Speed vs. Stealth: Stealth Wins

“Speed Kills”… or "Low Observability Changes the Survivability Equation: Speed No Longer Reigns Supreme".


From a comment in a recent thread at DoD Buzz:

….The one thing stealth did not do is make speed less valuable in air warfare. It is unfortunate that we've forgotten the lesson "speed is life" in the interest of making aircraft stealthy. The SR-71 combined a limited degree of signature reduction with high speed and would still be difficult if not impossible for most countries in the world -- including the Russians and Chinese -- to shoot down. Even missiles that fly faster than the SR-71 cannot sustain those speeds for a long enough time to hit that airplane regardless of whether they carry their oxidizer on board or get it from the air around them….

Nope.

"Speed is Life” is an Enduring Myth.
I will provide evidence that ‘Speed is Life’ is ‘no more’. I provide only evidence (vs. ‘overwhelming’ evidence) because I will not go anywhere near where I cannot go in public forums. (As an aside, there is also just so much ‘wrong’ with the above assessment of the SR-71’s hypothetical performance against modern systems that we’ll just note here that the statement presumes a ‘late’ acquisition and a ‘tail chase’ and falls apart on that presumption alone.)

NOTE: This is not to pick on the commenter who made the above assertions – I’ve heard similar from professionals who really should have known better. Myths die hard.

“Speed is Life” is an example of an air combat concept that has outlived its status as a ‘maxim’ and should be modified to read accurately today as: “Speed is Life… to a limited extent…maybe…sometimes”. More often than not, against an integrated air defense system in today’s battlespace, a truer statement would be: “Go Faster – Die Sooner”.

To support my assertion that in effect ‘Speed Kills’ the following are releasable excerpts from a study (disclosure: mine, written in 2000 and updated in 2009) that included observations concerning the Aeronautical Systems 1999 ‘study’ “System and Operational Implications for Choosing Best Speed for Global Missions” (aka ‘Speed Study’ or ‘ASC Study’) and the treatment of ‘speed’ vs. ‘survivability’ in other publications as well.

Excerpt 1

….. The ‘weaponization’ section of the ASC Study report reviewed the study’s exploration of the interrelationship between aircraft speed, altitude, and the ability of a very fast platform to attack using large standoff launch distances from a target. The report includes the observation that the survivability of the weapons, like the candidate platforms, would be based upon a best-value combination of factors including speed, altitude, tell-tale signatures maneuverability, and countermeasures. The definition of best value was not included in the report. The report indicates that the study further explored the ramifications of such a launch technique on the standoff weapons’ conceptual designs, noting that a higher kinetic energy delivery could reduce the fuel fraction of powered weapons and allow the weapon to have a larger warhead.

The ASC Study report reiterated that to ensure adequate survivability, all platform concepts studied would rely on the employment of standoff weapons to keep away from dense threat areas during the initial phases of an air campaign until other assets could be brought into theater for support, and presented a chart (p. 58) showing the relative glide weapon ranges when launched from aircraft flying at various speeds and altitudes. It is worth noting that while large launch distances from the target can be achieved, for the various concepts, it is seen that all launch platform concepts close the gap between the threat area and their position significantly after launch. It should be noted that it also appears from the study data that the faster the platform speed, the greater the post-launch closure to the target and threat area. A theoretical example of this dynamic is illustrated in Figure 9.

Figure 9. Hypothetical Mach 4 aircraft post-launch closure to target and associated potential threat.


Figure 9 illustrates estimates and profiles provided in the report for a Mach 4 launch of a glide weapon. This specific example presents the geometry of launching a weapon from approximately 180 nm away from a target to deliver the weapon with a .85 Mach impact speed on the target. Using the Gravity-load (G-load) factor provided by the study report for a practical operational turn, the launch aircraft would approach within approximately 87 nautical miles of the target after the launch in executing a turn away from the target. The launch aircraft closes to less than half the original launch distance after weapon separation. A thorough examination of the synergy that comes from combining standoff weapons and stealth is available (Paterson 1999), illustrating how the combination of stealth and standoff weapons delivered using conventional launch techniques becomes a significant contributor to survivability. However, it cannot be determined from the ASC report if the net impact of the post-launch closure at stand-off ranges using higher kinetic launch events was considered or factored into the ASC study’s kinetic delivery survivability assertions. If the candidate platforms were maneuvered in a manner that exploited the modicum of reduced signature reduction they were assumed to employ, then performing turns at even smaller bank angles would generate even larger turn radii, and the post-launch flight path of the aircraft would bring it even closer to the target and perceived threat, further minimizing the advantage of kinetic standoff attack….

Excerpt 2…


SPEED, OBSERVABILITY, AND SURVIVABILITY

In the conduct of this study, a need for a better understanding of the relationship between aircraft speed, observability, and survivability in a complex threat environment became apparent. In one of the earliest published discussions on low observability and survivability, it was noted that aircraft flying “at the greatest speeds possible in high threat areas minimizes time at risk” (Paterson, 1997, p. 10). A similar point was made in the 2006 Committee’s report ‘Future Air Force Needs for Survivability’:

Clearly, when trying to shrink an adversary’s reaction time, increasing the weapon system’s speed for the same signature can reduce its exposure time in the adversary’s weapons engagement zone. From the Radar Range Equation one can derive the approximate ratio that increasing the speed by a factor of 10 is equivalent to decreasing the frontal radar cross section (RCS) by a factor of 40,000 to provide the same exposure time. (NRC, 2006, p. 24)

While the relationship of speed and observability is elaborated upon and clarified within the 2006 Committee’s report, the 2006 Committee statement as it stands is incorrect and misleading. The quote is only accurate if the quality of the exposure time is equivalent. As noted by Grant (2001), the F-117s in Operation Allied Force had difficulty in maneuvering within the confined airspace over Serbia and Kosovo to attack targets and managing their signature profiles. When discussing transiting high threat environments at the greatest speeds possible, this must include provisions for management of the penetrating aircraft’s signature in doing so. The faster the aircraft is moving through the threat environment, the more difficult it is to manage its signature. The probability of the faster systems being able to equally manage their flight profiles and in turn equally managing their signatures as well as slower systems in a high threat environment can be shown to be comparatively low. This is easily demonstrated using a variation of Figure 9’s Mach 4 scenario that was presented earlier. In Figure 19 below, time has been substituted for distances, and the target is now a threat.

Figure 19. High speed aircraft have less time to avoid sudden appearance of new RF threats than slower aircraft.

The implication here is that in negotiating a dense threat environment a high speed transit can reduce the time within a threat engagement zone, but increases the probability of entering an engagement zone in the first place. The reduced reaction time and increased turn radius of the high speed aircraft has negative ramifications in planning and negotiating a mission route through a dense threat environment. Thus any discussion of speed as a benefit to survivability must include the quality of the relative low observability and difficulties in executing a transit of a dense threat area at higher speeds.

Post Script (a gentle reminder): The very definition of ‘Stealth’ is Very Low Observables (VLO) AND Tactics. “VLO” is highly ‘reduced’ radar (RCS), IR (Radiant Intensity), visual (Contrast, Area), acoustic (Sound Pressure) and EME (Electromagnetic Emissions) signatures. VLO designs are tailored to balance those signatures based upon mission and threats. ‘Tactics’ are maneuvering, mission planning/routing, selected sensor operational techniques, and weapons application techniques. Tactics are applied to maximize the advantages of the tailored VLO design. If anyone makes any claims about ‘Stealth’ outside of, or ignoring its definition in toto, they haven’t got a clue.

External refs used in the above excerpts:

Grant, R. (2001). The B-2 goes to war. Arlington, VA: IRIS Independent Research Institute.

Committee on Future Air Force Needs for Survivability, National Research Council. (2006). Future Air Force needs for survivability. Washington, DC: National Academies Press.

Paterson, J. (1997).Measuring low observable technology's effects on combat aircraft survivability. SAE.

Paterson, J. (1999). Survivability benefits from the use of standoff weapons by stealth aircraft, AIAA.

An Airpower History Lesson in 3 Parts

Updated: F-108 Mission (Below Original Post)

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B-52 vs. Flying Wing?... B-70 Canceled: Why?... What exactly WAS the F-108 'Mission'?

In a recent comment thread, three questions were raised as to the facts surrounding 50s-60s aircraft program histories. Normally I would blow off trying to address such diverse issues even those as narrowly defined, in one post. But it just so happens all involve information I already know via sources I’ve already acquired for other purposes.

Last of the '49's: YRB-49A in flight

In this post I intend more to let the sources tell the facts vs. my making observations on the facts: ie, this post will be heavy on the quotes, light on the sidebars. It will also ensure I don’t spend a lot of time that I can better spend elsewhere.

