it's harder to use (takes more skill). But when they get asked (~21:54) about "of all the weapons" which weapon do they they prefer?

Lt Marks closes his eyes, smiles and then Salomonson says: "The Gun".

Salomonson elaborates further including closing his eyes for a moment as if to relive the feeling in his head as he says....

"There's nothing like it."

There's no better example of the visceral power of 'the gun' than this interview. 16 (oops) 17 certain nearly instantaneous kills with missiles vs. 6 'slow cookers' and 10 'possibles' with the GAU-8...and they prefer the gun.

We're such irrational beings aren't we?

Part 1: The “Big Two” Close Air Support (CAS) Myths
Part 2: Those "not so good old days”
Part 3: Vietnam and the Rise of the “No-CAS Air Force” Myth
Part 4: Origins of the A-X Program
Part 5: Defining a New CAS Platform: the Evolution of the A-10
Part 6: A-10s 'Forever' ?
CAS Myths Sidebar: Army-Air Force Views on CAS and Airpower

Debunking The Close Air Support Myths: Part 5

2011-07-26T20:11:00.055-05:00

CAS, the Air Force, and the A-10
Part 5: Defining a New CAS Platform: the Evolution of the A-10
(scroll down for links to Parts 1-4,6 and 'Sidebars)

As a result of the 1966 study, the AF immediately launched an effort to field a dedicated CAS aircraft that would replace the (believed to be) best CAS aircraft of the time: the A-1 Skyraider. The A-1 was a naval strike aircraft developed towards the end of WWII and fielded too late for combat. It was used in Korea as a capable bomb-truck, and was re-invented for counter-insurgency warfare. An important planned improvement seen as needed in a Skyraider replacement was a better capability against ‘hard targets’, and this requirement dominated the replacement effort. The replacement program went through two major rounds of capability and mission analyses and numerous minor tweaks before the final A-X requirements were issued. All of these events were ‘fast-tracked’ by any contemporary definition of the term, which only highlights the point that the AF was NOT dragging its feet in bringing into existence a better CAS platform.

Epilogue: Ironically, a showdown on CAS between the Cheyenne and what was to become the A-10 was avoided -- as the Cheyenne program sank by the weight of its own technical requirements and ambitions.

A-10: An Aircraft Developed for a Milieu
As mentioned above, one of the requirements for a new CAS platform was more capability against ‘hard targets’. The ‘A-X’ Requirements Action Directive was issued for a specialized CAS aircraft, heavily armed, that could loiter for extended periods, and escort slower-moving aircraft. It was to have a crew of one, be comparatively ‘light weight’, and low maintenance. Although it was to provide armor protection to the pilot and critical systems, it was to be designed for operation in a ‘permissive environment’. According to the Air Force Center for Systems Engineering Case Study on the A-10:

Although the intended operating scenarios stressed a permissive environment, the CFP was to consider the feasibility of incorporating a limited air-to-air missile capability as a defensive measure. Survivability from ground fire was an essential characteristic for the A-X. Structural and system design would need to provide inherent survivability, to include self sealing fuel tanks and, if power flight controls were used, a manual backup system would be provided. The pilot and critical flight systems would be protected from 14.5mm projectiles (common Soviet Anti-Aircraft shells). The aircraft was to "incorporate maintainability characteristics which will make it possible for this system to meet its combat operational objectives with a minimum of maintenance effort and expenditure.

The definition of ‘permissive’ may be somewhat vague, but given what the threats were at the time, and the above paragraph statements we can safely presume it meant something similar to the circa 1966 South Vietnam environment: Small arms fire, some light anti-aircraft weapons and at least local air superiority. It was most definitely not conceived to face MANPADs or to go toe-to-toe regularly with ZSU-23 'Shilka' systems.

Initially, the ‘best’ A-X configuration was conceived to be turboprop powered, but by 1970 progress with high-bypass turbofan technology prompted the A-X program to direct potential contractors to examine using turbofan configurations. This change in plans created some interesting configurations to be submitted for development. Some of the concepts are illustrated below.

These were two of the early turboprop design concepts submitted to the Air Force:

General Dynamics Turboprop Concept

Northop Turboprop Concept

Here are the two turbofan concepts selected for prototyping and the so-called “fly-off” competition.

The Fairchild Republic A-10 ‘won’ the fly-off (another complicated and not all that clear-cut story for another series of posts sometime) and was put into production.

The twisted path of procurement, deployment and employment, modernization, life-extension, and ownership for the A-10 could fill several books, but this summary from an Air Force Case Study Report (in which the authors themselves somewhat ‘buy into’ Air Force CAS myths) is a fairly good and concise synopsis:

The A-10 aircraft had an inauspicious beginning for an Air Force that many have suggested only wanted the Air force to keep the Army from 'taking over' the CAS mission. The Air Force always believed that a fast multi-role fighter was a better choice for the feared war in Europe, but agreed to procure the A-10 for contingencies and “limited wars” like Vietnam. For its part, the Army seemed to like the A-10 as long as it did not threaten its own development of attack helicopters, and on several occasions the A-10 did appear as a political threat to continued funding for those helicopters. Despite these challenges, the Air Force did embrace development of the A-10 and produced a specialized CAS aircraft that would prove effective in a variety of operations throughout the world (fortunately for mankind in the 20th century, a shooting war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact never erupted, and it never became necessary to prove the A-10’s mettle against the armies and air forces of Eastern Europe). Close attention to key mission characteristics (lethality, survivability, responsiveness, and simplicity) allowed concept formulation and subsequent system design to result in an effective CAS aircraft, and design-to-cost goals kept the government and contractor focused on meeting the critical requirements at an affordable cost. The A-10 did not meet all its cost goals, but it came much closer to them than most major defense development programs did in that time frame or since then.

My only problem with the above paragraph is that it discusses how ‘well’ the program was run to meet cost and performance objectives in a manner that divorces the ‘qualitative’ from the ‘quantitative’ aspects of the A-10. To assess how well the program REALLY worked out we have to be aware of some of the A-10 ‘challenges’ that are not mentioned. Two paragraphs after the above, some caveats to this glowing appraisal were presented:

Alas, no program is perfect, and the A-10 provides no exceptions to that observation. Overlooked problems associated with production readiness and contractor financial stability did not go away and had to be resolved far too late in the development program. More significantly, the original structural design proved inadequate for the design life, and even fixes during production were inadequate for all but the latest aircraft produced.

Not mentioned above was the difficulty the designers had in de-bugging and integrating the 30mm cannon into the airframe, including getting past the gun’s tendency to ‘jam’ and engines ingesting the gun gases that eventuated with the loss of a test aircraft due to a double-engine flameout and a seriously injured test pilot as a result. Yet the program marched forward, as the ‘need’ was seen as pressing and real.

