Chasing Long Range Strike 1990-2009

Edit 27 Mar 11: Changed font size of post for readability in the new blog format.

Here's a little summary of the United States' steps and missteps in defining, developing and fielding a modern Long Range Strike capability since 1990. I offer it as a way to save future researchers a bit of work. I have selfish motives as well: hopefully this will let me keep a long story short in some future discussions. Enjoy.

Chasing Long Range Strike 1990-2009

This is an overview of the existing national security environment as it relates to Long Range Strike (LRS), how the LRS mission is perceived, and how the current LRS force structure and strategic direction came into being. Understanding the different factors that shape total weapon system performance, expressed in terms of effectiveness and efficiency are built on an awareness of how the LRS systems are likely to be employed and this understanding can be gained through thorough review of LRS literature.

Long-Range Strike from 1990-2007

The current LRS force structure and operational concepts are evolved constructs with roots reaching back to the late 1980's. This section highlights the pertinent events and relevant thoughts that shape current thinking on Long-Range Strike forces. These sources provide important rationale for selecting the conditions and assumptions for modeling that take place within this study.

Sole Superpower: Strength and Responsibilities

Indications that the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact might rapidly crumble, thus changing the balance of military power, were recognized by individuals responsible for strategic planning in the late 1980s (Jaffe, 1993). After considerable internal review and consensus building at the highest levels of the Executive Branch, a new view of national defense planning emerged, colloquially known as the Base Force. The Base Force was conceived by then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, as the absolute lowest force structure and manning strength that the Department of Defense could retain and still carry out its superpower responsibilities in an uncertain, post-Cold War world (Jaffe, 1993).

The major impact of the Base Force on long-range strike capabilities was that it capped the bomber force end strength, and drastically cut planned acquisition of the only bomber in development, the B-2A, to only 20 aircraft. At the time of the Base Force, consideration of the bomber force end strength was framed in terms of the bomber's contribution to the Strategic Triad: the nuclear forces of the United States that also include sea-launched and land-based ballistic missiles. There was no emphasis placed on the long-range bomber's role in conventional conflict and conventional capability needs were framed in terms of fighter wing needs and reductions (Jaffe, 1993). This blindness to the long-range bomber’s conventional capability should not have been a surprise. The ‘fighter’ community’s rise in the Air Force hierarchy had eclipsed the ‘bomber’ community years before, and the Strategic Air Command’s single-minded focus on the nuclear mission was effectively an abdication of the conventional role to the Tactical Air Command (Builder, 1994, p. 186).

While the Base Force was still in formulation, some in Congress were calling for even more drastic reductions in the armed forces. By the time the Base Force was publicly announced on August 2, 1990, the day after Iraq invaded Kuwait and set in motion what would become Operation Desert Storm, the effect of Congressional defense budgets that were already forecast through fiscal year 1994 would convert General Powell's envisioned force strength floor into a defense planning ceiling (Correll, 1992). Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm would temporarily alleviate the pressure to reduce the armed forces below Base Force levels, but after Desert Storm the pressure would return.

Desert Storm and Conventional Bomber Roles

While Operation Desert Storm was not a showcase for new bomber capabilities and roles, it served clear notice that precision-guided weapons and stealth technology would be of prime importance in future conflicts. It was seen that combining these advancements with the advantages of a heavy bomber's large payload and long-range could make future bomber conventional capabilities more important to the conduct of future wars (U.S. Air Force, 1992; Kowalski, 1993).

With this realization, the Air Combat Command and the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition directed the establishment of a "roadmap" to guide the Air Force in investing long-range modernization funds. The result was The Bomber Roadmap (U.S. Air Force, 1992). The roadmap's stated objective was to define the conventional bomber concept of operations, the right force structure mix of B-52, B-1B, and B-2A bombers, and the investment plan for 1994-1999 and beyond (p. 2). This roadmap, while useful in the sense that for the first time it identified the role of bombers in a post-Cold War conventional war, and quantified that capability in terms of effectiveness over the course of a Desert Storm-similar air campaign, was also severely limited in scope. The roadmap did not examine alternative force structures to determine what would be the most cost-effective strategies. Instead, it examined only how the existing force structure could be maintained and still satisfy near-term requirements within a shrinking defense budget.

Risk Assumption: Seeking the Peace Dividend

In 1992, Representative Les Aspin, Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, proposed cuts to the military force structure and capability that were even more draconian than those planned under the Base Force concept. Representative Aspin and other leading Democrats wrongly asserted (Correll, 1992) that the Base Force concept was still mired in the Cold War mentality and that further cuts in the military could be made without increased risk. When a Democratic Administration took office in 1993, Rep. Aspin became the new Secretary of Defense, and by September of that year he had codified his views and rationale in his Report on the Bottom-Up Review (Aspin, 1993).

This review impacted the future of the long-range strike force in two ways. First, it established a force structure that was still too large for forecasted budgets (Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment [CSBA], 1993), thus wreaking havoc across the entire Department of Defense modernization and acquisition system by increasing competition among programs for the shrunken defense budget. Second and more directly, it used near-term and familiar, instead of most likely threats (CSBA, 1993) as a planning basis to arrive at the conclusion that no more than 184 heavy bombers (Aspin, 1993) would be required. It also described the composition of the bomber fleet that largely reflected the then-current mix, conveniently reducing the numbers of B-52s, while holding the existing fleets of B-1Bs and B-2As constant. This finding was consistent with the 1992 Bomber Roadmap, but the basic approach used in both cases drew heavy criticism (Builder, 1993).

While the review was consistent with the 1992 Bomber Roadmap, it was entirely contrary to authoritative information that Aspin had in his possession at that time. In 1992, while he was still Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, Aspin had commissioned Major General Jasper Welch to conduct a study and author a paper titled Conventional Long-Range Bombers. General Welch is a Director Emeritus of the National Academy of Engineering and expert on many topics, including nuclear physics, advanced technology research and development, and strategic policy (U.S. Air Force, 1991). General Welch found during his research that contrary to Aspin’s assertions, the outcome of the 1991 study’s scenarios did not support then-Representative Aspin's proposed number and composition of the bomber forces, but instead supported the acquisition of 20 to 30 more B-2 bombers. The findings of the Conventional Long-Range Bombers study were not made public by Rep. Aspin at that time, but the findings were re-validated when, in 1994, General Welch updated the findings within the 1991 study for the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Senator Sam Nunn. A summary of both studies, with scenario descriptions, was later published (Welch, 1994) which highlighted the very real need for more Long-Range Strike platforms than planned, and exposed Rep. Aspin’s attempt to squelch the findings of the 1992 study.