Flying Wing Was an option to B-52 Development

As I showed in an earlier post, the B-52 for a while faced extinction until a program cancellation decision was fortunately reversed. One of the B-52’s competing concepts, contrary to what you may have been told, was the Northrop B-49 flying wing, a jet variant of the earlier propeller-driven theme. Fielding the ‘flying wing’ would have been the fruition of Jack Northop’s lifelong dream, but alas it was not to become true until after he passed away. He did die knowing the wing WOULD fly in the form of the B-2 Bomber. I could detail ‘why’ the flying wing was B-52 competitor but that is beyond the scope of this post. To the sources we go!

The year 1948 began under a dark cloud for AMC’s B-52 program managers. Air Staff officers succeeded in canceling, not simply Boeing Model 464-29, but the entire Boeing heavy bomber program due to doubts about the B-52’s ability to achieve the required range and speed. Some Air Staff officers preferred the Northrop YB-49 turbojet powered all-wing aircraft over Boeing’s conventional B-52 design: others favored opening a new competition for a heavy bomber. (Mandeles, pg 49)

Craigie added that AMC analyses of other studies of optimum airplane performance relied on extrapolations from past performance. However, these extrapolations were unreliable because aeronautic and aerodynamic knowledge was growing so quickly. Therefore, it was necessary to use the most current data and knowledge, which did not necessarily involve only extrapolations of past performance. For instance, he noted, that in 1941 Douglas Aircraft Company analyzed the predicted performance of the B-36, and concluded that the requirement of a 10,000-mile range with a 10,000-pound payload was unlikely to be achieved. The Air Force and Convair, however, used improved weight control and planning, and proved the study wrong. Despite increases in armament, radar, equipment, and the difficulty of development under wartime conditions, Convair and the Air Force produced an airplane which could meet the Air Force’s objectives. Craigie also urged discarding the alternatives to the B-52-the XB-35 and YB-49 Flying Wing and delta-wing designs. By May 1947 the delta wing did not have any marked superiority over a conventional airplane for long-range, high -speed operation. Craigie wrote that a reevaluation of these designs should be made only when “jet engine specific fuel consumption is reduced to a point to permit their [sic] use” in a bomber. (Mandeles, pgs 75-76)

At AMC, senior officers attempted to save the B-52. Maj Gen Franklin O. Carroll, AMC’s director of R&D, analyzed Northrop’s claims of superiority for the Flying Wing, and found them wanting. The basic premise for proponents of the all-wing aircraft was that the space requirements for military stores matched the space available in the optimum wing. Under this assumption, the all-wing aircraft would be more efficient than the conventional airplane. Carroll, however, argued that Northrop seriously underestimated the space needed for military stores. More space would be needed in the aircraft, and adding a body or nacelle to contain the extra military stores would vitiate the theoretical advantages of the all-wing design. The YB-49 Flying Wing also demonstrated longitudinal instability at high speed. Little was known about this instability and it could present severe engineering difficulties. The flying wing would not be versatile in a tactical setting and would be overly sensitive to changes of center of gravity caused by the position or absence of cargo. Such problems seemed not to justify reliance on the all-wing design. Carroll concluded by recommending the conventional Boeing design and that the B-52 be accorded the highest support from Air Staff. (Mandeles, pg 83)

Several days after the Symington-Allen meeting, Craig, Frederic Smith, and Craigie decided that “if the B-52 meets the requirements of the contract under which it is being bought, it will satisfy strategic requirements.” These requirements included unrefueled range of approximately 8,000 miles and a cruising speed of 500 MPH over 4,000 miles of enemy territory. 103 Boeing Model 464-35 (fig. 4) matched these strategic requirements, and Air Force Undersecretary Barrows confirmed the decision to retain Boeing as prime contractor of the heavy bomber rather than adopt the Flying Wing in early March. (Mandeles, pg 83)

Partridge and Craig urged the staff to stand firm, noting support from RAND and the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics for the Flying Wing design. At Symington’s urging, Allen agreed to give the Flying Wing due consideration. After further discussion, key members of the Air Staff met on February 14, 1948, and decided to keep the Boeing contract and issue a change order. Undersecretary Barrows concurred in the action. Despite the painful experience, the B-52 program had been radically redirected and was now aimed at fulfilling a new concept of strategic air operations. Thus even before the Aircraft and Weapons Board met in January, two of the major proposals up for consideration had already been approved. Both the B-36 and the B-52 had received a new lease on life, as had, incidentally, the Northrop YB-49 Flying Wing. (Moody, Pgs 182-183) Note: 'Moody' is a huge PDF file.

Read the complete sources for more information illustrating the point that the flying wing, specifically the YB-49 version was ‘competition’ for the B-52, and the whys and hows the B-52 came out on top.

Why was the B-70 Not Pursued?

North American XB-70 'Valkerie'

That the B-70 was cancelled because of ICBMs and the existing capabilities of the B-52 being sufficient is easily shown, but I’m not going to type the proof out, just show it in situ:

Source (can't find my copy dangit!):
"Politics and Force Levels: Politics and Defense Inside the Kennedy Administration", Pg 216

(The footnote #10 referenced is “President Kennedy, Special Message, Pg 11)

The F-108 Rapier Mission? Long Range Interceptor

If one believes in infallible ‘fact sheets’ the F-108 according to one 'fact sheet', was to have two missions: Long Range Interceptor and Escort Fighter for the B-70. Evidence supporting the escort mission assertion is so thin, it is ’invisible’, while evidence supporting the Interceptor role is bountiful.

XF-108 Rapier: Never Reached Beyond Mock-up Stage

As I've noted to a commenter, I did not say or imply it (F-108) couldn’t or wouldn’t be an escort fighter if the need arose. I would assume it would do any ‘fighter’ mission it was assigned to varying degrees of success. I also asserted: There can be little doubt that there was someone, somewhere in the entire AF command structure who thought it would be a good ancillary/alternate mission for the F-108, but it was not part of the F-108 design requirements NOR was it part of F-108’s operational concept. I will say now that I would consider the ‘factsheet’ to be wrong in asserting an escort role (beyond possible for any fighter as a generic capability).

Most critically, given the nature of the operational concept envisioned for the F-108 and planned end strength, the use of the F-108 as an ‘escort fighter’ would probably be less likely than the F-106 it was designed to replace. This too is easily shown. And now it will be shown, thanks to my  serendipitous and very slight connection to the author of the following in his 1988 ACSC paper titled: “The Search for an Advanced Fighter: a History From the XF-108 to the Advanced Tactical Fighter”.

Then Major (later Colonel) Robert Lyons wrote (beginning on Page 4):

The MX1554 "Ultimate Interceptor, 1954" produced the Convair F-102 that fell far short of the planned speed, altitude, and range performance (95:159-165). It could only fly at 677 Knots at 35,000 feet, with a maximum ceiling of 51,800 feet and 566 nautical mile combat radius (95:173). While the F-102 and its follow-on F-106 served as "interim interceptors," the Air Force developed requirements for a long range interceptor. These long range interceptor requirements, first developed in April 1953, were rewritten in July 1955 and November 1956, after several attempts failed to get an acceptable proposal from competing airframe contractors (114:Ch 2). The Air Force sought an interceptor to counter the perceived 1960 bomber threats of Mach 2.0 speed at 61,000 feet, and the revised 1963 bomber threats of Mach 2.2 to 2.7 speed at 65,000 feet (118:7,32; 114:Ch 2). Design studies to satisfy these requirements began in 1953 at Air Research and Development Command and in industry with the MX1554 designed to achieve a Mach 4.5, 150,000 pound Gross takeoff weight aircraft, but the aircraft appeared to lie beyond the state of the art (118:7,Fig 24). So another round of design studios attempted to meet the 1955 LRI (long range interceptor) requirements. These studies called for an aircraft with a cruise speed of Mach 1.7 at 60,000 feet and combat speed of Mach 2.5 at 63,000 feet, with a gross takeoff weight of 98,500 pound, But this aircraft would have had only marginal capability against the postulated 1963 bomber threat (118:7,Fig 24). 

A subsequent design competition in 1955 between Lockheed, Northrop, and North American was little better than previous ones, but North American came closest to meeting the goals, (114:23).

North American Aviation's letter contract of 6 June 1956 called for a long range interceptor that could operate at 70,000 feet with a combat speed of at least Mach 3. The all-weather interceptor aircraft was to have two engines, two crewmen, and at least two internally carried nuclear or conventional air-to-air missiles (95:330-331). Their Weapon System 202 configuration sported a single vertical tail and large delta wing, and was adopted in 1958 after considering iterations with as many as three vertical tails and a large canard (118:7, Fig 24; 95:331).

