Dan Ward’s Magnificent 7 Weapon Systems…

That weren’t (A continuation of the ‘Know Your Reformer’ series)

Part 1 of…?

 In his AOL Online piece "The Magnificent Seven Weapons" , Lt Col Dan Ward attempts to use a list of seven examples of weapons systems that, if the subtitle is to be believed, were ‘Awesome on a Shoestring’. Why?

The point of these seven stories isn't to deny acquisition problems exist or to engage in gratuitous "aren't we great?" back-slapping. The fact is, these stories prove new military weapon systems don't have to cost so much, take so long or be so complicated.

The implication being, ‘days of yore’ weapons and the exceptional modern weapon system didn’t “cost so much”, “take so long”, or were “so complicated” as compared to the ‘norm’ today. A further implication is that those weapons also adequately met the military need either out of the box or soon thereafter.

Many of the weapons programs cited in Ward’s article can be used as examples highlighting how those seeking to ‘reform’ defense acquisition employ oversimplification in describing the past as a way to draw false contrasts against the present – a common tactic in the so-called ‘Reformer’ playbook.

Question Arise

What if it can be shown that what ‘Reformers’ describe as ‘flaws’ in the current systems or ‘problems’ with the acquisition thereof or even today’s weapon performance relative to the specifications are really not very different from those systems either in the nostalgic past or the perceived odd and unfathomable exception in the present day?  Does this not lead to the further question that if what ‘Reformers’ claim is the problem with defense acquisition “isn’t” the problem, then what else IS THERE that is ‘the problem’ (or problems)?

Toppling Memes

I will be presenting substantial evidence contrary to the anecdotal narrative Ward presents in his Bazooka example, and I’m considering doing the same for the P-51 Mustang, F-16 [Fighting] Falcon, and Virginia Class Submarine ‘stories’. If I am really in the mood to beat a dead horse maybe I’ll also illuminate the missing parts of his ICBM ‘story’.  Each case offers insight into the kinds of glossing over past successes receive a posteriori compared to criticisms today’s programs receive a priori.  I notice one or two commenter(s) at the source have already mentioned obliquely some of what I might cover (and it seems in the thread Ward confirms a suspicion I had as to one of his ‘sources’ as well). But no matter, the space limitations in a moderated comment thread hardly provide the elbow room needed for a thorough refutation of the narratives offered at AOL Defense. For regular readers, the Bazooka post(s) will be much like my earlier post on the Spitfire, except this one IMHO doesn’t have nearly as happy an ending.

Tomorrow:  Bazooka:  ‘Magnificent Weapon’ or a ‘Crapshoot Fielded Too Soon’? 

Housekeeping Notes: I must state that I believe changes ARE needed in defense (or any government activity for that matter) acquisition. I just also happen to know, through long-running observation of the so-called ‘Reform Movement’ behaviors that said ‘movement’ more often than not has little or no inkling as to what those changes really should be. For a large majority of the most vocal within the ‘movement’, their ideology and philosophy seem to trump their logic when it comes to applying their intellect towards solving a problem (to the point that too often the only solution offered is to walk away proposing to wait for a magical solution in the future).

Misperception leads to misdirection, and misdirection prevents real problems from ever being solved. One wonders at how many attempts at ‘defense reform’,using the same assumptions, must fail before somebody at the top wises up. (I know there ARE people at the top who understand the problem. Trouble is, many of them are part of the problem).

I also wouldn’t classify Lt Col Ward exactly as one of the ‘Reformers’...yet. But his game-show host ‘stylings’, which possibly looked good when performed by an energetic Company Grade officer do not win many hearts and minds when performed by an aging hipster. As a more senior official with perceived authority and gravitas, it tends to take the perpetrator dangerously close to aiding and abetting the Reformers. Just like putting away the 'Speedo' when the waist goes over 30”, by the time you are a Lieutenant Colonel you’re supposed to be providing workable solutions instead of waving madly and pointing at problems. I suspect Dan Ward is more than acutely aware of this last point.    

RE: Dan Ward's AOL piece on 'Seven Weapons'

 The Magnificent Seven Weapons: 'Awesome On A Shoestring'

Yeah... riiight. I'm going to have some fun with most of it.

First: The 'Condor Cluster' Isn't a Weapon System. It looks more like filler used to make the title coherent.

It's seems like Lt Col Dan is preparing for his post-military career as an 'outside commentator', maybe even a Next-Gen 'Gadfly'?

At least 4 of the 6 remaining need attention, but it is the weekend and it looks like I'll be taking my AR Project into the field in defense against feral hogs tomorrow.

Priorities, y'know.

(More to come)

An Airpower History Lesson in 3 Parts

Updated: F-108 Mission (Below Original Post)

---------------------------

B-52 vs. Flying Wing?... B-70 Canceled: Why?... What exactly WAS the F-108 'Mission'?

In a recent comment thread, three questions were raised as to the facts surrounding 50s-60s aircraft program histories. Normally I would blow off trying to address such diverse issues even those as narrowly defined, in one post. But it just so happens all involve information I already know via sources I’ve already acquired for other purposes.

Last of the '49's: YRB-49A in flight

In this post I intend more to let the sources tell the facts vs. my making observations on the facts: ie, this post will be heavy on the quotes, light on the sidebars. It will also ensure I don’t spend a lot of time that I can better spend elsewhere.

Flying Wing Was an option to B-52 Development

As I showed in an earlier post, the B-52 for a while faced extinction until a program cancellation decision was fortunately reversed. One of the B-52’s competing concepts, contrary to what you may have been told, was the Northrop B-49 flying wing, a jet variant of the earlier propeller-driven theme. Fielding the ‘flying wing’ would have been the fruition of Jack Northop’s lifelong dream, but alas it was not to become true until after he passed away. He did die knowing the wing WOULD fly in the form of the B-2 Bomber. I could detail ‘why’ the flying wing was B-52 competitor but that is beyond the scope of this post. To the sources we go!