Part 1: The “Big Two” Close Air Support (CAS) Myths
Part 2: Those "not so good old days”
Part 3: Vietnam and the Rise of the “No-CAS Air Force” Myth
Part 4: Origins of the A-X Program
Part 6: A-10s 'Forever' ?
CAS Myths Sidebar: The A-10 and the 'Cult of the Gun'
CAS Myths Sidebar: Army-Air Force Views on CAS and Airpower

Debunking The Close Air Support Myths: Part 4

2011-07-25T19:53:00.049-05:00

CAS, the Air Force, and the A-10
Part 4: Origins of the A-X Program
(scroll down for links to Parts 1-3,5,6 and 'Sidebars)

In June of 1966, the AF Chief of Staff directed a study to determine if the AF was providing satisfactory support to the Army in Vietnam. By August the results were reported: The Army was generally satisfied with AF support, but in performing survey and decoding the results, the AF found that the Army, in the course of their ongoing experimentation and development of Air Assault and Air Mobility doctrines, were actually EXCLUDING the AF from certain missions and for 'fulfillment' by helicopters.

The survey also found that [due to the needs of the new Air Mobility concepts] the AF lacked the capabilities to 'perform helicopter escort and suppressive fire roles'. Thus, given the changes to Army operational doctrine, the finding meant that the multi-role platform approach (i.e. using aircraft such as A-7D for CAS when needed) wouldn't satisfy the perceived need for helicopter ‘escort’ and ‘fire support’ roles as the missions were then conceived and conducted.

Most remarkably, the 1966 discovery of the ‘exclusion’ of the Air Force from supporting Army missions was not even the first time it was ‘discovered’, nor was it the first time that the Air Force made an attempt to improve the situation. There is strong evidence that this schism between the services on CAS was driven by the Army’s aggressive ‘Airmobile’ aspirations appeared even long BEFORE the US began engaging in major ground combat in Vietnam.

According to “The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia 1961-1973” (Office of Air Force History, 1977) Army ‘Airmobile’ adherents were attempting to develop and expand their ‘Airmobile’ modus operandi without an AF fixed-wing aircraft support even before the Air Force (the American one anyway) was a major player in Vietnam:

Meanwhile, U.S. Army advisors were working to develop ARVN airborne helicopter assault tactics, using equipment of two U.S. Army companies which had arrived in Vietnam in late 1961. Almost at once a problem arose over fixed wing/air-ground coordination. According to directives issued by the newly organized U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (USMACV), all helicopter operations into areas where enemy opposition was expected were required to have fixed-wing tactical air cover. U.S. Army corps advisors who controlled helicopter usage, however, tended to ignore the requirement.
In April 1962, during a visit to South Vietnam, General LeMay learned that Army advisors were not calling for fixed-wing air support, that only about 10 percent of ARVN heliborne operations were accompanied by VNAF aircraft, and that the Air Support Operations center at Ton Son Nhut frequently were not informed of such operations. Concerned about this situation, LeMay subsequently obtained permission to assign air liaison officers (ALO’s) to all ARVN corps and division headquarters and USAF forward air controllers to augment VNAF liaison squadrons…,(pp 16-17)

Thus we see that as early as 1962(!), the Army was already pushing the Airmobile ‘way of war’ using ARVN operations as their laboratory, and the Air Force was already proactively seeking to support the ground forces in Vietnam as much as possible. Yet four years later the formal study findings showed that the Army was still pursuing a ‘go it alone’ Airmobile approach. It is therefore clear that a more reliable case can be made for the statement that the Army “did not want” Air Force CAS than there is for stating the Air Force “did not want to” perform the CAS mission.

This exclusion of the Air Force from missions generated by Army planners must have created a mistaken impression concerning AF ‘interest’ in CAS for a far larger number of men completing the mission on the ground who were not involved in mission planning who might have wondered ‘where was the Air Force?’ when they really would have preferred to have the AF overhead. One wonders how this misperception of the Air Force interest and support might have been exacerbated even more by the limitations placed on Army escort and fire support helicopters as the Army-Air Force conflict deepened. The big question is:

How many times were the men on the ground on the ‘losing end’ of the CAS conflict because the Army "couldn’t" support while the Air Force "wasn’t even asked"?

When this author began asking the question ‘why’ the Army excluded the Air Force from mission planning, there was a range of possibilities to consider. One rational explanation as to why the Army was excluding the Air Force from some force packages might have been that Army mission planners perceived the task of integrating the faster-moving AF assets with slower helicopter forces as ‘too difficult’. After researching the issue in some depth, I have to conclude that at the root of the problem, was Army Airmobile advocates wanting to prove their concepts as much as anything else. But this does not tell us exactly ‘why’ they wanted to prove them. Without knowing ‘why’ it was important to the Airmobile advocates to promote the self-escort and fire support to the detriment of Air Force support and cooperation, we can never know exactly the reason others within the Army chain of command did not solicit the Air Force for ideas on the subject, if indeed there really was a problem. It is difficult to believe that the men working CAS at the lower levels weren’t acutely aware of the ‘problem’ and easy to see that their frustration had to have been great.

To support the force packages (where the Air Force was being excluded) the Army was using armed helicopters for escort and suppressive fires, and decided the solution was to seek larger, more heavily armed helicopters as a solution to correct their shortfalls. It is anyone’s guess how an alternative history would have unfolded if the Army planners had chosen to seriously seek a joint solution by working with the Air Force instead of persistently planning the Air Force out of the solution. Some alternative histories are plausible based upon what the players were doing at the time. For instance, the Air Force was trying to field new precision capabilities at the time that could have benefitted the CAS mission and vice versa: such cooperation might have brought precision strike capabilities to fruition a decade or two earlier than it actually occurred. This is not to make the point that such a capability would have been developed, but that there were developments that could have been employed that did not require development of a new class of aircraft or possibly even weapons, ‘if only’ collaboration had been sought.

Part 1: The “Big Two” Close Air Support (CAS) Myths
Part 2: Those "not so good old days”
Part 3: Vietnam and the Rise of the “No-CAS Air Force” Myth
Part 5: Defining a New CAS Platform: the Evolution of the A-10
Part 6: A-10s 'Forever' ?
CAS Myths Sidebar: The A-10 and the 'Cult of the Gun'
CAS Myths Sidebar: Army-Air Force Views on CAS and Airpower

Debunking The Close Air Support Myths: Part 3

2011-07-24T13:36:00.003-05:00

CAS, the Air Force, and the A-10
Part 3: Vietnam and the Rise of the “No-CAS Air Force” Myth
(scroll down for links to Parts 1,2,4-6 and 'Sidebars)

Update: DefenseTech has a thread going now that couldn't be a better example of the Power of Myths.

Update 2 (6 Feb 12) DoD Buzz has another thread going that couldn't be a better example of the Power of Myths.

