“Fighter Aircraft” Design: Driven by Operational Requirements

Part 1: Introduction

In the wake of the disinformation cascade set off by the mischaracterization of an F-35 Developmental Test report leaked to the poster-boy for Punk Journalism (and his equally hapless compadres) it became apparent that somebody, someplace should highlight just how infantile all the F-35 H8er and click-bait copycats have been on the subject.

Since ‘Axe is Boring’ ‘broke’ the story (if you can call being hand-fed the raw data by some other cretin and then making sh*t up about things he doesn’t understand ‘breaking’), I think we’ve seen every perversion of reality about the test itself, the relevance of the test, the F-35’s capabilities, the history of air combat, ‘dogfighting’, and airpower-in-general trotted out and gleefully regurgitated as if it were gospel by the innumerate and the illiterate.
As creative as the fiction published about the aircraft (it was an early production 'A' model: AF-2) performance during  the Developmental Test has been, it seems most if not all of the F-35 criticisms related to the ‘leaked’ test report fall into two broad categories. In the first category we can place all the claims/accusations that the F-35 is not somehow ‘fighter’ enough to successfully engage in air combat. In the second category we can place all the assertions that the scenarios flown in this one test were representative of how the F-35 would perform Air Combat Maneuvering aka ‘Dogfighting’ in actual combat.

We will deal with both these strains of criticisms in what will be Part 2 and Part 3 respectively within this short series. In Part 2, we will recall a rather cogent, insightful and in many ways prophetic AIAA paper from 1970s: “The Characteristics of a Fighter Aircraft”. This paper is the text transcript for the Wright Brothers Lectureship in Aeronautics speech given by Prof. Gero Madelung (speak German?) to attendees of the annual AIAA Aircraft Systems and Technology Meeting in 1977.  I’ll then introduce the thoughts on fighter development from a very influential and widely-cited engineer (among aircraft design types anyway) who among other things can be considered the originator of the concept ‘supermaneuverability’.  Thus, Part 2 (which may have to be broken into sub-parts if it gets too unwieldy) will bring us up to speed on top-level ‘fighter’ aircraft design drivers right up to the present-day state-of-the-art, and maybe a peek or two at the future.

Whereas Part 2 will provide proper background and perspective, Part 3 will be where the perspective will be applied and so will be more ‘analytical’. We will break down a 1 vs. 1 air combat scenario into a high-level conceptual model of constituent phases and associated combatant states. Then we will apprise the F-35’s potential advantages and disadvantages at different points of reference during engagement scenarios as it moves into and out of those phases and states and under what conditions it can navigate its way through those phases and states. We will also weigh the relevance of those advantages/disadvantages to possible combat outcomes.

Part 3 will take some time to complete after Part 2, so I will ask the readers to bear with me on any delays, or perhaps I will invite comment on aspects of the approach to Part 3 as I build the conceptual model. We should not have to account for probability of outcomes and only illuminate the ‘possibilities’ for discussion-- which will simplify the problem significantly but not to the point that careful construction will not still be necessary just to avoid oversimplification on the one hand or sophistry on the other. This is the hard part of Part 3: to make complete enough to be valid and convey meaning, not so complete that too many eyes glaze over. The topic would be a lot easier for me to treat if there were more authorized references to the F-35’s Developmental Test that I could tie into, but we’ll muddle through without them somehow.

This is also probably going to seem awfully obvious and trivial in many places to some, but I want to have a single reference to point non-technical minds to in the future. -- Because this is one of those topics where you could get worn out just beating down the same stupidity and misperceptions every time they pop up.
Finally, in each part I will include a reminder:

NOTE:

Nowhere in this series of posts, or in any other posts the reader will find here, is the assertion made that ‘maneuverability’ (however one defines it) is "unimportant"-- in the past, modern day or immediate future . This must be stated unambiguously up front because I've seen the tiresome broad-brush accusation of same made too-often when anyone dares challenge some closely held belief as to maneuverability’s relative importance to fighter design or dares challenge the vague reasons why many of the uninitiated think “maneuverability” is important. 

This note won’t stop tired criticisms from arising, but it will make intelligent people stop and think before they paper any comment thread with false conclusions. And this series of posts isn’t for the people too stupid to know better anyway.

Part 2 is here

P.W. Singer and August Cole? 'Game Show' Quality Defense Analysis

(Apologies to Game Shows Everywhere)

AKA: The "Axe is Boring Disinformation Cascade" Continues...

Ersatz sound-bite providers cum defense 'thinkers' P.W. Singer and August Cole have piled even more B.S. on the F-35 non-story that was made up out of whole cloth earlier over at 'Axe is Boring'.

To summarize the authors (in sequence):

1. Help propagate the disinformation cascade by repeating the nonsensical hit-piece-on-a-report that neither they nor the original author propagating such drivel apparently are capable of understanding. 
2. Misrepresent the official response to said hit-piece and critique their own misrepresentation. 
3. Repeat a tired old ‘we tried missiles only’ trope. (Only interceptors designed to engage nuclear-armed bombers at a distance were ever ‘missiles only’ armed). 
4. Misrepresent the Navy’s actual design objective of the F-4, which was as a "Fleet Interceptor" of aforementioned bombers, and armed with A2A missiles designed to intercept those same less-than-maneuverable bombers and at very high altitudes (unlike how the ROEs shaped SEA combat). BTW: The Air Force ALWAYS wanted a gun on its F-4s in the fighter role. Robert the ’Strange’ said ‘NO’ to the AF until the F-4E. 
5. Provide a cartoon snapshot of the fighter pilots' post-1968 experience in SEA. 
6. Then reassert the bogus F-35 hit-piece masquerading as ‘reporting’ and analysis as if there were 'facts' involved.

So then.... 

Q: What IS there about the rest of the authors' so-called ‘analysis’ that would make their ‘blog post’ anything other than 'intellectual' booger-flicking?

A: Nothing.

By way of a palate cleanser, lets compare Singer and Cole's B.S. with some, y'know...FACTS.

Contrary to what some might believe, I try not to just point at the stupid people and their stupidity without also providing some positive and countervailing content. So in passing, let us review some information that at least provides some information as to what that 'test' Axe & Co. got their beta-boy panties in a wad over  REALLY means -- instead of what they want it to mean (apparently just because it fits their preconceived life-positions).

The Testing in Question was Described Ahead of Time Last Year 

From the 2014 AIAA paper "F-35A High Angle-of-Attack Testing"[1], authored by a Mr. Steve Baer, (Lockheed Martin "Aeronautical Engineer, Flying Qualities" at Edwards AFB), and presented to the Atmospheric Flight Mechanics Conference held between 16 and 20 June 2014, in Atlanta, Georgia we find that F-35 High AoA testing was designed to follow in the following progression: 

The test objectives for high angle-of-attack testing are as follows:

1) Characterize the flyqualities [sic] at AoAs from 20° to the control law limit regime with operationally representative maneuvers. 

2) Demonstrate the aircraft’s ability to recover from out of control flight and assess deep stall susceptibility 

3) Evaluate the effectiveness and usefulness of the automatic pitch rocker (APR) 

4) Evaluate departure resistance at both positive and negative AoA with center of gravity (CG) positions up to the aft limit and with maximum lateral asymmetry. 