Congressional Concern and Executive Avoidance

In 1994, a concerned Congress tasked the DOD to determine the contribution of additional B-2 aircraft in future conventional conflicts (Tirpak, 1995) and the Heavy Bomber Force Study (HBFS) ostensibly was conducted to accomplish that task. The Heavy Bomber Force Study's assumptions were skewed so favorably to the United States’ advantage regarding warning time, basing availability, and tactical fighter pre-deployment posture, that model outputs indicated the use of additional bombers made little impact on the outcomes compared to the impact of the large force that was optimistically modeled as being already deployed and available in the theater of operations. This approach overtly diluted the effect of long-range bomber capability (Guthe, 1996). The Heavy Bomber Force Study's assumptions altered the results to the point that they indicated an additional 60-80 B-2s would have to be acquired to make a positive impact on the modeled scenarios. These assumptions enabled the study to avoid dealing with more plausible scenarios using more real-world assumptions that would have yielded different radically outcomes that would have indicated that only 10 to 20 B-2s would have made a significant positive impact on the outcomes. The conclusion of the Heavy Bomber Force Study did not address the issue of finding or excluding any benefit from acquiring new LRS capabilities but instead as several subsequent studies (CSBA, 1993) also recommended, asserted that improving the capability of the existing bomber fleet as the most cost-effective way to use the planned budget.

It should be noted at this point in the review that the forecasted weapons carriage capabilities included in the modeling for the Heavy Bomber Force Study did not include the B-2's eighty (80) 500lb, 'near-precision' Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) weapons carriage option. This capability is now fielded and it had been proposed at the time of the HBFS. This development effectively gives each B-2 up to five times the lethality, in terms of aimpoints that can be struck on a single mission, compared to the baseline 2000 lb JDAM payload carriage method. That this configuration was not modeled as part of the HBFS was remarkable given that the study did advocate and cite other specific advanced weapons development proposals underway at the time that would enhance bomber lethality (Tirpak, 1995) and that indeed, the 80 500 lb JDAM effort was one of the more widely anticipated improvements for the B-2A. In addition to deficiencies in model inputs, the constructs of the HBFS’ core model itself have been found woefully deficient (Guthe, 1996).

The findings of the HBFS were largely and immediately discredited by a bipartisan group of Members of Congress (Tirpak, 1995) as well as leading military analysts. A RAND Corporation analyst, Dr. Glen Buchan, testified before a House of Representatives subcommittee in 1996 and summed up the methods of the HBFS as "Whoever framed the study, cooked the books" (Buchan, 1996, p. 208).

Not long after the release of the HBFS, the Commission on Roles and Missions (CORM) released their report. In their official report, the CORM also asserted that producing more B-2s would not be as cost-effective as buying additional precision weapons and improving existing bombers and short-range strike aircraft (CSBA, 1993). Unlike HBFS however, the Commission recommended no final decisions should be made until another study, the Heavy Bomber Industrial Base (HBIB) study, was completed.
The CORM report, like the HBFS Study before it, did not address the task it had been given by Congress. It had been chartered to examine the economic impact of losing and having to reconstitute the industrial base. Instead the commission merely iterated the industrial base could be reconstituted (Barefield, 1997) without answering the core question being asked: at what possible cost?

Shortly after the CORM released their report, it became public knowledge that it was as deficient as earlier studies, when it was revealed the CORM commission had rejected the recommendations and findings of its technical staff and instead reported findings that were unsupported by the facts in hand (Commission on Roles and Missions Staff, 1995). The CORM technical staff had conducted more than 20 different studies and found

 "the studies generally conclude that long-range bombers and the B-2 in particular, are cost-effective, and in some cases the only means of rapidly projecting survivable power" (p. 2). 

The CORM staff paper strongly advocated acquiring significant numbers of more B-2s. The staff paper was widely circulated in Congress, and was eventually made public, but the differences between the CORM report and the findings with recommendations of their technical staff were never publicly explained. This disconnect may very well have contributed to Congress’ continuing determination to keep revisiting the issue. It may have also influenced the decision of Congress to repeal budget cap limitations and to authorize additional B-2 acquisition activities as part of the 1996 Defense Authorization Act. Early in the 1996 election year, instead of applying funds for long-lead items needed to build more B-2s as intended, the President directed the acquisition funds authorized by Congress be used to only upgrade the one remaining dedicated flight-test aircraft to operational standards, bringing the total number of operational B-2s to 21 (GAO, 1996).

Approximately nine months after the CORM released its report, the Deep Attack Weapons Mix Study, Part II (DAWMS II) was released. This study examined the relative merits of weapons that could strike deep into an enemy's rear area in stopping an advancing force. The analysis included diverse weapons options including long-range artillery and missiles. The initial findings of DAWMS II supported buying more B-2s, but the scenarios were run again with changes to get different outcomes (Independent Bomber Force Review Commission [IBFRC], 1997). The second sequence of scenarios still indicated that the B-2 was an extraordinarily valuable asset (IBFRC, p. 20) during the halt-phase of an attack. But the DAWMS II findings asserted the tradeoffs required from buying more B-2s created what DAWMS II called capability gaps in other areas which were never fully described (p. 22). The primary model used to determine he DAWMS II outcome was called TACWAR. A critique (Courter & Thompson, 1996) of the DAWMS II findings noted that TACWAR seriously discounts the effects of airpower and de-emphasizes its value during the Halt Phase of a battle. This criticism was repeated in a later study (Ochmanek, Harshberger, Thaler, & Kent, 1998), which also demonstrated how future modeling could avoid the same deficiencies.

Long-Range Strike from 1997-Present

Rethinking Long-Range Strike

In 1997, the National Defense Panel (NDP) published its report Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century. The purpose of the panel was to provide Congress with an alternate view (Haffa & Patton, 1998) of defense for comparison with the DOD's 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review. Haffa and Patton noted the NDP report was widely criticized for not proposing alternative force structures, but the NDP did point out that as the United States reduced its overseas presence, it would become increasingly reliant on long-range strike systems. The NDP expressed deep concern regarding the emphasis on tactical airpower modernization at the expense of long-range systems.

Also in 1997, the findings of another blue-ribbon panel, led by Chairman and former National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, were released. This panel, known as the Independent Bomber Force Review Commission (IBFRC), had examined the planned future of long-range strike aircraft, the importance of long-range strike to the national security, and the potential benefit of acquiring more bombers, specifically more B-2s (IBFRC, 1997). As part of their review, they dissected and critiqued many of the studies that had been conducted up to that time.