In 1960, toward the end of the heyday of the "Century Series" fighter aircraft, Weapon System 202, renamed the XF-108 Rapier interceptor, promised to serve the Air Force with a Mach 3 cruise speed and 1,000 nautical mile range as a companion to the proposed B-70 supersonic bomber (106:44). [SMSgt Mac Note: I believe the fact that the Rapier was based on common design concepts with the B-70, coming out of the same design stable and discussions concerning the parallels in performance parameters may be as much of a source of ‘escort’ fighter role stories for the F-108 as any other. ]  The XF-108 design evolved to meet all of the expected Soviet bomber threats of the early 1960s. It was to have been fabricated from stainless steel sheet, a welded sandwich and honeycomb, rather than aluminum to withstand the high temperatures and stresses of sustained supersonic flight. Its two General Electric J93-5 turbojet engines were to have used a special high energy synthetic fuel (ethyl borane) (7:14). It would also use the ASG-18 Fire control system, and the GAR-9 missile. All these were under development simultaneously with the basic airframe. This combination of features allowed a totally new concept of long range interception of the supersonic bombers believed to be under development by the Soviet Union. The F-108, with its superior radar and high speed missile, was to patrol the DEW (Distant Early Warning) Line and make SAGE (Strategic Air Ground Environment) directed, semi-autonomous interceptions well before incoming bombers could launch their weapons against the major cities of Canada or the United States (118:7-8,Fig 25-26,Fig28-30). 

But intelligence sources eventually proved a serious Soviet bomber threat did not exist. That news reinforced growing concerns in the Department of Defense (DoD) over the cost and viability of manned aircraft. Offensive and defensive missiles now seemed to be the logical technological choice for the 1960s (7:14; 8:7). In August 1959 the Air Force canceled the chemical fuel development program (7:14), and on 23 September canceled F-108 development (94:402; 8:7). The Air Force announced that the program had no technical difficulties and had met all goals it the time of cancellation, but that there was a shortage of funds and programming priorities had changed (57:63). Both the fire control system and the missile developments continued at a lower level of Funding. The cost estimate of five to eight billion dollars for a few squadrons of F-108s was more than could be accepted to replace the F-106, given the doubtful nature of the threat (7:14) and the unresolved fate of future manned aircraft.

With the cancellation of the F-108, there appeared temporarily to be a hiatus in supersonic interceptor work in the United States. Indeed, although the Air Force continued trying to gain support for new interceptors in general and the F-108 in particular, the DoD continued to oppose the requirement pending verification of a threat (9:3).

7. Air Force Times. 15 August 1959, p. 14.

8. Air Force Times. 3 October 1959, p. 7.

9. Air Force Times. 11 March 1964, p. 3. 57. "F-108 Cancelled." Canadian Avionics (November 1959), p.63.

94. Kennedy, William V. "Future of the Fighter." Ordnance (January-February 1970), pp. 402-406.

95. Knack, Marcelle Size. Encyclopedia of US Air Force Aircoraft and Missile Systems Volume1. Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1978.

106. McCormacK, James, Jr., Maj Gen, USAF (Ret). "How the Air Force Is Buying Its Newest Manned Weapons." .Skyline (Fall 1958), pp. 44-47.

114. "NORAD's Quest for NIKE Zeus and a Long-Range Interceptor."(U). Ent AFB, CO: HQ NORAD/HO, 1962. SECRET-Declassified 31 December 1962. "Unclassified information only used from this source."

115. Neufeld, Jacob. "The F-15 Eagle: Origins and Development 1964-1972." (U). Pentagon, Washington, D.C.: HO USAF/HQ November 1974. SECRET "Unclassified information only used from this source." 

118. Parsons, T. R. "B-70 and F-108 Perspectives on Supersonic Cruise." .Proceedings of the Conference Ob the Operational Utility of Supersonic Cruise (U).Wright-Patterson AFB, OH: ASD/XR, May 1977. SECRET.-Declassified "Unclassified information only used from this source."

From the combination of the limited number of F-108 platforms, the operational concept of roving long-endurance patrols conducted at the farthest distances from home with limited and possibly nuclear payloads, as well as the intended purpose of replacing ‘interim’ interceptors, it is doubtful the F-108 would have had time for anything other than its interceptor role. If the Rapiers were to be ‘escort’ fighters at all, it would be in accompanying aircraft returning post-nuclear strike that might wander/enter their patrol areas, in a manner of what ANY fighter or other aircraft would do.

Updated 26 April 2012:

The  "Standard Aircraft Capabilities" of the F-108

Commenter BB1984 below reminded me of another public resource we can draw on in evaluating the accuracy of the Air Force’s F-108 ‘fact sheet’. Based upon review of the F-108’s Standard Aircraft Capability (SAC) sheets, from the earliest available at the resource (2 May 1958) to the last one available, 12 June 1959 (which was less than 6 months before the program was cancelled) we find two key points:

1. The F-108A mission was pure "long-range ‘interceptor". Anything else it could do would fall under ‘miscellaneous’ capabilities to be employed the same as for any GI’s job description: ‘other duties as required’.

From the 12 June 1959 F-108A SAC:

The primary mission of the F-108 weapon system is to deter armed attack against the U.S. and its area of defense responsibility by providing maximum defense potential against all airborne threats in the post-1962 time period. This defense function is implemented by the F-108’s potential to search out, evaluate, and destroy these hostiles at ranges beyond the capabilities of other defense systems. The F-108 is designed to operate not only in conjunction with SAGE and in cooperation with other weapons in the defense inventory, but to be equally effective well beyond the bounds of ground environment surveillance and under minimum operational control, relying on its self-contained high performance search, navigation, and communications equipment.

In time of war, F-108 operations can include directed intercepts and organized search missions resulting in repeated attacks with up to three kills by each interceptor. Operating beyond SAGE, the F-108 can make positive identification of DEW line violations, attack and trail hostile raids through remote areas, and report directly via long-range radio. Operating within the ZI, the F-108A performance features of all-weather capability, long range at Mach 3, and 15-minute turn-around, permit flexible commitment of forces to achieve the precise concentration of power required at any battle area with maximum retention of reserves.

The F-108A carries two crewmen and internally stowed missile armament. This high performance air vehicle cruises and combats at mach 3 with a 1000-nautical mile radius on internal fuel. It has a 1.2g maneuver ceiling in excess of 77,000 feet and a zoom-climb ceiling of 100,000 feet. Under normal loading and weather, the air vehicle requires runway lengths of only 3200 feet for take-of and landing. It can be operated from 6000-foot runways in all conditions of weather.  From a nominal 70,000 foot combat altitude , missile launch can be accomplished against any air-breathing target flying at altitudes from sea-level to 100,000 feet. The pulsed-doppler radar, with 40-inch antenna, provides target detection in excess of 100 nautical miles at all altitudes and is backed up by infrared search and track devices.

F-108A = Long Range Interceptor. First, Second, Last.

2. The weapons capability from beginning to end consisted of a payload of 3 GAR-9 missiles.  No Guns, No Bombs.No Rockets**

12 Jun 59 Standards Aircraft Capabilities Sheet, Weapons Sections

AF Museum and History Program's 'Factsheets': Swing and Miss

Unless someone threw ‘bombs’ on the F-108 in the last couple of months of the program trying to save it from the axe, The AF Museum and History Program has some ‘splainin’ to do. But even if it was an idea thrown out there in the death throes, if it didn’t get buy-in from the users, it didn’t count, in which case they still have some ‘splainin’ to do.

 **Definition of the term "rocket" in this timeframe was transititory. The GAR-9 indicated above stood for 'Guided Air Rocket'. The weapon would soon be renamed 'AIM-47' for 'Air Intercept Missile'-47. For real confusion look up the GAR-1 and it's short distinction as the 'F-98' before becoming the AIM-4. (the BOMARC was also known as the F-99 at the same time).

Air Force Magazine on the Latest From the F-35 Program Vaults: Part 3

Part 3 of what looks like...yep, 3

Part 2 Here

Solomon over at SNAFU! posted a piece centering on an excerpt from an Air Force Magazine article “The F-35’s Race Against Time” (November 2012 issue). I had read it already, and didn’t see anything ‘earth-shattering’ at the time. But with Sol’s posting, it occurred to me that it would probably become more interesting to people the further you got away from those familiar with the current state of aeronautics, and it may draw secondary comments from the anti-JSFers to boot.

 Situational Awareness? You need Data AND Understanding  (Source: www:SLDinfo.com)

Networking & Situational Awareness

As F-35s criss-cross enemy airspace, they also will automatically collect vast amounts of data about the disposition of enemy forces. They will, much like the JSTARS, collect ground moving target imagery and pass the data through electronic links to the entire force. This means the F-35 will be able to silently and stealthily transmit information and instructions to dispersed forces, in the air and on the ground.

