Showing posts with label Logical Fallacies. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Logical Fallacies. Show all posts

Thursday, July 04, 2013

Pierre Sprey: Expert?

Pffft! More Like POGO's 'Circus Barker'

(File Under "Know Your Reformer")
Hat tip 'munny' at F-16.net

Pierre Sprey: Old Whine in a Cracked Bottle

There's a new You Tube Video (link here) up with Pierre Sprey blathering his usual nonsense about 'complex' vs 'simple', 'heavy' vs. 'lightweight' fighter performance... blah... blah... blah. As if he ever knew d*ck about the topic at hand. Virtually everything he says is just as wrong or worse than the first time he spouted it off.  Remember, this is all part of the POGO P.A.C.E. propaganda strategy.

I left a few comments that were smaller than I would've liked because the format doesn't allow me to put together a larger coherent one such as:

Pierre Sprey has never ‘designed’ anything with wings, and he still doesn’t know diddley-squat about aircraft design OR air warfare . He played a bit role in developing top level requirements at OSD for a couple of years, basically parroting whatever John Boyd or Everest Riccione were hawking that day. His ‘expertise’, as well as much that which is claimed about the rest of the so-called ‘Reformers’ was pure fabrication by James Fallows. Those fabrications have been echoing in the halls of the anti-defense lairs for consumption by the useful idiots ever since.
Best summary* of Sprey I’ve read:
While working on the F-X, Boyd met Pierre Sprey, a weapons system analyst on the OASD/SA staff, whose background was similar to [Alain] Enthoven’s but much less distinguished. By his own account, Sprey was a dilettante with an engineering degree but no military experience. After graduation from Yale, Sprey became a research analyst at the Grumman Aircraft Corporation for space and commercial transportation projects. He came to OSD/SA in 1966, where he declared himself an expert on military fighter aircraft, despite his lack of experience. Sprey admitted being a gadfly, a nuisance, and an automatic opponent of any program he was not a part of.   

*Source: Pierre Sprey, Oral History Interview by Jacob Neufeld, 12 June 1971, K.239.0152-969, AFHRA, 9, passim. , as cited in THE REVOLT OF THE MAJORS: HOW THE AIR FORCE CHANGED AFTER VIETNAM, Marshall L. Michel III, 2006 (PDF).

Michel gets a little too 'Fighter Pilot Uber Alles' in his thesis, and I found myself having to force my eyes to read past those parts, but it still is a good read. If you want to read a really cold-blooded delivery of a takedown concerning the so-called ‘reformers’--including Sprey-- buy and read “Military Reform: the high-tech debate in tactical air forces” by Walter Kross.

Clearly POGO is focused on Canada as a 'weak link' in the JSF coalition at this time.

Sunday, March 24, 2013

POGO’s Propaganda Circus: F-35’s “aft visibility will get the pilot gunned every time”

A Case Study in How the Project on Government Oversight (POGO) Demagogues Against National Defense Programs.

I’ve considered something similar to what you are about to read many times, but I never pulled the trigger because I hadn’t yet figured out how to cover it without either making most people’s eyes glaze over from too much psychological exposition on the one end of the spectrum, or oversimplifying to the point that the explanation does violence to the phenomenon on the other end. I was at a symposium this week that I believe provided me with a way to reach the middle ground I’ve been seeking. One of our Keynote Speakers (yes, there were several) spoke on the subject of how we humans ‘Innovate’ and how organizations and individuals can overcome barriers to innovation.

The speaker presented us with four fundamental characteristics of the human psyche that affect our ability to (among other things) be “insightful” and “innovate”. She also reviewed how those characteristics are inhibited or disrupted by outside influences. It occurred to me at the time, that what she was describing was, among other things, a pretty good explanation as to how propagandists are also able to manipulate public attitudes. Shortly afterward, I realized it would be helpful in achieving my goal of getting a substantial explanation as to how POGO/Winslow Wheeler and crew operate. By showing how POGO and fellow travelers manipulate the elements of Perception, Attention, Context, and Emotion (PACE) we are able to adequately grasp the manner in which they exploit human nature to further their agenda of subverting national defense acquisition programs.

P.A.C.E: A Tour Inside POGO’s Meme Machine

Winslow Wheeler and POGO have provided any number of examples of what I’m about to cover, but their latest machinations concerning the recent “F-35A Joint Strike Fighter Readiness for Training Operational Utility Evaluation” report is as perfect an example as any to use for this discussion.
The report in question was issued by DoD’s Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, J. Michael Gilmore, and is as close to being more of a political document than a technical one as any I’ve seen issued from that office (but that is another topic for another time). But the most interesting aspect to the report was in how it was apparently leaked to POGO/Winslow Wheeler ahead of the public release, and the ONE thing POGO/Winslow Wheeler chose to lift from that report to propagate was a statement by an evaluation pilot that the F-35’s “Aft visibility will get the pilot gunned every time”. That ‘money quote’ was then repeated throughout the mainstream media before anyone had the chance to really digest the contents of the report in their entirety.

