It's as if his phony-baloney job depends on it
Ah! The DOT&E memo leaked last month to Anthony “SlowTony” Cappacio by ‘someone’ has a follow-on. It is oozing out of the woodwork this
time via the keyboard of a budding “Slow Laura” Seligman. No doubt the rabble
will get their panties in a knot again, not realizing (or more likely: not
caring) that it is essentially the same knot they tied last month: Gilmore
doesn’t like the F-35 test program, doesn’t have the budget or technical knowledge
to conduct a test himself (he’s a nuke physicist that went down the management track
eons ago) and he just can’t shut up about his ‘concerns’ lest someone realize
he and his organization are largely superfluous. Let’s break this memo down
before the cycle repeats. It’s another hoot.
14 Oct 2016
MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION,TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS
SUBJECT: Concerns Regarding
Progress and Readiness of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program for initial
Operational Test and Evaluation (lOT &E)
‘Prophet
Gilmore’ he ain’t.
The Director of DOT&E has concerns? Who knew?
Seriously, if the DOT&E Director didn’t have ‘concerns’
and let the DoD command chain know-- he wouldn’t be doing his “job”. The
biggest problem with his ‘concerns’ as far as I am ‘concerned’ are:
1) The content of his reports and testimonies
go outside his consequential knowledge base in asserting beliefs as facts or
possibilities as inevitable, and/or
2) Presents his assertions on ‘risks’
and their consequences as if he were some soothsayer.
Whereas the above fairly summarize my objections to
Gilmore’s performance, the DOT&E apparatus itself is another thing
entirely. It is a political construct that was created for political purposes
by politicians AND it has been used consistently by SOME politicians as an
instrument for their own political machinations from day one, on down through
to today AND, contrary to another political construct’s superficial analysis, can be shown to cost us taxpayers far
more than the value we get out of any benefit in return. And though I've pointed it out for quite some time, I know I’m not the only person to recognize this.
Bottom line: We shouldn’t have to worry about how bad Gilmore is in the first
place because his job shouldn’t even exist.
IF Gilmore’s outfit was worth a spit, they wouldn’t have to
leak their reports and memos to the Faux Military Reform machine before the
rest of us saw it. It’s the only way they keep their wall of illusion from
falling over whenever reality leans on it. (Think P.A.C.E. )
Gilmore continues…
The purpose of this memorandum is
to document my continuing concerns regarding progress in the F-35 JSF program
as you prepare to conduct the upcoming Defense Acquisition Board review. In a
memorandum dated August 9, 2016, I identified concerns to you, the Secretary of
the Air Force and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force that, in spite of the
recent Initial Operational Capability (IOC) declaration by the U.S. Air Force,
achieving full Block 3F combat capability is actually at substantial risk. The
primary concerns were that the program appeared to be prematurely ending System
Development and Demonstration (SDD) and was not taking the necessary steps to
be ready for IOT&E, which will be conducted using realistic combat missions
fully consistent with our war plans and threat assessments. The program's limited progress since the memorandum continues to
indicate clearly the program will not be able to deliver the full
Operational Requirements Document (ORD)-required combat capability within the
planned remaining SDD schedule….
This is where Gilmore places his stake in the ground. But
since the program cannot by definition ‘complete SDD’ without delivering “the
full Operational Requirements Document (ORD)-required combat capability within
the planned remaining SDD schedule” will Gilmore’s reference to ‘prematurely
ending’ SDD rely on some false belief about the use and purpose of the ORD, how
‘planning’ or ‘testing’, or risk management is ‘done’, or involve the
presentation of transient situations as either insurmountable or permanent?
Perhaps we’ll see again see DOT&E’s persistent cloying-on to raw program
performance metrics as if the metrics equal program performance itself? Maybe
we’ll again see Gilmore driving off into the ‘non-DOT&E’ weeds?
If past performance is an indication, I think we’ll find a
bit of everything.
And so here it comes…
The reasons I have reached this
conclusion include the following:
• Continued schedule delays. According to the program's baseline
mission systems software and capability release schedule, the planned release
to flight test of Block 3FR6 mission systems software has slipped from February
2016 to December 2016, 10 months later than originally planned. This delay was
caused in part by the need for multiple additional "Quick Reaction
Capability" (QRC) software builds of Block 3FR5 to enable weapons testing
to proceed and to reduce stability problems. However, since the program was
funded to the baseline schedule, this 10-month delay in Block 3FR6 software
indicates strongly that the program has shortfalls in funding and time to
complete the planned testing of the remaining set of full Block 3F capabilities
and necessary fixes. Moreover, releasing Block 3FR6 in December is another
3-month delay to the program's more recent estimate that this version of Block
3F software would be released to flight test in September.