I don’t think at this time we can possibly overemphasize how the F-35 systems allow a pilot to gain and exploit superior situational awareness relative to legacy systems nor how much an edge it gives to any F-35 on the network. So I’m going to refer to Barry Watts’ excellent McNair Paper “Clausewitzian Friction and Future War” (Updated PDF version here) for insight on what this means in terms of reducing Clausewitzian Friction for F-35 drivers while increasing the same for their opponents. In the early part of his Chapter 9, Watts leans heavily on R.L. Shaw’s classic "Fighter Combat: Tactics and Maneuvering,"but there is much after it that I’ve read nowhere else.

I’m asking for a slight indulgence here. I’m going to beat a dead horse to again drive home a point the advocates of simple lightweight and ultra-maneuverable fighters NEVER come to grips with: ‘first look’ (almost always) equals ‘first kill’. [To keep clear which quotes are from where, Watts quotes are normal font and the AF magazine quotes are in italics]

What factors have tended to drive engagement outcomes in air-to-air combat? Surprise was linked to general friction in chapter 6. Air combat experience going at least back to World War II suggests that surprise in the form of the unseen attacker has been pivotal in three-quarters or more of the kills. In writing about his experiences flying long-range escort missions over northern Europe with the U.S. Eighth Air Force, P–38 pilot Mark Hubbard stressed that “90 percent of all fighters shot down never saw the guy who hit them.” Hubbard was by no means alone in observing that friction in the form of the unseen attacker from six o’clock played a dominant role in engagement outcomes. The American P–47 pilot Hubert Zemke (17.75 air-to-air kills in World War II) stressed that “few pilots are shot down by enemies they see.” Similarly, the German Me-109 pilot Erich Hartmann, whose 352 kills during World War II made him the top scorer of all time, later stated that he was “sure that 80 percent of kills never knew he was there before he opened fire.”

Subsequent technological developments in the means of air-to-air combat did not change the basic pattern observed by Hubbard, Zemke, and Hartmann during World War II. These developments include the shift to jet fighters for air superiority during the Korean War, the advent of infrared air-to-air missiles by the mid-1950s, and the appearance of radar-guided air-to-air missiles in time for American use in the Vietnam War. The best combat data are from the American involvement in Southeast Asia. From April 1965 to January 1973, American aircrews experienced more than “decisive” air-to-air engagements, meaning encounters in which at least one U.S. or North Vietnamese aircraft was destroyed. These engagements produced some 190 aerial kills of North Vietnamese fighters against 92 American losses. Detailed reconstructions of the 112 decisive engagements from December 18, 1971, to January 12, 1973, revealed that 81 percent of all aircrews downed on both sides either were unaware of the attack, or else did not become aware in time to take effective defensive action. In the jargon of contemporary American aircrews, such failures to be sufficiently cognizant of what is taking place in the combat area around one to avoid being shot by an unseen or unnoticed adversary have come to be described as a breakdown of situation (or situational) awareness. In an air-to-air context, situation awareness (or SA) can be understood as the ability of opposing aircrews to develop and sustain accurate representations of where all the participants in or near the air combat arena are, what they are doing, and where they are likely to be in the immediate future. This understanding of situation awareness is, of course, crucial to appreciating that the driver in 81 percent of the decisive air-to-air engagements in Southeast Asia from December 1971 to January 1973 involved more than just the “element of surprise,” although this was the interpretation at the time. Surprise can certainly affect combatant situation awareness on either side…

… Even without the evidence from subsequent tests like Air Combat Evaluation (ACEVAL) in the late 1970s and the Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) Operational Utility Evaluation (OUE) in the early 1980s , combat data from Europe in World War II and Southeast Asia during 1965–1973 not only confirm the contention in chapter 8 (proposition I) that general friction can dominate combat outcomes, but indirectly quantify what the term “dominate” has meant in historical air-to-air combat. If some 80 percent of the losses have resulted from aircrews being unaware that they were under attack until they either were hit or did not have time to react effectively, then a relative deficit of situation awareness has been the root cause of the majority of losses in actual air-to-air combat. A deficit in situation awareness accounts for four out of five losses. While this statistic may not measure frictional imbalances directly, it does reflect the influence friction has had on outcomes over the course of large numbers of air-to-air engagements.

“You’re only about one-third as efficient as you think you are [at sorting in complex engagements], which is why you go out with a sexy missile and lose your ass anyway.”

Watts goes on to iterate the ‘surprising’ (to some) AIMVAL/ACEVAL and the AMRAAM OUE results, then follows up with a discussion that hints as to what the F-35’s SA advantage brings to the mix (Boldface mine):

By 1984, Billy R. Sparks, a former F–105 “Wild Weasel” pilot with combat experience over North Vietnam, had been involved in analyzing or running three major humans-in-the-loop tests: AIMVAL/ACEVAL, the AMRAAM OUE, and the Multi-Source Integration test (also conducted in simulators). Yet, in reflecting on all that experience, Sparks felt that he had not once witnessed perfect sorting in 4-v-4 and more complex engagements. “You’re only about one-third as efficient as you think you are [at sorting in complex engagements], which is why you go out with a sexy missile and lose your ass anyway.” As Clausewitz wrote, in war “the simplest thing is difficult,” and it is hard for normal efforts to achieve even moderate results. Such observations go far to explain why even small SA deficits relative to the opposition have been statistically more dominant in engagement outcomes than differences in aircraft, weapons, force ratios, or other conditions such as having help from GCI. It also strongly suggests that friction’s influence on outcomes in air combat during World War II was not noticeably different in Korea’s “MiG Alley,” the Vietnam War, the Middle East in 1967, 1973, and 1982, or even in Desert Storm. In this sense, general friction’s “magnitude” does not appear to have diminished noticeably over the course of all the technological advances separating the P–51 from the F–15.

Could information technology be used to mitigate this longstanding pattern of very low sorting efficiencies in complex engagements arising from seemingly small lapses in situation awareness? Early experience in 4-v-4 and more complex engagements with the recently fielded Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS) indicates that the answer is “yes.” JTIDS not only provides integrated, all-aspect identification of friendlies and hostiles based on available information, but even displays targeting decisions by others in one’s flight. The aggregate gains in air-to-air effectiveness resulting from these improvements in situation awareness and sorting have been nothing less than spectacular. During Desert Storm, F–15Cs, aided in most cases by E–3A Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) aircraft, downed 28 Iraqi fighters without a single loss, including 15 kills from engagements that began with BVR shots. When JTIDS–equipped F–15s flew against basically the same fighter/AWACS combination that had done so well in the Gulf War, the JTIDS “information advantage” enabled them to dominate their opponents by exchange ratios of four-to-one or better. Hence technology, properly applied, can certainly manipulate the differential in friction between opposing sides to one’s advantage at the tactical level.

The F-35 MADL capability adds another dimension beyond the JTIDS/LINK16 capability: More information and more kinds of information integrated and synthesized for easy (i.e. transparent) operator consumption and shared over a more secure link for use while skulking about in ‘Indian Country’. The system ‘sorts’ for the pilot. (Now you know why Northrop Grumman bothered with highlighting this capability in producing this video.)

Hey, Here’s That ‘Maneuverability’ Thing Again!

Because it was designed to maneuver to the edge of its envelope with a full internal combat load, the F-35 will be able to run rings around most other fighters, but it probably won’t have to—and probably shouldn’t.

"If you value a loss/exchange ratio of better than one-to-one, you need to stay away from each other," said O’Bryan, meaning that the fighter pilot who hopes to survive needs to keep his distance from the enemy.

He noted that, in a close-turning dogfight with modern missiles, even a 1960s-era fighter such as the F-4 can get into a "mutual kill scenario" at close range with a fourth generation fighter. That’s why the F-35 was provided with the ability to fuse sensor information from many sources, triangulating with other F-35s to locate, identify, and fire on enemy aircraft before they are able to shoot back.

The F-35’s systems will even allow it to shoot at a target "almost when that airplane is behind you," thanks to its 360-degree sensors.

According to O’Bryan, the F-35 also can interrogate a target to its rear, an ability possessed by no other fighter.

If you survive a modern dogfight, O’Bryan claimed, "it’s based on the countermeasures you have, not on your ability to turn."

I think that last comment is a slight overstatement. You want to be able to get out of a jam if you get your self into one. The fact that the F-35 probably won't lead you into a bad spot, doesn't mean it won't keep a really determined pilot from getting into one on his own.