The IBFRC reached two major conclusions that were stated in the Chairman’s cover letter delivered with the IBFRC report, the first conclusion was that “long-range air power will be more important than ever in the decades ahead” and the second, “Pentagon opposition to further B-2 production is shortsighted and parochial.” The commission’s Chairman further noted in the cover letter that evidence indicated "there is a consensus across the services that long-range airpower can be abandoned in the long run” and added that it was “a view with which we strongly disagree.” The report expanded on the IBFRC’s primary conclusions, and recommended force structure changes, including acquiring "a minimum of one additional B-2 squadron" (IBFRC, 1997, p. 2) and keeping open the possibility of accelerated procurement of even more aircraft afterwards.

In October 1997, via the Defense Appropriations Act of 1998, Congress chartered one more commission to review some very specific issues related to long-range airpower and its operational employment. Within six months, The Panel to Review Long-Range Airpower released its report. In testimony before the House of Representatives’ Military Procurement Subcommittee, the panel’s Chairman stated that while the panel stopped short of recommending additional B-2s, it did recommend upgrades to existing aircraft as most 'cost-effective', as well as repeated earlier studies' recommendations to develop more advanced weapons for long-range strike aircraft. The Chairman further testified that the panel recommended the DOD create a plan to replace the existing force, stating in testimony that there was not at that time an “adequate basis” for choosing between upgraded versions of the B-2 or developing a follow-on or direct replacement, built with more advanced technologies (Panel to Review Long-Range Airpower, 1998).

Future Long-Range Strike Solution Remains Out of Reach

The Panel to Review Long-Range Airpower's call to develop a plan caused Congress in late 1998 to direct the DOD and Air Force to provide such a plan (U.S. Air Force, 1999). The product was called the U.S. Air Force White Paper on Long-Range Bombers, released in March of 1999. It was very similar to the Air Force's 1992 effort, The Bomber Roadmap, but incorporated modernization and weaponization plans that had been defined in the interim. What the new white paper did not include was a plan to replace existing systems as they became obsolete, but instead the white paper asserted that the issue did not need to be addressed until the year 2019. The assumptions made within the study, such as a viable B-52 bomber force at even the end of a proposed 80-year service life, drew heavy criticism (Thompson & Davis, 2000). Congress then directed the Air Force to update the roadmap "to include a new long-range bomber development program" (ASC, 1999, p. 2). Several studies were undertaken, including the Future Strike Aircraft (FSA) study, and even today aerospace contractors are conducting follow-on studies to the FSA effort (DOD, 2000).

In 1999, the Air Force began what appeared to be another round of studies to determine the future of long-range strike programs. The Air Force's Aeronautical Systems Center gave limited release to its in-house study, System And Operational Implications For Choosing Best Speed For Global Missions. It was designed for use by the Air Force in preparing their own personnel to "understand and evaluate the results of the contracted studies" (ASC, 1999, p. 2). The 1999 ASC study was an important first step towards ultimately establishing realistic requirements for future systems. The 1999 ASC study possessed serious deficiencies in its assumptions, internal constructs and scope, such as modeling a clearly sub-optimal subsonic planform in its analyses, but it was an important common starting point for interested parties to conduct further analyses and develop a better understanding of Long-Range Strike needs.

A lack of clear direction for fielding the next-generation LRS capability is not caused by a lack of effort. It was estimated that by 2006 that more than 20 studies had been “conducted in recent years” (Hebert, 2006, p. 26) in search of finding the best way forward for acquiring a future Long-Range Strike capability. Hebert also noted that in 2004, the Air Force Air Staff Requirements Director had stated that there had been so many Long-Range Strike studies, that “enough studying had probably been done” (p. 26) and it was time to proceed with fielding a solution. By February 2008, it was estimated that on average, one study of long-range strike requirements had been conducted every “fiscal quarter since the Cold War ended over 20 years ago” (Murch, 2008, p. 7).

While there is a dearth of publicly available and official information giving insight into the inner workings of all the later studies, there have been some official indications as to what directions these studies point towards, such as that found in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (DOD, 2006):

The Air Force has set a goal of increasing its long-range strike capabilities by 50% and the penetrating component of long-range strike by a factor of five by 2025. Approximately 45% of the future long-range strike force will be unmanned. The capacity for joint air forces to conduct global conventional strikes against time-sensitive targets will also be increased. (p. 56)

This 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) planning extract indicates that the LRS capability being sought at that time represented the force projection capability equivalent to 80 combat-coded B-2A bombers. The extract further indicates the capability sought was to be split nearly equal between manned and unmanned systems. The extract also indicates that time-critical targeting is a high priority mission for defense planners. The 2006 QDR provided additional information as to future LRS capability goals including developing “a new land-based, penetrating long-range strike capability to be fielded by 2018 while modernizing the current bomber force” (DOD, 2006, p. 46).

Also in 2006, the National Research Council Committee on Future Air Force Needs for Survivability examined the full spectrum of design and speed options. Their report acknowledged that for the near future, a subsonic strike platform is the most desirable, but also made the assertion that higher speeds should be pursued as a hedge against potential future threat environments. The 2006 Committee also recognized a need for a better basis for decision-making and thus strongly endorsed the pursuit of more capable modeling and analytical tools and techniques for future analyses. These tools and techniques were seen as needed to better understand the factors affecting survivability, and in particular the speed factor and its influences on survivability. The 2006 Committee made these recommendations based upon a consensus among panel members that determining an optimum design that adequately evaluates the speed factor and its contributions to survivability was too large and complex an issue to resolve without a significant effort beyond either the panel’s charter or ability.

Summary

Perceptions of Long-Range Strike mission requirements, including the nature of the mission itself, have evolved significantly in the last two decades: changing as the lessons learned from modern LRS implementation have taken root. The analyses used have also matured, reshaped by real-world experiences and the practical and recurring application of long-range airpower. No longer is the need for a modern LRS capability in doubt. Careful examination of the missions that LRS performs now and is expected to perform in the future has eliminated all but two concepts from consideration until well after the year 2035. Of the two remaining concepts, a subsonic platform of uncertain size is foreseen as the preferred concept for the next LRS platform to be fielded in the 2018 timeframe.

Emerging technology and its advantages are not yet well understood enough to determine if the 2035 follow-on LRS system should be a subsonic or supersonic system, with the survivability seen as the dominant unknown factor preventing a decision between the two. To close the open issues left by the previous studies and analyses surveyed in this review, a better analytical approach is needed to support decision-makers both in how well they understand LRS requirements and in how well competing LRS weapon system alternatives are able to fill those requirements.