Well, the program has asserted (and Slow Lara notes in her article)
that any extra testing will be coming out of existing program funds. In any
case, DOT&E’s charter is to ensure technical test sufficiency. Gilmore
was/is essentially complaining about funds that aren’t tithed to the DOT&E coffers
yet but he’s acting like that there will be no funds forthcoming. I
would expect he knew the situation before the JSFPO made the fact public, so
the question is why does he note only part of the circumstance? Was it because
“JSFPO is working to provide” or “JSFPO has committed” to filling any shortfall
in test dollars from other areas of the F-35 was too difficult to put in a
report? Or was that fact an inconvenient truth against the desired DOT&E
narrative? Active mitigation of risk is just as relevant as the ‘risk’. Unless,
apparently, you are DOT&E. Anyway, if there were no funds to ensure
DOT&Es pet testing could be done, his test report would be very short and
easy to write: “Test failed because test could not be performed.” Whew! Good
thing this is a non-problem.
This next paragraph is built upon absolutes that are
conditional possibilities. IMHO it can be made MOSTLY correct with just a few
caveats (in red) added.
• Need to complete all planned and agreed-to developmental testing (DT).
The program’s continued cost and schedule-driven plan to truncate planned DT
points and prematurely close-out SDD would could shift
significant risk to OT and the warfighter. This ill-advised action could would also discard
either create test gaps OR safely reduce test
requirements in the carefully planned build-up test content in the Test
and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP) .The TEMP content that
might be removed was not included as an optional
throwaway, but rather was content the Program Executive Officer formally agreed
was required when he signed the TEMP. The program’s plan to ‘·quarantine”
buildup test points that were in the Joint Test Plan (JTP) and planned to be
flown by the test centers, skip ahead to complex mission effectiveness test
points, and then delete the build-up test points as “no longer required” will only could delay
problem discoveries and increase the risk to IOT &E, as well as to the men
and women who will use the F- 35 in combat, or might
have little or no effect on the end state capability. Additionally, the
program will need to continue to allocate test
points not in its current plans for characterization, root cause
investigations, and correction of a large number of the open deficiencies and
technical debt described later in this memorandum. The completion of the
planned baseline test points objectives from the Block 3F JTP, along with
correction or mitigation of significant deficiencies, is necessary to ensure
full Block 3F capabilities are adequately tested and verified before
operational test and, more importantly, before they are fielded for use in
combat.
Remember I wrote the above paragraph could be made MOSTLY
correct by adding caveats. It still has problems in that it is built upon a
presumption of ‘technical debt’ (clever soundbite there BTW). Unmodified, this
paragraph tries to sells an idea that the consequences of a ‘problem’ are
serious, without proving the ‘problem’ itself is even a serious problem.
Gilmore will now attempt to prove a problem in the crudest of fashion—using the
crudest of numbers. Let’ let him run a couple of paragraphs here while he builds
his straw man. As a ‘bonus’ fun exercise, try to find all the places where he
keeps talking in absolutes about what is merely possibilities or opinions, we
won’t belabor the point anymore, because now you can’t help but see them for
yourself.…
• Insufficient progress in F-35A, F-JSB and F-35C flight sciences
testing. Although progress has been made in all variants, each is behind in
planned test point completion for the year, as shown in the table below (data
as of the end of September).
Variant
|
Planned Points
Thru Sep 30, 2016
|
Points
Accomplished
Thru Sep 30.2016
|
Planned Points for
CY16
|
F-35A
|
1322
|
1080
|
1364
|
F-35B
|
1593
|
1580
|
2119
|
F-35C
|
1441
|
1354
|
1906
|
• Insufficient progress in F-35
mission systems testing. As of the end of September, the program had only
accomplished 2,069 mission systems test points against the goal of 3, 189 and
the plan of 3,709 for the year. Despite falling farther behind and carrying a
significant number of open deficiencies, the program has decided to terminate
testing of Block 3F software as scheduled in CY 17 due to inadequate funding to
complete the planned testing in the JTP. As a result of this decision and ongoing
software delays, the program has deleted two full software releases from their
mission systems schedule, removing Block 3FR8 and replacing 3FR7 with additional
contingency QRC software builds of3FR6, which will now be the last full developmental
software release. The outcome of these decisions is that the remaining number
of software releases to complete Block 3F development is currently insufficient
to support adequate testing to identify and correct deficiencies prior to IOT&E
and use in combat. Although the 3FR6 release in late 2016 is planned to have
full Block 3F capabilities, some of those capabilities will be tested for the
first time in that release and will certainly not be mature enough to be
effective without additional testing and the necessary additional time and
resources. In particular, additional builds of software to characterize and
correct deficiencies, each of which will also require regression testing to
verify fixes, will be needed. These problems are exacerbated by the proposal to
quarantine test points described above. Despite these delays, and the fact that
some of the "full" Block 3F capabilities are just beginning flight
test or have not yet started (i.e., gun accuracy testing), the program still
plans to terminate flight testing as scheduled in early 2017 and finalize Block
3F.