Because the Vietnam War would be a war fought quite unlike those before it, the 'lessons learned' from earlier conflicts proved to be less than ‘completely’ helpful in Southeast Asia. It is not that Vietnam could not have been fought much like WWII, or even Korea, but that the lessons were less than useful because Vietnam was not fought as wars before it. Political exigencies and choices made by the US civilian leadership to NOT risk escalation through more 'vigorous' execution minimized the impact of the past lessons learned. It is well documented, that when North Vietnam risked its forces with more exposure through more conventional military operations their forces were dealt with decisively by air interdiction and ground forces, and that when we chose to pursue aggressive strategic bombing and mining of the North, such efforts (as in 1972’s ‘Linebacker II’) produced decisive military results.

Changes in Army Operational Doctrine Gives Rise to the CAS Dispute
As outlined in Andrew Krepinevich’s 1986 book “The Army and Vietnam”, the conflicts and issues between the ‘Regular’ and ‘Airmobile ‘Army factions in the early 1960’s can be viewed as the factors that essentially forced the greater conflict with the Air Force. The Airmobile advocates (such as General Robert R. Williams) really wanted to prove their concept in a higher-intensity conflict arena than Vietnam and feared that proving the concept in Vietnam would not be enough to convince the non-believers in the Army that Airmobile Forces were desirable in a more conventional role. But the ‘Regular’ Army adherents would not entertain the conversion of heavy forces to airmobile forces for conventional warfare purposes. It was only due to pressure coming from the OSD that compelled the Army to do ‘something’ and form the first airmobile division. In “The Army and Vietnam” Krepinevich appears to address these internal and external conflicts as separate issues, yet much of how we recounts the history unfolding virtually screams to this reader that it was Army Airmobile ambitions and internal friction that fueled the push for organic winged (albeit ‘rotary’) fire support, and it was this push that fueled the Army-Air Force conflict on the same subject. I believe this perspective is reinforced by known events and actions leading up to (for the lack of a better term) ‘major ground involvement’ in Vietnam.

By 1965, the Army, in the pursuit to improve their attack helicopter capability to support their air assault concept, had been increasing the spending for upgrading armament on the existing ‘interim’ AH-1 and was well along in working towards fielding something called the Advanced Aerial Fire Support System. Readers will more likely know it as the AH-56A Cheyenne if they know of it at all. Existing DoD doctrine in 1965 allowed the Army to pursue rotary wing solutions to providing ‘suppressive fire’ support that could augment but not replace CAS. The Army was thus developing its ‘Airmobile’ doctrine and sought to expand acquisition and use of both rotary and fixed wing aircraft to support it. In particular, the Army's effort to acquire more Caribou and Mohawk aircraft was seen as trespassing into AF missions and the effort was shot down at the SecDef (yes, ‘McNamara’) level and NOT at the Air Force level. Lest one assume this was due to some ‘anti’ army-aviation bias on the part of Secretary McNamara, it should be noted here that it was McNamara who supported the Air Mobility advocates within the Army in standing up Aviation Brigades. McNamara’s support was given in opposition to the positions of the more conventional warfare advocates, up to and including supporting the diversion of funds from heavy divisions to acquire Airmobile capabilities, and such support was given years before America moved beyond the ‘advisory’ stage in Vietnam.

The 'fixed wing expansion' attempt shot down by McNamara, combined with the Army's efforts to field the Cheyenne (the roots of which also reach back to circa 1962 before major involvement in Vietnam) was seen by some in the AF as proof of the Army's intent to expand beyond the 'suppressive fire' mission and into the CAS arena. This was due to the quantum leap ahead in rotary-wing capabilities (high speed, advanced avionics, 30mm gun, grenade launcher/mini-gun, etc) that the Cheyenne represented.

Lockheed AH-56 Cheyenne (US Army Photo)

Indeed today, the Cheyenne is often thought of as a ‘hybrid’ (helo-fixed wing) design. This apparent attempted ‘mission creep’ on the part of the Army did nothing to reduce tensions between the AF and Army.

There were Congress-critters taking sides (largely the Army’s) in the debate, and one in particular, U.S. Representative Otis Pike, played a major role in bringing things to a head. He convened a hearing in late '65 and his committee’s findings released in early 1966 criticized the AF for not being more “serious” about fielding a better CAS capability. These findings were in spite of the on-going AF effort to field an interim platform (The quite effective ‘fast-mover’ A-7D) while searching for a more permanent solution. IMHO, Pike’s background as a WWII Marine aviator probably ‘poisoned the well’ on the issue, since Marine Aviation’s sole reason for existence during WWII was to support the Rifleman on the ground. Like many of my ground-dwelling brothers-in-arms, Pike probably confused/confuses CAS with Airpower, instead of recognizing the first as a subset of the second. As it will be noted later, in reality the Army was generally happy with the AF’s CAS capabilities with the only exceptions related to helicopter escort operations, so it appears that ‘someone’ was overstating the case against the AF on CAS for reasons that are anyone’s guess.

There was a behind-the-scenes cooperative effort at the highest levels that occurred within this highly politicized environment to resolve -- or at least lessen--the ‘CAS’ friction between the Army and Air Force. In the Spring of 1966, the Army Chief of Staff General Harold Johnson and Air Force Chief of Staff General John McConnell “met secretly to resolve air support differences that the Vietnam War had aggravated” (Douglas Campbell, “The Warthog and the Close Air Support Debate”). They arrived at a compromise agreement that changed the criteria for dividing responsibility from aircraft weight to aircraft type. The Army was thus allowed to provide helicopter fire support and the Air force retained the CAS mission. As in all compromises, no one was completely happy.

A cynic would assume that the Army, or at least nefarious members thereof, were consciously attempting a turf takeover to support their Airmobile aspirations. But a more likely (to me) explanation is that the situation at the lower levels of command was more along the lines of the Army Airmobile commanders wanting to control as much of their own destiny as possible by making as many of their ‘fires’ as organic as possible and at all times, including when in contact with the enemy. This desire has appeared to have been pursued with single-minded purpose since the earliest days of Vietnam to the modern era, without too much concern for the unintended consequences to the overall ability to eliminate the enemy, or reducing his capabilities PRIOR to contact. [I believe Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom operations and AF-Army friction during give some validity to the second explanation.] Pick your own root cause, but all the evidence suggests Army commanders have consistently demonstrated an insular and expansionist tendency that clearly flags them as the chief instigator of friction between the services on the CAS issue. I assert that what will follow is some fairly strong evidence of the Army’s culpability in fostering the ongoing interservice conflict over CAS.

Part 1: The “Big Two” Close Air Support (CAS) Myths
Part 2: Those "not so good old days”
Part 4: Origins of the A-X Program
Part 5: Defining a New CAS Platform: the Evolution of the A-10
Part 6: A-10s 'Forever' ?
CAS Myths Sidebar: The A-10 and the 'Cult of the Gun'
CAS Myths Sidebar: Army-Air Force Views on CAS and Airpower

Debunking The Close Air Support Myths: Part 2

2011-07-23T20:14:00.130-05:00

CAS, the Air Force, and the A-10
Part 2: Those "not so good old days”
(scroll down for links to Parts 1,3-6 and 'Sidebars)
‘Learning Large Lessons’ has the most cogent and concise summary (p. 12) of the state of Air-Ground operations in WWII and throughout most of the Cold War that I have ever read:

In World War II, and during subsequent major conflicts, each service largely fought independently. This is not to say that the Army and the Air Force have not effectively integrated their capabilities in the past. Nevertheless, the most effective “systems” of cooperation were generally developed in the field—not by the institutions responsible for training, organizing, or equipping forces—because the need was so great. Perhaps the most compelling example of this development of closely integrated air-ground capabilities can be found in the experience of General Omar Bradley’s 12th Army Group in Europe during World War II.