Options… Options…

If the situation demands a turning dogfight, however, the F-35 evidently will be able to hold its own with any fighter. That is a reflection on the fighter’s agility. What’s more, a potential future upgrade foresees the F-35 increasing its air-to-air missile loadout from its current four AIM-120 AMRAAMs to six of those weapons.

Since the F-35’s biggest advantages (that are talked about publically anyway) in going up against large numbers of adversaries are its Stealth and its situational awareness provided by on-board/off-board systems, I’d say even the 4 AMRAAM loadout should be seen as ‘sufficient’ for otherwise pretty scary “bad guy/good guy” ratios of 3-4 to one. A 6 AMRAAM (or follow-on missile in perhaps greater numbers) loadout? Even better.

The F-35, while not technically a "supercruising" aircraft, can maintain Mach 1.2 for a dash of 150 miles without using fuel-gulping afterburners.

That works out to about 12 ½ minutes of ‘dash’ at 30K feet. The fact there is a time limit indicates that supersonic drag is slowly pulling the plane down to subsonic at Mil Power. The fact that it would take about 12 and a half minutes at 30K feet is indicative the plane is pretty slick aerodynamically without external stores. Even if the reason has to do with having no external stores and nothing else, that makes the F-35 far superior to any alternative that would be dragging around external stores.

"Mach 1.2 is a good speed for you, according to the pilots," O’Bryan said.

This is a mildly interesting data point, as M1.2 is commonly understood as the point where the definition of “transonic” ends and true “supersonic” begins (see chart below).

At Mach 1.2, you are usually still high on the supersonic drag rise. Source: DESIGN FOR AIR COMBAT,, Pg 46,  Ray Whitford   Update: Graphic now showing drag rise for swept wing configuration vs. straight wing.

 If Mach 1.2 is a ‘good speed’, then I would deduce that probably means that the F-35 supersonic aerodynamic drag, the F-35 installed thrust, or simply the F-35 thrust/drag ratio is among the best possible for a fighter operating within the laws of physics and given current propulsion/airframe technologies.Though may not be a ‘worldbeater’, it will hold its own aerodynamically, and it definitely means the F-35 is nowhere near a ‘dog’ as some might fear (or hope).

A Questionable Advantage (AKA “4th Gen Fighter Think in a 5th Gen World”)

The high speed also allows the F-35 to impart more energy to a weapon such as a bomb or missile, meaning the aircraft will be able to "throw" such munitions farther than they could go on their own energy alone. 

As I noted in the comments at Sol’s SNAFU! site, I really don’t see a very large benefit here. I do see an artifact of the ‘speed is life’ religion.

'Fairly Easily'?

There is a major extension of the fighter’s range if speed is kept around Mach .9, O’Bryan went on, but he asserted that F-35 transonic performance is exceptional and goes "through the [Mach 1] number fairly easily." The transonic area is "where you really operate."

Agreed.
But I wonder about the earlier ‘warning signs’ that the transonic acceleration time KPPs were unlikely to be met? Perhaps this hints at changes to the KPP? If so, I believe it would be completely justified: The spec was originally written to surpass or equal those of legacy systems, but as far as I can determine, all legacy aircraft performance was verified/validated using a clean, unarmed configuration.
Since there is no aerodynamic difference between the F-35 in its primary unarmed or armed configuration (internal stores only), the KPP should have been written to be one that was based upon legacy platforms combat capabilities with loadouts comparable to the F-35’s internal load. This would have kept the relative measure comparison an ‘apples to apples’ exercise. A potential side-benefit of changing the KPP might be the entertainment value from inducing know-nothings to whine about the F-35 ‘cheating’ on KPPs…again.

More Range? Mo Bettah!

In combat configuration, the F-35’s range exceeds that of fourth generation fighters by 25 percent. These are Air Force figures, O’Bryan noted. "We’re comparing [the F-35] to [the] ‘best of’ fourth gen" fighters. The F-35 "compares favorably in any area of the envelope," he asserted.

Conclusion:

The F-35 is an all aspect low observables, net-centric systems, long-range, yankin’, bankin’, killin’ machine.

Works for me.

Charter Cable: Media Malpractice

Charter News, 'Isn't'

(Still working on a lengthy 'aircraft/F-35 maneuverability' post, but this HAS to go up tonight.)

Charter Cable is my cable provider. NO complaints about the internet speed or connectivity, not even though I suspect their move to 'all digital' last week wreaked havoc with signals (off and on) as thousands of users finally added even more thousands of cable boxes and cards to the network in just a few days. It now seems to have stabilized, so 'no problem'.

But Charter Cable's 'homepage' has a section with rotating 'news' headline pictures and captions. All too often the caption and photo make it appear that some tragedy has happened in the US or even just the 'Modern' world, and you click on the link talking about a school being bombed with what appears to be a typical American elementary school (they've done school buses too if I recall correctly) and the story is about a school in some war zone in a 'turd world' country. The Chief and I just chalked it up to lazy web content developers and editors.

Today, they went beyond 'lazy' and deep into 'media malpractice' . I got home and booted up the laptop to check the web and this is what greeted me (left headline):



Charter Home Page 9 April 2013 ~1920 Hrs CST

 



WTFO? "Veteran Kills 13"?

I clicked on the link, and this is what popped up:

Charter 'Article' 9 April 2013 ~1920 Hrs CST

Oh. A Serbian 'vet' in Serbia loses it and goes on a rampage. Tragic in it's own right. Why the 'trick' headline?

You would have to be either incompetent or agenda-driven to put this one up.  Either way it doesn't 'inform' but misleads and distorts several issues in one nice swoop.

Besmirching veteran's mental health? Check!

'Tragedy' as background for upcoming 2nd Amendment legislation? Check!

The Chief likes to try and calm me down when some unthinking slug nearly kills us because they're doing something clueless in traffic. She says something like "I'm sure they didn't see us". She forgets what makes me the MOST angry is the fact that they probably were clueless as to what was going on around them. If I assume Charter was just being 'brain dead' in this, it just p*sses me off more. tell me again: What business are they in? Do they have any standards?
 
Either way, Charter's website is Media Malpractice writ large in a Low Information Consumer world.

Are There ANY Adults At Charter Cable?

Roundup on Latest VLJ and Air Taxi Developments

Archive (Friday's Post) Here

Quarterly (4 months actually) Update on Very Light Jets & Air Taxis

After I posted a few items on how VLJs and Air Taxis look to be part of an emerging paradigm shift in air travel earlier this year, the Very Light Jet Market has heated up. Several direct competitors and ‘niche-fillers’ have made progress in many technological and regulatory compliance areas. To bring people up to speed on the major developments since I last reported, here is a roundup of news to-date. If you’ve been keeping up with the subject you may want to skip to the latest developments at the bottom of the post.

I’ve noted that with the increasing number of technical mileposts reached by the VLJ contenders, there has been a corresponding increase in ‘legal’ and ‘business’ articles on the subject. This is partly due to the fact that as the VLJs have become more ‘real’, the contenders are focused more in on the objective of getting their product to fit in the market – while the market is being defined - and the environment in turn is beginning to determine how Air Taxi aircraft will be integrated into the Air Transportation System.

I'vs collected these links over the past months. The articles are not comprehensive but I believe they do fairly well represent the thrust of developments since May :

It was a horse race to be first with FAA certification, and in these past few months, some of the contenders crossed the finish line, while others reminded the market that they were very close.

"Very Light Jet" is a term that is pretty loosely defined at this time. Use of the label spills over into describing jets much larger than the Eclipse or Cessna entries.

A ‘dark-horse’ jet company suffered a major setback.

A Surprise ‘Big Business’ player appeared

‘Safety’ and ‘Capacity’ articles started appearing more regularly. Part in response to the challenges ahead, but also in response to the airline trade industry’s group, the ATA jockeying to ensure VLJs don’t create any more instability for their industry than already exists. (Good luck with that!)

Sweeping speculations on the relative safety of different forms of air travel have started making the rounds, in part because of the involvement of high profile pilots and passengers in some corporate jet incidents the last few years.

People are suing over reserved spots for delivery orders. I take this as a positive development as nothing attracts lawsuits like ‘success’!

31 May 06

Eclipse nearing FAA certification

…The Eclipse 500 -- a twin-engine, six-seat jet aircraft that will cost about $1.5 million -- is on track for FAA certification by the end of the quarter, Eclipse said Tuesday in a news release.

…Eclipse said its test fleet has exceeded 2,000 flight hours.

…The FAA has estimated 100 "very small jets" -- also called VSJs, ultra light jets or microjets -- will be produced by the end of the year and that in a decade nearly 5,000 such airplanes will be flying, an estimate the FAA says is "relatively conservative."