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FURTHER READING

Arena, M.V., Younossi, O., Brancato, K., Blickstein, I., & Grammich, C.A. (2008). Why has the cost of fixed-wing aircraft risen? : A macroscopic examination of the trends in U.S. military aircraft costs over the past several decades. Santa Monica, CA: RAND.

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Stillion, J., & Orletsky, D.T. (1999). Airbase vulnerability to conventional cruise-missile and ballistic missile attacks: Technology, scenarios, and U.S. Air Force responses. Santa Monica, CA: RAND

Thaler, D.E., & Shlapak, D.A. (1995). Perspectives on theater air campaign planning. Santa Monica, CA: RAND

Tirpak, J.A. (2001). Bomber questions. Air Force, 84, 36-43.

U.S. Air Force Aeronautical Systems Center. (2004). Global strike global persistent attack capability request for information (RFI). Retrieved June 20, 2008, from https://pixs.wpafb.af.mil/pixs_solicitation.asp?id=3196

Warden, J.A. (1998). The air campaign. New York: ToExcel.

Winchester, J. (2003). Bombers of the 20th century. Shrewsbury, England: Airlife Publishing Ltd.

The Opponents of Long Range Strike

I posted a slightly abbreviated version of this in a comment at Strategy Page a couple of months ago. I wanted to make sure I had a copy of it at my place as a kind of quick reference for me to refer to in the future. Whenever I run into the typical 'anti' long range strike weapon systems type I can now just point them here.

Enjoy.

"Enemies" of Long Range StrikeThere are several entrenched interests that have played tag-team in working continuously against the development of a new Future Long Range Strike heavy bomber. In order of effectiveness, they are: the Speed Fetishists, the Nostalgia Air Force, the Cruise Missile Cultists, and the Airliners Alliance. At the current time, the Speed Fetishists and Nostalgia Air Force are the strongest insurgents.
Speed Fetishists
The Speed Fetishists invoke the 'Faster! Faster!' battle cry for two interrelated reasons. First, faster means smaller which means more fighter-like, which is what fighters-can-do-everything pilots believe in.
Unfortunately it also means shorter range and lower payloads. 'Faster' has also meant 'more survivable' in the past, and the Speed Fetishists can't seem to wrap their heads around the possibility that 'faster' just means 'die sooner' on the modern battlefield against a sophisticated near-peer foe.
Speed Fetishists cling to the heartfelt belief that faster is better, yet cannot explain what a Mach 2 speed will do for you against a Mach 10 double-digit SAM, except decrease your turn rate and ability to get out of the way for any given bank angle.

The Nostalgia Air ForceThe Nostalgia Air Force is fully vested in the near-religious belief that the venerable B-52 should fly on forever, and that the B-52 is the most dependable of all the LRS assets. The first is a romantic notion, and the second is a false truth. The fact that the BUFF has changed missions from direct attack to standoff in high threat areas gets glossed over in discussion of its long operational life on the one hand, while if a new bomber design came down the pipe tomorrow and had a forecast operational life equivalent to the BUFF's - it would be pilloried for having 'too high' forecasted life cycle costs on the other hand.
The vaunted reliability and O&S costs of the BUFF are the result of gaming the maintenance reporting burdens, due to the availability of co-located attrition reserve aircraft, essentially 'flying spares', that allow work to be performed off an organization's O&S books. 'Hard break' on a B-52? Just rotate it into the Attrition Reserve pool and bring on a full-MC bird, and voila!... little reported downtime. Trouble is, when they forward deployed in OEF/OIF, they had the worst MC rate in-theater.

The Airliners Alliance & Cruise Missile CultistsThe Airliners Alliance guys come and go, as it seems each generation of defense planners has one or two bean-counters get what they think is an epiphany, and the idea gains traction until somebody actually does the cost tradeoffs between standoff and direct attack...and realizes that the system cost including weaponization is many times higher using commercial airframes to carry standoff weapons (caveat: only IF it is ever actually used however).
And in anything but a highly permissive environment, a commercial airframe would need to carry standoff weapons such as one of the various cruise missile types. This makes every aimpoint an expensive proposition to attack, even if cruise missiles were a) suitable for the aimpoint and b) had a high success rate. The cost differential between direct attack and standoff attack is dramatic.
For example, even assuming 100% success rate for each weapon type, the cost differential of employing JDAMs instead of certain cruise missiles saves about the equivalent of an Aegis cruiser for every 1000 aimpoints serviced.

I may clean this up later and perhaps add some graphics, but for now I just wanted to get it on the site.

Holding Back the "Cruise Missile Cultists"

I just know they're coming....a nefarious faction of the Opponents of Long Range Strike.

Sheesh. First at SNAFU, we get a winners and losers list with the B-2 and Tomahawks reversed and on the wrong lists (Sorry Solomon - I still love ya' bud). It gets linked to AvWeek's Ares' Blog 'Frago' post which also links to a doozy at Information Dissemination which in turn has an extract from, and link to, a cruise missile puff piece at National Defense Magazine .

Time for a short course in economics and the application of long range strike.

Why I'm the Guy to Give it....

This is the first air campaign (using the term loosely) that I've not been at least a small part of since 1991, or a significant contributor to since 1999. Between moi' and the sources above I'm probably the only person who has actually launched and tested cruise missiles, as well as understands their strengths and limitations. I'm also probably the only one to have done long range strike 'bang-for-buck' analyses and what-if scenarios for DoD campaign planning efforts and/or wrote his Master's thesis or capstone on the subject of the proper methodology for top-level conceptual design of next generation LRS platforms.

Ready? Here we go!!!!!!!!!!!

Lesson 1. There is no ONE best weapon for everything and cruise missiles are only the one best weapon at attacking a very small subset of the total target set in any conventional (non-nuclear) campaign. There are efforts to make them more effective against a wider subset of targets but that will add cost and probably complexity to their designs. The very best subset of targets for conventional cruise missiles are taking out 'soft' nodes of Integrated Air Defense Systems and Command and Control networks/Power Grids. They are 'enablers' that allow the non-stealthy aircraft in the force-mix to operate more freely over the battlefield and do that killing hoodoo-that-they-do so well....instead of getting shot down before their 'magic' happens. Valuable? Within a narrow confine, yes. Wonder-weapon? No.