POGO,Winslow Wheeler and “Perception”

In this example, POGO and Winslow Wheeler were continuing the long-standing practice of ‘poisoning the well’ against any positive perception that might arise from any public reporting on the F-35. In this case, the ‘report’ in its totality is remarkably unsurprising. What the OT&E evaluators found concerning the training program after a limited exposure to early configuration F-35s is pretty much what one would expect. But in highlighting a single comment in the report POGO made the report about the F-35 itself and not the status and readiness of the training program. The Director of OT&E was an enabler (codependent?) in this development due to the report’s excessive regurgitation of ‘old news’ that didn’t belong in this report, but POGO is the ‘perp’ that picked the forbidden fruit.
When each of us perceives something, it is estimated that only 20% of that perception is based upon what we actually sense as new, and 80% of the perception is due to what we’ve already experienced in life. As most people have little or no working knowledge of what it takes to field advanced technology and designs, that makes their ‘80% experience’ base highly vulnerable to any manipulation of the ‘20% new’ information. POGO selected and amplified a quote concerning how a pilot felt about rear visibility in a plane that does not yet have the key technology installed that makes such rear visibility concerns moot. That pilot brought his experience and training to a new aircraft and applied his old knowledge to a new situation. Without his experiencing what is the baseline F-35 EODAS and HMD capabilities that were yet to be delivered, his comments should have been noted in the backup data. But in an objective document this never would have been a feature in the report.
In cherry-picking the “get gunned every time” quote, POGO and Winslow Wheeler exploit the general ignorance of the public as to how the jets and training program are still in development, how the F-35 program is structured and how capabilities are scheduled to be brought on line by deliberately injecting into the public’s consciousness the misperception that the F-35s now being used for initial type training are representative of the capability that define the baseline F-35. This is only the latest in a long series of flagrant misrepresentations of F-35 truths, in effect LIES, committed by POGO, and the F-35 is only the latest in a long line of weapon systems to receive that special POGO/Winslow Wheeler ‘touch’. We can expect nothing but more of the same from POGO and Winslow Wheeler because they dare not let any positive or neutral development concerning the F-35 go without preemptory and presumptive criticism, as the façade of failure that they work so hard to build up from nothing requires constant maintenance to prevent it from crumbling around their ears.

POGO, Winslow Wheeler and “Attention”

Long-time observers of POGO, Winslow Wheeler and other so-called ‘reformers’ will note that the ‘get gunned every time’ sound bite will be dropped fairly quickly and something else concerning the F-35 will be targeted as a ‘failure’, ‘mistake’ or ‘criminally negligent’ decision/design feature/performance characteristic, perhaps from the same report, or from one to come later. This is because POGO et al are acutely aware that an extended exchange or dialog with anyone who disagrees with them will expose the misdirection they (POGO et al) endeavor to sustain. POGO and Wheeler go for the sound bite to plant negativity into the public’s consciousness knowing that the general public’s attention span is short. By the time anyone dives deep into a POGO/Wheeler claim and cries “Hey! Wait a minute!” the public has moved on to other circuses. Such ‘Hit and Run’ tactics, along with their careful cultivation of media enablers, allow POGO/Wheeler relief from ever having their methods, biases and motives undergo serious public scrutiny. This is classic guerrilla warfare of the information domain.
Once the initial ‘buzz’ is past, if the ‘get gunned every time’ line is ever again referenced by POGO/Wheeler, it will be as only one item in a litany of similar perversions of reality in support of some general condemnation of the F-35 or as an introduction to the next misdirection issued by POGO/Wheeler. It is a clear testimony to POGO’s and Wheeler’s confidence in the public’s inability to critically examine information POGO/Wheeler spoon feed the media, that POGO and Wheeler have felt comfortable posting the source documents which they pervert at their own websites.

POGO, Winslow Wheeler and “Context”

If there is a hallmark to POGO/Wheeler PR announcements, it is that whatever is being decried or derided will be framed in as little context as possible. What context that is provided, will be selectively added to support the official POGO/Wheeler meme du jour. In this instance, the “get gunned every time” comment is highlighted without any reference to the inconvenient (to POGO and Wheeler) fact that the F-35s EODAS and Helmet are still being developed, the software releases to exploit these systems were not sold off for the aircraft used for the training readiness evaluation, or that if later version aircraft that are now flying had been available, the ‘get gunned’ claim would probably never have been uttered.
As individuals, we perceive reality in terms of context. When we see two circles, one drawn within the other, depending upon where our heads are at the time, or depending upon what else is drawn beside the circles determines whether we view the circles as representing a bagel, a wheel, a ring, or any number of other similarly- shaped objects. Stripping the context from the ‘get gunned’ comment allows POGO/Wheeler to insert their own meaning and relevance: a constructed perversion for consumption by the uninformed and only marginally-interested public.