Gosh, the root cause of all the hooey Gilmore spouts in
those two paragraphs could be caused by anything, including any and all of the
following:
·
Gilmore presumes all test points are created
equal, vs. there being the ability to eliminate test points through the
analysis of other test points to reduce duplication.
·
Gilmore presumes all test points are mandatory
vs. there being some that are perceived as optional from the get-go: contingent
on upon the outcomes from predecessor test activity.
·
Gilmore has never heard of “replanning“, or “rethinking
a plan“ based upon knowledge gained since the last plan was issued.
·
Gilmore mentally equates more test cycles as
being good, when if your software is getting more stable, more test cycles will
just waste everybody’s time and money.
·
Gilmore thinks he understands the risks of test
compression more than the developers.
·
Gilmore thinks he knows how to manage risk
better than those who are actually managing risks.
Gilmore proceeds…
• Insufficient time and resources to conduct all required weapons
delivery accuracy (WDA) events. The program completed a surge of weapons
test events in August and is analyzing the results. While some of the events
appear to have been successful, several WDAs unsurprisingly had significant
issues that either required control room intervention or the employment of the
weapon was likely unsuccessful. Despite making some progress, the program still
has not completed the full set of planned test events for Block 3F weapons in
the TEMP, with 13 WDAs remaining, excluding the multiple gun scoring events,
which must also be completed. Due to the limited time and funding remaining in
SDD, the program has prioritized completing testing of new and deficient Block
3F mission systems capabilities over completing the remaining WDAs. While completion
of Block 3F mission systems is necessary, the WDAs are also an integral part of
successfully completing required development and adequate testing of full Block
3F capabilities. Each of the planned WDA events is an essential end-to-end test
of the full fire-control chain. Conducting all of the WDAs is the only way to
discover problems that otherwise will be realized in operational test and/or combat.
For example, one of the recent AIM-120 missile WDA events required control room
intervention to direct the pilot when to launch, as there were no shoot cues or
launch zone indications displayed to the pilot due to an outdated AIM-120 missile
attack model within the mission systems software. Due to their importance and
the distinct differences among them, all of the planned WDA events must be completed
during DT; otherwise, these events will have to be completed before or during
IOT &E, which will delay discovery of deficiencies and the completion of IOT&E
while adding to its cost.
So. Gilmore STILL doesn’t like how the program prioritizes,
deals with unexpected events, or apparently conducts/eliminates as many test
points as possible in a test even when there’s a missing display element that
otherwise would have prevented the test from proceeding. Noted.
But hold on. Doesn’t that partial test count towards
‘building up’ to a fuller test later?--Something Gilmore advocates whenever he yaps about it? ---i.e. when it is convenient?
And how important was it to get all the data that has been collected through August ‘analyzed’
first to ensure the remaining testing was not adversely impacted until the missing
display was ready?
And let us observe that it takes more than a little chutzpah
to bring up future test needs when the actual need is not fully quantified
(except in ‘planned test points’ of course) when analysis of the last relevant testing
is still underway. The jet’s not done yet. OK. We get it.
But isn’t it interesting how Gilmore glosses over the actual
progress made in August in completing the WDAs? If his audience was told that 13 WDAs were completed in that one month,
might that indicate a far-less harrowing situation than Gilmore portrays with only
another 13 WDAs to go? Any bets that the remaining WDAs won't be easier to set up since those setting them up will be leveraging lessons learned from experience?
WDAs traditionally have taken a longer time because of what it takes to organize and set up test assets and conduct dry runs. If you blow up one target, you
need another one ready at another spot if you want to retest in anything less
than a month at best in my experience. Doing as many as the F-35 did in August required a lot of work orchestrating multiple ranges and test support organizations. The 30 or so weapons tests (13 of them WDAs)
the F-35 program accomplished in August is a sign of a program capability to
complete a very complex set of test challenges, and all Gilmore can do is play ‘kid
in the back seat'; whining about “why are we not there yet?”.