Lesson 2. Cruise missiles are VERY expensive.... unless you never use them or if you use them, you won't miss them. Complexity costs money, and increases the probability of failure. The farther and longer a system has to operate to get to the target, the more the system is likely to fail on the way (see TLAM in Desert Storm note in the slides below).

Lesson 3. As long as the attrition rates are low enough, (and they don't even have to be THAT low) Direct Attack is ALWAYS cheaper and more effective than stand-off attack even if standoff attack has a PERFECT success rate.

I've dusted off and sanitized an extract of publicly available and unclassified data from a circa-2000 briefing I gave after Operation Allied Force. The exact dollars are 'off' now, but the relationships remain the same. Cruise Missiles are orders of magnitude more expensive to operate than using precision direct attack. BTW: These charts were all based upon 2000lb JDAM usage. Smaller JDAMs would be relatively cheaper and just as,or more, effective than TLAM Tomahawks.

Enjoy.


The TLAM accuracy and reliability have improved since Desert Storm, but it doesn't make any difference. It is a more complex machine than a JDAM, and must operate reliably for a much longer period of time. That line waaaay down at the bottom is the JDAM cost line. The cruise missiles are so expensive their real value comes in reducing risk to other systems: use as necessary - and no more.

In Operation Allied Force, the B-2 was dropping JDAMs using developmental software and it still had a 95% hit rate. The B-2 had the highest percentage of first-pass 'kills' of all the aircraft employed.
These dollar figures were probably mid-late FY 1990s when I used them in 2000. I notice TLAMS are even more expensive now, but JDAM kits are as well I suppose. As I noted at SNAFU in the comments, prices are very sensitive to lot buy quantities. So even if cruise missiles were 100% successful, and even if all aimpoints were suitable for cruise missiles, what would you spend your savings on using JDAMs?

LRS-B: The Next-Next Generation Bomber!

Old School Long Range Strike (Click on Pic For Larger)

Work kept me from catching this story earlier. News slowly coming out about the new Long Range Strike platform in the works isn't substantial enough yet for me to determine if I should call it a 'great idea' or a waste of time in the continuing saga of fielding a new long range strike asset. How I think of it will depend largely on the unrefueled range and payload numbers if it is like the 'LRS-A'  in all other respects.
Phil Ewing at DoDBuzz 'disappoints' in this observation (emphasis in original):

By relying on proven technologies and by planning to evolve the aircraft over time as threats evolve, similar to the B-52 legacy fleet, the up-front acquisition costs will be reduced significantly from the B-2 experience. The average procurement unit cost is anticipated to be about $550 million in FY 2010 dollars for a fleet of 80–100 aircraft. The Air Force plans to utilize an executive-level, highly streamlined, stable oversight structure to manage the program, and keep requirements manageable, tradable [sic] and affordable. Funding in FY 2013 is $0.3 billion and totals $6.3 billion from FY 2013 – FY 2017.

Hey Phil? About that 'doing things differently' angle. If we would have bought 80-100 B-2s, in the first place the unit acquisition cost would have been far less than those "$550M" in 2010 dollars, and probably much less than that even in then-year dollars. CBO numbers for only 26 B-2s in the early 90s was $540M per plane. Northrop offered to sell the AF only half as many (40)  B-2Cs in 2001 for a fixed price of $545M/aircraft.

End Note:
Right behind an almost pathological ignorance (perhaps often feigned?) of the Logical Fallacies, the thing that bugs me the most about the state of the news media today is the absolute lack of (again, perhaps feigned?) awareness as to how math or economics are actually applied within the topics on they write so breathlessly.

[minor cut/paste errors corrected 2/17]

The Long Range Strike Imperative

World's Finest Bulk Exporter of Tritinol and Steel 

An "Op For" post (more specifically a comment in the thread) reminded me that there are ‘those’ out there who think we are ‘fat’ with the most critical Long Range Strike assets (AKA Strategic Bombers).

For those so inclined, I would counter with (Emphasis Mine):

Nations that can maintain freedom of action and the ability to threaten and apply violent force without retaliation will hold the ultimate strategic advantage. Failure to maintain credible LRS capabilities diminishes the effectiveness of the other instruments of national power. Although the US military has provided a dependable backdrop of international security for over 60 years, the size of that force has diminished recently even though the need for a strong force has not. In light of the present situation, one that closely resembles the slow demise of the British and Roman global powers, we would do well to heed Julian Corbett’s remarks about the intrinsic advantage of sea control during the waning years of Britain’s global preeminence: “Yet the fact remains that all the great continental masters of war have feared or valued British intervention . . . because they looked for its effects rather in the threat than in the performance. . . . Its operative action was that it threatened positive results unless it were strongly met.” Just as sea control and power projection proved critical for Britain, so is LRS valuable for today’s leading nations. Global actors such as China, Russia, and India recognize LRS’s strategic value, considering it imperative to a successful national security strategy. These rising global competitors, especially China and Russia, seek to obtain or develop their own LRS and to cultivate antiaccess [sic] and area denial capabilities to diminish the enduring strategic advantage of the United States...

--- Major Wade S. Karren, USAF. Read it all HERE (PDF).

"It's ALWAYS the 'Fighter's Turn', It's just that every now and then the rest get their fair share". Even with whatever the NGB will become, this chart won't change much from when I first built it around 2000

We are not ‘fat’ with Long Range Strike/Strategic Bomber capabilities.  

We are not even ‘fluffy’.



'Marauder' in the comments nails it (Photo Added 18 Aug 2012)

An Airpower History Lesson in 3 Parts

Updated: F-108 Mission (Below Original Post)

---------------------------

B-52 vs. Flying Wing?... B-70 Canceled: Why?... What exactly WAS the F-108 'Mission'?

In a recent comment thread, three questions were raised as to the facts surrounding 50s-60s aircraft program histories. Normally I would blow off trying to address such diverse issues even those as narrowly defined, in one post. But it just so happens all involve information I already know via sources I’ve already acquired for other purposes.

Last of the '49's: YRB-49A in flight

In this post I intend more to let the sources tell the facts vs. my making observations on the facts: ie, this post will be heavy on the quotes, light on the sidebars. It will also ensure I don’t spend a lot of time that I can better spend elsewhere.

Flying Wing Was an option to B-52 Development

As I showed in an earlier post, the B-52 for a while faced extinction until a program cancellation decision was fortunately reversed. One of the B-52’s competing concepts, contrary to what you may have been told, was the Northrop B-49 flying wing, a jet variant of the earlier propeller-driven theme. Fielding the ‘flying wing’ would have been the fruition of Jack Northop’s lifelong dream, but alas it was not to become true until after he passed away. He did die knowing the wing WOULD fly in the form of the B-2 Bomber. I could detail ‘why’ the flying wing was B-52 competitor but that is beyond the scope of this post. To the sources we go!