POGO, Winslow Wheeler and “Emotion”

Indignation and inflammatory statements about defense acquisition programs are the stock and trade of POGO and Winslow Wheeler. Consider how in the original ‘story’ at TIME Winslow Wheeler attempts to paint a ‘horror story’:
Perhaps the biggest horror story is the poor showing of the Lockheed plane’s complicated, expensive helmet-mounted display system that distorts and obscures – rather than enhancing — the pilot’s vision and awareness of the outside world.

Wheeler seeks to elicit the reader's emotion by making an assertion that the F-35’s HMD’s performance is deficient (oh woe is us!), by obliquely referring to much (at least two years) earlier technical development challenges as if they were still current and relevant. Yet Winslow Wheeler, if he was honest when asked about the HMD, would have to acknowledge that the F-35 program is fairly confident in the current state of HMD performance and sees no ‘show-stoppers’ in delivering the desired capability. Lockheed Martin was discussing positive HMD developments nearly a year ago. It is notable that the latest GAO report did not highlight any definitive problems with the HMD system, only the usual ‘concerns’. When the ‘alternative’ just-in-case helmet being developed in parallel is cancelled (possibly this year), don’t expect any surrender from POGO or Wheeler on this point: “DOOM!” will always be just around the corner.
Using our neurons takes considerable (relatively) energy and it is estimated that we can only have about 2 ½ % of our brain active at any one time. When we are irate, our limbic system/amygdala can compromise, to varying degrees, our reason and judgment. Thus, when POGO, Winslow Wheeler, or others appeal to our emotions (Waste! Corruption! Conspiracy! War Mongering Military-Industrial Complex!) they are really attempting to subvert our ability to see through the flawed logic that binds whatever nonsense they are peddling at the moment.

Know Your Reformer Bonus Content: About Winslow Wheeler’s Move to POGO

I still consider Winslow’s move under POGO a positive development. In May of last year I noted the move from the Center for Defense Information (CDI) to POGO and as I also noted, I like it when targets bunch up. The tendency of radical activism to date has been to splinter and re-label itself when caught in the daylight. This may be a consolidation for survival (one can only hope).
CDI had been slipping for years but was often extremely entertaining to watch – it was like a zoo for disillusioned and misunderstood ‘military geniuses’ founded by possibly the biggest crackpot ever to reach ‘flag’ rank.
At the time, I didn’t know that the ‘Strauss Military Reform Project’ moved with Wheeler to POGO, so the same ‘photographer’ cum ‘radical chic’ trust-fund baby must still be paying Wheeler’s salary. The ‘Strauss Military Reform Project’ is little more than a one-job program for Winslow Wheeler. Strauss, when he isn’t producing forgettable photography, or financing disgruntled, ex-Congressional staffers’ caterwauling and rabble rousing, is the Chairman of the Board of Directors of that iconic bastion of American culture (/sarc) “Mother Jones”. How cliché can you get?

Friday, December 21, 2012

Smacking Down Gun-Grabber's (Cough) 'Reasons' (Cough)

Hat-tip to Instapundit (who is bumping this story to keep it in view).

Larry Correia.  Source
The author Larry Correia got his start in writing by 'self-publishing' a young adult fantasy best-seller that got the attention of mainstream publishing. But before that, he was firmly established in firearms and law enforcement circles. He's got a GREAT summary of all the intellectually effete 'anti-gun' crowd's so-called 'arguments' once again being trotted out in the wake of the latest mass murder of innocent children and teachers at Sandy Hook elementary.


Correia's blog post can be read in its entirety here, but here's his conclusion: 
In conclusion, basically it doesn’t really matter what something you pick when some politician or pundit starts screaming we’ve got to do something, because in reality, most of them already know a lot of what I listed above. The ones who are walking around with their security details of well-armed men in their well-guarded government buildings really don’t care about actually stopping mass shooters or bad guys, they care about giving themselves more power and increasing their control.  
If a bad guy used a gun with a big magazine, ban magazines. If instead he used more guns, ban owning multiple guns. If he used a more powerful gun with less shots, ban powerful guns. If he used hollowpoints, ban hollowpoints. (which I didn’t get into, but once again, there’s a reason everybody who might have to shoot somebody uses them). If he ignored some Gun Free Zone, make more places Gun Free Zones. If he killed a bunch of innocents, make sure you disarm the innocents even harder for next time. Just in case, let’s ban other guns that weren’t even involved in any crimes, just because they’re too big, too small, too ugly, too cute, too long, too short, too fat, too thin, (and if you think I’m joking I can point out a law or proposed law for each of those) but most of all ban anything which makes some politician irrationally afraid, which luckily, is pretty much everything.  
They will never be happy. In countries where they have already banned guns, now they are banning knives and putting cameras on every street. They talk about compromise, but it is never a compromise. It is never, wow, you offer a quick, easy, inexpensive, viable solution to ending mass shootings in schools, let’s try that. It is always, what can we take from you this time, or what will enable us to grow some federal apparatus? 
Then regular criminals will go on still not caring, the next mass shooter will watch the last mass shooter be the most famous person in the world on TV, the media will keep on vilifying the people who actually do the most to defend the innocent, the ignorant will call people like me names and tell us we must like dead babies, and nothing actually changes to protect our kids.  
If you are serious about actually stopping school shootings, contact your state representative and tell them to look into allowing someone at your kid’s school to be armed. It is time to install some speed bumps.