Gilmore is handwringing over a possible 1-2 month schedule hit at
most... unless it’s not really that important to the program then it might be nobody except Gilmore cares about how long it will take and where it will occur. Worst case, something
is missed in DT and gets cleaned up in OT (it better not be in combat AFTER OT
for Gilmore’s sake). He makes an absolute assertion that the WDAs are something
that MUST be done in development test, when in all actuality as far as the
warfighter is concerned, a miss in DT will only be a problem if the operational
testers actually miss it in OT as well. Things ARE more expensive to resolve
the later the problem is discovered. It all comes down to risk management and
finding as many big things as early as possible, knowing it is impossible to catch
every problem before it escapes to the next level of testing.
Gilmore is at the least flicking boogers at the program's risk management approach. At the most, Gilmore is insisting ‘all must be known’ and ‘all
risk eliminated’ with WDA performance in an operational environment BEFORE the ‘operational
test’, then mustn’t one then wonder: What is the freaking purpose of that operational
test in the first place?
Fear Really IS the Mind Killer
About here is where Gilmore falls into the usual practice of
pointing out ‘deficiencies’ of the current, and interim, software/hardware configurations.
He’s been whining about the ‘gun test’ schedule since at least 2014, and does
so this time around.
Pentagon’s ‘Top
Bean Counter’ Wants to Count Beans His Way Dang It!
This next paragraph is a two-part whine by Gilmore. The
first 1/3 is a whine about the DT schedule, which is pretty much the same
schedule he’s never liked. He asserts it doesn’t look like the DT schedule will
support the OT schedule the way he WANTS the OT schedule to be run (more on
that in a minute).
Remember: DOT&E is testing NOTHING. DOT&E vetted the
test requirements, now they’re just holding the camera.
• Insufficient progress in gun testing. Planned gun testing continues
to fall farther behind as the program works through design deficiencies, test
discoveries, and the resulting modifications to the test aircraft. Despite the
limited time remaining in SDD, the program still has not completed initial
flight sciences testing of the F-35B gun pod, started ground testing of the
F-35C gun pod, or attempted an aimed gunshot using the Helmet Mounted Display
System (HMDS) on any variant. Based on discoveries during F-35A flight sciences
gun testing, required changes to vehicle systems software are being added to Block
3FR6 to attempt to mitigate yaw induced by the gun firing in the F-35A, as well
as expected pitching moments when the gun pod is fired under the F-35B and
F-35C-this adds further to the substantial burden of problems 3FR6 is supposed
to correct. The first flight testing of a properly modified F-35A gun from a
mission systems aircraft with 3F software, aimed by the Gen III HMDS, was
planned to start in October but will likely not begin until 2017 due to continued
delays.
Gilmore spends the next 2/3 of the paragraph wringing his
hands over the program schedule risks from stuff left to test and having to fix
stuff found in earlier testing. He provides an opinion as to when a specific
configuration (as specific as possible given the vague and unquantifiable
‘properly modified’ caveat anyway), without indicating if and when in 2017
would test completion become a problem.
This next paragraph is Gilmore ‘deficiency’
bread-and-butter:
• Ineffective operational performance. The performance of earlier
Block 3F versions during DT to date shows significant operational shortfalls.
An assessment, based on OT pilot observations of DT missions, of the
operational utility of Block 3FR5.03 software to support planned IOT &E
missions, including Close Air Support, Destruction/Suppression of Enemy Air
Defenses, Offensive and Defense Counter Air, Air Interdiction, and Surface
Warfare, rated each of the mission areas "red" and unacceptable
overall, with significant deficiencies in capabilities and/or performance shortfalls.
Interim capabilities have deficiencies and operational
shortfalls. He left the ‘as expected and per the plan’ part out though.
• Numerous remaining deficiencies and technical debt. The program's
recent decision to eliminate two full software builds and delete TEMP- and
JTP-required testing due to software schedule slips and funding shortages is
inadequate to address the large number of significant open Deficiency Reports
(DRs) remaining in SDD. This plan assumes no further significant discoveries in
SDD; however, even in the unlikely event no additional discoveries are made,
the program is running out of time and budget to properly test and verify the
required fixes for the existing DRs. The program currently has 146 Category 1
and 1,033 Category 2 "active" open DRs, along with 16 new DRs, since
the last deficiency review board on September 26, 2016. Of the 1,179 DRs, there
are 528 that are being categorized as "Open Under Investigation"
(OUIN) and 385 categorized as "Open Awaiting Fix Verification" (OAFV).