The year 1948 began under a dark cloud for AMC’s B-52 program managers. Air Staff officers succeeded in canceling, not simply Boeing Model 464-29, but the entire Boeing heavy bomber program due to doubts about the B-52’s ability to achieve the required range and speed. Some Air Staff officers preferred the Northrop YB-49 turbojet powered all-wing aircraft over Boeing’s conventional B-52 design: others favored opening a new competition for a heavy bomber. (Mandeles, pg 49)

Craigie added that AMC analyses of other studies of optimum airplane performance relied on extrapolations from past performance. However, these extrapolations were unreliable because aeronautic and aerodynamic knowledge was growing so quickly. Therefore, it was necessary to use the most current data and knowledge, which did not necessarily involve only extrapolations of past performance. For instance, he noted, that in 1941 Douglas Aircraft Company analyzed the predicted performance of the B-36, and concluded that the requirement of a 10,000-mile range with a 10,000-pound payload was unlikely to be achieved. The Air Force and Convair, however, used improved weight control and planning, and proved the study wrong. Despite increases in armament, radar, equipment, and the difficulty of development under wartime conditions, Convair and the Air Force produced an airplane which could meet the Air Force’s objectives. Craigie also urged discarding the alternatives to the B-52-the XB-35 and YB-49 Flying Wing and delta-wing designs. By May 1947 the delta wing did not have any marked superiority over a conventional airplane for long-range, high -speed operation. Craigie wrote that a reevaluation of these designs should be made only when “jet engine specific fuel consumption is reduced to a point to permit their [sic] use” in a bomber. (Mandeles, pgs 75-76)

At AMC, senior officers attempted to save the B-52. Maj Gen Franklin O. Carroll, AMC’s director of R&D, analyzed Northrop’s claims of superiority for the Flying Wing, and found them wanting. The basic premise for proponents of the all-wing aircraft was that the space requirements for military stores matched the space available in the optimum wing. Under this assumption, the all-wing aircraft would be more efficient than the conventional airplane. Carroll, however, argued that Northrop seriously underestimated the space needed for military stores. More space would be needed in the aircraft, and adding a body or nacelle to contain the extra military stores would vitiate the theoretical advantages of the all-wing design. The YB-49 Flying Wing also demonstrated longitudinal instability at high speed. Little was known about this instability and it could present severe engineering difficulties. The flying wing would not be versatile in a tactical setting and would be overly sensitive to changes of center of gravity caused by the position or absence of cargo. Such problems seemed not to justify reliance on the all-wing design. Carroll concluded by recommending the conventional Boeing design and that the B-52 be accorded the highest support from Air Staff. (Mandeles, pg 83)

Several days after the Symington-Allen meeting, Craig, Frederic Smith, and Craigie decided that “if the B-52 meets the requirements of the contract under which it is being bought, it will satisfy strategic requirements.” These requirements included unrefueled range of approximately 8,000 miles and a cruising speed of 500 MPH over 4,000 miles of enemy territory. 103 Boeing Model 464-35 (fig. 4) matched these strategic requirements, and Air Force Undersecretary Barrows confirmed the decision to retain Boeing as prime contractor of the heavy bomber rather than adopt the Flying Wing in early March. (Mandeles, pg 83)

Partridge and Craig urged the staff to stand firm, noting support from RAND and the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics for the Flying Wing design. At Symington’s urging, Allen agreed to give the Flying Wing due consideration. After further discussion, key members of the Air Staff met on February 14, 1948, and decided to keep the Boeing contract and issue a change order. Undersecretary Barrows concurred in the action. Despite the painful experience, the B-52 program had been radically redirected and was now aimed at fulfilling a new concept of strategic air operations. Thus even before the Aircraft and Weapons Board met in January, two of the major proposals up for consideration had already been approved. Both the B-36 and the B-52 had received a new lease on life, as had, incidentally, the Northrop YB-49 Flying Wing. (Moody, Pgs 182-183) Note: 'Moody' is a huge PDF file.

Read the complete sources for more information illustrating the point that the flying wing, specifically the YB-49 version was ‘competition’ for the B-52, and the whys and hows the B-52 came out on top.

Why was the B-70 Not Pursued?

North American XB-70 'Valkerie'

That the B-70 was cancelled because of ICBMs and the existing capabilities of the B-52 being sufficient is easily shown, but I’m not going to type the proof out, just show it in situ:

Source (can't find my copy dangit!):
"Politics and Force Levels: Politics and Defense Inside the Kennedy Administration", Pg 216

(The footnote #10 referenced is “President Kennedy, Special Message, Pg 11)

The F-108 Rapier Mission? Long Range Interceptor

If one believes in infallible ‘fact sheets’ the F-108 according to one 'fact sheet', was to have two missions: Long Range Interceptor and Escort Fighter for the B-70. Evidence supporting the escort mission assertion is so thin, it is ’invisible’, while evidence supporting the Interceptor role is bountiful.

XF-108 Rapier: Never Reached Beyond Mock-up Stage

As I've noted to a commenter, I did not say or imply it (F-108) couldn’t or wouldn’t be an escort fighter if the need arose. I would assume it would do any ‘fighter’ mission it was assigned to varying degrees of success. I also asserted: There can be little doubt that there was someone, somewhere in the entire AF command structure who thought it would be a good ancillary/alternate mission for the F-108, but it was not part of the F-108 design requirements NOR was it part of F-108’s operational concept. I will say now that I would consider the ‘factsheet’ to be wrong in asserting an escort role (beyond possible for any fighter as a generic capability).

Most critically, given the nature of the operational concept envisioned for the F-108 and planned end strength, the use of the F-108 as an ‘escort fighter’ would probably be less likely than the F-106 it was designed to replace. This too is easily shown. And now it will be shown, thanks to my  serendipitous and very slight connection to the author of the following in his 1988 ACSC paper titled: “The Search for an Advanced Fighter: a History From the XF-108 to the Advanced Tactical Fighter”.