The year 1948 began under a dark cloud for AMC’s B-52 program managers. Air Staff officers succeeded in canceling, not simply Boeing Model 464-29, but the entire Boeing heavy bomber program due to doubts about the B-52’s ability to achieve the required range and speed. Some Air Staff officers preferred the Northrop YB-49 turbojet powered all-wing aircraft over Boeing’s conventional B-52 design: others favored opening a new competition for a heavy bomber. (Mandeles, pg 49)

Craigie added that AMC analyses of other studies of optimum airplane performance relied on extrapolations from past performance. However, these extrapolations were unreliable because aeronautic and aerodynamic knowledge was growing so quickly. Therefore, it was necessary to use the most current data and knowledge, which did not necessarily involve only extrapolations of past performance. For instance, he noted, that in 1941 Douglas Aircraft Company analyzed the predicted performance of the B-36, and concluded that the requirement of a 10,000-mile range with a 10,000-pound payload was unlikely to be achieved. The Air Force and Convair, however, used improved weight control and planning, and proved the study wrong. Despite increases in armament, radar, equipment, and the difficulty of development under wartime conditions, Convair and the Air Force produced an airplane which could meet the Air Force’s objectives. Craigie also urged discarding the alternatives to the B-52-the XB-35 and YB-49 Flying Wing and delta-wing designs. By May 1947 the delta wing did not have any marked superiority over a conventional airplane for long-range, high -speed operation. Craigie wrote that a reevaluation of these designs should be made only when “jet engine specific fuel consumption is reduced to a point to permit their [sic] use” in a bomber. (Mandeles, pgs 75-76)

At AMC, senior officers attempted to save the B-52. Maj Gen Franklin O. Carroll, AMC’s director of R&D, analyzed Northrop’s claims of superiority for the Flying Wing, and found them wanting. The basic premise for proponents of the all-wing aircraft was that the space requirements for military stores matched the space available in the optimum wing. Under this assumption, the all-wing aircraft would be more efficient than the conventional airplane. Carroll, however, argued that Northrop seriously underestimated the space needed for military stores. More space would be needed in the aircraft, and adding a body or nacelle to contain the extra military stores would vitiate the theoretical advantages of the all-wing design. The YB-49 Flying Wing also demonstrated longitudinal instability at high speed. Little was known about this instability and it could present severe engineering difficulties. The flying wing would not be versatile in a tactical setting and would be overly sensitive to changes of center of gravity caused by the position or absence of cargo. Such problems seemed not to justify reliance on the all-wing design. Carroll concluded by recommending the conventional Boeing design and that the B-52 be accorded the highest support from Air Staff. (Mandeles, pg 83)

Several days after the Symington-Allen meeting, Craig, Frederic Smith, and Craigie decided that “if the B-52 meets the requirements of the contract under which it is being bought, it will satisfy strategic requirements.” These requirements included unrefueled range of approximately 8,000 miles and a cruising speed of 500 MPH over 4,000 miles of enemy territory. 103 Boeing Model 464-35 (fig. 4) matched these strategic requirements, and Air Force Undersecretary Barrows confirmed the decision to retain Boeing as prime contractor of the heavy bomber rather than adopt the Flying Wing in early March. (Mandeles, pg 83)

Partridge and Craig urged the staff to stand firm, noting support from RAND and the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics for the Flying Wing design. At Symington’s urging, Allen agreed to give the Flying Wing due consideration. After further discussion, key members of the Air Staff met on February 14, 1948, and decided to keep the Boeing contract and issue a change order. Undersecretary Barrows concurred in the action. Despite the painful experience, the B-52 program had been radically redirected and was now aimed at fulfilling a new concept of strategic air operations. Thus even before the Aircraft and Weapons Board met in January, two of the major proposals up for consideration had already been approved. Both the B-36 and the B-52 had received a new lease on life, as had, incidentally, the Northrop YB-49 Flying Wing. (Moody, Pgs 182-183) Note: 'Moody' is a huge PDF file.

Read the complete sources for more information illustrating the point that the flying wing, specifically the YB-49 version was ‘competition’ for the B-52, and the whys and hows the B-52 came out on top.

Why was the B-70 Not Pursued?

North American XB-70 'Valkerie'

That the B-70 was cancelled because of ICBMs and the existing capabilities of the B-52 being sufficient is easily shown, but I’m not going to type the proof out, just show it in situ:

Source (can't find my copy dangit!):
"Politics and Force Levels: Politics and Defense Inside the Kennedy Administration", Pg 216

(The footnote #10 referenced is “President Kennedy, Special Message, Pg 11)

The F-108 Rapier Mission? Long Range Interceptor

If one believes in infallible ‘fact sheets’ the F-108 according to one 'fact sheet', was to have two missions: Long Range Interceptor and Escort Fighter for the B-70. Evidence supporting the escort mission assertion is so thin, it is ’invisible’, while evidence supporting the Interceptor role is bountiful.

XF-108 Rapier: Never Reached Beyond Mock-up Stage

As I've noted to a commenter, I did not say or imply it (F-108) couldn’t or wouldn’t be an escort fighter if the need arose. I would assume it would do any ‘fighter’ mission it was assigned to varying degrees of success. I also asserted: There can be little doubt that there was someone, somewhere in the entire AF command structure who thought it would be a good ancillary/alternate mission for the F-108, but it was not part of the F-108 design requirements NOR was it part of F-108’s operational concept. I will say now that I would consider the ‘factsheet’ to be wrong in asserting an escort role (beyond possible for any fighter as a generic capability).

Most critically, given the nature of the operational concept envisioned for the F-108 and planned end strength, the use of the F-108 as an ‘escort fighter’ would probably be less likely than the F-106 it was designed to replace. This too is easily shown. And now it will be shown, thanks to my  serendipitous and very slight connection to the author of the following in his 1988 ACSC paper titled: “The Search for an Advanced Fighter: a History From the XF-108 to the Advanced Tactical Fighter”.