As 'they' say, go to the link and read it all.

Thursday, May 24, 2012

F-35 and Concurrency: Steven Bucci at Heritage Gets It

(The Idiots Still Do Not)

H/T Solomon @ SNAFU!

From Bucci's post F-35: Slowing Down Production Makes No Sense we find:
The Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), as the F-35 is known, is designed to maximize both capability and survivability. Its production methodology was developed to allow for faster fielding of the aircraft and calls for incremental improvements in the design as early models roll of the line. Safety is not sacrificed, and the process known as “concurrency” puts the best available plane in the hands of the warfighters as soon as possible. It also allows for cuts in cost per copy as efficiencies build upon one another.
Unfortunately, forces that never wanted the nation’s pilots to have this aircraft in the first place are now trying to pull a bait and switch. They are saying that there is too much concurrency, and they want to slow down production of the JSF. This would drive up the cost per unit of each JSF and probably force some of our allies to cut the number of planes they have ordered. These cuts would further drive up cost, creating a vicious cycle of cost increases.

The clear goal here is to slow down production and drive up costs in a spiral that will eventually allow opponents of military modernization and proper readiness to call for killing the program altogether. Congress should not allow this to happen.

Solomon's right: Bucci nails it.

Nothing New Under the Sun

Good to see Heritage picking up on a theme I identified years ago. Ladies and Gents, time once again for a slide from SMSgt Mac's Acquisition 101 "Slash and Whine" Detractor Strategy course, first seen on the web in 2006 in reference to F-22 critics.
The 'Concurrency Bogeyman' is the 'Reason' this time
 'Concurrency' is the current lie being used by the detractors (including so-called 'reformers') being leveraged to pretend saving money is the objective. And let's not forget to mention (once again) how big a LIE the 'concurrency' angle is. See my post on Congressional Bloviation on Concurrency from about 9 months ago to get the total picture, but here's a sample as cited from a 2010 Defense AT&L Journal article:

What to Do About Concurrency?
So far, no conclusive evidence exists that concurrency (no matter how it is defined) is generally a problem. This does not mean that concurrency is never a problem. But most likely, concurrency leads to cost and schedule growth under very particular circumstances. What these circumstances are is not very clear just yet. Nor is it clear why in our study, the sweet spot for concurrency is somewhere around the 30 percent mark. What is clear is that there are definite advantages to concurrently designing and building a weapons system that most program managers take advantage of, to some extent or another.
The [1988] Congressional Budget Office study advised that “Congress may wish to take no further action regarding concurrent programs as a group,” given the very weak relationship between the concurrency and cost growth. Instead, the office argued that Congress should simply ask that DoD develop a consistent measure for concurrency to be published in a program’s acquisition report and then monitor programs to see how they are performing relative to their planned level of concurrency. More than 20 years later, this advice still seems to be appropriate.

The Concurrency Bogeyman is not going to disappear until people who use it get called out for their lies, so 'good on' Bucci and the Heritage foundation! 

Awww. The Usual F-35 Hatin' Suspects seem to have shown up at the Heritage site with their usual quiver full of lies, half-truths, and distortions. How quaint. They range from ignorant to stupid-but they're quaint. Around here people say 'Bless their hearts' when we see that kind of lunacy.

Wednesday, February 15, 2012

Airpower is Developed, Sustained, and Provided by an "Air Force"


Composite Photo of a Aerospace Power Dead End, a.k.a. A-10 N/AW

In thread over at SNAFU!, we find one commenter 'Lane" advocating the wet dream of 'Army über alles' types everywhere, i.e. the disbandment of the Air Force. I've invited him to read a couple of my older posts Space Force? and Space Coast Guard?  and have posted this to give him an opportunity to make his case a little better than he did over at Solomon's.

Thoughtful arguments (beyond 'because', 'because I say so', and 'there was this one time in band camp' please) for disbanding the AF are welcome, but will be countered even more thoughtfully. I predict and forewarn that IF I get any response, my most common references in countering will involve "Goldwater-Nichols" and the words 'Train and Equip'.