5) Assess the handling qualities of the aircraft in the High AoA flight

Now, in case a 'punk journalist' or other factually-challenged reader wanders by, we need to be clear that #5 has nothing to do with "dogfighting". We know this because Mr. Baer makes two points shortly thereafter within the paper. 

The first point is relevant to the state of the testing at the time of his writing. I observe that this paper was written during Objective #4 testing and published at about the time it concluded. This observation is supported by the passage [emphasis/brackets mine]:

With intentional departure testing [Objective #4] wrapped up, the team will soon move into departure resistance [Objective #4] and plan to remove the SRC now that these systems have been verified. In this phase of testing, the jet will test the CLAW limiters with much higher energy and rates than previous testing, fleshing out and correcting areas that may be departure prone. Lastly, select operational maneuvers [Objective #5], such as a slow down turn and a Split-S, will be used to gather handling qualities data on high AoA maneuvers. With the completion of this phase, the F-35 will be released for initial operational capability in the high AoA region.

   Note: 'CLAW' is Control Law and 'SRC' is Spin Recovery Chute.

Clearly the testing was not yet at step #5 at the time of writing but to emphasize same, the author followed the above paragraph with [emphasis mine]: 

While the flight test team will explore legacy high AoA maneuvers for handling qualities, it will be the Operational Test and Evaluation team that will truly develop high AoA maneuvers for the F-35. In the operational world, a pilot should rarely be taking the F-35 into the high angle-of-attack regime, but the ability to do so could make the difference between being the victor or the victim in air-to-air combat....

So with this paragraph, not only does the author expound on the exploring of "legacy high AoA maneuvers" (the 'legacy' part is important) that is to come, he specifically assigns the kind of testing that will "truly develop high AoA maneuvers for the F-35" (vs. 'legacy' which may be differed from) to the Operational Testers and NOT part of the Edwards AFB Developmental Test Team activities. 

In a nutshell, just within these two paragraphs that Baer wrote in early/mid 2014 is precisely what the JPO/LM stated in their official response to Axe's B.S.

Therefore the "reasonable man" may logically and confidently conclude the JPO response:

1. WAS NOT simply something that was contrived in response to Axe's made up bullsh*t  but...
2. WAS accurately asserting what the testing was truly about...

....debunking all and any claims to the contrary.

[1] AIAA #2014-2057

Minor changes for clarity, readability and typo corrections made 23 July 15 @ 1944 hrs.  

. 

A Mysterious LM CUDA Missile Update

Just gets more interesting as time goes on...

Major Hat Tip to Marauder for finding the relevant AFIT Technical thesis and passing it along

Regular readers may remember one of my most popular posts on LM’s CUDA missile concept. In that post, I hypothesized some about the CUDA’s weight and resultant performance by using a comparative analysis of what little was known about the CUDA and existing missiles with known physical characteristics. Key assumptions were that the same kind of propellant characteristics and relative scaling of the different components of existing missiles would apply to the CUDA.

Based upon a recent AFIT paper I no longer believe that approach is sufficient.

Employment of a CUDA missile ‘concept’ was used in a thesis written by Army Major Casey D. Connor, and published earlier this year. In his paper “AGENT-BASED MODELING METHODOLOGY FOR ANALYZING WEAPONS SYSTEMS”, Major Connor modeled and examined the relative effectiveness of different missile loadout combinations for a very specific A2A mission using two methods of attack: 'straight-in' and ‘pincer’.
The paper was exploratory in nature, and there’s not enough in the paper to come to any more conclusions than Major Connor did -- but I’m sure someone will read more ‘findings’ into it than he did. In fact, I'd expect 'some' to leap to all kinds of ‘conclusions’ about a lot of different sub-topics because the paper really does raise some very interesting questions that someone else will probably/hopefully pick up and follow-up on going forward.
The value of the paper to us in this instance is that it gives us an indication of some key performance—shall we say—“possibilities” for a CUDA-like weapon system. The paper uses the terms CUDA-like and SACM (Small Advanced Capability Missile) interchangeably. Given the rumblings on the web and in aero media since the CUDA concept’s existence went public, the relationship of the CUDA (a Lockheed Martin concept) to SACM (the programmatic objective of CUDA) is now better known. No surprises there.

What is Surprising?

What IS surprising (to me at least) are the characteristics used for the CUDA/SACM in Major Connor’s thesis. Specifically, Connor provides the CUDA/SACM weight used in his simulations as 49Kg (108 lbs). This has HUGE implications. 

If by my original speculation where I extrapolated known data about existing technology, I had arrived at a weight estimate that was 45.5 lbs higher (153.5 lbs) than the 108lb weight Connor uses, then it almost certainly speaks of significantly more advanced/miniaturized technology than simply scaling down 'more of the same' from existing systems.

I had toyed with putting a wedge in my original estimate for a reverse-weight spiral (less structural weight is needed the lower the non-structural weight), but thought that would have been pushing all the ‘estimating’ a little too far. As it turns out I would have come closer, but still nowhere near a mere 108 lbs for a CUDA weight estimate by my using current weapons for baseline info. I think now that ‘Next generation’ guidance, control, structure, and maybe  propulsion technology breakthroughs almost certainly permeate that CUDA/SACM design concept. As the scaling of RM propellant weight probably still applies (harder to make lighter propellant than other components), I don't think there's much weight change per cubic inch of volume there. But even so, this new lower weight could potentially drive the CUDA/CACM higher in the ‘Delta V’ performance than what I had previously estimated.

What Changed?

If only the weight is lower, with the other factors such as the ratio between pre-launch and expended rocket motor weights, and propellant/rocket factors, etc., then the CUDA potential top speed would not necessarily be higher than my first estimate (~24% higher than AMRAAM using existing missiles as guides). But I don’t think that at this new lighter weight, the same ratio CAN still hold true: a larger percentage of the total CUDA/SACM weight is now more likely found in the rocket motor -- if only just because everything else got lighter.
This shift in weight contribution, in turn, would mean a larger percentage of pre-launch weight is propellant that will be expended in acceleration. The scope of the impact of such a change is unknown, but here is a parametric exploration of the impact of various possible RM weight ratios from no change (54.53%) and up to a little more than 5% increase (60%):

What if the CUDA has a higher percentage of propellant weight than the AMRAAM?
(updated verbiage for more clarity less obfuscation)

As you can see, very little increases in the ratio of propellant weight to total weight yields significantly higher potential Delta V that could be tapped into to:

1. increase range, 
2. enable shaping complex flyouts, and/or 
3. increase end-game dynamics. 

That this improved performance is likely a ‘truism’ in the CUDA/SACM design concept is reflected in Major Connor’s findings.

Connor’s modeling of the engagements he selected resulted in outcomes where the ‘pure’ CUDA/SACM loadout successfully engaging the RED AIR targets at significantly greater distances (32%-38% greater, depending on attack method used) than the Medium Range Missile Model (AMRAAM-basis) used (see Fig. 43 below from the source). That kind of range advantage would be consistent with a higher Delta V for the CUDA/SACM weapon.