Then Major (later Colonel) Robert Lyons wrote (beginning on Page 4):

The MX1554 "Ultimate Interceptor, 1954" produced the Convair F-102 that fell far short of the planned speed, altitude, and range performance (95:159-165). It could only fly at 677 Knots at 35,000 feet, with a maximum ceiling of 51,800 feet and 566 nautical mile combat radius (95:173). While the F-102 and its follow-on F-106 served as "interim interceptors," the Air Force developed requirements for a long range interceptor. These long range interceptor requirements, first developed in April 1953, were rewritten in July 1955 and November 1956, after several attempts failed to get an acceptable proposal from competing airframe contractors (114:Ch 2). The Air Force sought an interceptor to counter the perceived 1960 bomber threats of Mach 2.0 speed at 61,000 feet, and the revised 1963 bomber threats of Mach 2.2 to 2.7 speed at 65,000 feet (118:7,32; 114:Ch 2). Design studies to satisfy these requirements began in 1953 at Air Research and Development Command and in industry with the MX1554 designed to achieve a Mach 4.5, 150,000 pound Gross takeoff weight aircraft, but the aircraft appeared to lie beyond the state of the art (118:7,Fig 24). So another round of design studios attempted to meet the 1955 LRI (long range interceptor) requirements. These studies called for an aircraft with a cruise speed of Mach 1.7 at 60,000 feet and combat speed of Mach 2.5 at 63,000 feet, with a gross takeoff weight of 98,500 pound, But this aircraft would have had only marginal capability against the postulated 1963 bomber threat (118:7,Fig 24). 

A subsequent design competition in 1955 between Lockheed, Northrop, and North American was little better than previous ones, but North American came closest to meeting the goals, (114:23).

North American Aviation's letter contract of 6 June 1956 called for a long range interceptor that could operate at 70,000 feet with a combat speed of at least Mach 3. The all-weather interceptor aircraft was to have two engines, two crewmen, and at least two internally carried nuclear or conventional air-to-air missiles (95:330-331). Their Weapon System 202 configuration sported a single vertical tail and large delta wing, and was adopted in 1958 after considering iterations with as many as three vertical tails and a large canard (118:7, Fig 24; 95:331).

In 1960, toward the end of the heyday of the "Century Series" fighter aircraft, Weapon System 202, renamed the XF-108 Rapier interceptor, promised to serve the Air Force with a Mach 3 cruise speed and 1,000 nautical mile range as a companion to the proposed B-70 supersonic bomber (106:44). [SMSgt Mac Note: I believe the fact that the Rapier was based on common design concepts with the B-70, coming out of the same design stable and discussions concerning the parallels in performance parameters may be as much of a source of ‘escort’ fighter role stories for the F-108 as any other. ]  The XF-108 design evolved to meet all of the expected Soviet bomber threats of the early 1960s. It was to have been fabricated from stainless steel sheet, a welded sandwich and honeycomb, rather than aluminum to withstand the high temperatures and stresses of sustained supersonic flight. Its two General Electric J93-5 turbojet engines were to have used a special high energy synthetic fuel (ethyl borane) (7:14). It would also use the ASG-18 Fire control system, and the GAR-9 missile. All these were under development simultaneously with the basic airframe. This combination of features allowed a totally new concept of long range interception of the supersonic bombers believed to be under development by the Soviet Union. The F-108, with its superior radar and high speed missile, was to patrol the DEW (Distant Early Warning) Line and make SAGE (Strategic Air Ground Environment) directed, semi-autonomous interceptions well before incoming bombers could launch their weapons against the major cities of Canada or the United States (118:7-8,Fig 25-26,Fig28-30). 

But intelligence sources eventually proved a serious Soviet bomber threat did not exist. That news reinforced growing concerns in the Department of Defense (DoD) over the cost and viability of manned aircraft. Offensive and defensive missiles now seemed to be the logical technological choice for the 1960s (7:14; 8:7). In August 1959 the Air Force canceled the chemical fuel development program (7:14), and on 23 September canceled F-108 development (94:402; 8:7). The Air Force announced that the program had no technical difficulties and had met all goals it the time of cancellation, but that there was a shortage of funds and programming priorities had changed (57:63). Both the fire control system and the missile developments continued at a lower level of Funding. The cost estimate of five to eight billion dollars for a few squadrons of F-108s was more than could be accepted to replace the F-106, given the doubtful nature of the threat (7:14) and the unresolved fate of future manned aircraft.

With the cancellation of the F-108, there appeared temporarily to be a hiatus in supersonic interceptor work in the United States. Indeed, although the Air Force continued trying to gain support for new interceptors in general and the F-108 in particular, the DoD continued to oppose the requirement pending verification of a threat (9:3).

7. Air Force Times. 15 August 1959, p. 14.

8. Air Force Times. 3 October 1959, p. 7.

9. Air Force Times. 11 March 1964, p. 3. 57. "F-108 Cancelled." Canadian Avionics (November 1959), p.63.

94. Kennedy, William V. "Future of the Fighter." Ordnance (January-February 1970), pp. 402-406.

95. Knack, Marcelle Size. Encyclopedia of US Air Force Aircoraft and Missile Systems Volume1. Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1978.

106. McCormacK, James, Jr., Maj Gen, USAF (Ret). "How the Air Force Is Buying Its Newest Manned Weapons." .Skyline (Fall 1958), pp. 44-47.

114. "NORAD's Quest for NIKE Zeus and a Long-Range Interceptor."(U). Ent AFB, CO: HQ NORAD/HO, 1962. SECRET-Declassified 31 December 1962. "Unclassified information only used from this source."

115. Neufeld, Jacob. "The F-15 Eagle: Origins and Development 1964-1972." (U). Pentagon, Washington, D.C.: HO USAF/HQ November 1974. SECRET "Unclassified information only used from this source." 

118. Parsons, T. R. "B-70 and F-108 Perspectives on Supersonic Cruise." .Proceedings of the Conference Ob the Operational Utility of Supersonic Cruise (U).Wright-Patterson AFB, OH: ASD/XR, May 1977. SECRET.-Declassified "Unclassified information only used from this source."

From the combination of the limited number of F-108 platforms, the operational concept of roving long-endurance patrols conducted at the farthest distances from home with limited and possibly nuclear payloads, as well as the intended purpose of replacing ‘interim’ interceptors, it is doubtful the F-108 would have had time for anything other than its interceptor role. If the Rapiers were to be ‘escort’ fighters at all, it would be in accompanying aircraft returning post-nuclear strike that might wander/enter their patrol areas, in a manner of what ANY fighter or other aircraft would do.

Updated 26 April 2012:

The  "Standard Aircraft Capabilities" of the F-108

Commenter BB1984 below reminded me of another public resource we can draw on in evaluating the accuracy of the Air Force’s F-108 ‘fact sheet’. Based upon review of the F-108’s Standard Aircraft Capability (SAC) sheets, from the earliest available at the resource (2 May 1958) to the last one available, 12 June 1959 (which was less than 6 months before the program was cancelled) we find two key points:

1. The F-108A mission was pure "long-range ‘interceptor". Anything else it could do would fall under ‘miscellaneous’ capabilities to be employed the same as for any GI’s job description: ‘other duties as required’.