The above is followed by a citation from Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers: Innovation in the U.S. Army, 1917–1945, by David E. Johnson (1998):

A postwar review of operations in the European theater asserted that the Army’s failure to develop air-ground doctrine meant that means of cooperation had to be invented extemporaneously in the field. In the combat theaters, ground and air commanders were forced to create ad hoc procedures for tactical air power because their superiors provided no centralized direction. . . . The final after-action report of General Omar Bradley’s 12th Army Group emphasized that “the air-armor team is a most powerful combination in the breakthrough and exploitation. . . . The use of this coordinated force, in combat, should be habitual.” Thus, although air support of ground operations played an important role in the Allied drive into Germany and procedures were continually improved, the initiative came from below. In the combat zones, where Americans were dying, intra-service agendas were discarded and field expedients were devised to overcome institutional agendas.

It wasn’t ‘Air’ ignoring ‘Ground’ at the higher command levels -- the “ignoring” part cut both ways. I submit that since the early Vietnam era through to today, our Air and Ground forces have been far more integrated, and increasingly so, than in WWII. I also submit that in the post Goldwater-Nichols Act world, the (joint) doctrine driving the integration now actually does ‘come from above’. The principles, techniques, and tactics of our Air Force ‘air’ (and space) and Army ‘ground’ forces are now developed and practiced ‘jointly’ in peace and then applied and adjusted ‘jointly’ in war far more often than any time in history.

Pre A-10 CAS: “Secondary Missions” NOT “Afterthoughts”
The Air Force philosophy for ‘matching aircraft to mission’ leading up to Vietnam was that aircraft designed for the most demanding mission requirements and hostile environments could also be employed to satisfy what was perceived as less demanding missions and less hostile environments. This wasn’t an original ‘Air Force’ idea, but a legacy of Army philosophical from WWII and before. Learning Large Lessons points out no fewer than three times that the existence of an Army having forces (of all kinds) prepared for the most demanding missions was presumed to also be capable in turn of dealing with lesser contingencies. This tenet has roots that go back to the Army’s 1923 Field Service Regulations and has survived through to the modern era at least up to the Army’s 1986 FM 100-5 ‘Operations’ Manual and the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff’s 2001 JP 3-0, ‘Doctrine for Joint Operations’ (superseded in 2006). Preparing for the most demanding missions on the assumption that a force could then deal with lesser ones therefore is a tenet completely consistent with long-standing ARMY philosophy, firmly rooted in ARMY doctrine, and which the Air Force inherited. That the Air Force worked under the belief that it could satisfy the Close Air Support (CAS) mission using: 1) aircraft designed with capabilities developed for other air-to-ground (strike) missions, 2) by multi-role aircraft, or by 3) aircraft modified for air-to-ground missions that had been originally designed for air-to-air roles can hardly be criticized as ‘Air Force’ short-sightedness.

These doctrinal beliefs were built upon experience so were not mere assumptions. The relevant 'lessons learned' in WWII and Korea were that Strategic Bombing and Interdiction were far more ‘decisive’ than providing CAS. The relative decisiveness of Strategic Bombing and Interdiction was ‘true’ for several reasons, not the least of which was that Strategic Bombing and Interdiction missions had the highest probability of hurting the enemy and the lowest probability for killing our own people. This should be unsurprising, given the weapon delivery accuracies of the day, as well as the primitive state of the art of air-ground coordination and communications. It can also be said, that Strategic Bombing and Deep Air Interdiction missions posed the greatest challenges for aircraft design (range, speed, defensive armament, payload) and posed the greatest risk to the aircrews. However, from an “execution” point of view, CAS was/is the more complex mission: it presents the mission planners with the worst possible consequences of failure combined with the highest demand for precision.

Part 1: The “Big Two” Close Air Support (CAS) Myths
Part 3: Vietnam and the Rise of the “No-CAS Air Force” Myth
Part 4: Origins of the A-X Program
Part 5: Defining a New CAS Platform: the Evolution of the A-10
Part 6: A-10s 'Forever' ?
CAS Myths Sidebar: The A-10 and the 'Cult of the Gun'
CAS Myths Sidebar: Army-Air Force Views on CAS and Airpower

Debunking The Close Air Support Myths: Part 1

2011-07-22T23:00:00.096-05:00

CAS, the Air Force, and the A-10
(scroll down for links to Parts 2-6 and 'Sidebars)

I've posted a bit of what I’m about to cover in different places as comments, including one in response to a Strategy Page piece quite a while ago, but my hope is that this series will serve nicely as a single-point source for me to refer others. There is so much mythology surrounding the Air Force, Close Air Support and the origins of the A-10, that one is constantly running into it on the web -- which I’ve found to be extremely tiresome over the years (This post should save me bags of time in the future). My overarching goal is to provide evidence, if not proof, that certain myths that have risen concerning the title subjects are indeed ‘myths’. I also realize that there is no moving some people off a well dug-in position (especially some--not all—of my brothers-in-arms on the ‘grunt’ side of the family who seem to have employed the mental equivalent of a stainless-steel nuclear-powered trenching tool). I would at least hope the information here shakes and cracks the foundations of their close-held, albeit groundless, beliefs.

The “Big Two” Close Air Support (CAS) Myths
There are other myths out there, but I view the following as the ‘Big Two’.

Myth #1: “CAS Was More Important to the Flyboys When the Air Force Was Part of the Army”
This one usually gets trotted out as a solution to a perceived (i.e. not necessarily actual) discrete ‘problem’ or event. It usually makes the news every time Air Force-wielded Airpower doesn’t “make somebody’s day” (regardless whether or not it was busy was making MANY OTHER ‘somebodies’ day at the time). You will also hear it whenever a non-CAS acquisition program comes under scrutiny. Something like:

“Never mind more F-##s! We need more planes like the A-10 or A-1 or (fill in the blank – preferably with some ‘prop job’)!”

Or more obliquely …

“Put the AF back into the Army like in WWII and then the money will be spent on the ‘right’ aircraft!”

There is no basis of fact to suggest either of the above is true. I believe they are usually uttered by those who, to paraphrase Dr. Thomas Sowell, “see only problems with single solutions” and never think in terms of answers involving ‘tradeoffs’. In this case their single solution would be based upon a non-existent major premise, that is to say, they propose a solution that is in search of a problem.