All of the 385 OAFV DRs require flight test activity by the Integrated Test Force
(ITF), and a large percentage of the OUIN will need flight test points to
gather root cause data. None of these test points are currently allocated or
accounted for in the ITF flight test priority. The scope of unaccounted-for DRs
and the program's intention to terminate flight testing early demonstrate
clearly the need for additional resources to complete SDD.
This is mostly more bean-counting without any indication as
to how important those various beans are. In the end it is more ‘test sausage’
that Gilmore manages to avoid explaining how any of it is ‘made’.
How the DRs will be closed will vary by DR. If history is
any guide, the important ones will be addressed by priority and as efficiently
as possible. Some hits will be obviated by current planned Block 3F builds and
will simply go away. Some will even be determined to be immaterial, irrelevant,
or at worst ‘nuisance’ gripes that the Customer decides aren’t worth the
trouble/cost to get rid of. I would suspect a good many of them are matters of
the paperwork not catching up to reality, or (my favorite) simply unachievable
due to the tyranny of math and poorly conceived requirements.
That last is my favorite because I was once on a program doing
a job that every year would give me a request for engineering disposition of a
DR against an allegedly “high ICAWS false alarm rate”. The problem wasn’t with
the failure system reporting performance, it actually reported false alarms per
flight hour at a rate an order of magnitude lower than legacy systems. The
problem was the system hardly ever failed and generated a real ICAWS event. Since
you can’t divide even a small number by zero and not get an infinitely high
false alarm rate, the superior system could never 'meet the spec'. The spec was a legacy spec that was meaningful—as long has
you had enough REAL failures to count. I don’t know if they ever got the
paperwork cleared up on that one: some accounting systems appear impregnable.
That one sure was for me at least.
Let’s take Gilmore’s ALIS b*tches in one swoop.
• Shortfalls in the Autonomic Logistics Information System (ALIS). The
program continues to experience delays in the development and fielding of ALIS.
o The latest version of ALIS in development - version 2.0.2 - was planned to be
delivered by August 2016, as the Air Force had expected it to be fielded prior
to their declaration of Initial Operational Capability (IOC), but it has yet to
successfully complete testing and likely will not be fielded until early 2017.
The key additional capabilities in ALIS 2.0.2 include propulsion integration,
which will allow uniformed maintenance personnel to download and process engine
data with the rest of the aircraft data in ALIS following flight. Currently,
the propulsion data must be processed separately by Pratt & Whitney field
service representatives.
•Delays in ALIS 2.0.2 development
have also delayed the development of ALIS 3.0, the planned final release of
ALIS software for SDD. Because of these cascading delays and additional
emerging service and partner requirements, including critical security
enhancements, the program adjusted development and fielding of remaining
capabilities and has moved content out of ALIS 3.0 into post-SDD releases. The
cumulative effect of these deferrals and unresolved deficiencies on suitability
will be evaluated during IOT&E.
Big question here is what is the program impact of all the
ALIS schedule deviations? Is it a show-stopper for the warfighter? Will it
drive higher costs that will have to come outside the program? Is Gilmore being
shy about telling us if the answers to the first two questions were
troublesome?
Just kidding on that last question-- I’m certain if there
were real problems with the ALIS impacts Gilmore would have mentioned each one
two or three time by now.
Next stop for Gilmore is in an area I’m very interested in,
but his feigned (I hope) naiveté as to when and how ORDs are modified is not
very credible.
• Inconsistencies between contract
specifications and the ORD. The program has accepted numerous changes or
deferrals to contract specifications, while not receiving formal relief from,
or changes to, the associated requirements in the ORD. As an example, the
program office, in coordination with the Services, determined that the specification
requirements for gun accuracy could not be met with the new ammunition planned
to be used, the Frangible Armor Piercing (F AP) round for the F- 35A and the
Semi-Armor Piercing High Explosive Incendiary-Tracer (SAPHEI-T) round for the
F-35B and F-35C. The program office completed a specification change to the
contract to delete the old requirement for gun accuracy and lethality, but did
not add the new planned specification values nor complete any requirements changes
for the ORD. As a result, the program now apparently has no contract specifications
for either air-to-air or air-to-ground lethality and engagement performance;
however, the program still has approved air-to-ground ORD criteria that have
not been adjusted or changed, which are not possible to achieve due to the change
in ammunition. The JSF stakeholders, including the Services and Joint Staff, should
immediately conduct a requirements review of the ORD versus the contract specifications
to identify documentation or performance shortfalls as the program closes out
SOD.