Then Major (later Colonel) Robert Lyons wrote (beginning on Page 4):

The MX1554 "Ultimate Interceptor, 1954" produced the Convair F-102 that fell far short of the planned speed, altitude, and range performance (95:159-165). It could only fly at 677 Knots at 35,000 feet, with a maximum ceiling of 51,800 feet and 566 nautical mile combat radius (95:173). While the F-102 and its follow-on F-106 served as "interim interceptors," the Air Force developed requirements for a long range interceptor. These long range interceptor requirements, first developed in April 1953, were rewritten in July 1955 and November 1956, after several attempts failed to get an acceptable proposal from competing airframe contractors (114:Ch 2). The Air Force sought an interceptor to counter the perceived 1960 bomber threats of Mach 2.0 speed at 61,000 feet, and the revised 1963 bomber threats of Mach 2.2 to 2.7 speed at 65,000 feet (118:7,32; 114:Ch 2). Design studies to satisfy these requirements began in 1953 at Air Research and Development Command and in industry with the MX1554 designed to achieve a Mach 4.5, 150,000 pound Gross takeoff weight aircraft, but the aircraft appeared to lie beyond the state of the art (118:7,Fig 24). So another round of design studios attempted to meet the 1955 LRI (long range interceptor) requirements. These studies called for an aircraft with a cruise speed of Mach 1.7 at 60,000 feet and combat speed of Mach 2.5 at 63,000 feet, with a gross takeoff weight of 98,500 pound, But this aircraft would have had only marginal capability against the postulated 1963 bomber threat (118:7,Fig 24). 

A subsequent design competition in 1955 between Lockheed, Northrop, and North American was little better than previous ones, but North American came closest to meeting the goals, (114:23).

North American Aviation's letter contract of 6 June 1956 called for a long range interceptor that could operate at 70,000 feet with a combat speed of at least Mach 3. The all-weather interceptor aircraft was to have two engines, two crewmen, and at least two internally carried nuclear or conventional air-to-air missiles (95:330-331). Their Weapon System 202 configuration sported a single vertical tail and large delta wing, and was adopted in 1958 after considering iterations with as many as three vertical tails and a large canard (118:7, Fig 24; 95:331).

In 1960, toward the end of the heyday of the "Century Series" fighter aircraft, Weapon System 202, renamed the XF-108 Rapier interceptor, promised to serve the Air Force with a Mach 3 cruise speed and 1,000 nautical mile range as a companion to the proposed B-70 supersonic bomber (106:44). [SMSgt Mac Note: I believe the fact that the Rapier was based on common design concepts with the B-70, coming out of the same design stable and discussions concerning the parallels in performance parameters may be as much of a source of ‘escort’ fighter role stories for the F-108 as any other. ]  The XF-108 design evolved to meet all of the expected Soviet bomber threats of the early 1960s. It was to have been fabricated from stainless steel sheet, a welded sandwich and honeycomb, rather than aluminum to withstand the high temperatures and stresses of sustained supersonic flight. Its two General Electric J93-5 turbojet engines were to have used a special high energy synthetic fuel (ethyl borane) (7:14). It would also use the ASG-18 Fire control system, and the GAR-9 missile. All these were under development simultaneously with the basic airframe. This combination of features allowed a totally new concept of long range interception of the supersonic bombers believed to be under development by the Soviet Union. The F-108, with its superior radar and high speed missile, was to patrol the DEW (Distant Early Warning) Line and make SAGE (Strategic Air Ground Environment) directed, semi-autonomous interceptions well before incoming bombers could launch their weapons against the major cities of Canada or the United States (118:7-8,Fig 25-26,Fig28-30). 

But intelligence sources eventually proved a serious Soviet bomber threat did not exist. That news reinforced growing concerns in the Department of Defense (DoD) over the cost and viability of manned aircraft. Offensive and defensive missiles now seemed to be the logical technological choice for the 1960s (7:14; 8:7). In August 1959 the Air Force canceled the chemical fuel development program (7:14), and on 23 September canceled F-108 development (94:402; 8:7). The Air Force announced that the program had no technical difficulties and had met all goals it the time of cancellation, but that there was a shortage of funds and programming priorities had changed (57:63). Both the fire control system and the missile developments continued at a lower level of Funding. The cost estimate of five to eight billion dollars for a few squadrons of F-108s was more than could be accepted to replace the F-106, given the doubtful nature of the threat (7:14) and the unresolved fate of future manned aircraft.

With the cancellation of the F-108, there appeared temporarily to be a hiatus in supersonic interceptor work in the United States. Indeed, although the Air Force continued trying to gain support for new interceptors in general and the F-108 in particular, the DoD continued to oppose the requirement pending verification of a threat (9:3).

7. Air Force Times. 15 August 1959, p. 14.

8. Air Force Times. 3 October 1959, p. 7.

9. Air Force Times. 11 March 1964, p. 3. 57. "F-108 Cancelled." Canadian Avionics (November 1959), p.63.

94. Kennedy, William V. "Future of the Fighter." Ordnance (January-February 1970), pp. 402-406.

95. Knack, Marcelle Size. Encyclopedia of US Air Force Aircoraft and Missile Systems Volume1. Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1978.

106. McCormacK, James, Jr., Maj Gen, USAF (Ret). "How the Air Force Is Buying Its Newest Manned Weapons." .Skyline (Fall 1958), pp. 44-47.

114. "NORAD's Quest for NIKE Zeus and a Long-Range Interceptor."(U). Ent AFB, CO: HQ NORAD/HO, 1962. SECRET-Declassified 31 December 1962. "Unclassified information only used from this source."

115. Neufeld, Jacob. "The F-15 Eagle: Origins and Development 1964-1972." (U). Pentagon, Washington, D.C.: HO USAF/HQ November 1974. SECRET "Unclassified information only used from this source." 

118. Parsons, T. R. "B-70 and F-108 Perspectives on Supersonic Cruise." .Proceedings of the Conference Ob the Operational Utility of Supersonic Cruise (U).Wright-Patterson AFB, OH: ASD/XR, May 1977. SECRET.-Declassified "Unclassified information only used from this source."

From the combination of the limited number of F-108 platforms, the operational concept of roving long-endurance patrols conducted at the farthest distances from home with limited and possibly nuclear payloads, as well as the intended purpose of replacing ‘interim’ interceptors, it is doubtful the F-108 would have had time for anything other than its interceptor role. If the Rapiers were to be ‘escort’ fighters at all, it would be in accompanying aircraft returning post-nuclear strike that might wander/enter their patrol areas, in a manner of what ANY fighter or other aircraft would do.

Updated 26 April 2012:

The  "Standard Aircraft Capabilities" of the F-108

Commenter BB1984 below reminded me of another public resource we can draw on in evaluating the accuracy of the Air Force’s F-108 ‘fact sheet’. Based upon review of the F-108’s Standard Aircraft Capability (SAC) sheets, from the earliest available at the resource (2 May 1958) to the last one available, 12 June 1959 (which was less than 6 months before the program was cancelled) we find two key points:

1. The F-108A mission was pure "long-range ‘interceptor". Anything else it could do would fall under ‘miscellaneous’ capabilities to be employed the same as for any GI’s job description: ‘other duties as required’.