Myth #2: “The Air Force ‘Doesn’t Like’ Close Air Support”
This one has several variants. Among the most popular are versions of “Fighter Pilots just want to zoom around in the sky”, or “The Air Force would rather shoot down other airplanes than help the troops on the ground”. Believers in this myth often point out that their ‘proof’ is in the lack of a dedicated CAS aircraft post-war design prior to the A-10, or wild claims that by the Air Force wanting to phase out and replace the A-10 at various times, with aircraft that did not have the same physical and operating characteristics that the AF didn’t really care… as if a different approach somehow represented a desire to abandon the ‘grunt’ on the ground. The wildest claim of all IMHO is that the post-1947 Air Force had to be metaphorically dragged to CAS in a ‘shotgun wedding’ of sorts: i.e. the idea that the Air Force was allegedly ‘shamed’ or ‘forced’ to provide CAS and/or buy the A-10 by an indignant and righteous Congress/Army/public (pick one or more). All of these claims are demonstrably false.

Debunking via Historical Review

Close Air Support From 1940 through the Korean War
At times in this post--and in this section in particular-- I will be relying on content and sources found in RAND’s “Learning Large Lessons: The Evolving Roles of Ground Power and Air Power in the Post-Cold War Era”. Despite the title, it provides quite a bit of information prior to the Post-Cold War Era as perspective on what the ‘roles’ were/are evolving ‘from’.

From the front matter of the publication: “Several of the generals who developed and employed the air-ground cooperation system for the U.S. 12th Army Group during World War II in Western Europe at Fort Ehrenbreitstein, Koblenz, Germany on April 6, 1945. From left to right: Lieutenant General George S. Patton, Jr., 3d Army; Major General Otto Paul “Opie” Weyland, XIX Tactical Air Command; General Omar N. Bradley, 12th Army Group; Major General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Ninth Air Force; Lieutenant General Courtney H. Hodges, First Army; and Major General Elwood R. “Pete” Quesada, IX Tactical Air Command. (U.S. Army photograph), collection of the Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library and Museum, courtesy of the U.S. National Park Service”

I’ve referenced this publication many times on various comment threads, so forgive (but don’t try to stop) me if you’ve “already heard this one”. The PDF version is free online at RAND (LINK) but you can also order a hardcopy from RAND at the same link or from Amazon.

Note: In reviewing the front matter of this material I find that Dr Christopher Bowie, “Deputy Director, Air Force Strategic Planning, Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Programs, Headquarters U.S. Air Force (AF/XPX)” was the sponsor of this publication in 2007. I may have noticed it before and it didn’t ‘click’ that I should mention it, but in the interest of full disclosure, I acknowledge that in past years I have performed some minor analyses for Dr. Bowie, have cited his peer-reviewed journal and RAND publications in my own work, and have communicated with him on rare occasion, mostly by e-mail, on sundry ‘Airpower’ topics.

When the United States entered World War II, Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall oversaw the reorganization of the Army to deal with the demands of the global conflagration. The Army in effect divided itself and reorganized into three autonomous components: Army Air Forces, Army Ground Forces, and Army Service Forces. Therefore, the idea that creation of the U.S. Air Force also created a sharp break of some bond with the U.S. Army’s ground forces is simply not true. The separation of ‘air’ and ‘ground’ started before WWII and the separation was just moved one step up on the command chain in September 1947.

The use of ‘Forces’ term in these descriptions is indicative of the separation by ‘types’ of force to be employed. During the war (WWII) the separation became more formalized. When the Army published its 1943 manual on “Command and Employment of Air Power” (FM 100-2) it included this rather stark and explicit statement on the “new relationship between Army ground and air forces”:

“Land Power and Air Power are co-equal and interdependent forces; neither is an auxiliary of the other.”

The 1943 manual went further and defined command relationships that have been passed down through time and are still recognizable within today’s joint doctrine. (Text in [brackets] are mine and describe the modern corollary for emphasis):

Control of available air power must be centralized and command must be through the air force commander if this inherent flexibility and ability to deliver a decisive blow are to be fully exploited. Therefore, the command of air and ground forces in a theater of operations will be vested in the superior commander charged with the actual conduct of operations in the theater [today’s Combatant Command Commander, ex: CENTCOM], who will exercise command of air forces through the air force commander [today’s Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC)] and command of ground forces through the ground force commander [today’s Ground Component Commander (GCC)].

Therefore we see that even before there was an Air Force as a separate military department, there were separate forces and that the Army leadership had already put the key tenet of the modern Air Force in place: ‘Centralized Control’ with ‘Decentralized Execution’. This basic Airpower tenet is therefore an Army creation; NOT an Air Force one.

So how did CAS “work” in WWII? Was it better in 1941-46 and only later marginalized or ignored by the ‘new’ Air Force from 1947 on as it is claimed by some? Were things ‘better’ when it was an ‘Army Air Forces’ mission?

In a word: NO.

Part 2: Those "not so good old days”
Part 3: Vietnam and the Rise of the “No-CAS Air Force” Myth
Part 4: Origins of the A-X Program
Part 5: Defining a New CAS Platform: the Evolution of the A-10
Part 6: A-10s 'Forever' ?
CAS Myths Sidebar: The A-10 and the 'Cult of the Gun'
CAS Myths Sidebar: Army-Air Force Views on CAS and Airpower

Hoss Cartwright on Long Range Strike

2011-07-16T18:23:00.002-05:00

Looks like Hoss is Still a Little Slow, even when trying to circle the wagons to protect the Womenfolk and Rice Bowls. I suspect the Rice Bowls are more important.

Well, Adam and Little Joe were always the smart ones.

p.s. the General is a fighter meat-servo. He's got the brains to know better, but it smells like he's got one very big Long Range Blind Spot.

Army of JSF-Haters STILL Short of Logicians

2011-07-15T16:48:00.003-05:00

I'm back home (as of 00:30 hrs) Thursday from a business trip. Blog-wise, my immediate aspirations are to try to 1) ferret out the real Next Gen "Semi"-Long Range Strike story and 2) close out a substantial CAS Mythology post in my little 'spare' time.

BUT! since someone 'asked' for a comment on the latest "F-35 is Evil" drumbeat (especially one so loaded with snarky false confidence) and it is such an easy request to fulfill....I figure, eh-why not?

Latest 'Isn't This Just Awful' F-35 scare headline from Flight Global: "Lockheed adds $771 million to early F-35 production bills." I suspect Steve Trimble might not have written the original headline, but if he did.... 'meh'. Headlines, if done properly, should draw the reader in. If the story is boring, it is not unheard of to have the 'zing' come from careful phrasing of both headline and story. Such careful delivery allows interested and targeted readers to overwrite their own bias and beliefs into the piece.
This headline gets transformed into the less accurate: "Early F-35 costs increase $771M, Lockheed says" at DoD Buzz.