[Note: Read the paper for information on the mixed loads of a short range missile (AIM-9X ‘like’), medium range missile (MRM) and the CUDA/SACM weapons]

The higher performance of the CUDA/SACM also shows up in the higher 'effectiveness' ratings of the pure CUDA/SACM loadout over the pure MRM loadout. As Figure 42 from the paper below illustrates, the pure CUDA/SACM missile loadout kills targets at better than a 2 to 1 advantage over the MRM’s kill rate as well as doing so at ranges farther than the MRM. 

This increased effectiveness suggests perhaps an even better end-game kinematic CUDA/SACM design performance than the MRMs due to a higher percentage of propellant design weight, working with the hit-to-kill Attitude Control Motors (ACMs) in the front-end. 

Connor’s focus in the paper isn’t on getting into the nuances of the CUDA/SACM’s capabilities, but the higher performance of the CUDA concept indicated by the data is supported by his observations within the text as well:

The main characteristics of the new missile technology examined in our research include hit-to-kill technology in which the missile uses a kinetic warhead to attack the target, agility in that the missile’s guidance, propulsion, and control surfaces allow it to maneuver more flexibly towards a target, and a smaller size allowing each fighter to carry more missiles. These new weapons have the potential for dramatically changing the range of possible tactics and mission roles allowed. (p.1)

And…

Tactics best suited to the new missile are ones that maintain BVR to take advantage of the increased engagement ranges and possibly combined tactics that allow the flexible maneuvering characteristics of the new missiles to engage enemy aircraft at angles that the enemy aircraft will be unable to counter. (p.102)

There’s a lot of other ‘food for thought’ on many air combat topics in the paper. Connor was meticulous in documenting what he could of the methodology that he used including the limitations, ground-rules and assumptions. There’s also some excellent sources listed for further reading in the list of references.

Time will tell if the SACM concept will be developed into a full-up weapon system. But I must say that if it doesn’t go forward in some iteration or another I will be even more surprised than I have been so far in following the CUDA/SACM story.

Note: minor edits for readability and clarity made 16 July @ 1945 CST.

David Axe is More Boring Than Ever (Bless His Heart)

And still practicing Punk Journalism 

Bumped! Axe Doubles Down

*******Update 2 at End of Original Post******* 

Gawd. Saw this at work today and am only posting a short comment because somebody (surer than sh*t) will read something into any non-comment on my part, considering how I've already provided input (17 March 2015) on this subject:

I will bet dollars to donuts that IF the program chooses to respond to such hooey, that we will discover the first two BFM "tests" were in the middle of January, the first two flights were on two consecutive days, the missions were flown by two different pilots, and both of them had nothing but glowing reviews about the jet's performance. If I find eventually a public source to validate this 'guess' I will be happy to also share who I 'guessed' were the pilots, which flight they flew, and which plane(s?) was/were flown. And perhaps even quote the pilots.

First, I'm certain that whatever the test pilot report being cited by Axe may bear some faint resemblance to Axe's representation of same. Axe's perversions of the facts, per his usual modus operandi come via his bizarro assertions-stated-as-fact  and their complete disconnect from any reality as to the purpose and goals of the first A2A scenarios that were flown.

What the objectives were came out shortly after I made my first comments. From Av Week online (2 Apr 15), and with important bits in bold/EMPHASIS:

The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter has been flown in air-to-air combat maneuvers against F-16s for the first time and, based on the results of these and earlier flight-envelope evaluations, test pilots say the aircraft can be cleared for greater agility as a growth option. 

Although the F-35 is designed primarily for attack rather than air combat, U.S. Air Force and Lockheed Martin test pilots say the availability of potential margin for additional maneuverability is a testament to the aircraft’s recently proven overall handling qualities and basic flying performance. “The door is open to provide a little more maneuverability,” says Lockheed Martin F-35 site lead test pilot David “Doc” Nelson..... 

..... “When we did the first dogfight in January, they said, ‘you have no limits,’” says Nelson. “It was loads monitoring, so they could tell if we ever broke something. It was a confidence builder for the rest of the fleet because there is no real difference structurally between AF-2 and the rest of the airplanes.” AF-2 was the first F-35 to be flown to 9g+ and -3g, and to roll at design-load factor. The aircraft, which was also the first Joint Strike Fighter to be intentionally flown in significant airframe buffet at all angles of attack, was calibrated for inflight loads measurements prior to ferrying to Edwards in 2010.

The operational maneuver tests were conducted to see “how it would look like against an F-16 in the airspace,” says Col. Rod “Trash” Cregier, F-35 program director. “It was an EARLY look at any control laws that may need to be tweaked to enable it to fly better in future. You can definitely tweak it—that’s the option.”

The expectation of the tests was to see how the airplane behaved when slung about in a A2A engagement using the current control laws within the current G-limit design, and they found they can open them up the laws for more. Let's ignore the fact we don't know AF-2's empty weight and that the program was delivering the SDD baseline weight aircraft about the time the engagement occurred.

Let's pretend it doesn't matter that we don't know the weight of the F-16 or the altitudes and speeds the engagements occurred either. Let's also ignore the fact that ALL jets need to have many such engagements before the aircrew really know how to best exploit their advantages. Even without all that, Axe is STILL  just laying down a nice pile of fertilizer for the rest of the Punk Journalists and Faux Reformers to spread and nurture yet another disinformation cascade.

Sit back and watch the fun. Any bets on who cites this weak-a** hit-piece first?

Update: I see F-16.net is on the case.

******************************************************

Update 2(1 July 15)

******************************************************

Wow. A lot can happen in a day, and I can't even go into the kind of detail I'd love to go into for some of it. (I'll have to stay 'hypothetical' about the now-out-in-the-open Test Report, given the caveats plastered at the top and bottom of every page of the report.)

First. A former fighter driver with experience in both the F-16 and F-18 chimed in with some thoughts that fit pretty much hand-in-glove with what I've stated so far in his post: Why The “F-35 v F-16″ Article Is Garbage.
 
Second. The global disinformation cascade Axe set off (and I predicted) was gathering a lot steam until the former fighter driver posted his thoughts.

Third. The F-35 program office and LM then added some information that was also consistent with my posts on the topic. (I'm not claiming any special insight here, just an experienced one that appears to be consistent with other experienced viewpoints.)

Fourth. Axe appears to have felt enough sting in the criticism he's received so far to now have gone a step further and posted a lightly-sanitized copy of the report. If he cared a whit versus just playing a gadfly, I would love to explain to him the cognitive dissonance between what the report says and means in contrast to what he asserts it means. I suspect the JPO or LM will have to go through the process of releasing some of the leaked information for export just so they can spell it out for the low-information crowd.

Until they do, I won't be linking to or addressing anything directly mentioned in the report because doing so could constitute an 'export'. I like my current digs and income status and look terrible in orange or broad stripes, so NO.
Axe better hope he's as insignificant a pissant as I think he is, because the caveats on those pages obviously leave him and his employer open to criminal prosecution and civil lawsuits. It would take a lot of political capital to be spent by the anti-defense crowd to keep Axe and Co. out of the grinder if Uncle Sugar or Lockmart decide to call them out on this. BTW: May whoever leaked the report be far less connected and may the scum twist in wind over this leak.