From the 12 June 1959 F-108A SAC:

The primary mission of the F-108 weapon system is to deter armed attack against the U.S. and its area of defense responsibility by providing maximum defense potential against all airborne threats in the post-1962 time period. This defense function is implemented by the F-108’s potential to search out, evaluate, and destroy these hostiles at ranges beyond the capabilities of other defense systems. The F-108 is designed to operate not only in conjunction with SAGE and in cooperation with other weapons in the defense inventory, but to be equally effective well beyond the bounds of ground environment surveillance and under minimum operational control, relying on its self-contained high performance search, navigation, and communications equipment.

In time of war, F-108 operations can include directed intercepts and organized search missions resulting in repeated attacks with up to three kills by each interceptor. Operating beyond SAGE, the F-108 can make positive identification of DEW line violations, attack and trail hostile raids through remote areas, and report directly via long-range radio. Operating within the ZI, the F-108A performance features of all-weather capability, long range at Mach 3, and 15-minute turn-around, permit flexible commitment of forces to achieve the precise concentration of power required at any battle area with maximum retention of reserves.

The F-108A carries two crewmen and internally stowed missile armament. This high performance air vehicle cruises and combats at mach 3 with a 1000-nautical mile radius on internal fuel. It has a 1.2g maneuver ceiling in excess of 77,000 feet and a zoom-climb ceiling of 100,000 feet. Under normal loading and weather, the air vehicle requires runway lengths of only 3200 feet for take-of and landing. It can be operated from 6000-foot runways in all conditions of weather.  From a nominal 70,000 foot combat altitude , missile launch can be accomplished against any air-breathing target flying at altitudes from sea-level to 100,000 feet. The pulsed-doppler radar, with 40-inch antenna, provides target detection in excess of 100 nautical miles at all altitudes and is backed up by infrared search and track devices.

F-108A = Long Range Interceptor. First, Second, Last.

2. The weapons capability from beginning to end consisted of a payload of 3 GAR-9 missiles.  No Guns, No Bombs.No Rockets**

12 Jun 59 Standards Aircraft Capabilities Sheet, Weapons Sections

AF Museum and History Program's 'Factsheets': Swing and Miss

Unless someone threw ‘bombs’ on the F-108 in the last couple of months of the program trying to save it from the axe, The AF Museum and History Program has some ‘splainin’ to do. But even if it was an idea thrown out there in the death throes, if it didn’t get buy-in from the users, it didn’t count, in which case they still have some ‘splainin’ to do.

 **Definition of the term "rocket" in this timeframe was transititory. The GAR-9 indicated above stood for 'Guided Air Rocket'. The weapon would soon be renamed 'AIM-47' for 'Air Intercept Missile'-47. For real confusion look up the GAR-1 and it's short distinction as the 'F-98' before becoming the AIM-4. (the BOMARC was also known as the F-99 at the same time).

The B-52 Turns 60: What IF? (Part 3)

(To Start at Part 1: 1946-47 Click Here)

Introduction:

It has been written that “What If?” is historian’s “favorite secret question”. Would the B-52 have become the venerable icon of airpower that it is ‘then’, if American communications and norms had been different?

What if’ 1946-1952 was anything like 2006-2012?

(All persons and institutions are fictional, Any resemblance of characters cited within to persons living or dead is pure serendipity ).

1950

XB-52 (Model 464-67), Source: Boeing

In November 1949, convinced that the inadequate range of the Model 464-49 could seriously jeopardize the future of the entire project, Boeing undertook an effort to improve the range. As an answer, Boeing offered a heaver version known as the Model 464-67. The wing remained the same, but the length of the fuselage was increased to 152 feet 8 inches, offering more space for fuel. Gross weight was estimated at 390,000 pounds. Combat radius was estimated at 3500 miles. The Model 464-67 was looked upon favorably by SAC personnel, including General LeMay. On January 26, 1950, a conference was held at USAF Headquarters to consider once again the future of the B-52. Alternatives were considered once again, including new proposals from Douglas and Republic, Fairchild Aircraft Corporation's idea for a rail-launched flying wing, the swept-wing Convair YB-60, a Rand turboprop aircraft, two new designs based on the B-47, plus several missile aircraft. Although the meeting adjourned without reaching any firm decision, General LeMay still backed the B-52 as providing the best solution for SAC's strategic mission. In February 1950 the Air Staff requested performance and cost data for all the strategic vehicles so far proposed. In the same month, however, General LeMay asked the Board of Senior Officers to accept the Boeing 464-67 in lieu of the Model 464-49. This choice was approved by the Board on March 24, 1950, but there was still no definitive commitment to production. --Origins of the B-52

--Peacenik Objectors Gone Overboard (POGO) 1950 Press Release

Air Force Leadership Suppresses Competition At Taxpayer’s Expense

The Air Force, in a move indicative of the utter contempt for the American taxpayers has killed the possibility of holding any meaningful competition to fulfill the requirement for a new heavy bomber. With the problems found with the new newly fielded B-50 and B-36, the Air Force should be exerting its energies in fixing existing problems rather than seeking to field even more advanced technology. The Air Force is now openly speaking of the new B-50s and B-36s as ‘interim’ designs whose hundreds of millions or perhaps billions of dollars in development costs will now have been wasted fielding aircraft that will only fly for a few short years if the Air Force has its way. Congress should act now to force the military to clean up their existing messes before they are allowed to proceed with production of their newest unneeded weapon.

‘Wheels’ Wincelow: Centre of Defense Disinformation (CDI) Press Release

The Bomber Forces ‘Death Spiral’

The Air Force now plans to retire their entire fleets of B-50s and B-36s with new bloated bomber program. It is alleged that General Lemay has stated he fears the costs of the new bomber could prevent acquisition of more than 100 aircraft. This new, overly complex and overly ambitious bomber design bought in such small quantities cannot match the capabilities of the more than 700 B-50s and B-36s now delivered or planned could provide.