Oh!.. and please leave the 'we have x number Air Forces' B.S. for use as sound bites on some space limited I-hate-AF thread. The Army has trains and it isn't a railroad, and some say it has more floating assets than the Navy and no one claims it is a 'Navy'.  

If serious discussion on Airpower isn't your thing, then I refer you to a light-hearted romp on the subject of service roles and missions. See Harry Harrison's "Navy Day" ..........

The Army had a new theme song: "Anything  you can do, we can do better!" And they meant anything, including up-to-date hornpipes!




 

Monday, October 24, 2011

DT, Winslow Wheeler and 'Manufacturing' Problems

Defense Tech is 'moderating' a comment of mine I tried to post on this thread. The last time they did this my comment disappeared into the Ether. I suspect it is an administrative thing where they don't like a .com, or an acronym vs. malevolence (how petty would it be otherwise?), but no matter-- I saved a draft first. I tried to post:

Stop the presses! Winslow Wheeler has discovered that the entire logistics support package for the F-35B was not prepositioned on the Wasp. Someone tell Winslow that the WASP is cruising about 80 miles from F-35B home base in Pax River and that this is NOT a supportability test. Then ask him exactly DoubleU Tee Eff is his point?  I would also suggest the unattributed 'author' of this piece refer to earlier Mil.com articles that note the 2 weeks was the shortest(!) expected period expected for this round of shipboard trials and that the WASP was booked for much longer. Are 'we' now beating up programs for accomplishing tasks slightly slower than the fastest possible time?
And this is what I got:


Update at 2005 Hrs: My guess is is that ol' Winslow Wheeler just couldn't let positive news get out on the F-35 without a little caviling. This fey attempt at shaping the budget battlefield is pathetic in light of the real story:

Bloomberg: The F-35B short-take off and vertical landing version finished three weeks of tests on the Marine amphibious assault ship USS Wasp, achieving “all planned flight envelope test points,” Joseph DellaVedova, a spokesman for the Joint Strike Fighter program, said in an e-mail. “We’ve been pleased with the initial sea trials” and the aircraft “performed to predictions.”

Update 25October2011: Eventually my comment appeared at DT sometime today with the original time tag from last night.


Tuesday, September 13, 2011

DefenseTech Challenge Thread

Updated and Bumped!
(warning: what follows will be dry as dust unless you enjoy logic and tautology.)

I had a somewhat whimsical response to my challenge from a ‘JoeC’:
It's bad management because it's not on time or on budget and, so far, it doesn't work! I'm not sure what else you need in order to be convinced.
Of which, given the ground rules were clearly stated, prompted my reply:
Invalid Claim! [;-) (and you provide no definition of, much less evidence supporting 'doesn't work')
Then Joe C. responded with:
"Doesn't work" meaning it was banned from flying until recently. That fits my definition of "doesn't work"! :)

I work in software, so I'm well aware of how people tend to underestimate the time it takes to get things done. We're all very optimistic creatures at heart, I guess. I think some of that is what's going on in the F-35 program. It's also a result, as I've said before, of our Pentagon always wanting the newest, shiniest, most advanced toy instead of being satisfied with an incremental upgrade.
Since under the conditions I laid down in the challenge were not met, I could have just let Joe C’s wistful comment (including the outrageous unsupported claim concerning 'shiniest' jab) lay where it was, but I sensed this person was new to the discussion (i.e. probably not even a past lurker) and seemed somewhat naïve on the subjects of advanced technology and acquisition thereof. So I gave him some prompting so he would possibly go try to disprove, discover, or perhaps reply with more detailed questions, with a little hint as to the difference between aerospace and ‘other’ software development (my typos corrected):
Do you know what TRLs are? I ask because buying a weapon system isn't like buying a commercial product. EVERY weapon system sufficiently advanced to be worth developing and fielding with an expected operational life of 20-30-40 years requires the same effort and hits pretty much the same kinds of hurdles (depending on technologies involved). The F-35 program is actually doing better than a lot of its 'successful' predecessors, especially since it is really delivering 3 weapon systems in one. The only difference here is F-35 brand sausage is being made under a spotlight and rice bowls are threatened. The decision to first launch and then develop a new weapon system has been most definitely "requirements-pull" since the end of the Cold War so if an 'incremental' advancement was all that was needed, that is all that is pursued. Biggest problem with the incremental over existing is that on the modern battlefield, if you aren't low observable and connected, you are dead. As to 'software development' if we developed software like the commercial sector, we'd only need half the airbases - because most planes would just make smoking holes enroute to the next base. Kind’a hard on the Beta testers.