14 June 2006

Eclipse building jets, hiring staff

...After years of work, and building five test jets to win Federal Aviation Administration certification, the first production jet is being built for delivery to a real customer. That customer is one of more than 2,000 people or companies who have already ordered their own jets and made deposits with Eclipse.

...“We'll be exiting the end of this year with production aircraft of just over one aircraft per day,” Eclipse CEO Vern Raburn said. “So we'll build about 86 planes this year and then about 606 airplanes next year.”

...The company plans to hire more than 300 more employees by the end of the year.

27 June 2006

FAA announces next-generation air traffic control

…The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has announced that it is backing plans for new satellite technology to improve the safety and capacity of air transportation systems.

…The aviation industry as a whole welcomes the move, but the system will be introduced slowly in order to fully integrate processes and ensure a smooth transition, with passenger safety at the top of the agenda.

16 July 2006

Lots of developments in one:

There's A BRS Chute in D-Jet's Future

…During a lavish and ornate Saturday night public unveiling of Diamond Aircraft's single-engine Williams FJ33 powered D-Jet GA jet, Diamond CEO Christian Dries (pictured below) confirmed to ANN that they have entered into an agreement to develop a BRS emergency aircraft parachute system for the D-Jet.

…First announced by Diamond Aircraft in January 2003, the single-engine Diamond "D-Jet" is powered by a single Williams FJ-33 turbofan, an engine also used in the upcoming twin-engine Adams A700 and ATG Javelin. The five-passenger D-Jet is expected to cruise at a maximum speed of 315 knots, at an altitude of 25,000 ft while offering a range of 1,351 nm -- which translates to a decidedly un-jetlike fuel burn around 34 gallons per hour.

…..The composite aircraft features a Garmin G1000 glass cockpit, which in basic configuration features a dual screen PFD/MFD with integrated GFC 700 autopilot. The optional enhanced avionics package adds a massive 15" MFD to the two 10" PFD's, a glare shield mounted autopilot controller for the GFC 700 and a center console mounted FMS controller.

24 July 2006

Eclipse successfully tests first customer aircraft

…Eclipse Aviation has successfully tested the first production aircraft that is slated for delivery to a customer.

…Until now, Eclipse has operated a fleet of five test aircraft, accumulating more than 25-hundred flying hours. F-A-A certification was expected by late June, but delays by suppliers have pushed the date back twice this year.

25 July 2006
Honda has been testing an aircraft prototype as a technology demonstrator since 2003 and everyone was wondering what they were going to do with it. Now we know....and it was a 'gut' decision. Who knew Honda management was sentimental?

Honda to Sell Commercial Jet

…The HondaJet cruises 10 percent faster, has a cabin that is 30 percent larger and a range that is about 40 percent greater on 14 percent less thrust than Cessna's CJI+ model, according to Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association's AOPA Pilot magazine.

…The company began studying aeronautics to honor the memory of founder Soichiro Honda, who dreamed of building aircraft before he died in 1991, Koichi Kondo, chief executive of officer of Honda's North American unit, said in a January interview.

…"There was no grand strategy. It was kind of an emotional decision,'' Kondo said.

26 July 2006

Experimental plane crash kills two in Spanish Fork

… An experimental plane crashed at the city airport Tuesday after takeoff, killing two people who worked for a company building the lightweight aircraft in Utah County.

…"This was the only one. We have to determine what went wrong," Blue said. Spectrum employs about 80 people in Spanish Fork. Blue said it was too early to know the impact on future production. Rocky Mountain Composites, Inc. of Spanish Fork and Spectrum Aeronautical in June celebrated the first public flight of the plane.

…The plane's composite carbon-fiber skin, produced by RMC, is what makes it different from other similar planes.

…Comparable jets weigh around 13,000 pounds, while the Spectrum is about 7,000 pounds. With the cost of fuel, the lightweight spectrum will be more appealing to pilots than similar planes.

Victims In UT Spectrum Jet Crash Identified

...Austin Blue, president of Spectrum Aeronautical LLC, identified the two victims of Tuesday afternoon's crash of the Spectrum 33 prototype as Glenn Maben, director of flight operations at Spectrum Aerospace LLC, and vice
director Nathan Forrest.

...The plane that was lost was the sole prototype of the very light jet, introduced last November at the NBAA Conference in Orlando, FL.

…About the same cabin size of Cessna's Citation CJ-2+ and offering up to 10-place seating, Spectrum Aerospace told ANN in January its VLJ entry offers top speeds in excess of 415-knots, non-stop range of 2,000 nautical miles yet weighs in at a low 7,300 pounds gross takeoff weight. At maximum weight, the 33 can reach its typical cruising altitude of 45,000 feet in a direct climb of only about 20 minutes.

…Linden Blue, CEO of Spectrum Aeronautical, told ANN at that time he had high hopes for the Spectrum 33 commenting, "Citations are out of my range, and Lears are certainly as well. So is the King Air. I figured if we could make something significantly different in terms of weight and cost, it was worth doing. If all we could do was make a Citation that was maybe 5 or 10 percent better, that's just beating your head against the wall -- you've got to make a substantial improvement or it's not worth doing."

...It is not yet known what impact Tuesday's loss of two valued members of the Spectrum team... and the prototype... will have on the program.

Update: Preliminary Report Identifies Improper Maintenance

Honda Partners With Piper!

…Not only has Honda committed to production of the innovative Honda TwinJet, but Piper has been named a a partner in a venture that will in part, result in the production of that aircraft in the United States.

…Honda confirmed their plans to enter the innovative HondaJet in the growing very light jet market, with the process of accepting sales orders expected to begin in the U.S. in fall 2006. Toward this goal, Honda will establish a new U.S. company to hold FAA type certification and production certification. Honda's goal is to complete type certification in about 3-4 years, followed by the start of production in the U.S.

…"Aviation has been an important dream of Honda for more than four decades," said Satoshi Toshida, senior managing director of Honda Motor Co., Ltd. "Our goal is consistent with the philosophy of other Honda products -- to provide convenient and efficient transportation that will make people's lives better. We are excited now to enter a new dimension of mobility."

….To date the prototype six-to-seven seat HondaJet has completed more than 240 hours of flight-testing since December 2003. So far, the prototype HondaJet has achieved an altitude of 43,000 feet and a speed of 412 knots and is on course to meet or exceed all of its design specifications.

More information on the Honda Jet here.

1 September 2006

Eclipse Expects Fed Blessing; Full FAA Certification To Let Buyers Claim
Their Jets

...Eclipse Aviation expects full Federal Aviation Administration certification of its twin-engine jet within the next two weeks, president and CEO Vern Raburn said Tuesday.

...The company, which received provisional certification from the FAA in late July, had expected full certification of the $1.5 million Eclipse 500 by today.

...Since July, the company has been working on a handful of "IOUs" with the FAA, including the design and installation of new aluminum wingtip fuel tanks to replace composite tanks that failed a lightning test. The FAA still needs to complete testing of the Avio avionics system from Eclipse supplier Avidyne, which Raburn has said faced software development delays.

..."We're done except for one last thing," Raburn said.

...Upon full certification, customer delivery will begin "almost immediately," he said.

15 September 2006
Cessna's more conventional design at least gets 'bragging rights'.

Eclipse Rival Cessna First VLJ with Full FAA Ticket

...Cessna Aircraft Co. reported Monday that it has received full Federal Aviation Administration type certification for its $2.6 million Citation Mustang jet. The certification, awarded about a month ahead of schedule, makes Cessna the first company to receive full FAA certification for a so-called "very light jet."

..."Market expansion is what we're all about," Broom said of Cessna's certification announcement. "A new avenue for people to utilize private aviation is nothing but good for the industry."

...Many believe VLJs, generally defined as jet aircraft weighing less than 10,000 pounds, will revolutionize aviation by bringing jet ownership and operation within reach of pilots and owners who previously would have been limited to prop-driven aircraft.

...Cessna first unveiled its Citation Mustang in 2002. The company plans to build and deliver 50 planes in 2007, and reports it has 250 orders on the books, which will sell out production through 2009.

...For comparison, Eclipse says it has about 2,500 orders on the books and plans much higher production - eventually up to 1,000 planes a year. The company has said volume production is key to the Eclipse 500's comparably low price.

19 September 2006

Not a VLJ, but a prop cousin to their jet project. Given the high commonality between the two projects this has to be considered a step forward for the jet as well.

Adam Aircraft Receives FAA Production Certificate

…the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) issued a Production Certificate to Adam Aircraft, giving the company approval to manufacture and deliver its A500 aircraft under an FAA-approved type design. This allows Adam Aircraft to accelerate production of the A500 by being able to inspect and apply standard airworthiness certificates under a system approved by the FAA. The FAA Production Certificate substantiates that Adam Aircraft's Quality System and manufacturing procedures meet the Federal Aviation Regulations.