Phil Sweetham (Aviation Leaks)

The design of the Air Force’s new bomber, now identified as the XB-52 is STILL changing. If this plane is ever fielded (doubtful), expect it to be many years from now and in even smaller quantities than the 100 currently feared as unit costs will undoubtedly continue to skyrocket.

1951

Final Design Evolution to Production Configuration

On January 9, 1951, USAF Chief of Staff General Hoyt S. Vandenberg approved a proposal that the B-52 be acquired as a replacement for the B-36. Letter Contract AF33(038)-21096, signed on February 14, 1951, was the first contract authorizing production. It called for an initial batch of 13 B-52As (with serials 52-001/013), with first delivery slated for April of 1953. Still more controversy broke out among the USAF hierarchy as to whether the B-52 would be better employed as a bomber or a reconnaissance aircraft. SAC wanted a dual-role aircraft which could accommodate a pod-mounted set of reconnaissance sensors that were easily remov[e]able so that the aircraft could quickly be reconfigured as a straightforward bomber. USAF Headquarters wanted the B-52 to concentrate on the reconnaissance role with the exclusion of everything else. In October of 1951, the Air Staff issued an order that all aircraft would be RB-52 reconnaissance aircraft. This directive was actually misleading, since it was agreed that the aircraft would retain the ability to be converted for bombardment operations. Early in 1951, General LeMay told Boeing that he thought that the tandem seating arrangement featured by the XB-52 mockup was poor. General LeMay believed that side-by-side seating of pilot and copilot was superior, since it allowed more room for flight instrumentation and permitted the co-pilot to be a better assistant to the pilot. In August 1951, it was decided that the Air Force would adopt the side-by-side arrangement, but that some of the early production B-52s would still retain the tandem seating arrangement. This was later amended to stipulate that only the two prototypes would retain the tandem seating arrangement, with all production machines having side-by side seating for pilot and co-pilot. --Origins of the B-52

Derek Palmetto – Letters to the Editor, Sydney Daily Herald

Well, the Americans have decided to waste hundreds of millions of US Dollars not only fielding an unnecessary bomber, but the first batch aren’t even representative of the production standard, and later versions will be incorporating fixes to shortcomings already known to exist, These ‘mistake jets’ will have to be fixed later, or more likely retired early further adding to the magnitude of wasted taxpayer dollars. The early retirement of the B-36, which it has been announced that the B-52 will be replacing, means many of the dollars and much of the effort to produce the Peacemakers have been wasted as well.

Phil Sweetham (Aviation Leaks)

The Air Force has much explaining to do as to why their nearly-new bomber fleet already needs replacement, if claims justifying the B-52 are REAL that is. We note that the Air Force has changed their tune as to the B-52’s purpose. Is its mission ‘reconnaissance’ or ‘strategic bombing’? What else will the Air Force claim its new plaything can do, if Congress doesn’t bite on their rationale this time around?

‘Wheels’ Wincelow: Centre of Defense Disinformation (CDI) Press Release

"Overkill: Too Many Nukes" Congress should trim the Air Force’s plans to acquire potentially several hundred B-52 Bombers. With the B-52’s massive payload and the ever-shrinking packaging of Atomic weapons, surely we will reach the practical upper limit of weaponry required to act as a deterrence and fielding more than the required number will only make other nations suspect us of ulterior motives. Please forget that ‘Death Spiral’ thing I mentioned earlier. I’ll let you know when we’re really serious about using it again.

“Oh, the Controversy!”--Title of Stranger Room column, Dave Axiom, ‘Mired’ magazine

1952


1. The XB-52 and YB-52 take to the skies,
2. Some B-52A orders are converted to B-52Bs,
3. Critics yammer on….

The B-52 Turns 60: What IF? (Part 2)

(Part 1: 1946-47 Here)

B-52D at Edwards AFB Museum, Source: SMSgt Mac

Introduction:

It has been written that “What If?” is historian’s “favorite secret question”. Would the B-52 have become the venerable icon of airpower that it is ‘then’, if American communications and norms had been different?

What if’ 1946-1952 was anything like 2006-2012?
(All persons and institutions are fictional, Any resemblance of characters cited within to persons living or dead is pure serendipity ).

1948

Boeing Model 464-39, Source: Mandeles

The year 1948 began under a dark cloud for AMC’s B-52 program managers. Air Staff officers succeeded in canceling, not simply Boeing Model 464-29, but the entire Boeing heavy bomber program due to doubts about the B-52’s ability to achieve the required range and speed….

…Rapid progress on an acceptable heavy bomber design then was stalled in the early months of 1948 while Boeing president William M. Allen and AMC officers lobbied Air Force Secretary Symington and headquarters officers to reinstate Boeing’s contract. During this period, despite the cancellation, Boeing and AMC engineers continued their discussions and research on heavy bomber design. This activity led to the Boeing proposal for Model 464-35 after Symington and, Air Force Undersecretary Arthur S. Barrows reestablished the Boeing contract. While several compromises in military characteristics were made to give Model 464-35 a better chance of meeting Air Force needs (e.g., reduced required range), technical shortcomings in the fire control system, landing gear, engine nacelle design, and aircraft configuration still made achievement of military characteristics dubious. (Mandeles, Pg 49**)

Early 1948…

Brochure at Peacenik Objectors Gone Overboard (POGO) fundraising event for donors

“POGO’s investigations into the new troubled bomber program played key role in successfully bringing scrutiny that resulted in the program’s termination.”

Wheels’ Wincelow: Centre of Defense Disinformation (CDI) Press Release

‘Military Contractors Brazenly Lobby For Your Tax Dollars to Continue Failed Program. Bomber contractor Boeing Doesn’t take ‘no’ for an answer. That is why we find top Pentagon officials bombarded with inappropriate pressure from Boeing and ‘collaborators’ in the Air Material Command to reinstate Boeing’s failed bomber program.

Phil Sweetham (Aviation Leaks)

“Bomber program cancelled. See, I told you so. I saw this coming. I was right.  ”

Dave Axiom of Stranger Room

Controversial Bomber Cancelled Amid Controversy

Later in 1948…

Peacenik Objectors Gone Overboard (POGO) Brochure at Fundraising Event for Donors

Reinstated Bomber program highlights Collusion of Military and Industry. The two entities form an interwoven ‘complex’ that is no harmless cliché’. No, really! That's why your contributions to POGO are more important than ever! 