Thus I’d call the response to my challenge to this point ‘tepid’ at best. But shortly thereafter it got somewhat more interesting. A commenter after my reply, one ‘halcyon_ 33p’, decides to add two comments [I assume the DT space limitations probably drove the breaking of ‘one’ into ’two’ ]

SMSgt Mac,

So are you stating that because the F-35 is doing better than a lot of it's 'successful' predecessors there is no problem here? I notice you put successful in quotes as if you don't believe these unnamed predecessors were successful. If they weren't successful than even if the F-35 is better how does that serve as an argument that everything is fine with the F-35. Sounds like you are making the argument that because bad isn't worst, than it is good. If they were successful during deployment does that justify all the problems in development? Is it possible for a bad process to still produce viable results? I think all of this "history as a standard" and "Not worst, therefore good" argument stuff fails to take into account that the political climate is completely different today and that is the real deciding factor in this projects survival.

SMSgt Mac,

Your pro-F-35 arguments suffer from the following fallacies. I've included single line summaries of many of your arguments. IF you feel I am unfairly summing up your arguments please direct me to evidence that I am not being fair to you.

Appeal to Tradition - this is the way military projects always work http://www.nizkor.org/features/fallacies/appeal-to-tradition.html

Biased Sample - Because the F-35 program isn't as bad as these projects it is great http://www.nizkor.org/features/fallacies/biased-sample.html Appeal to novelty -- The F-35 is the greatest best thing therefore it must continue

http://www.nizkor.org/features/fallacies/appeal-to-novelty.html

Burden of Proof -- Detractors must prove the F-35 is not the best plane in the world for it's job http://www.nizkor.org/features/fallacies/burden-of-proof.html
I responded:
Given the space limitations on DT, I will Fisk your post at my place and let you know when it happens here (No earlier than Sunday- late). It would be earlier, but I have other pressing commitments this weekend. Kudos for the attempt and willingness to be specific and avoid logical fallacies, but unfortunately you employed several above. As a prequel -- think about the phrase 'it does not follow' as it may apply to what you've posted.
I will deal with halcyon’s comments above by repeating below with my response/observations inserted in [bold blue brackets]. But first I note that I came back last night to find that ‘halcyon’ had decided to add (in split posts):
Thanks for the reply, and I have great respect for your service, however since I am only summarizing your arguments and asking you to clarify I think you will have a very difficult time proving that my logic is not sound. Asking you to clarify your position and pointing out your logical fallacies can only be right or wrong, not a logical fallacy. I haven't even started to argue against your points. Only point out that many of your arguments don't hold up to the standard you have selected. The only point I have made here that might be considered an argument is that you are not taking into account the current political climate which is very different from 20-30 years ago. There is no logical fallacy there-- I haven't even asserted my own opinion. In fact logic will not help you in understanding the current political climate.
  ….
By the way in your post can you please answer my challenge that if I have misrepresented your position you provide evidence to show this. I am a clarity over agreement kind of guy. I don't care if we agree but I really don't want to slime you.
I will deal with the remains of this last response after I have dealt with ‘halcyon’s first assertions.

Note: for clarity I refer to the first two of 'halcyon’s' posts above as Part 1, and this last bit above as Part 2. I am completing this response before revisiting the original thread lest ‘halcyon’ added more that I would need to add below.

Ready? As promised, let the Fisking begin!

Responses to Part 1:

SMSgt Mac,
So are you stating that because the F-35 is doing better than a lot of it's 'successful' predecessors there is no problem here? [No, I am saying that not only do the challenges that the F-35 program has encountered to-date NOT rise to the level sufficient to label the F-35 as ‘failed’ , ‘doomed’ or any other of a number of terminal adjectives in criticisms of the program so carelessly slung about in the comments (and some articles) in Military.com, but that the technical and programmatic challenges to date are not even unique AND that the difficulties to date are not even remarkable for an advanced high performance fighter aircraft, and less than what many might consider ‘successful’ predecessors] I notice you put successful in quotes as if you don't believe these unnamed predecessors were successful [No, it was in quotes because ‘successful’ without explanation is a fairly abstract concept that may mean different things to different people]. If they weren't successful than even if the F-35 is better how does that serve as an argument that everything is fine with the F-35. Sounds like you are making the argument that because bad isn't worst, than it is good. If they were successful during deployment does that justify all the problems in development? Is it possible for a bad process to still produce viable results? [You thus begin down a slippery slope to create a ‘strawman’ argument as a prop in an attempt to make an argumentative point in what will follow. Read on.] I think all of this "history as a standard" and "Not worst, therefore good" argument stuff fails to take into account that the political climate is completely different today and that is the real deciding factor in this projects survival. [I wouldn’t know, I have never used this argument. If you are implying that I am using this argument, I would only point out that that if I am asserting the F-35 is doing better than many of its ‘successful’ predecessors, that “it does not follow” that I am claiming anything more, including anything to do with your ‘strawman’. (However I will note that as far as political climate goes: what is old is new again.)]

SMSgt Mac,
Your pro-F-35 arguments suffer from the following fallacies. I've included single line summaries [Strawmen Alert! Read on.] of many of your arguments. IF you feel I am unfairly summing up your arguments please direct me to evidence [Weak and transparent attempt to shift the Burden of Proof – more on this topic below] that I am not being fair to you.