Let’s put Happy’s perplexed mind at ease about the apparent
disconnect (as if he didn’t already know). All we have to do is talk a bit
about the nature of changing ORDs and Contract Requirements
Changing The ORD
The F-35 Program’s Joint ORD (JORD) is ‘owned’ by DOD’s
Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). Programs are loath to ask ORD
owners to modify ORDs up to and until a requirement is either seen as
unachievable or inadvisable. The JROC’s are loath to let any program off the
hook for a requirement until it is both necessary and justified. I know this
point doesn’t set well with the conspiracy theory types, so besides being true,
it’s often fun to point out to the mouth breathers.
Changing the Contract Requirements
The Customer is always loath to change a contract spec
beneath the contract requirement until it is known that the spec is truly
unachievable or unneeded. The contractor may recommend change or elimination
years before the Customer agrees or disagrees because each spec is a piece of a
larger picture, and that picture becomes better known the further the program
goes toward completion. In the F-35’s case the requirements are mostly about
‘W’ Lethality, ‘X’ Survivability, ‘Y’ Supportability, and ‘Z’ Affordability.
There is a trade space between those requirements and each requirement has
performance specs below them that also create a trade space below the requirements
to achieve the right balance of W, X,Y,Z requirements that comprise total
system capability.
Aligning ORD and Contract Requirements
Contract changes will be recommended. Those contract change
requests, if the ORD is affected, will generate requests for ORD changes. It
takes time to shake out the changes, and Gilmore can rest his punkin’ head knowing
the process is working and that eventually all his little requirement beans
will line up in neat rows and columns for him to count up and down, and side to
side to his heart’s content. And it won’t make one whit of difference to the
warfighter if DOT&E counts them now or come final judgement day.
Core F-35
DT Problem: Gilmore’s Attitude About OT Sucks
All that has come before and all of which Gilmore is about
to dump in the next few paragraphs can be fixed with one simple attitude
adjustment by the DOT&E. Director Gilmore! Repeat after me:
I know it can. I know it can. OT CAN be done incrementally!
• Inadequate preparations for DOT&E. The program office and some
other JSF stakeholders have proposed a "phase-start" for IOT &E,
based on the assumption that the modification schedule for the fleet of OT
aircraft will provide some aircraft earlier with which testing could begin.
Besides the modifications to the OT aircraft being substantially late to need
to start IOT &E (see immediately below), the full Block 3F flight envelope
and weapons clearances, along with a verified Block 3F mission data file, will
not be available before May 2018, according to the program's most recent schedule
estimates. DOT&E will not approve a "phased start" for IOT&E
that violates the spin-up and test entrance criteria, as outlined in the TEMP
(list of criteria attached), which was signed and approved by the F-35
stakeholders, including the JSF Program Executive Officer. (Note that these
criteria include a detailed and definitive definition of the agreed composition
of full Block 3F combat capability.) This includes the requirement for all 18
U.S. OT aircraft and the US Partner OT aircraft to be in the Block 3F
production-representative configuration. The full fleet of OT aircraft, with
the full Block 3F capabilities including envelope and weapons, is required for
the efficient and effective execution of spin-up mission rehearsals and for successful
execution of the complex IOT &E plan, which includes four-ship and eight-ship
test trial missions. These are common-sense, long-agreed-to criteria that must
be satisfied to conduct a realistic and rigorous test of the Block 3F
capabilities that will actually be fielded so that our warfighters will know
what the aircraft truly can and cannot do in combat - the inviolate reason for
the test.
•Late plans for modification of OT aircraft. The TEMP requirement to
provide production-representative Block 3F OT aircraft for IOT &E has been
well known for more than seven years; however, the program has not adequately
planned nor contracted for the necessary modifications, including the Technical
Refresh 2 (TR2) processor upgrades. This failure to develop an adequate plan
for providing modified OT aircraft does not relieve the program of the IOT
&E spin-up and test entrance criteria. Late discovery of issues during
development - such as those requiring the extensive modifications to provide an
operational gun system or the ability to carry the AIM-9X missile throughout
the employment envelope on the F-35C - are continuing and should be expected
for a program as complicated as the JSF that is experiencing significant
development and testing delays. However, these issues must still be addressed
with modifications to the OT aircraft. Expecting DOT &E to allow IOT &E
to start without a full complement of fully production representative aircraft,
as agreed to and documented for years, is a recipe for a failed test,
especially in light of the aircraft availability issues mentioned later.
Failure to meet the TEMP entrance criteria means not only that the program is
unready for operational test - it means JSF is not ready for combat and,
therefore, certainly not ready for a Block (i.e., Multi-Year) Buy or full-rate production.