Given I won't be discussing the contents of the report, I WILL say that Axe's doubling-down on this stupidity gives me some inkling as to how Forest Rangers must feel when some life-long urbanite visits the park and keeps pointing at some small woodland creature insisting it is a 'bear' no matter how many times the Ranger points out the differences. I can't believe he offered the report as if it supported his position. Is he THAT clueless, or is he 'whistling past the graveyard' hoping nobody will call him out further on his peddling crap?

Maybe he wouldn't have made this mistake of misreading things into the report that aren't there, if he read more widely.


      

F-35 Transonic Acceleration vs. an F-16 Block 60 'Hot Rod'

UAE's Block 60 in early livery
over the Arizona Desert (original source)

Updated (at bottom of post) and 'bumped'

'Tim A,' in the comments of my last series of posts covering F-35 KPPs and 'Transonic Acceleration', piqued my interest in doing a comparative analysis of the F-35A's transonic acceleration KPP against a hypothetical, lightweight Block 60 F-16E that LM built for UAE. We can only 'estimate' and in the case of the F-16E/F the estimates can, I believe, be regarded as fair approximations since they are based upon F-16 Block 50 data in hand. Excursions away from the F-35 KPP data will be more presumptive, but we will not venture too far away from 'firmer ground'.

To do the comparison that we want to do, will first require us to make some reasonable assumptions (and remember they are assumptions) concerning the Block 60 aircraft and how they differ from, or are materially the same as, the more well-known Block 50 aircraft.

Major Differences between Block 50 & 60 Aircraft 

There is little 'hard' data available beyond certain basic information on the Block 60 configuration. The United Arab Emirates funded the development of this version in its entirety, and there is no 'Dash 1' manual in the public domain (that I am aware of) that could provide us with the 'authoritative' source for the information we seek. In any case, the factors most important to our discussions will be the establishment of an acceptable aircraft empty weight, and evaluation on what effect the Block 60's higher thrust engine (32,500 lbs vs 29,000 lbs of thrust in afterburner) would have on overall performance.
A major factor that might warp our evaluation of the Block 60 against the F-35A KPP performance--if we let it --would be quantifying the effect of wave and other drag differences between F-16 Block 50 and Block 60. My approach will be to do so in a manner that passes the "Reasonable Man' test.
As the purpose of this exercise is to get an idea as to  how well the 'future' (i.e. F-35A) stands up in comparison to the 'present' (aka F-16 Block 60), I intend to give the Block 60 performance every reasonable benefit of the doubt in surveying the drag differences between the Block 50 and Block 60. I choose to do so in part because I expect the non-wave drag differences between the Block 50 and 60 aircraft will be seen as less important compared to the wave drag contributions. (This should be seen as reasonable, if only because of the relative contributions of the factors proportional to the drag total). I do not expect to be able to characterize the effect of the differences exactly, but we should be able to identify the differences and their effect within a comparatively narrow range with the data in hand.

Block 50 vs Block 60 F-16 Drag and Weight Differences

For our earlier F-16C Block 50 comparison to an F-35A KPP configuration we used this Block 50 configuration:

F-16C Baseline: Full Internal Fuel, 2 AMRAAMs on wingtip launchers and full 20mm load.

The table above was just for a 'baseline' configuration. The source document for the data actually provides us with a wealth of information concerning many different F-16C/D weight and drag configurations that effectively define the F-16C/D transonic performance across a wide region of weight/drag possibilities: 

F-16 Block 50 Drag Count and Weight Differences.
Note that at low drag counts the differences in weights have a greater impact on acceleration times than the differences in drag, In particular, the increases in acceleration time due to a DI below 30 are small (interpolation looks like ~5-6 secs at 32K lbs)

We'll use this information to characterize the effect of the Block 60's external configuration and weight on its total 'drag'. 

For this exploration, we have selected a slightly "better armed" F-16E Block 60 configuration: 

F-16E Block 60 Configuration: Full Internal fuel load not includng CFTs,
Empty CFTs, 4 AMRAAMs and full 20mm load 

The four AMRAAM load was suggested by 'Tim A,', though I kept the CFTs empty because I wanted to keep the Block 60 configuration reasonably light.

The drag differences between the Block 50 and Block 60 F-16 configurations are reduced to the effect of the Block 60's greater total weight and increased drag profile. For the drag numbers in the selected Block 60 configuration I'm using the HAF F-16 manual and an article on CFTs found here. The CFT article mentions specifically the CFT set as "12%" of 300 gallon tank, but that is a general statement that may be the average drag reduction for the 300 in the subsonic region. I selected using 4 as the estimated DI for the CFTs for the transonic region, but even if it is less (perhaps '2') the difference between DI totals of 22 and 24 won't be seen in any guesstimate we can do. In addition, I have elected to treat the Block 60 basic airframe drag the same as the Block 50 in spite of the fact the Block 60 is designed to use and carry sensors/systems that are specific to the type.

Block 50 and lower pods on the left, Block 60 targeting system shown
on the bottom right. Some of the extra weight of the Block 60
comes from carrying an internal infrared search and tracking system,
of which only the FLIR ball can be seen just ahead of the canopy

These Block 60 systems, while they are no doubt 'lower drag' than the Block 50's 'add on' LANTIRN pods etc, they are also not "drag free". This is especially treu of the Sniper XR-derivative targeting system installation shown above. To give the Block 60 every advantage in the quantitative analysis, I choose to ignore the drag of the Block 60's unique installations. I do so for a couple of reasons. First, I doubt it will make as much 'drag difference' as accounting for all the weights involved, and second there is photographic evidence that while the Block 60-specific targeting system installations were initially expected to be carried all the time, in practice it hasn't always the case(Google "Block 60 F-16" and check out the photos). We'll just keep the 'drag factor' of these systems in the back of our minds going forward.

Block 50 vs Block 60 F-16 Engine & Thrust Differences

F-16 Block 50 Engine (source)

F-16 Block 60 Engine (source)

The differences between the Block 50 F110-129 engine and the Block 60 F110-132 engine are slight, but the -132 engine yields 2600 more pounds of thrust at sea level (standard day):
The key differences between the two engines that drive the increased thrust for the -132 variant aren't relevant to our analysis but for the sake of completeness, let us observe that the -132 has a slightly higher airflow than the -119, and that is at least partly due to the ever-so-slightly lower bypass ratio (more 'fast hot' air) for the -132 design. There are also some 'efficiency' improvements in the -132, some of which can be retrofitted to -129 engines for better durability if the users want to pay for the 'goodness'.
Normally, I would be loathe to try and extrapolate what a difference in engine thrust between planes would mean to the relative transonic acceleration performance, but given we are looking at essentially the same aircraft at different weights (and thrust to weight ratios), I think we can make a reasonable accommodation for the effect (on Block 50 acceleration) of the the extra thrust based upon looking at comparable Block 50 thrust-to-weight ratios. We can-- and WILL!-- apply that analysis to arrive at a fairly narrow region of impact of the higher thrust to the Block 60's transonic acceleration performance estimates.

Deriving an Estimation of F-16 Block 60 Performance Based Upon Block 50 Performance

We'll do this in a two-step process to bracket the likely transonic performance of the Block 60 compared to the Block 50. It doesn't make a difference in what order the process is applied, but we'll start with the simplest to explain first, and we'll just keep the F-35A KPP performance in sight as a sort of benchmark for now.