From the 12 June 1959 F-108A SAC:

The primary mission of the F-108 weapon system is to deter armed attack against the U.S. and its area of defense responsibility by providing maximum defense potential against all airborne threats in the post-1962 time period. This defense function is implemented by the F-108’s potential to search out, evaluate, and destroy these hostiles at ranges beyond the capabilities of other defense systems. The F-108 is designed to operate not only in conjunction with SAGE and in cooperation with other weapons in the defense inventory, but to be equally effective well beyond the bounds of ground environment surveillance and under minimum operational control, relying on its self-contained high performance search, navigation, and communications equipment.

In time of war, F-108 operations can include directed intercepts and organized search missions resulting in repeated attacks with up to three kills by each interceptor. Operating beyond SAGE, the F-108 can make positive identification of DEW line violations, attack and trail hostile raids through remote areas, and report directly via long-range radio. Operating within the ZI, the F-108A performance features of all-weather capability, long range at Mach 3, and 15-minute turn-around, permit flexible commitment of forces to achieve the precise concentration of power required at any battle area with maximum retention of reserves.

The F-108A carries two crewmen and internally stowed missile armament. This high performance air vehicle cruises and combats at mach 3 with a 1000-nautical mile radius on internal fuel. It has a 1.2g maneuver ceiling in excess of 77,000 feet and a zoom-climb ceiling of 100,000 feet. Under normal loading and weather, the air vehicle requires runway lengths of only 3200 feet for take-of and landing. It can be operated from 6000-foot runways in all conditions of weather.  From a nominal 70,000 foot combat altitude , missile launch can be accomplished against any air-breathing target flying at altitudes from sea-level to 100,000 feet. The pulsed-doppler radar, with 40-inch antenna, provides target detection in excess of 100 nautical miles at all altitudes and is backed up by infrared search and track devices.

F-108A = Long Range Interceptor. First, Second, Last.

2. The weapons capability from beginning to end consisted of a payload of 3 GAR-9 missiles.  No Guns, No Bombs.No Rockets**

12 Jun 59 Standards Aircraft Capabilities Sheet, Weapons Sections

AF Museum and History Program's 'Factsheets': Swing and Miss

Unless someone threw ‘bombs’ on the F-108 in the last couple of months of the program trying to save it from the axe, The AF Museum and History Program has some ‘splainin’ to do. But even if it was an idea thrown out there in the death throes, if it didn’t get buy-in from the users, it didn’t count, in which case they still have some ‘splainin’ to do.

 **Definition of the term "rocket" in this timeframe was transititory. The GAR-9 indicated above stood for 'Guided Air Rocket'. The weapon would soon be renamed 'AIM-47' for 'Air Intercept Missile'-47. For real confusion look up the GAR-1 and it's short distinction as the 'F-98' before becoming the AIM-4. (the BOMARC was also known as the F-99 at the same time).

Sigh~The Bomber Flies Back Into the Wilderness

Punting Long Range StrikeThere's a lot of decisions in the FY2010 defense budget, announced today, that are problematic, but one thing in SecDef Gate's announcement leaps out as farce:

We will not pursue a development program for a follow-on Air Force bomber until we have a better understanding of the need, the requirement, and the technology (emphasis mine).

This statement is pure political Bulls***. It is a statement that provides cover for an organizational blindspot whereby unpopular answers to tough questions can be avoided.


As I illustrated only a short while ago, the long-range strike question is one of the most thoroughly examined and best understood issues in defense. Let me provide a translation of the above; one that I assure you is FAR more accurate than the drivel shoved into the SecDef's announcement:

We will not pursue a development program for a follow-on Air Force bomber until we have an answer that will NOT threaten the Fighter Establishment and its aquisition strategies. We have grand hopes that we can develop promising technologies that will greatly improve the small and fast-mover capabilities while magically be of no benefit to long-range subsonic platforms.
With these magic technologies, our Fighter Mafiosi expect to be able to FINALLY get rid of all pesky non-fighter strike aircraft.

There. Much better.

The most staggering thing in all this (to me) is that so many in the Fighter Establishment really and truly believe in their steeds and the nobility of their Crusade.

Looks like Return of the Bomber is set back, once again, by the Long-Range Blind Spot.

One Bright Spot
The recent creation of the Global Strike Command should re-establish a virile constituency for the LRS mission and mission needs. Its first 'provisional' Commander, BGen James M. Kowalski, is both an airpower theorist (see my earlier post where he is cited) AND a veteran practitioner of LRS. I only hope his selection is part of a process to groom him to take over the permanent job (or ACC) someday (It is at this time a three-star position). A competent advocacy for LRS could do much to turn the DoD's officially stated position against the entrenched parochial interests.

Long Range Strike Moves Forward.....Finally?

...and is it in the right direction? Tech. Sgt. Shane A. Cuomo / Air Force

I'll reserve judgement until after the details inevitably emerge.

In today's announcement President Obama's Most Useful Idiot (why there seems to always be someone who until asked is NOT-generally-a-tool willing to be the front-man giving cover to Administrations that are malevolent and destructive to the national defense , I'll never understand) had this to say at least:

Finally, a major area of new investment for the Air Force will be a new long-range, nuclear-capable penetrating bomber. This aircraft, which will have the option of being remotely piloted, will be designed and developed using proven -- using proven technologies, an approach that should make it possible to deliver this capability on schedule and in quantity.

It is important that we begin this project now to ensure that a new bomber can be ready before the current aging fleet goes out of service. The follow-on bomber represents a key component of a joint portfolio of conventional deep-strike capabilities, an area that should be a high priority for future defense investment, given the anti-access challenges our military faces.

Of what was explicitly stated, I would only call the 'optionally-manned' criteria as 'gross stupidity' - and probably a product of an internal AF/DoD political schism . Being of a highly suspicious nature on this topic for some reason, we'll see what the emphasis on 'existing technology' means: could be 'good' but with this crowd one never knows.

The issue as to what kind of long range platform is needed and the open questions surrounding it were covered fairly well in a recent Air Force (Air Force Association) magazine article. The same source has a pretty good backgounder on the status quo here.

I might comment on the remaining gems and turds in this punchbowl of an announcement elsewhere. Alas, there's a few of the former and piles of the latter.