I like the skillful misrepresentation of ‘Block Buys’ as
parenthetical ‘Multi-Year Buys’ there at the end, Gilmore. Let us also note here that the
Block Buy question is STILL none of your or DOT&E's business.
Speaking of
None of DOT&E’s Business
•Inadequate aircraft availability (AVA). Although AVA is not an
entrance criteria, if the program is only able to achieve and sustain its goal
of 60 percent AVA, the length and cost of IOT &E will increase
significantly because the expected combat-ready availability of 80 percent was
planned for in the TEMP and is needed to efficiently accomplish the open-air
mission trials with the number of aircraft planned for IOT &E. The fleet of
operational test aircraft, currently consisting of 8 F-35A and 7 F-35B
aircraft, averaged an AVA of approximately 50 percent over the last 6 months
(through the end of September), as shown in the table below. Although slightly
better than average AVA of all of the Lot 3 through Lot 5 aircraft - from which
the OT aircraft were produced - this is well short of the 60 percent objective
and not adequate to support the flight rate of test trials planned for
IOT&E. The table below also shows the maximum and minimum monthly average
AVA over the last 6 month period, for reference, and indicates the wider
variance in the OT fleet, as would be expected from a smaller sample size. Over
the same six-month period there has been no readily discernable trend of
increasing or decreasing availability for any of the groups of aircraft, supporting
the assertion that availability has flat-lined and will not improve
significantly prior to the start of IOT &E.
Aircraft
|
Average
|
Maximum
|
Minimum
|
F-35A OT (8 A/C)
|
51.2%
|
64.5%
|
39.8%
|
F-35B OT (7 A/C}
|
50.4%
|
64.2%
|
34.5%
|
Lots 3 thru 5 (76 A/C}
|
44.5%
|
49.0%
|
40.8%
|
Two things about this paragraph bug me no end. The repeated
assertions of Gilmore’s beliefs as absolutes by this point are merely annoying
1.
Gilmore is clinging to a TEMP that is based upon
an 80% AVA and the program has always planned a 60% AVA rate as a goal? Why
hasn’t Gilmore fixed that disconnect yet? Is he setting the program up to now
be blamed for something he would be equally responsible for?
2.
Gilmore is attempting to tie past and present
availability rates to future availability rates without explaining WHY the AVA
cannot be higher in the future. Claiming current rates are relevant to future
rates without showing additional support for that assertion is highly suspect,
as that assertion can be shown to be a non-sequitur. Any maintenance or ops
puke can tell you the number one determinant in aircraft availability (given
adequate spares) is flying schedule and how other priorities stack up against
the flying schedule. It is a fine balance that is needed to get maximum AVA out
of a fleet. On the one hand, if you have a flying schedule that doesn’t let
maintenance touch the jets at the intervals they should, the AVA will drop
because maintenance cannot keep up with the breakdowns. On the other hand, if
you are not scheduling to fly the jets as much as they can, there is no impetus
to fix jets as soon as possible to make them available: maintenance/service
work is stretched or deferred and the AVA drops. My studies have found that the
MOST military fleet AVA you can ever get over a sustained period of time
is about 80-85% depending upon aircraft type. External operational
factors/decisions and budgets having nothing to do with aircraft capability can
and will limit the availability of even ‘perfect’ aircraft.
Then Gilmore goes back to more issues related to the aforementioned
attitude problem:
• Insufficient progress in
air-to-air range instrumentation (AARI). AARI has not yet been tested in the
F-35. In fact, the required DT of AARI has not yet been planned. Despite the
limited time remaining in SOD, the AARI OT must be completed in time to support
a fly-fix-fly correction cycle so this TEMP-required system is ready in time to
support and not delay IOT&E.
• Inadequate Fusion Simulation
Model (FSM). Corrections to this model, which is currently too unrealistic to
be used for IOT &E, are required and must be put on contract to ensure FSM
can support IOT &E requirements.
• Inadequate Virtual Threat
Insertion (VTI). The task of adding missing threats required for IOT &E to
the VTI-associated reference table must also be put on contract as soon as
possible. This will ensure threat messages from AARI for required threats can
be recognized and displayed by FSM on the F-35 cockpit displays during IOT
&E.
• Inadequate United States
Reprogramming Lab (USRL). Upgrading the USRL to the necessary Block 3F
configuration is late to need to enable the USRL to begin the development of
Block 3F mission data files (MDF); the latest projection is that the USRL will
not be able to start building basic Block 3F MDFs until February 2017. However,
because of the inadequate tools provided to the USRL and the complexity of the
MDFs, the USRL estimates that it will take approximately 15 months to create, optimize
and validate the MDF for IOT &E. Also, because the program failed to order
the required signal generators, the Block 3F MDFs will not be optimized against
several fielded threats of significant concern. The inadequately equipped USRL
increases the likelihood of failure in operational test, and, more importantly,
in combat.