Step A: The Weight/Drag Impact 

As mentioned earlier, we can use the HAF T.O. GR1F 16CJ 1 1 Change 8 document containing the max acceleration performance data for the Block 50 to derive an approximation of the effect of the Block 60's weight and drag relative to the Block 50, We've approximated the drag index of the Conformal Fuel Tanks and added the known drag index of the Block 60's launchers and extra (2) AMRAAMs to arrive at a drag index 'upper' of  24 over a baseline Block 50. As this drag index is approximately halfway between a known DI=0 and DI=50, and the Block 60's selected configuration weight of 31,503 lbs is slightly lower than the the Block 50 32K lb configuration, the effect of weight and drag differences ALONE would indicate a transonic acceleration time of about 53 seconds (plus or minus). This is a performance better than the Block 50 at 32K lbs (DI=50) but not so good as a Block 50 at 28K lbs and with a DI=50 (obviously).

Note: This step would have been a lot easier to show/follow if the Block 50's DI=0 performance at 28K and 32K lbs were 'feasible' configurations. We could have just bracketed the DI=0 and the DI=50 values for a 32K weight.         

Estimating the Effect of Block 60 Weight Drag ONLY based upon Block 50 data. 

As we observed earlier within the 'F-16 Block 50 Drag Count and Weight Differences' chart, large aircraft weight difference have more effect on acceleration times than Drag Indexes when Drag Indexes are low:

Effect of Low Drag Count at relevant weights

Step B: The Impact of the Engine Difference

This step is a little more involved than the other. We again will rely on using the Block 50 data from HAF T.O. GR1F 16CJ 1 1 Change 8, but in estimating the impact of this factor we have to normalize the data for the Block 50 before applying it to the Block 60.

In the first section of the following graphic, I have charted the relative thrust-weight values for both the Block 50 and Block 60 aircraft. Notice how close  both the absolute values and the relative step functions are for the highlighted ratios shown for each F-16's Block data. The highlighted Block 60 ratios and step functions are slightly lower than the Block 50's but still very close.

If we ignore all other differences between the ircraft and assume acceleration differences are purely a matter of thrust to weight, and  generously assume all increased thrust-to-weight for the Block 60 translates proportionally into better acceleration at every weight AND look at the acceleration times for the Block 50 configurations between weight steps, we can express those step 'time deltas' for the Block 60 as a function of the ratio of  Block 50/Block 60 thrust ratios times the time deltas for any selelcted drag index. If that sounds confusing, it is because it is...without a spreadsheet.

To simplify, for this specific example I divided the 'Raw' Block 50 Thrust-Weight Ratio for the 28K weight by the 'Raw' Block 60 thrust-Weight Ratio for the 32K weight (1.0357143/1.0156325). I then  treated the Block 50 28K DI=24 acceleration time shown in the 'Normalized for Drag' portion of the chart below as being solely a product of thrust-to-weight, multiplied the Block 50 acceleration time for the 28K weight (44 seconds) times the 'ratio of thrust ratios used.

Stated more clearly without an audit trail: We assume the heavier block 60 will accelerate like a Block 50 at the same thrust to weight ratio. 

I am giving the Block 60 further benefit of the doubt by not accounting for the higher weight, but that's OK!: we're estimating remember?

Plotting the Step B as standalone estimate on the same graph with the Part A standalone estimate we find:

Estimating the Effect of Block 60 Weight Drag ONLY (A) and Block 60 Thrust to Weight ONLY (B), based upon Block 50 data. 

Obviously the actual Block 60 performance should fall somewhere between the outcome for each as independent factors:

Block 60 Transonic Acceleration Estimate: A Near-32K pound Block 60 with 4 AIM-120s accelerates like a Block 50 F-16 DI=50 at 28K Lbs.   

So in the end, the big advantage of the Block 60 aircraft appears to be the increased range and better/equal performance at a slightly higher weight than the Block 50. Nothing to sneeze at, but nothing too surprising either.

But HEY! What about the Block 60 in comparison to the F-35A KPP performance? 

We've covered the whole F-35A configuration setup already elsewhere. The big thing we do not really 'know' still is how much fuel is aboard the F-35 for the KPP measurement. We DO however understand that the KPP was written based upon a load of two 2K Lb JDAMs and 2 AMRAAMs carried internally. If we simply swap the two JDAMs for two more AMRAAMs the F-35A's weight would be about 4,000 pounds less (Most 2K Pound JDAMS weigh more than 2K lbs with the kits).

This F-35A KPP configuration performs almost exactly the same as a 36K pound Block 50 with a DI=50, the removal of 4000 pounds of weight should yield performance approaching that of a 32K pound Block 50 with a DI=50:

If the F-35A in an A2A configuration wants to match this F-16 Block 60 A2A configuration in transonic acceleration, it can probably just dump some fuel, or more likely simply 'unload'.  Conversely, in an A2G configuration similar to the F-35A KPP setup, the F-16 Block 60 would probably fair not so well against the F-35A KPP configuration

I'm not even going to plot this one (DI=74? Yikes!)

Housekeeping: Note that the Block 50 data in hand starts the acceleration run at Mach .79 and not the Mach.8 used for the F-35 KPP performance. That's OK! At the weights we are looking at, this translates to about 1 second or less difference: well within any margin of error.

*********************************************************

Update 29 April 15: About the presumed KPP configuration

(This ‘Update’ driven by conversation in the thread, because covering all the aspects of a complex subject in a comment thread is futile)

It doesn’t really matter if the F-35A configuration for the transonic acceleration KPP includes 2 JDAMs or if the JDAMs have already been dropped. It really doesn’t matter for three fundamental reasons, only one of which we’ve discussed in any detail.

First Fundamental Reason: Ambiguity of KPP Configuration

The KPP configuration and weight ‘is what it is’, and all our analysis has been focused on the relationship between those factors that affect transonic acceleration, and how (and how much) changes to those factors affect performance.

We do not ‘know’ the payload carried for the KPP values for any of the explorations we’ve made, and I’ve been comfortable in doing these parametric examinations using the assumption that the internal payload for the F-35A consisted of (2) 2K JDAMs, (2) AMRAAMs and a nose load of 25mm cannon rounds. Unlike an F-16 or any other aircraft that carries bulk fuel and weapons externally, it really didn’t matter what the F-35 was carrying internally from a drag POV except as in how whatever weight the F-35 was bearing increased the drag due to lift. While I used the assumption that the plane was carrying the JDAMs, We’ve never asserted or implied a total F-35 weight as the basis for the estimates. We have seen that at whatever the baseline weight basis is, the F-35A in its KPP configuration (whatever that is) accelerated from M.8 to M1.2 very much like an F-16 Block 50 at 36K lbs and a Drag Index =50.

I then posed a ‘what if’ scenario where the F-35A was 4K Lbs (or so) lighter to estimate performance at an “X”-4K pound F-35A. I took away the hypothetical 2k JDAMs because they were convenient to quantify. This is acceptable because, as I have mentioned many times, these analyses are about gaining an understanding of the factors involved and their impact/effects.