So.... 'why' are these 'early' bills/costs/whatever "increased"? Trimble's original Flight Global article contained the 'bottom line', faithfully parroted at DoD Buzz:

    The $771 million reflects the impact of the 2004 weight reduction redesign on the Lockheed’s production system, the company said. The redesign carved off thousands of pounds of excess weight, but suppliers could not keep up with the flow of design changes. That led to late delivery of parts, then extra labour hours to install them outside of the normal manufacturing sequence, the company said.
    As the F-35 continues to be developed even as the first production models are delivered, the $771 million bill also includes the cost of future modifications to make the aircraft standard with jets delivered after the development phase ends in 2016.
    It is possible that the bill for LRIPs 1–3 could be reduced in the future. “The F-35 team is focused now on any opportunity to reduce the concurrency estimate and improve the final cost-to-complete on these early production lots,” Lockheed said.

Ahhh....so the cost of the 'production system' weight-reduction redesign, for building all three variants in the entire fleet built between then and the last F-35 to be delivered someday probably decades from now , as well as its impact on the aircraft built during the weight reduction redesign effort, is 'billed' in the present time, and this 'bill' might even be reduced in the future, since it assumes future costs included in the 'bill' as well?

At the end of the DoD Buzz article, the fever swamp known as the 'comments section' does its usual 'kill the witch' thing until a commenter "Another Guest" tries to inject a little sanity:

    I'm sure an Australian, other fighter manufacturer marketing rep, or nauseus dog will try to correct this uninterested observation. Trimble's article implies these costs were related to 2004 weight reductions to meet F-35B STOVL requirements by shaving weight off parts common to all variants and unique to the Marine model.
    An assumption then follows that this is a one-time expense...caused by the Marine requirement that no other aircraft can duplicate. It constitutes one quarter of one percent of total program costs while ensuring better performance of all aircraft types to include decreased fuel consumption that may retrieve some of the cost.
    From LRIP 5 on, LockMart will assume more, if not all over and above costs. BTW, a Gripen/Raptor/F-15SE (or F-16, F/A-18) mix would be nowhere near as effective with most aircraft obsolete against future threats at far higher acquisit[i]on costs than Tee claims. Seen any F-22s flying lately, bombing Libya or Afghanistan, being sold to allies, or replacing Naval service aircraft?

Well said. Of course now the denizens of the fever swamp are furiously trying to 'down-rate' his comment, as if that means anything. But let us look at the hard numbers behind 'Another Guest's cogent observation on the costs involved in this 'bill'.

Compare these two charts:

Extract from a Canadian briefing on the F-35

How the $771M 'Bill' breaks down over the whole program

From these two charts we can readily see that even with a massively reduced F-35 buy, the 'cost' of the weight reduction re-engineering amortized over the number of units built comes under a piddling $1M/unit. In any case the end cost is still far, far, (millions $ for the A model, and I would guess similarly for the B and C) below the unit cost difference between 'actuals' and internal estimates.

In short: Add the cost of the weight reduction and to-date you are still delivering aircraft well under internal cost estimates on the curve and those costs are trending orders of magnitude lower than the bulls*** CAPE estimates.

Thus we now understand what the 'bill' is.

Now Let's Talk "Value"

What is a cynic? A man who knows the price of everything and the value of nothing.

--Oscar Wilde

What did we as taxpayers get in return (Besides ensuring an 'executable' STOVL version)? We could do an analysis of the design changes to see where lower weights translate into lower stress and wear and tear and in turn higher reliability and fewer failures and balance that against the ledger where reduced weight may have increased probability of failure or loss, but we don't have sufficient data. I would suspect the balance is positive in 'reliability', but cannot prove it. All I do know is that the entire program is being managed to constrain Total Life Cycle Costs.

What we CAN easily perceive is that since the airplanes weigh 'thousands' of pounds less at the lighter weights, the fleet will almost certainly burn BILLIONS of Dollars LESS fuel over the operational life of the fleet. A common aircraft design rule of thumb that shakes out from the Breguet range equation is that for every 1.00% of aircraft weight removed, ~0.75% less fuel is required. 3000 aircraft, 8000 hr operational life, SFC ~.7 as basis for fuel consumption......do the math.

BTW...
The 'McCain' angle is just a red herring. McCain is (still) just a self-aggrandizing, hot-headed a**hat. What else would anyone expect from him?

Hat tip Solomon at SNAFU: Heh. Bill Sweetman 'double-downs' on the topic. I should have used the words 'Anti-JSF drumbeat' more. Honestly, what brand of stupid do you have to sniff to try to amortize the total 'bill' for re-engineering production capability for the entire fleet against just the first 31 aircraft? Whomp, Whomp, Whomp.

From "The Hill" --Think tank to Obama: Defense budget not your domestic ATM

2011-07-09T10:29:00.000-05:00

H/T Instapundit.

From an article at The Hill ...
The Heritage Foundation marks the moment when President Obama lets the mask slip and reveals his real priorities:

“The nice thing about the defense budget is it’s so big, it’s so huge, that a 1 percent reduction is the equivalent of the education budget,” Obama said, immediately noting he was “exaggerating” the exact numbers.

Only by an order of magnitude Mr. President. Only by an order of magnitude (~13X).

Mr. President, the 'nice thing' about the defense budget is that it is one of the few things in the Federal Budget that actually belongs there....unlike all that other crap you want to spend it on.

The Heritage Blog Post that was the source of The Hill's article also mentions some specific problems with how "Defense" is (not) managed by the current Administration:

What the President left out is the impact his “modest changes” are having on our men and women in the Armed Forces. The poster child for stupid defense budgeting is the F–35: how the Administration has stretched out, exaggerated the costs of, and played politics with funding for the military’s next-generation fighter aircraft. Today’s air forces are the oldest in the history of U.S. air forces. Replacing old airframes and ensuring the U.S. maintains its superiority over potential adversaries is a national security priority.
Yet Obama has done little to show he takes the challenge of modernizing the air fleets seriously. Particularly troubling is his penchant to let the Pentagon slow-roll the fielding of the F–35B (the vertical takeoff and landing version of the fighter for the Marine Corps). The answer may be, as one defense analyst notes, “Put the Obama Administration on Probation, Not The F–35B.”
Today, the Marines are stuck with aging airframes that have limited capabilities and are expensive to operate—a double problem. In contrast, the “B is a winner on both counts. The impact on the fleet is significant. The Marines go from three to one aircraft; and it gets a new aircraft with significant reductions in cost of maintenance.”
The fate of the F–35 is a case study in the President’s penny-wise, pound-foolish approach to defense spending.

President Obama's early successes depended on enough people believing "He surely doesn't mean that!" when every stupid idea was brought forth. His problem now is that more people take his Regime's machinations at face value.
P.S. I had NO idea there was an F-35 story at the end of this string when I started pulling it.