Appeal to Tradition - this is the way military projects always work http://www.nizkor.org/features/fallacies/appeal-to-tradition.html

[Strawman!--Perhaps based upon an ‘It does not follow’ assumption that because I note the programmatic and technical challenges are met as well or better as successful programs?
In any case, considering my long-running and public beef with programmatic problems are with the status quo in how programs are funded and fiddled with and micromanaged by forces outside the program proper, I am hardly ‘appealing to tradition’ in that case.

Considering I do not comment on programmatic decisions unrelated to external forces (very few exist) that I am not in an informed position to question or comment or have public domain information in hand, call me ‘neutral’ in that respect.

Considering that my comments on technical challenges merely note they always occur in developing advanced systems is based upon the usually self-evident point that if they are ‘advanced’ they will have unknowns, many unknowable-beforehand elements involved, and that these challenges are to be expected as unavoidable. 

Remarkably, no one has ever questioned this point online before. Perhaps an excerpt of a paper and presentation I gave at a symposium about two years ago on the subject of conceiving, developing and implementing a Failure Modes and Effects Test (FMET) program for an advanced development program will help:

It does not require much imagination to perceive that perhaps complexity in any one of the three software, hardware, and operational/environment factors have the potential to fuel the complexity of the other two, and that this often results in an even more rapid increase in complexity of the overall system. Given that the overall complexity of modern systems already preclude the possibility of ever having enough time or money, even with automation, to test for 100% coverage 1 , the importance of bounding the scope and effort of an FMET test program will only become more important as systems become even more complex.  
1 Automated Software Testing, Dustan Rashka & Paul, 1999, pp.35-36, Addison-Wesley ]

Biased Sample - Because the F-35 program isn't as bad as these projects it is great http://www.nizkor.org/features/fallacies/biased-sample.html

[You’ve created another ‘Strawman’ based upon an ‘it does not follow’. I refute the assertion that F-35 is as its critics claim, ‘failed’ (or other euphemism for same). You take what is essentially my pointing to evidence to the contrary, including noting its successes and comparative relationships to past successful programs , and substitute (quoting the Nizkor page here) “a distorted, exaggerated or misrepresented version” of my position or substitute with an assertion that I say “that it is ‘great’”.]

Appeal to novelty -- The F-35 is the greatest best thing therefore it must continue http://www.nizkor.org/features/fallacies/appeal-to-novelty.html

[And you create yet ANOTHER ‘Strawman’. This time, I can only suspect it is based upon my consistently noting that the F-35 has the critical technologies (as identified by the users- the Services) of low observability and connectivity among other things, that existing aircraft and potential competitors do not, or similar supported assertion, and convert it into “a distorted, exaggerated or misrepresented” (this time an ‘overly simplistic’) “version” of my position.]

Burden of Proof -- Detractors must prove the F-35 is not the best plane in the world for it's job http://www.nizkor.org/features/fallacies/burden-of-proof.html

[Well, you ALMOST got this one right. Instead of employing the ‘best plane in the world’ Strawman , had you typed: “Detractors have the burden of proof and must prove fielding the F-35, as the current program of record, is not the best solution for its missions”. You would have accurately described my position on 'burden of proof'.

Now, let us address whether or not is it reasonable for me to require the critics to satisfy the burden of proof. Using Nizkor as our guide: 

In many situations, one side has the burden of proof resting on it. This side is obligated to provide evidence for its position. The claim of the other side, the one that does not bear the burden of proof, is assumed to be true unless proven otherwise. The difficulty in such cases is determining which side, if any, the burden of proof rests on. In many cases, settling this issue can be a matter of significant debate. In some cases the burden of proof is set by the situation. For example, in American law a person is assumed to be innocent until proven guilty (hence the burden of proof is on the prosecution). As another example, in debate the burden of proof is placed on the affirmative team.
By either standard, the “Burden of Proof” in my challenge is on the CRITICS of the F-35 (plane and program).

The legal standard would have to be applied metaphorically: Is the F-35 ‘guilty’ or ‘innocent’ of (fill-in-the-blank)? Since on the Military.com boards I never see anyone viewing F-35 as ‘succeeding’ and ‘guilty’, the burden of proof would have to be on those who see the F-35 as ‘failing’ and ‘guilty’.

By the more appropriate ‘debate’ standard (for that is what we are engaged in - albeit too often poorly), when I posited the question: “How about one of you (or all of you) working from the philosophical position that the F-35 suffers from 'bad management' actually cite an example of same?” I am CORRECTLY placing the “burden of proof” on those who "affirm" that the F-35 suffers from same.