Wheels’ Wincelow: Centre of Defense Disinformation (CDI) Writing in ‘Babbleland’ column of Thyme Magazine

“Cozy Relationship Between Boeing and Air Force Revives Failed Bomber Program and Will Cost Taxpayers Dearly.

Phil Sweetham (Aviation Leaks)

Bomber program was cancelled. I told you so. I was right. I did see it coming. So what if it wasn’t the final decision, I was right on that one point. It WAS cancelled. I was right.

Dave Axiom of Stranger Room

Controversial Un-Cancelling of Controversial Bomber: Controversy Continues

1949

Boeing Model 464-35, Source: Mandeles

Within the Air Force, secrecy concerning the stockpile and technical characteristics of the weapons complicated the design of a nuclear-capable force. The Air Force wanted light weapons, but the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) did not release specific information about weight. Hence, the B-52 bomb bay design remained open throughout 1948 to provide for the possibility of a 15,000-pound bomb instead of a 10,000-pound bomb. The design bomb weight was not reduced to 10,000 pounds officially until mid-January 1949. In the meantime, the additional 5,000 pounds reduced the B-52’s projected range and raised the possibility of costly changes in bomb bay configuration. (Mandeles, Pg 37-38**)

Dave Axiom, Stranger Room columnist, ‘Mired’ magazine 'Controversial Bomber Cheats: Meets Controversial Specifications'.

Sure, the revived new bomber can carry the payload it needs to carry, but it can’t carry what it WAS expected to carry, before the Air Force knew what it was going to HAVE to carry – which it turns out to be what it CAN carry. Bummer. I still think that’s cheating.

Peacenik Objectors Gone Overboard (POGO) Press Release

Department of Defense fudges requirements numbers to get new Bomber to meet specifications so they can reinstate a failed program. This over-the-top development only represents tip of the iceberg that reaches down into the depths of depraved corruption that runs throughout the Department. We will have many other mixed metaphors to be revealed from POGO’s ongoing investigation, as soon as we can find someone depressed enough to be willing to talk to us.

‘Wheels’ Wincelow: Centre of Defense Disinformation (CDI) 1949 Press Release

Payload ‘Death Spiral’ Only by Making the Payload Smaller can Air Force Get Its New Bomber Over the Target. CDI believes the Air Force should pause their design effort until their bomber can carry 5000 more pounds of dead weight to meet original specifications. It’s a Death Spiral we say!You know things are bad because we capitalized ‘Death Spiral’.

Phil Sweetham (Aviation Leaks)

You know, everyone is talking about this current weight/payload weight thing, and I know that is has been the standard measure by which weight has been traditionally been viewed while systems are in development, but that's a ruse to keep the public off the scent of the real issue: mature system weight, I want to highlight that at the current rate of weight growth this bomber will weigh a gazillion pounds by 1952 if the current trend continues. I'm sure that is a bad thing. So bad that it will dog the program until it's cancelled...again. Soon I bet.

Boeing Model 464-40, Source: Mandeles

Boeing Model 464-49, Created Oct 1948, Adopted 1949, Source: Mandeles

 

Part 3 

The B-52 Turns 60: What IF?

As the “BUFF” enters a long planned twilight, how might things played out if the era had been different?

B-52D on Display at Dyess AFB (SMSgt Mac Photo)

The B-52 is a beautiful over-engineered-by-slide-rule beast first flown on April 15, 1952 that has now flown for 60 years. The newest airframe is now over 50 years old. The 50+ operational life of the B-52 began with it being a high altitude penetrating bomber, painfully transitioning to a low altitude penetrating bomber, and then finally to its current primary role as a standoff weapons launch platform.
    

The Value of History: Perspective

Novices in mathematics, science, or engineering are forever demanding infallible, universal, mechanical methods for solving problems. -J. R. Pierce

It has been written that “What If?” is historian’s “favorite secret question”. Would the B-52 have become the venerable icon of airpower that it is ‘then’, if American communications and norms had been different?

What if’ 1946-1952 was anything like 2006-2012?
(All persons and institutions are fictional, Any resemblance of characters cited within to persons living or dead is pure serendipity ).

1946

Boeing Model 462, Source: Mandeles

The tremendous growth of the Air Corps during World War II created a plethora of offices with overlapping concerns-the organizational conditions for the establishment of a multiorganizational system that ultimately influenced the postwar formulation of operational requirements for jet-propelled strategic bombers. Peacetime, however, brought large cuts in personnel, budget, and orders to aircraft manufacturers and-against the background of great uncertainty and strife in the defense establishment-many doubts surfaced during the first 13 months of the new heavy bomber program. The first bomber configuration, Model 462, was accepted in mid-1946. Within three months, this version was subjected to much criticism by the Air Staff. Boeing proposed an entirely different configuration, Model 464, to answer Air Staff doubts. Over the course of several years, the profusion of offices having overlapping functions regarding the development of new aircraft promoted a useful pattern of proposal, criticism, and change. (Mandeles, Pg 48**)

**Page numbers: electronic version online

Boeing Model 464-17, Source: Mandeles

‘Wheels’ Wincelow, "Pentagon Waste Proliferates in Bureaucratic Redundancy", Centre of Defense Disinformation (CDI) 1946 Press Release:

The War Department’s latest folly involves not one, not two, but THREE new and unnecessary bomber programs. By far the worst of the three has to be the new and as yet undefined ‘Heavy Bomber’ program. Already it is reported that the first design attempt has failed and the contractor has happily gone back to the drawing board no doubt with more of the public’s money in its pockets. The conflicted decision and review process of this program is being carried out through a bloated, redundant, and ponderous bureaucracy that will no doubt generate tremendous waste of the taxpayer’s dollars in an effort doomed to fail under the weight of its own inertia.