Deliver Us From Bean Counters

2011-07-06T20:38:00.006-05:00

Background:
I’ve been ‘taking to task’ a hyperventilating commenter over at DoD Buzz who goes by the handle ‘Engineer_Economist’. He (I am assuming he is a ‘he’) is in a fully formed outrage over what he claims is the completely failed and doomed F-35 program. He bases his claims on what I see as superficial knowledge of what might be the actual status of the program and what IMHO publically mimics a school-house awareness of the acquisition process (see for yourself here). It is entirely possible that he has worked one or more 'smallish' programs (as compared to the F-35), but doubtfully anywhere near a Program Manager level. This experience seems to have reinforced a dogmatic, and incorrect belief that the acquisition process must be implemented according to strict interpretation of a very rigid paradigm, and if not then there is a certainty that chaos and failure WILL result. When and if he someday runs a program, he will find there are many ways to ‘skin a cat’ within the bounds of the acquisition process. When and if he someday gets involved in a program with major political ramifications, then maybe he’ll see where real program chaos comes from.

In the linked-to comment thread, I gave him a challenge (my typos corrected):

I haven't avoided your arguments at all, just cast scorn on them as hybris-ridden rantings of a program manager wannabe. If you can't Grok that the objectives and goals of the processes are more important than the processes themselves, that we have rules and processes to foster success and order--not to DEFINE success and order, that is not my problem. Let me flip your arguments back on you: tell us EXACTLY WHY what is so overarchingly important to you, should be just as important to me, and EXACTLY WHAT will be the consequences if your worst fears come true if no one listens to you....and I will post a complete ‘fisking’ of it at my place.

'Engineer_Economist’s' response:

yes you have avoided the arguments and you are still avoiding them. you have faith in and are selling us on the unit cost estimates when development is far from complete. again, I have to explain to you, the F-35's latest SAR shows MS B as being rescinded, and all the dates for IOT&E, IOC, MS C, FOC, are all TBD. That means there is no schedule. They canceled the DAB that was supposed to determine these dates. They can't even hold the DAB the program is so screwed. If you'd pay attention I wouldn't have to REPEAT to you over and over again why this matters. F-35 continues the repeated failing pattern of late, overbudget, and underperforming programs. If we continue to reward such programs, the problem will just get worse and worse. We will fail to properly recapitalize our defense system portfolios, forcing us to operate legacy systems longer & longer and greater risk. If I just say "DMS" are you able to make the connection or am I going to have to explain THAT to you as well?

And now, I fulfill my promise
The only 'splaining' you've done is to yourself –and it is more appropriately called ‘rationalization’. Simply declaring you are ‘right’ about something without supporting facts or claiming doom without explaining how and why “B” will follow “A”. Stating what form it will take and assertion of doom with certainty) does not explain much less prove diddly-squat. The irony here is that if you had managed to judiciously insert a few ‘perhaps’ , ‘mights’, or ‘increased chances of’, I don’t think hardly anyone would have have had a problem with your comments. But instead you pretty much only insist repeatedly that the 'formalities must be observed' and declare that because they’re not occurring according to a script (as you believe they should be), then an epic program failure is happening all around us. And all of your outrage is based upon ... made-up and poorly understood (public) cost estimates (and expectations) as well as your frail outsider understanding of actual schedule drivers and impacts to-date, and all with no idea of the nature of program or what risks are behind it or what the risks are that sit ahead. The program does. DoD does. Political posturing aside, I believe even enough of Congress does. You don't, and are in a sophomoric snit about it.

Let the Fisking begin!
Your argument is sufficiently vague to ALMOST evade ‘fisking’, but not vague enough.
We’ll take your key ‘points’ in order.

>RE: ” …the F-35's latest SAR shows MS B as being rescinded, and all the dates for IOT&E, IOC, MS C, FOC, are all TBD. That means there is no schedule. They canceled the DAB that was supposed to determine these dates”

Such hyperbolic breathlessness! Schedules and progress don’t magically disappear based upon a declaration of a Milestone do-over or reprogramming, so rescinding MS B doesn’t mean there is no schedule or budget baseline. It DOES mean that the program is still working to a previous baseline while it is developing updated schedules and budget forecasts for a new baseline.

>RE: “They can't even hold the DAB the program is so screwed…”.

No. It means that because the F-35 is a VERY large and complex program, nothing is easy - even bean counting. In fact, if you read around a bit, I believe you will find that the biggest driver in delaying the DAB is the reconciliation of the so-called ‘independent’ CAPE and program cost estimates. The PEO wants to get things right, and ensure as much actual program data is available so the DAB is now slated for sometime in the Fall. Good on him.

"It was decided: why don't we let a little bit more of the performance of the program both in test and production play out through the summer; why don't we let that integrated master schedule get finished, do a schedule risk assessment of it, present that to service leadership, let them ponder IOC [initial operating capability], let the operational test planning complete," said JSF program executive officer Vice Adm. David Venlet. "Then, rather than set a baseline now with a whole bunch of go-finish-your-homework assignments, we will go finish the homework and then present the new baseline for [Pentagon procurement chief] Dr. [Ashton] Carter's approval in the fall of this year."
….The delay is a matter of being thorough, not an indication of new problems, Venlet said.
"That is not a sign of alarm. It is, I think, a determination to continue in a deliberate fashion with good solid fundamentals applied to get things done," he said.

Thus we find the JSF program is evidently not “so screwed” as the ranting of a PM ‘wannabe’ might lead us to believe and insists MUST be true in spite of evidence otherwise.

>RE: “…. If we continue to reward such programs, the problem will just get worse and worse. We will fail to properly recapitalize our defense system portfolios, forcing us to operate legacy systems longer & longer and greater risk.”

I think we may assume that you are using the term “reward” metaphorically for deciding to continue pursuit of a program instead of a literal and illogical ‘reward/punish’ paradigm. Mission need and the cost of meeting that need versus the risk of not being capable of meeting that mission need is all that matters in determining the viability of a program. To-date, the F-35 program is seen as executable by those responsible, and the mission need remains in the eyes of the users. As I’ve noted before, outside observers on the sideline don’t know diddly, never have – never will.