…The A500 twin-engine piston aircraft has been Type Certified by the FAA, and the
A700 AdamJet is currently undergoing flight test and development.

27 September 2006

Honda to Start Taking Orders for Small Business Jet Next Month

…Honda Motor Co., the world's largest engine maker, starts taking orders next month for a new small business jet as the Japanese company diversifies from its main auto, motorcycle and power products businesses.

…Sales of the seven-passenger HondaJet begin Oct. 17 at the National Business Aviation Association show in Orlando, Florida, spokeswoman Alicia Jones said today. Honda will announce the price and specifications for the jet then, she said.

…``It will be priced under $4 million,'' said Jones, with Honda's U.S. unit in Torrance, California.

…Competitors include Textron Inc.'s Cessna, Empresa Brasileira de Aeronautica
SA and Eclipse Aviation Corp.

29 September 2006

FAA, GA Leaders Agree On Impact Of Very Light Jets

…Jack Pelton, Chairman of the General Aviation Manufacturers Association (GAMA), and Chairman, President, and CEO of Cessna Aircraft Company, addressed recent concerns regarding the effects of the introduction of VLJs.

…"The introduction of VLJs will be at a rate in which they will be transparently and smoothly absorbed into the system.”

…"FAA officials, Nicholas Sabatini, Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety, and Michael Cirillo, Vice President of Systems Operation Services within the FAA’s Air Traffic Organization, agreed. They told the committee that the FAA has the capability to safely introduce all aircraft into the system, no matter the size, speed or performance. “VLJs will be assimilated into the system in an orderly fashion,” said Sabatini. Cirillo added, “Major airports will not be inundated with VLJs.”

…"This hearing has also completely discredited the myth propagated by the airlines that VLJs will place an undue burden on the national airspace system.”

1 October 2006

Eclipse Aviation Gets E500 Certification

…Eclipse Aviation Corp. said its E500 "very light jet" has been fully certified by the Federal Aviation Administration - meaning the small aircraft are cleared for delivery to customers.

3 October 2006

NBAA's Bolen Blasts ATA For 'Unfounded' Comments On VLJs

…Disputes Assertion Jets Will Be "Significant Burden" On NAS On Monday, the National Business Aviation Association came out swinging against allegations made by the Air Transport Association the emergence of very light jets (VLJs) would impose a burden on the nation's aviation infrastructure.

…As Aero-News reported, an official with the commercial airline lobbying group contended last week VLJs would be a "significant burden" in the aviation system, interfering with the operations of the commercial airlines. NBAA President and CEO Ed Bolen (right) says ATA's statements simply don't hold water -- and what's more, several government officials have already said as much.

…"The unfounded comments by the ATA fly in the face not only of public statements by Federal Aviation Administration Administrator Marion Blakey but also congressional testimony by top FAA officials," said Bolen. "The fear-mongering by the airlines may be part of their broader strategy to pay less for air traffic services even as they try to seize control of the system."

…"The development of VLJ aircraft is good news on many levels," Bolen said. "Their introduction produces high-skill manufacturing jobs. They will help make many small and mid-sized companies more competitive. And, they will strengthen aviation services for many small communities. Those benefits should be the focus of discussion about VLJs."

5 October 2006

Eclipse Aviation Sued By Swiss Customer

…Says VLJ Maker Delayed, Then Cancelled Order Despite great news from Eclipse Aviation in the past few days... there are a few flies in the ointment at the Albuquerque, NM-based planemaker. Aviace Limited -- a Swiss start-up jet charter company, and what would have been one of Eclipse's first big customers -- is suing the company, after it says Eclipse first delayed, then cancelled, a 112-plane order supposedly made four years ago.

...Aviace alleges the situation is all about money -- that Eclipse deliberately cancelled the order, so it could sell the same planes to another customer at greater profit.

...On Tuesday, US District Judge Christina Armijo denied a request by Aviace
for a temporary restraining order, according to the AP.

6 October 2006
A comprehensive rundown on business jets (including supersonic projects!) and an update on the future of the Spectrum 33:

New Bizjets

…Calif.-based Spectrum Aeronautical is vowing to press ahead with the Spectrum 33 program, despite the fatal crash of its sole prototype on July 25.

…The NTSB found no evidence of any pre-existing failures of the airplane’s structure. However, “examination of the translation linkage on the aft side of the aft pressure bulkhead revealed that it was connected in a manner that reversed the roll control…the linkage was connected such that left roll input from the sidesticks would have deflected the ailerons to produce right roll of the airplane, and right roll input from the sidesticks would have deflected the ailerons to produce left roll of the airplane.”
…“The nature of the accident didn’t call the Spectrum 33’s design characteristics into question,” Blue said. The next test aircraft will be closer to a “production configuration” and will be designed to ensure that the controls can never be misrigged, he noted. This aircraft is expected to fly next year.

…Spectrum plans to release more details at the NBAA Convention this month, where it will begin taking orders for the $3.65 million twinjet.

10 October 2006

A very good summary of Air Taxis and VLJ developments, with special emphasis on the variety of business models and strategies.

NBAA 2006: Meter's running - The air-taxi era in the USA

…At next week’s National Business Aviation Association convention in Orlando, Florida, the potential of the air-taxi sector will be one of the biggest themes, as the most talked about air-taxi operator and air-taxi aircraft – Florida’s DayJet and the newly certificated Eclipse 500 – get ready to begin service.

….The “air-taxi” epithet is convenient, but confusing. Each of the major services so far operating or planning to launch has a distinctive business model. Not all even call themselves air taxis. Only DayJet – which has 239 Eclipses on order – intends to immediately offer services on a per-seat basis. Although all of them plan to eventually operate VLJs, SATSair has built a successful regional business around the Carolinas and Virginia using SR22s. Linear Air, based near Boston, Massachusetts, has launched its service with Cessna Caravans, although it has 15 Eclipses on order. Some shun the air taxi moniker: Magnum, in Stamford, Connecticut – which has ordered 110 Adam A700s and 50 Embraer Phenom 100s – markets itself as an “air limousine” service; Point2Point of Bismark, North Dakota, another SR22 operator, insists it is a “personal airline”.

…Of all the new air-taxi business models, DayJet’s is the most radical – and risky.

…Iacobucci – a former associate of Eclipse Aviation founder Vern Raburn – has no doubt he has his sums right. Announced in 2002, DayJet plans to set up bases at a network of underused local airports, called DayPorts, from where it will try to match travellers who want to go from one to the other at roughly the same time.

11 October 2006

href="http://www.flightglobal.com/Articles/2006/10/10/Navigation/177/209710/NBAA+2">16 October 2006

Spectrum Aero has some good news! I like what they're doing at the 'larger-VLJ' (for the lack of a better term) This is a pretty positive development from them that only adds to their credibility…

GE-Honda Venture Gets First Customer for Jet Engine
…GE Honda Aero Engines LLC, a joint venture between General Electric Co. and Honda Motor Co., said plane maker Spectrum Aeronautical will be the first customer for its small, Honda-designed jet engine.
….Spectrum begins taking orders for its Freedom jet and the smaller, $3.65 million Independence model at the National Business Aviation Association convention in Orlando, Florida, starting tomorrow, Blue said.
….Honda will use the convention to start taking orders tomorrow for the HondaJet, its new entry in the light-jet market. Tokyo-based Honda also has said it may sell a small engine for propeller-driven aircraft.

Debunking The Close Air Support Myths: Part 6

CAS, the Air Force, and the A-10
Part 6: A-10s 'Forever' ?
(scroll down for links to Parts 1-5 and 'Sidebars)

As noted previously, the A-10 design was from the very start designed to be operated in a ‘permissive environment’. This limitation had been a concern of AF planners since the A-10’s inception, and its vulnerability to weapons larger than those it was designed to encounter became more of a concern with the advent and proliferation of Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADs) such as the SA-7 (and successors) as well as increases in numbers and types of larger mobile systems that filled the gap between short range low-altitude MANPADs and longer-range high-altitude fixed site systems (SA-2/3s and successors). Before the A-10 was even out of flight test, evidence that the battlefield was getting a lot nastier was seen in the 1973 Arab-Israeli ‘October War’:

Egyptian SAMs (SA-2s, SA-3s, and SA-6s) along with 23-mm ZSU23-4 antiaircraft cannons destroyed some 40 Israeli aircraft in the first 48 hours of the war, or 14 percent of the frontline strength of the IAF.3 In contrast, only five Israeli aircraft were destroyed in air-to-air combat during the entire conflict. Coupled with the high number of aircraft lost to ground-based air defenses in Vietnam, the results of the October War prompted some analysts to ask whether tactical aircraft had outlived their usefulness on the modern battlefield.(link)

Air planners saw the world’s Integrated Air Defense Systems (IADs) evolving at an alarming rate and anticipated that flying low-and-slow would soon be a poor survival strategy. 
Other developments were also occurring that would influence AF attitudes and decisions concerning future CAS capabilities:

1. Israeli successes with the F-16 in the Osirak Reactor Strike (air-to-ground) and the Bekaa Valley (air-to-air) “reenergized proponents of fast multi-role fighters”.