Peacenik Objectors Gone Overboard (POGO) Testimony before the House Whines and Memes Committee:

In this time of hard-won peace and enduring economic uncertainty, the United States enjoys primacy as the world’s exclusive nuclear power, the United States should not be pursuing another long range bomber aircraft and should scrap development of the overly complex and expensive medium and heavy bombers now in development. We strongly recommend substituting more B-29s and the new B-50s for half of planned buys of the recently announced B-47 and ongoing B-36 development programs and cancelling the rest, and to cease the wasteful development of these unnecessary and unproven weapons technology. With a planned total buy in excess of 2000 aircraft, these bomber programs are among the Department of War’s largest weapon procurement efforts and will (for a decade or more) drain the Treasury of funds needed to strengthen peaceful international relations and pay for domestic programs . This option would buy half as many simpler, cheaper aircraft, purchasing instead more of the current generation of bombers at a fraction of the cost to develop, field and support the new gold-plated aircraft with all their extraneous bells and whistles. The rationale for this change would be that DOD does not need even more new bombers as the new B-50, an advanced development of the B-29 that has yet to fly. This option might also allow the War Department to upgrade their bomber fleets faster than possible with the newer unproven aircraft designs which will undoubtedly experience delays related to additional technical problems driven by their unnecessary complexity.

Phil Sweetham (Aviation Leaks):

"This new bomber program is in trouble already and it hasn’t even been active two years. Will it EVER be fielded?"  

 Dave Axiom Headline ('Stranger Room' Column, 'Mired' Magazine):

‘Controversial’ New Bomber Controversially Struggles Early in Controversy,

 Title of General Accountants Office Report:

"New Bomber’s Unstable Design and Concurrency Creates Excessive Risk"

1947

Yet, Air Materiel Command constituted a useful “redundancy of calculation” for the assistant chiefs, and functioned as an element of a nascent multiorganizational system. AMC staff often criticized the bas[i]s and assumptions of headquarters’ B-52 decisions. A June 1947 memorandum from the Aircraft Laboratory argued that AC / AS staff (1) misunderstood the relation between military requirements and aircraft size, (2) misunderstood how difficult it would be to design an aircraft capable of 5,000-mile radius, (3) did not appreciate how well balanced the B-52 design was, and (4) misunderstood how technical setbacks should be expected but could be solved in later versions of the aircraft. In July AMC’s Maj Gen Laurence C. Craigie, arguing on the basis of technical studies conducted in the Engineering Division, suggested that AC / AS officers should refrain from proposing either the all-wing or delta wing as alternatives to the B-52. He emphasized, in response to misgivings about B-52 range, that design deficiencies could be rectified in the aircraft’s life cycle. (Mandeles, Pg 47**)

‘Wheels’ Wincelow: Pursuit of Unobtainable ‘Perfect’ Bomber Solution Highlights Complexity Problems, Centre of Defense Disinformation (CDI) 1947 Press Release:

"Well here it is a year later and one design attempt after another has fallen barren. The bloated bureaucracy inherited by the new Air Force continues to generate tremendous waste of the taxpayer’s dollars through incompetence and inefficiency chasing unnecessarily complex weapon systems. It is still a program destined for certain failure."

Dave Axiom of Stranger Room (while trying to look really, really, serious) :

New Controversial Bomber Still Controversially Struggles in Ongoing Controversy: “They’re claiming their new designs meet specifications but are having to cheat by changing the specifications. Those cheating cheaters!” 

 Peacenik Objectors Gone Overboard (POGO) 1947 Press Release:

Pentagon suppressing dissent in ranks over New Bomber Designs:  "Scandal grows as faults and failures in design process and poor management are being covered up by the new Air Force’s leadership". POGO calls for Congressional investigations

 From Gonzo Accounting Office (GAO) 1947 Report: “New Bomber’s Unstable Design, Division of Effort and Concurrency Creates Excessive Risk”:

To summarize, the Army Air Force’s focus, needed to ensure that this program will succeed appears to be hampered by priorities given to the current Department of War reorganization plans. It is doubtful that the many parallel bomber programs now in varying stages of development will allow sufficient attention will be given to this new bomber program. The GAO recommends termination of this program and the newly-organized Department of Defense should seriously reconsider current plans and delay fielding the current programs of record until the threat driving the need for the B-36 emerges and until the technology for the B-47 is considerably more mature.

 Phil Sweetham (Aviation Leaks):

The newly created Air Force has been no more able to nail down exactly what this fancy new bomber of theirs is expected to do (or what it will even look like) than their Army Air Force progenitors. Whatever plans these new ‘princes’ of the sky have for their new toy must solidify before they can proceed, and there is no indication of any set plan materializing as of this writing. One must also wonder about how much additional cost is buried in the Air Force’s plans to fix inherent “design deficiencies” that will “be rectified in the aircraft’s life cycle”. The probability of this program coming to fruition is becoming even more unlikely and surely increased Congressional scrutiny must be imminent.

 Part 2 (1948-1949)

Army of JSF-Haters STILL Short of Logicians

I'm back home (as of 00:30 hrs) Thursday from a business trip. Blog-wise, my immediate aspirations are to try to 1) ferret out the real Next Gen "Semi"-Long Range Strike story and 2) close out a substantial CAS Mythology post in my little 'spare' time.

BUT! since someone 'asked' for a comment on the latest "F-35 is Evil" drumbeat (especially one so loaded with snarky false confidence) and it is such an easy request to fulfill....I figure, eh-why not?

Latest 'Isn't This Just Awful' F-35 scare headline from Flight Global: "Lockheed adds $771 million to early F-35 production bills."  I suspect Steve Trimble might not have written the original headline, but if he did.... 'meh'. Headlines, if done properly, should draw the reader in. If the story is boring, it is not unheard of to have the 'zing' come from careful phrasing of both headline and story. Such careful delivery allows interested and targeted readers to overwrite their own bias and beliefs into the piece.
This headline gets transformed into the less accurate: "Early F-35 costs increase $771M, Lockheed says" at DoD Buzz.

So.... 'why' are these 'early' bills/costs/whatever "increased"? Trimble's original Flight Global article contained the 'bottom line', faithfully parroted at DoD Buzz:

    The $771 million reflects the impact of the 2004 weight reduction redesign on the Lockheed’s production system, the company said. The redesign carved off thousands of pounds of excess weight, but suppliers could not keep up with the flow of design changes. That led to late delivery of parts, then extra labour hours to install them outside of the normal manufacturing sequence, the company said.
    As the F-35 continues to be developed even as the first production models are delivered, the $771 million bill also includes the cost of future modifications to make the aircraft standard with jets delivered after the development phase ends in 2016.
    It is possible that the bill for LRIPs 1–3 could be reduced in the future. “The F-35 team is focused now on any opportunity to reduce the concurrency estimate and improve the final cost-to-complete on these early production lots,” Lockheed said.