The data in-hand can’t be used to prove anything either way, it can only point to ‘possibilities’.

I am completely agnostic as to whether or not the F-35A KPP includes carriage of the JDAMS. If, as it has been suggested by ‘Tim A.’ in the comments that the KPP weight of the F-35 for the transonic acceleration performance does NOT include the 4K+ of JDAMs, I am good with that. BUT, I still cannot make a claim either way with certainty. If one takes at face value [1] then-Commander Bowman’s statement that

“The fuel levels and payloads at which maneuverability is calculated differs for each variant but generally focuses on a post-weapons release payload and fuel state at 50% of the required combat radius”

…do we assume that the transonic acceleration KPP falls within both the “post-weapons release” AND “50% fuel” ‘generalities’, or just one? Or the other? Or neither?

We don’t know. 

Looking at the key table in the Bowman paper….


We see two distinct CTOL (F-35A) loadouts specified for two KPPs in the footnotes. Are these the only two ‘possible’ exceptions to the “general” configuration to which Boman refers, or are they the ONLY exceptions? Are they just configurations that Bowman highlighted because he thought they were important to his arguments? We don’t know.

I’ve always been struck by the reference to the 2 empty external tanks in the first footnote, given the F-35 at this time does not carry external wing tanks and to-date they have not been seen as ‘value-added’ enough to be pursued by the program (an interesting topic for another time), but of interest to our discussion here is the second footnote as it relates to Bowman’s introduction to the table.

If it is worth mentioning in the footnote that “60% of internal fuel load” is carried as an exception to the ‘general’ rule, why would it be worth mention that the JDAMs had been “jettisoned/released” as if it were not part of the ‘general’ rule as well? I believe there is enough incongruity between the text and the table to prevent anyone from asserting the F-35A’s transonic acceleration KPP configuration MUST include or exclude JDAMs OR must be at 50% or 60% (or ‘n%’?) fuel [2] carried. This ambiguity is the primary reason I resisted establishing a baseline weight for the F-35A in doing the acceleration modeling and analysis. (Observant readers will note the only time I quantified F-35 variant weights in looking at the F-35 acceleration performance was when we examined possible discriminants between variants as drivers for variations in acceleration times.)

To go beyond the point that we have already gone can only add more uncertainty. Which leads us to Fundamental Reason #2

Second Fundamental Reason: The F-35A Baseline Design Itself is NOT Final

And the ramifications of this point are HUGE. Much of it relates to what will be the final weight/drag of the aircraft itself, but some of it relates to how the ‘books’ are being kept that prevent any definitive performance statements until SDD is complete (see Reason #3).

The weight uncertainty factor we touched upon under Reason #1 looms larger than many people might realize. We can assume all KPPs are based upon all or part of a fuel load required to achieve some unknown-to-us mission utility, objective and/or point, so weight is a factor in all KPPs.

Aircraft total weight will be driven by Aircraft Empty Weight, Fuel Weight, and Payload Weight. To meet ANY KPP objective listed, changes in the basis for Aircraft Empty Weight will have a compounding effect on total weight; creating a fuel-weight ‘spiral’ that can be positive or negative. The lighter or heavier the aircraft, the more or less fuel weight will need to be carried, and reciprocally, less or more payload can be carried. For every pound of empty weight added, how much more fuel weight is needed or how much payload weight will be affected? (Answer: “It depends”.) Whatever a percentage of fuel load weight used for each KPP, and the primary driver for specifying a max weight for each variant appears to vary [3], it can only be of importance as part of a total weight (assuming all weight is carried internally for all KPPs allowing us to ignore external drag ‘adders’), and what we do NOT know about this value and how it relates to performance parameters far outweighs what we do know. Keep this in mind going forward, as the first thing that we DO know about the F-35A’s empty weight is that it is currently below design objectives (DOT&E FY14 PDF):

Weight management of the F-35A is important for meeting air vehicle performance requirements and structural life expectations. These estimates are based on measured weights of components and subassemblies, calculated weights from approved design drawings released for build, and estimated weights of remaining components. These estimates are used to predict the weight of the first Lot 7 F-35A aircraft (AF-72), planned for delivery in August 2015, which will be the basis for evaluating contract specification compliance for aircraft weight.
-- According to these reports, the program has reduced weight by 16 pounds in CY14 (from January to October estimate). The current estimate of 29,016 pounds is 355 pounds (1.2 percent) below the planned not-to-exceed weight of 29,371 pounds.
-- The program has demonstrated positive weight management of the F-35A over the past 38 months, showing a net loss of 123 pounds in the estimates from August 2011 to October 2014. The program will need to ensure the actual aircraft weight meets predictions, as well as continue rigorous management of the actual aircraft weight beyond the technical performance measurements of contract specification in CY15 through the balance of SDD to avoid performance degradation that would affect operational capability.

An empty weight that is 355 pounds lower than the modeled KPP weight implies a much larger weight in fuel that does not to be carried to achieve the F-35A’s combat radius (or ‘60%’ mission radius/endurance distance/time). JETA-1 fuel weighs 6.71 lbs per gallon. How many pounds of fuel can be left behind by not having to carry 355 pounds of dead weight over 1200+ nautical miles out-and-back? We don't know. the uncertainties are certainly adding up.

While the AF-72 aircraft is the target point that is “the basis for evaluating contract specification compliance for [F-35A] aircraft weight”, we also do not know how much margin is in the “planned not-to-exceed weight of 29,371 pounds” target weight. I’ve seen indicators[4] that prevent me from completely assuming the weight targets are the weight assumptions used for KPPs. If the targets aren’t the limits, then there is further weight margin that the KPP model may not be accounting for in performance modeling. I personally wouldn’t assume this to be the case, but we don’t know. Time will tell.

Third Fundamental Reason: The KPP Ground Rules and Assumptions and/or their Impacts aren't fully known or accounted for either.

The ‘unknowns-unknowns’ here might outweigh any factor we have examined in trying to compare an F-35A to any legacy aircraft. The 'known-unknowns' are bad enough. Example? We know the KPPs are based upon a ‘pessimistic’ engine performance with 5% thrust and fuel efficiency degradation (Ref #8 here). We do NOT know what impact that factor has on the overall ‘standard’ aircraft weight or acceleration, but just as important, we do not yet know if that the ‘engine of record’ in the models is the original 40K Lb thrust engine, or an engine with the newer 43K Lb thrust rating. So, what else do we NOT know about the model GR&As?

Finally,

I don’t lose any sleep over the F-35A’s transonic acceleration because in the end it still gets back to the fundamental fact that you can always just ‘unload’ the plane to shed all that wave drag due to lift… if you so desire. Using such a technique, the F-35A should be able to run away to, from, or with any current or future aircraft through the transonic region unless that other aircraft is heavier AND with a higher Thrust/Weight ratio, and there are always other ways to deal with such contingencies (TANSTAAFL). I’ll THINK about getting concerned when the JPO and users get concerned.