The following paragraph is just more Gilmore insinuating
himself into areas that are none of his business that he WANTS to make his
business. After the Block 3F configuration is tested DOT&E’s F-35 charter
is complete. This is just another sales pitch
by Gilmore, proffered to keep DOT&E’s Non-Value-Added A**es in their
feathered bureaucratic nests.
Sadly, I’m certain ‘some’ will listen.
• Substantial Risks to Follow On
Modernization (FoM). Despite the significant ongoing challenges with F-35
development listed above, including the certainty of additional problem
discoveries, the proposed modernization schedule is not executable. Even with
the significant ongoing SOD delays and problems delivering full Block 3F
capabilities, the program still plans to award contracts to start simultaneous
development of Blocks 4.1and4.2 in 2018, well prior to completion of IOT&E
(and possibly before it has even started for the reasons detailed above), and therefore
lacking understanding of the inevitable problems it will reveal. Also, the proposed
aggressive modernization plan and overlapping schedule for Block 4 increments
do not depict adequate schedule and resources for formal operational testing.
In addition, due to the cost and complexity of the proposed additional capabilities
in Block 4, sufficient test resources, including enough test aircraft, will
need to be available. Furthermore, because of program concurrency resulting in
the fielding of multiple configurations, (i.e., different avionics processors)
additional configurations of test fleet aircraft will be needed. For example,
enhancements and fixes of mission systems software for aircraft with TR2
processors will be needed while capabilities are developed and tested
simultaneously for aircraft with new open architecture Technical Refresh 3
(TR3) processors. Due to the hundreds of aircraft that will already have been
produced, the program and Services will be sustaining aircraft with TR2
processors with versions of Block 4 software for 10 to 15 years before all
aircraft can be modified to the TR3 configuration.
BTW: making a big deal out of having a mixed fleet of TR2
and TR3 processor aircraft is a
Red Herring, used apparently to increase the memo’s page count. The mixed fleet
was the plan. It is not unexpected, not unprepared for, and certainly not a
'problem'. Gilmore can take some smelling salts and stop fainting
already.
Gilmore closes by reiterating all the risk, deficiency,
‘inevitability’, and ‘you need me for Block 4’ horse sh*t that he’s already
spread.
For all the reasons stated above
and described in my previous memoranda, the F-35 program clearly lacks
sufficient time and resources to deliver full combat capability and be ready for
operational testing and deployment to combat if it is unwisely constrained to
operate within its currently planned budget and schedule. The program should
now be provided the additional resources required to deliver full Block 3F
combat capability; i.e. to complete all the testing (including regression)
needed to rectify a substantial number of existing critical deficiencies as well
as the new deficiencies that will inevitably be discovered during the remaining
Block 3F testing.
Failure to adequately finish SDD
will result in far greater risks and costs than completing it now. First, since
the program clearly will not be able to start IOT&E in August 2017, as indicated
in their program of record, the program's plan to draw down staffing and test infrastructure
in CY17 to close out SDD would occur at a time when the program should be aggressively
using the full capacity of the current test resources and experienced personnel
to complete testing, address deficiencies, and ensure full Block 3F capability
is delivered and ready for IOT&E and combat. Second, if the program
continues with plans to close out SDD prematurely, it will carry the high risk
of failing and having to repeat the approximately $300- million operational
test, and failing for many years to provide the full combat capability Block 3F
has long been meant and claimed to provide. Third, the unresolved technical
debt will spill into FoM. where it will take longer to fix and cost more to
address than if rectified now. Finally, the combination of unfinished SDD work
and the likely follow-on operational test would significantly delay, and
increase the cost of, achieving the important FoM capabilities which are urgently
needed to counter current and emerging threats.
I therefore recommend very strongly
that the program be restructured now and provided the additional resources it
clearly requires to deliver its long-planned and sorely needed full Block 3F
combat capability.
Gilmore’s 8
Page Memo in Bullet Format:
1.
Gilmore says schedule delays bad!
2.
Gilmore says much risk ahead!
3.
JSFPO wants incremental OT to accommodate
delays, reduce risk and keep schedule!
4.
Gilmore has piece of paper that he likes that
says NO to incremental OT!
5.
Gilmore/DOT&E doesn’t want to count
incremental beans!
6.
Gilmore says Replan/Stretch the SDD Schedule so
OT schedule stays same!
7.
Gilmore says keep DOT&E employed!