On CAPE estimates and comparisons for casual readers dropping in:
My ‘opponent’ gives much credence to external estimations (that employ varying assumptions, (many of which are irrelevant) that predict outlandish costs In the out-years, yet completely discounted the fact that LRIP 1-3 deliveries have beaten internal program cost estimates to-date and are trending downward. Like many, he chose to believe external numbers. I choose to believe my ‘own lying eyes’ and the information in front of them. [BTW: I suspect these same internal estimates are now showing adverse impacts to earlier LRIP 4 and 5 due to constantly imposed program ‘tweaks’, but I also predict they will STILL be significantly lower than the farcical external estimate methodologies, including CAPE’s.]
Since reconciling the CAPE estimates with actual costs to-date and internal cost projections is a sticking point that will remain with us for some time, I cannot pass up this opportunity to highlight some known aspects of the CAPE estimate -- and how much ‘relevance’ the government really (vs. publically) places on CAPE estimations… and we need not look any further than how the LRIP 4 negotiations were conducted [emphasis mine]:

Lockheed Martin officials take issue with the Pentagon’s APUC estimates, which come from the cost analysis and program evaluation (CAPE) office. “The CAPE model uses production costs derived from the F-18 and F-22 programs and extrapolates them out to 2037 using only a 50-percent confidence level,” Steve O’Bryan, vice president for F-35 business development, told AIN. “That model takes no account of our plans for lean production, nor our much lower supplier costs. For instance, we can buy an F-35 radar for half the cost of an F-22 radar. We can make the same order of savings on the electronic warfare system and other avionics, including the single-piece plasma screen in the cockpit.”
Moreover, he added, the APUC figure includes military construction necessary to support the F-35 and a portion of the support costs. The F-35 comes complete with radar, avionics, defensive systems and so forth, as well as weapons pylons, he noted.
“While the U.S. government uses the high independent estimates for program budgeting purposes, it holds the contractor to an entirely different standard in contracting for the actual aircraft,” another Lockheed Martin spokesman told AIN. Negotiations for LRIP Lot 4 (low rate of initial production) have been under way in the weeks leading up to this week’s Farnborough show. The government’s offer was 40 percent lower than its own CAPE estimate for this lot, while Lockheed Martin’s opening bid was 20 percent lower than the same estimate. “We’ll settle somewhere in the middle of that range,” the spokesman added.

And so a LRIP 4 production deal came to pass. [As a side note, I find it interesting how many of the major aerospace websites covered the same story at the time. They somehow seemed to have ‘missed’ some of the more ‘affirmative’ details concerning the F-35. (Just saying)]
The above quote also highlights the pivotal bookkeeping hook that ‘some’ are using to draw inappropriate (since the end purpose appears to be nefarious -- might I say “unfair”?) comparisons. Whereas F-16/F-18/AV-8 costs tossed around are essentially the URF [my note: ‘Unit Recurring Flyaway’ cost], we note that the F-35 numbers tossed around by critics these days are estimated “APUC”[my note: Average Procurement Unit Cost]. This is not trivial, so an example is in order:

Mod programs to bring early production aircraft up to final production standard have typically been booked against the APUC and are thus missing from F-18/F-16 and AV-8 URF numbers, But these costs ARE included in what is being thrown around concerning the F-35. These high jinks are not unprecedented: Pushing the APUC costs in the public mind has been an increasingly common tactic of incumbent programs (not just by contractors – do NOT underestimate entrenched DoD constituencies):

Comparisons between the acquisition costs of the F/A-18E/F and an attack capable version of the F-14D, such as the F-14D Quick Strike, have been highly conjectural because of conflicting estimates of development and production costs, and projected inventory requirements . In mid-1991, Department of Defense (DOD) officials estimated their flyaway unit costs in FY1990 dollars as $33 million for the F/A-18E/F vs. $44.5 million for the F-14D Quick Strike . F-14 supporters noted, however, that flyaway costs do not include development costs, which would be several billion dollars for the F/A-18E/F vs. several hundred million for the F-14D Quick Strike . They noted further that these flyaway costs assumed annual buys of 72 F/A-18s vs. 24 F-14s, and they argued that comparable 72-plane buys would reduce the cost of each F-14D Quick Strike to $34 .5 million, approaching the cost of an F/A-18E/F. “ (p.10)

When evaluating mercantile claims critical of ongoing programs, it is best to always consider “Cui bono?” While the incumbent contractor’s ties to their commercial interests are obvious, it still takes a certain willful ignorance to pretend those assailing an ongoing program are not serving what they perceive to be their own self-interests.

Additional Notes on the Use and Abuse of Cost Numbers
In a rational world, we could leave the question of whether or not the JSF program is progressing, is ‘worth it’ and has the majority of its ‘risk’ behind it with an answer of definitely “YES” . We can also answer a similar question as to if the JSF program still needs to be managed carefully to ensure the plans and program are successfully implemented in the years to come with an equally emphatic ‘YES” (I am aware of no one who disputes the second point) . But I think given the disconnect between the hysteria generated by JSF-detractors in their public-relations war against the F-35, and actual program status, a couple more points should also be made.

1. SDD costs are running higher than first projected. That anyone would think stretching the SDD to reduce program and production risk would not have adverse cost impacts speaks more about those who think such lunacy than the program itself. Squawking about increased SDD costs as if they were some unexpected anomaly without acknowledging the role that decisions made to ‘buy down’ risks had in the cost increase is disingenuous. I would blame decisions made solely by Lockheed Martin for exactly one year’s worth of schedule delays to-date, and that was because their plan was to fully staff the program faster than any program had been staffed before, but did not change any of their staffing processes or ground rules: you can’t get different results unless you do things differently. Ironically, this delay is about the only one that we can point to that contributed relatively little to the SDD cost growth: if you don’t hire the people to begin with, it doesn’t cost the program for people they don’t have to not do the work. Conversely, if you stretch your plan after the people are on board, it costs big $ to have a capability run in place. Conversely, if you elect to cut deliverables after your program is staffed up and running, you are burning dollars while running in place. I’d like to know what the costs of cutting the LRIP batches are. This would include not only the costs of LRIP production batches, but also the costs added by suppressing the learning curve needed to achieve full production rates. There’s also a PhD thesis ripe for the picking for some industrious candidate in this problem: Develop a methodology to trade off the costs of early production units having to be modified to later baseline configurations against the increased costs of production units with inhibited learning curves. The trick is to make the methodology transparent enough for innumerate policy makers to understand. Good Luck.

2. Given that the F-35 program is replacing (from the US point-of-view) 4 existing aircraft weapon systems, shouldn’t the SDD cost of replacing more than one weapon system (at least two?) be the standard by which the F-35 SDD program costs and schedules are declared “too high”? (some other thoughts on ‘perspective’ and other factors here) I submit that the SDD cost increase would have to be significantly greater than the current projected bill before the JSF SDD costs became anything less than a ‘tremendous bargain’.

About the worst that could ever happen at this point is for the program to ‘break even’ and that is only if some VERY major technological hurdle pops up that no one yet sees. I think the chances of such a big ‘uh-oh’ moment are highly unlikely this late in the program. (This not to say the weak sisters among us don’t try to manufacture a crisis every time a little hiccup comes along)

In closing, it must be mentioned that at the root of all the confusion, claim and counterclaim concerning costs, is the fact remains that no one has ever presented a complete line by line comparison and analysis of the cost numbers, or the legitimacy of their underlying rationale, being thrown about.
Nor is there a reason to – the decision makers have the numbers.

Hope Everyone Had a Good 4th of July Weekend

2011-07-05T20:52:00.001-05:00

Mine was bittersweet. All my immediate family is stateside for the first time in years. But I also found out I had just lost a former colleague (and Texan) whom I was fond of -- he was killed in an experimental aircraft flying accident mere days before he retired from an illustrious career in aerospace. 'Priorities' were on my mind this weekend and blogging didn't make the cut.