Notes:
1. While I used the Bowman paper data, I put no weight on what was discernible as Bowman’s own analyses or observations surrounding the data. I treated the paper in this way, because I cannot divine if his positions/opinions come from ‘fact’ or from his ‘views’ on the facts: especially since I see several assertions/conclusions (unrelated to any of the KPP discussions so far) within that I know are erroneous--if only through their over-simplification. Further, Air Command and Staff papers tend to be advocacy papers and Bowman’s certainly falls into that description. I know enough about ACSC papers to know that they are just like almost all college papers, they are usually done for a ‘grade’ and not posterity. False data can get you a failing score in ACSC, but I’ve not seen evidence that faulty reasoning will-- unless you argue it ineffectively.

2. As an aside, if I HAD to pick a fuel quantity for the transonic KPP I would pick a value above 50% fuel on the assumption that the operators would desire at least 50% fuel on hand after a transonic dash, presumably to get to or get away from a fighting position.

3. For the F-35B model, the obvious weight constraint beyond those affecting range, acceleration and turning is Vertical Lift Bringback (VLBB) weight. For the F-35C, the Maximum Carrier Landing Weight is a driver as well as whatever weight will be essential to NOT bust the approach speed limitations.

4. One example is a chart online (that is marked US/FOUO, so I won’t post or link to here) shows the F-35C’s Weight Status in 2012 with a 'target' weight well below the key Carrier Landing Weight limit.

U.S. Navy ‘Non-Receptive’ to the F-35?

 Where did that come from? 

Source of original photo: US Navy 

Where did the idea that the “Navy” has been less than enthusiastic about the F-35C come from? I think I know, and can trace it back two or so years to a single statement made by the incoming CNO in an article for the USNI ‘Proceedings’. That single article gave such hope to the anti-JSF crowd that it gained far more audience and credence that it would have ever otherwise received, certainly more than it ever deserved.

Today, with the successful-to-date F-35 sea trials of the CF-3 and CF-5 aircraft operating off the USS Nimitz these past two weeks, the story has become one of a ‘surprising’ reversal of opinion (or beginnings thereof) by the Navy—at least as far as the media would lead us to believe.

I submit, that to the contrary it can be shown that what Navy enthusiasm there is for the F-35C is probably pretty much what it has always been, with perhaps a few more opinions among Wizened within the competing NAVAIR tribes lately changed for the better.

The life cycle of the whole ‘Navy chill to the F-35’ meme can be tracked easily—all the way back to its origins. The first FIVE citations/quotes are from the same publication taken over time. I do not mention the publication’s name for a couple of reasons. One, it doesn't matter. The media followed pretty much the same path getting here no matter what the sponsor. Two, I am partial to the reporting at the source and do not want to unfairly highlight this one little misadventure among a larger body of greater work. [I've numbered the steps involved in developing the meme to make it easier to discuss and reference if needed]

Ready? We begin…. 

Published this week, our source informed us that:

1. …The Navy has been much less enthusiastic about the F-35 than its two sister services, the Air Force and Marines. That seems to be changing now that the F-35C has successfully landed and taken off repeatedly from an aircraft carrier….

There was an embedded link in the statement that took me to last year:

2. “That’s the message Orlando Carvalho, new head of Lockheed Martin’s iconic aeronautics business wants to send the US Navy, the service most skeptical of the F-35."

There was an embedded link in THAT quote that took me to earlier last year:

3. “Speaking for the Navy,” added the Chief of Naval Operations, Adm. Jonathan Greenert, “I need the fifth-generation fighter, and that [F-35] provides it, so we’re all in — but it has to perform. It has problems; it is making progress.” 

“I do not at this point believe that it is time to look for an exit ramp, if you will, for the Navy for the F-35C,” continued Greenert, who in the past has damned the Joint Strike Fighter with similar faint praise.

This passage had an embedded link to an article with this bit:

4. By contrast, the CNO sounded more resigned than excited about the Navy piece of the $240 billion F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program, the carrier-launched F-35C. We have to have it, but “the question becomes how do we buy and how does it integrate into the air wing,” Greenert said. “If we bought no Cs, I think that would be very detrimental for the overall program.”

This passage contained one link to a 2012 article presenting this passage:

5. …Chief of Naval Operations Jonathan Greenert’s recent article in Proceedings announces in public what many have already known in private: The U.S. Navy is not wholly committed to the Lockheed Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program. Admiral Greenert’s controversial — and, potentially, hugely consequential — article raises several interesting points, among which is the contention that advances in sensing capabilities and electronic and cyber warfare will increasingly degrade America’s stealth arsenal. 

This is not news. What is news, however, is the head of the U.S. Navy signaling a tepid commitment to the military’s largest acquisition program, not to mention the many allied and partner country participants. 

There were three links embedded to sources in the above to the ‘sources’ that follow. These are the first references external to the publication we’ve been citing so far:

6. A link to Admiral Greenert’s “Limits of Stealth” script in his now infamous “Payloads Over Platforms” article in USNI’s Proceedings as incoming CNO (2012), which, I note here, does not even mention the F-35. His shtick did not impress me at the time. Still doesn’t. But as we have seen in getting back to this point in time, his later comments appear to reflect a somewhat more ‘informed’ POV now. The 'CNO' is NOT 'the Navy' BTW.

7. A link to the ‘corrected final’ copy of the 2010 “The Final Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel”, A report that a word search of finds no mention of the “F-35C”, nor just the ‘F-35”, nor the words “Stealth” or “Low Observable”. Why it was even linked, I cannot tell.

8. A link to a Heritage Foundation paper titled “Thinking About a day Without Seapower: Implications for US Defense Policy”. It also has not a single mention of the “F-35”, ‘C’ model or otherwise, or “Low Observable”. It does mention the word “Stealth” three times:

Developing a Long-Term Research and Development Plan. After numerous studies and a half-dozen shipbuilding plans, Navy leaders have correctly concluded that the United States needs a larger fleet—not simply in numbers of ships and aircraft, but also in terms of increased network capability, longer range, and increased persistence. Navy leaders recognize that the U.S. is quickly losing its monopolies on guided weapons and the ability to project power. Precision munitions (guided rockets, artillery, mortars, and missiles) and battle networks are proliferating, while advances in radar and electro-optical technology are increasingly rendering stealth less effective. Policymakers should help the Navy to take a step back and look at the big picture to inform future investment portfolios. Congress should demand and uniformed leaders should welcome the opportunity to develop long-range technology road maps, including a science and technology plan and a research and development plan for the U.S. Navy. These plans should broadly outline future investments, capabilities, and requirements. The possibilities include:

• A next-generation surface combatant,
• A sixth-generation fighter, and
• Low-observable capabilities beyond stealth…

And....

Building a Modern Congress–Navy Partnership. …
...To relieve additional pressure on the already strained Navy shipbuilding budget, Congress should seriously consider funding the design and construction costs of the Navy’s new replacement ballistic missile submarine outside of Navy budget controls. These national assets are employed as part of critical strategic missions. Without additional resources, the defense industrial base and the nation’s conventional advantage at sea could be sacrificed to recapitalize the strategic force. Alternatively, Congress should consider whether this extremely expensive leg of the nuclear triad should be maintained in the face of decreasing stealth, shrinking nuclear stockpiles, and limited shipbuilding funds….