2. The emergence of the Army’s Air-Land Battle doctrine which “envisioned a faster and freer-flowing battlespace without a traditional battle line”. This was a doctrine that clearly favored use of a faster aircraft and operations that were less reliant on air-ground coordination.

3. The discovery that the A-10’s structural design life was significantly less-than-specified, and that would require remedy either via an extensive and expensive modification program and/or replacement of much of the A-10’s structure or the development of a replacement aircraft far earlier than anticipated.

All these factors contributed to the Air Force considering an A-10 replacement that was a ‘fast mover’ and viewing an F-16 variant as a good candidate for that replacement. Making aspersions that the Air Force ‘doesn’t want to do Close Air Support’ because it has sought (and seeks) to perform the mission using resources more survivable than a relatively ‘low and slow’ platform such as the A-10 says more about the ignorance of what is necessary in performing the CAS mission by those making such accusations than anything else. 
If one were to make a list of all the things that the A-10 brings to the battlefield that make it a good CAS platform, none of them are directly dependent upon the ability to fly ‘low and slow’ : its ability to fly low and slow enables it to provide timely and effective CAS in  many cases...in a highly permissive environment, but timely and effective CAS can be provided in any number of different combinations of weapon systems and tactics See here and here for examples. 

General Chuck Horner, the 'Air Boss' in Desert Storm, gets to have the last word on whether the A-10 or an A-10 'like' platform qualifies as the 'best' CAS tool in the future (LINK):

Q: Did the war have any effect on the Air Force's view of the A-10?
A: No. People misread that. People were saying that airplanes are too sophisticated and that they wouldn't work in the desert, that you didn't need all this high technology, that simple and reliable was better, and all that.
Well, first of all, complex does not mean unreliable. We're finding that out. For example, you have a watch that uses transistors rather than a spring. It's infinitely more reliable than the windup watch that you had years ago. That's what we're finding in the airplanes.
Those people . . . were always championing the A-10. As the A-10 reaches the end of its life cycle-- and it's approaching that now--it's time to replace it, just like we replace every airplane, including, right now, some early versions of the F-16.
Since the line was discontinued, [the A-10's champions] want to build another A-10 of some kind. The point we were making was that we have F-16s that do the same job.
Then you come to people who have their own reasons-good reasons to them, but they don't necessarily compute to me-who want to hang onto the A-10 because of the gun. Well, the gun's an excellent weapon, but you'll find that most of the tank kills by the A-10 were done with Mavericks and bombs. So the idea that the gun is the absolute wonder of the world is not true.

Q: This conflict has shown that?
A: It shows that the gun has a lot of utility, which we always knew, but it isn't the principal tank-killer on the A-10. The [Imaging Infrared] Maverick is the big hero there. That was used by the A-10s and the F-16s very, very effectively in places like Khafji.
The other problem is that the A-10 is vulnerable to hits because its speed is limited. It's a function of thrust, it's not a function of anything else. We had a lot of A-10s take a lot of ground fire hits. Quite frankly, we pulled the A-10s back from going up around the Republican Guard and kept them on Iraq's [less formidable] front-line units. That's line [sic] if you have a force that allows you to do that. In this case, we had F-16s to go after the Republican Guard.

Q: At what point did you do that?

A: I think I had fourteen airplanes sitting on the ramp having battle damage repaired, and I lost two A- 10s in one day [February 15], and I said, "I've had enough of this." ....

The Air Force Tried to Give the A-10 to the Army?
One of the most recent episodes fueling the “Air Force Doesn’t like CAS” myth often pops up in real and virtual discussions on the subject as a form of 'proof' or evidence is the simplistic claim that “the AF tried to give the A-10 to the Army”. This argument has its roots in a singular event after Desert Storm, when General Merrill McPeak, shortly before his retirement as Air Force Chief of Staff, proposed a radical change in DoD and Service responsibilities based upon his particular view of “roles and missions”. The A-10 ramifications were collateral damage in the scheme of things. It was McPeak's view that such a restructuring would reduce redundancy and exploit each Service’s strengths to the most effective level.

Per 'Learning Large Lessons' (p.197), McPeak asserted:

In my view, modern land warfare can be seen as containing four “battles”—the rear battle, which includes all the base and supporting elements; the close battle, in which the main opposing ground forces engage one another; the deep battle, which includes hostile territory well beyond the line of contact; and the high battle, the arena of air and space combat. . . . The rear and close battles should be the responsibility of a ground forces commander, an Army or a Marine Corps officer. His forces should be capable of relatively autonomous operations—they should be capable of engaging the enemy in the friendly rear and immediately in front of them, without a lot of outside help. True, the ground commander has a deep and abiding interest in what goes on overhead in the high battle or over the horizon in the deep battle and he may even have some capability to get into these fights. But, his forces are not the most effective for the high or deep battle. Air assets provide the best, most often the only capability to operate in these parts of the battlefield. . . . [T]his approach to dividing battle space provides a logical starting point for identifying unnecessary overlap and duplication. If you accept the scheme I just laid out, it follows that the commander with responsibility for the close battle does not require systems or capabilities that reach across the boundaries into the deep and high battles. If there are such systems in the field or on the drawing board, they might be good candidates for retirement or transfer to another service. Alternatively, the commander with responsibility for the deep battle does not need forces that are configured for direct support of close combat operations. If there are any, they too could be transferred out. 

McPeak called for the Army to give up the ‘deep battle’, the Air Force to give up ‘close battle’, and called for, among other things, the other services to get out of ‘space’ operations. His proposal (thankfully) went nowhere with the other services nor anyone else in the Air Force. Thus, the ‘give CAS to the Army’ was the idea of one man – now long gone and most definitely ‘not missed’, as part of a complete realignment of service roles and missions, essentially dictated by geography of the battlespace.

There were very large problems with inter-service cooperation and conflict that McPeak saw and was trying to solve. The challenge was real, but his solution would have created as many problems as it would have solved, even without entrenched interests subverting such an effort (and there would be). Desert Storm experience, if it did nothing else, clearly exposed the Army’s parochial and incorrect view that Airpower is nothing more than a support element. When in reality it should be viewed as a maneuver element.
Updated and expanded references 7/28: Some excellent papers on differing Airpower-as-manever-or-support views (large .pdf files at links):

Thunder and Lightning: Desert Storm and the Airpower Debates (1995)
Airpower and Maneuver Warfare (1994)
Integrating Joint Operations Beyond the FSCL (1997) (Army POV with AF POV Intro)
Unity of Effort: Crisis Beyond the FSCL (1999) (Army POV on resolving ambiguities in Joint Doctrine)

Conclusions

Thus we have found:
 
1. The Air Force supports the CAS mission better now than when it was part of the Army.

2. The Army was the primary antagonist in creating inter-service friction over CAS post-WWII and in it's Army-Centric way of war it continues to generate friction to this day.

3. CAS is a mission NOT a platform.

Post Script: 
There were a lot of sub-topics we could have pursued and I was/am tempted to further explore the effects of organizational culture and tendencies of the services on the CAS debate, but I fear that will drive the discussion down a ‘rabbit hole’ from which there may be no return. There are also some interesting dynamics now changing the Army’s way of fighting that could lessen the perceived friction between the services, but I am content to simply monitor them for the present time. I could have also expanded greatly on what makes up 'Effectiveness' for a CAS mission. Finally, the Marines insistence on being the primary provider of CAS as an organic USMC function is another topic for another time.

Update 7/27/11@~19:45hrs: Added part of a response that Gen Horner made in the Q&A above that had been dropped in copying the file from a word document to Blogger.(Now the answer makes sense.)

Part 1: The “Big Two” Close Air Support (CAS) Myths
Part 2: Those "not so good old days”
Part 3: Vietnam and the Rise of the “No-CAS Air Force” Myth
Part 4: Origins of the A-X Program
Part 5: Defining a New CAS Platform: the Evolution of the A-10
CAS Myths Sidebar: The A-10 and the 'Cult of the Gun'
CAS Myths Sidebar: Army-Air Force Views on CAS and Airpower
Second Edition: 
Part 7: Sourcing AF Hates A-10 Nonsense
Part 8: The AF 'Had To" Buy a CAS Plane?