I dissect and dismiss criticisms of the F-35 with reasoning (why the criticisms are lacking), or I make assertions supported by fact (burden of proof!). If what I type does not fall into either of those categories, you will see caveats, such as ‘I believe’, ‘as far as is known’, ‘I’m fairly certain’ etc. Barring copy-paste errors or typos, and with the possible exception of the occasional hyperbole for shock value, you will NEVER see an assertion made by me that cannot be backed up by a hard fact or verified by a reader themselves if they are willing to do the research.]

Responses to Part 2:

Thanks for the reply, and I have great respect for your service, [I’m wondering now how new you are to these boards. My active duty service is FAR in the past and other than the core program management experience and initial knowledge concerning advanced weapon system development it gave me, not very relevant to the discussion at hand] however since I am only summarizing your arguments and asking you to clarify I think you will have a very difficult time proving that my logic is not sound [Hopefully, not true by now.]  Asking you to clarify your position and pointing out your logical fallacies can only be right or wrong, not a logical fallacy [Sure, if only you could have succeeded AND avoided employing logical fallacies in attempting doing so.] I haven't even started to argue against your points. [re-read this post again if you still believe what you typed afterwards. Repeat as necessary] Only [attempted, and failed to] point out that many of your arguments don't hold up to the standard you have selected. The only point I have made here that might be considered an argument is that you are not taking into account the current political climate which is very different from 20-30 years ago. There is no logical fallacy there-- I haven't even asserted my own opinion. [You just did, I am almost curious. Were you around 20-30 years ago?] In fact logic will not help you in understanding the current political climate [Another opinion, unsupported by fact- I’ll let it go] .…. By the way in your post can you please answer my challenge that if I have misrepresented your position you provide evidence to show this [See all of above]. I am clarity over agreement kind of guy. [We should get along swimmingly then] I don't care if we agree but I really don't want to slime you. [I am kind to those who are kind].

Any bets on whether or not we will be entering the realm of
Argumetum ad nauseum very soon? I won't go there, as alas I have bigger fish to fry...and that work pays much better returns.




---------------------------------Original Post Below this Point------------------------------------------------


There's a post up at DefenseTech calling for opinions as to whether or not the F-35 can be 'turned around'. This an obvious case of working from the philosophical position that the F-35 NEEDS turning around (begging the question). I laid down a gauntlet that I doubt will be picked up by very many, but it could prove interesting if my challenge is accepted instead of subjected to the usual furious 'thumbing down' given comments that do not follow a certain 'groupthink' guide. I wrote:   
A modest proposal. How about one of you (or all of you) working from the philosophical position that the F-35 suffers from 'bad management' actually cite an example of same?
Please post as a separate post instead of a reply. It is a long weekend and if the F-35 is as poorly managed as those asserting it is, we should be able to run up the count to a new DT record for our hosts!
There are only three criteria for a claim to warrant a response other than "Invalid Claim!":
1. Single sentence description of the "bad management" decision/action.
2. Identification of those responsible (names are best) for the "bad management" to at least a) the Government (DoD office or equivalent and higher) or Corporate/Industry leadership level responsible--for 'actors' OUTSIDE the program, and/or b) Identification of those responsible (position or name) WITHIN the program.
3. Single sentence description of WHY it was a bad management event/action.          


Valid claims will be evaluated/critiqued using only three sources: RAND's "Sources of Weapon Systems Cost Growth", DAU's Defense Acquisition Review Journal peer-reviewed papers, and the NIzkor Project Logical Fallacies website.


Enjoy!

We'll see if anyone takes up the challenge.

BTW: Contrast the DT piece with Dave Majumdar's facts-only story on an F-35 structure fix at
Defense News with what will no doubt soon be breathlessly announced with Wagnerian 'doom' music in the background at AvWeek, Military.com, and elsewhere.

Saturday, August 13, 2011

F-35 Jobs & Logical Fallacies

Steve Trimble has a little blurb up on the Commerce Dept numbers for F-35 job creation and closes with the following:

"This doesn't mean that 127,000 people will suddenly lose their jobs if the programme goes away. Using the same methodology, Lockheed warned two years ago that 100,000 jobs would be lost if F-22 production was not extended. The F-22 line is scheduled to shut down next year, but Lockheed is actually adding jobs in Marrietta, Georgia, as other programmes, including C-130J, C-5M and F-35 ramp up."


Trimble is better than this.

"It Does Not Follow"
This makes absolutely no sense. The first sentence is not supported in ANY way shape or form by the rest of the paragraph.

I am dying for Flight Global to fix their 'Captcha' widget. I'm a direct approach kind of guy and this feels too much like skulking around behind someone's back. But if I were "Emperor of the World", Columbia and all other J-Schools would have to have a series of courses on Logical Fallacies and not just as a section in the odd Technical Writing class,

There are some serious aspects to this story not brought up by Mr. Trimble, or for that matter anyone I am aware of, but I'm tired and it is late.  Maybe later.