Note only two of the three ‘stealth’ references relate to low observable aircraft, and those stake out a claim similar to that which Admiral Greenert has since backed away from after he assumed the CNO responsibility. In any case, the Heritage Foundation report comes closest to representing the “Navy’s” coolness towards Low Observables in the form of one of the co-authors: a retired Navy Captain and ship driver. Not quite "The Navy' .

Strip away the journalistic overlay of 'what it all means' and there's no 'there' there. So much for the Navy being ‘cool’ towards the F-35C.

Now if you want to talk about the F-18E/F/G ‘community’ (read ‘tribe’) being cool towards the F-35, well………..DUH!

Just wait until the F-35 starts smacking the F-18 tribe around in training. It will be worse.

That’s called ‘Tradition’.

Operation Allied Force: 15 Years After

I have no real time to do any substantive postings right now, and I want to get back to the '20 questions series' in that regard before I move onto other topics. But I could not let this anniversary pass without a nod to what may have been my biggest contribution to National Defense (six years after retiring from the AF) at that time.

I'm the guy who told the Air Force in 1998 that unless the missions are too long for the aircrews, they shouldn't bother to forward deploy: They could do more operating from home station. The B-2 was getting beat up (wrongfully--sound familiar?) for not being 'deployable'.  The program SPO came to my 'shop' and contracted us to accurately describe where any shortfalls were and recommend corrective action. The first question in answering that question is: "Under what circumstances will it make sense for the B-2 deploy instead of operate from Whiteman AFB?" the second question was "When it does deploy, where should it deploy to?" The analysis showed a clear answer to both questions: deploy rarely and only a handful of locations would provide coverage for the entire globe.

Deployment is Hard Work for Not a Whole Lot More Return

Because when units deploy, it looked like it took at least a week to get packed up, move, get set up and start forward operations. The B-2s in most circumstances spend that week getting a head start (in servicing aim points) on any other system that has to deploy, and the B-2 and B-1 experiences in Allied Force actually played out to prove that assumption. Once a system is forward deployed, the logistics of feeding fuel, munitions and everything else is tougher than the logistics of doing same at home base. I had modeled that even if the forward deployed system was able to adequately generate sorties for all their airplanes 'faster' (because they were closer) that for a six bomber package, all the unit at home station had to do was add one aircraft at home station (easily done) to surpass the deployed sortie rates.

The News Was Well Accepted

When I briefed  my findings to the 509th at Whiteman in the summer of 1998, I had one maintenance officer tell me after the brief that when a package forward deploys, the first airplane that breaks hard usually becomes the forward deployed parts bin and 'hangar queen'. They probably wouldn't even need to add a plane at home station to equal the 'forward-deployed" effort.
One of the positive developments that came out of the effort before Allied Force was that the Air Force decided to get off the dime and start setting up, at key FOBs, the portable shelters they had been developing. By the time Allied Force kicked off, there was significant movement in that area which would pay off not very much later in Operations Enduring and Iraqi Freedom (another war story).

The B-2's Contribution....and More

To commemorate the anniversary the B-2's successful combat debut, here are a few slides extracted from a General Hawley brief. I got my hands on it in early 2000, but it was probably one of the last big presentations the General made before retiring in mid-1999.

Leading up to Operation Allied Force...

We were testing CALCMs on the ranges before they were used in Desert Storm, and in 1993 I was testing the smart weapon interface for what would become the GATS/GAM and later JDAM weapon concepts 

Operation Allied Force...

The 'Air Boss' Lt General Michael Short called the B-2 one of the 'Stars' of the campaign. He said he could count on "sixteen quality DPMIs" for every sortie. DPMI = Designated (NOT 'Desired') Mean Point of Impact

This was 'then' in 1999

Developments after Operation Allied Force....

This was a big step. Carrying even MORE SDBs, or a couple of BIG BLUs, and mixed loads is a quantum jump  

This is 'Now' 

                

Air-to-Air Combat Over Southeast Asia: 20(+/-) Questions That Resonate Today

Questions 1 thru 4

A Q&A series on things you probably know but your friends probably don’t.

I’ll update the subtitle and bump the post every time I add a question. The number of questions in the end will be determined by where the discussion takes us.

I anticipate that my primary sources will be the AF Weapon Systems Evaluation Group, The Ault Report, Marshall Michel’s Clashes (and perhaps some of his other writings), some Air Force Historical Studies Office publications, and Nordeen’s Air Warfare in the Missile Age (Second Edition) at the minimum. I’ll add other sources as required.
I intend to start simply and build on the discussion. Readers are invited to answer the latest question for themselves before they open the fold. Below the fold I’ll post the answer along with perhaps some related observations including the relevance of the question and answer today.

If you have questions or comments about a particular question or section, please reference the relevant question/section number(s). Otherwise this 'single post' format may become confusing pretty quickly.

NOTE: I've 'inverted' the series to keep this post from taking up so much real estate AND to allow people who've been following the series to get to the new stuff without wading through the old stuff. If you are just joining us, take a stab at the latest question and open the fold to see past questions as well.

 

Section 4

From the ‘Acquisition Phase’ we now move to consideration of the “Attack Phase”.

From the Red Baron Report Volume IV, pg 50:

The performance of U.S. aircraft, combined with the skill and tactics employed by U.S. aircrews versus the enemy aircraft/crew combinations, resulted in a 111/8 advantage against the MIG-17 and 36/1 advantage against the MIG-21. This result indicates that under the prevailing conditions, timely position information of the enemy aircraft was the single most significant requirement to enable U.S. aircrews to achieve a position to fire first. However, reference to Figure III-B1 indicates that only 41 of 154 or 27 percent of U.S. first attacks resulted in a MIG kill. Any improvement in U.S. weapons or weapon delivery capability would result in an appreciable number of MIG kills for these acquisition conditions.

The ‘Figure III-B1’ identified above is recreated here:

The Red Baron authors recognized there might be “a slight upward bias to the ratio of U.S. to enemy firing attempts” because “there probably were instances where the enemy achieved a firing position and even fired its weapons without being observed”. But this may be balanced out if one thinks of ‘opportunities’, since it was acknowledged that there were circumstances where opportunities for the U.S to attack were ‘passed up’ when it would have interfered with the primary mission. Example: F-105s at one time were ordered to ignore MiGs unless they were under imminent threat’ (Red Baron, Vol, IV, pg 47) .

The Red Baron Study looked at the engagements in the previous discussion using a variety of factors in an attempt to evaluate the potential encounter outcome as a product/result of those factors, where there was sufficient information (data) available to analyze. There were other factors the study members would have liked to have included (crossing angles, attitude, sun position, maneuver sequence to name those listed in the report) but there was insufficient data of those types for too many of the engagements to perform a statistical analysis.

The factors where there was enough information to analyze for relevance/importance to outcome were:
1. U.S. aircraft type
2. Hostile aircraft type
3. Acquisition range
4. Acquisition clock position
5. Hostile altitude
6. Friendly relative altitude
7. Time of day
8. Stage of war (through 1967)
9. Method of acquisition and identification

Question 4:

From this list of factors above, Red Baron analysts reduced the list of relevant factors to four that were found to “correlate in a complex way”. Were those four factors:
A) 1, 3, 4, 8
B) 2, 3, 4, 6
C) 2, 3, 5, 6
D) 1, 3, 5, 8

Answer and much more below the fold