Ahhh....so the cost of the 'production system' weight-reduction redesign, for building all three variants in the entire fleet built between then and the last F-35 to be delivered someday probably decades from now , as well as its impact on the aircraft built during the weight reduction redesign effort, is 'billed' in the present time, and this 'bill'  might even be reduced in the future, since it assumes future costs included in the 'bill' as well?

At the end of the DoD Buzz article, the fever swamp known as the 'comments section' does its usual 'kill the witch' thing until a commenter "Another Guest"  tries to inject a little sanity:

    I'm sure an Australian, other fighter manufacturer marketing rep, or nauseus dog will try to correct this uninterested observation. Trimble's article implies these costs were related to 2004 weight reductions to meet F-35B STOVL requirements by shaving weight off parts common to all variants and unique to the Marine model.
    An assumption then follows that this is a one-time expense...caused by the Marine requirement that no other aircraft can duplicate. It constitutes one quarter of one percent of total program costs while ensuring better performance of all aircraft types to include decreased fuel consumption that may retrieve some of the cost.
    From LRIP 5 on, LockMart will assume more, if not all over and above costs. BTW, a Gripen/Raptor/F-15SE (or F-16, F/A-18) mix would be nowhere near as effective with most aircraft obsolete against future threats at far higher acquisit[i]on costs than Tee claims. Seen any F-22s flying lately, bombing Libya or Afghanistan, being sold to allies, or replacing Naval service aircraft?

Well said.  Of course now the denizens of the fever swamp are furiously trying to 'down-rate' his comment, as if that means anything. But let us look at the hard numbers behind 'Another Guest's cogent observation on the costs involved in this 'bill'.

Compare these two charts:

 Extract from a Canadian briefing on the F-35

How the $771M 'Bill' breaks down over the whole program 

From these two charts we can readily see that even with a massively reduced F-35 buy, the 'cost' of the weight reduction re-engineering amortized over the number of units built comes under a piddling $1M/unit. In any case the end cost is still far, far, (millions $ for the A model, and I would guess similarly for the B and C) below the unit cost difference between 'actuals' and internal estimates.

In short: Add the cost of the weight reduction and to-date you are still delivering aircraft well under internal cost estimates on the curve and those costs are trending orders of magnitude lower than the bulls*** CAPE estimates.

Thus we now understand what the 'bill' is.

Now Let's Talk "Value"

What is a cynic? A man who knows the price of everything and the value of nothing.

--Oscar Wilde

What did we as taxpayers get in return (Besides ensuring an 'executable' STOVL version)? We could do an analysis of the design changes to see where lower weights translate into lower stress and wear and tear and in turn higher reliability and fewer failures and balance that against the ledger where reduced weight may have increased probability of failure or loss, but we don't have sufficient data. I would suspect the balance is positive in 'reliability', but cannot prove it. All I do know is that the entire program is being managed to constrain Total Life Cycle Costs.

What we CAN easily perceive is that since the airplanes weigh 'thousands' of pounds less at the lighter weights, the fleet will almost certainly burn BILLIONS of Dollars LESS fuel over the operational life of the fleet. A common aircraft design rule of thumb that shakes out from the Breguet range equation is that for every 1.00% of aircraft weight removed, ~0.75% less fuel is required.  3000 aircraft, 8000 hr operational life, SFC ~.7 as basis for fuel consumption......do the math.

BTW...
The 'McCain' angle is just a red herring. McCain is (still) just a self-aggrandizing, hot-headed a**hat. What else would anyone expect from him?

Hat tip Solomon at SNAFU: Heh. Bill Sweetman 'double-downs' on the topic. I should have used the words 'Anti-JSF drumbeat' more. Honestly, what brand of stupid do you have to sniff to try to amortize the total 'bill' for re-engineering production capability for the entire fleet against just the first 31 aircraft?   Whomp, Whomp, Whomp.

X-45 Secret History? More Like Historical Fiction

Ah...A 'Boeing Tall Tale' to scare the children. Someone should tell them that the UAV world is still a fairly small and close-knit one...and made up of people with very good memories.

David Axe has a piece up at Wired’s Danger Room that self- identifies as an uncritical ‘Boeing POV’. While Northrop Grumman evidently declined to comment on Boeing’s collective memory, that hardly excuses the slobbering deferral to Boeing’s ‘claims’ and the gross lack of investigative skill or skepticism applied in the article.

That it seems like Axe didn’t bother with a critical eye at all in this ‘effort’ is shown by the assertion that the Government gave Northrop Grumman money to develop the X-47A. Wrong. US Government funding came after the development of the Pegasus.

Northrop Grumman X-47A Pegasus

The ‘Pegasus’ was a “company-funded” effort that Corporate Vice President Scott Seymour sponsored and nurtured through a rapid development process to keep Northrop Grumman in the UCAS running. This fact was in all the news at the time. The ‘Pegasus’ existed before DARPA got involved and gave the UAV the ‘X-Plane’ designation.

Since Scott Seymour no longer works for Northrop Grumman, perhaps he might be willing to talk to David Axe about it some and give another viewpoint that isn't 'All Boeing'? I know software developers and integrators that produced the X-47A, so far the only response I’ve received from any of them when I refererred them to this article is that the piece made their stomach turn….and to tell Axe the X-47(A or B) is not ‘remote controlled’: It is AUTONOMOUS -- with provisions for human intervention by exception rather than as a rule. If Axe ever viewed the X-47A first flight video, he might have observed that no one was 'controlling' the Pegasus: everyone was monitoring the flight. The only commands given by the ‘controller’ (‘Old Heads’ in the Test Pilot community should immediately recognize him in the control room BTW) was to hit the ‘GO’ button to get it moving off the parking spot, some EOR power checks by the engine contractor,  the ‘release brakes’ command for takeoff and a precautionary speed change. For a 'First Flight'? Incredible. The whole point of the exercise was to demonstrate autonomous flight with a precision carrier-type approach and landing, which the demonstration did admirably (See SRGPS link below) .

Having got the who-funded-what wrong on the X-47A, Axe’s Boeing fairy-tale tellers didn't get any better. He should try to be a little less gullible next time. He had me falling out of my chair laughing with the Boeing claim that since their X-45 was 'thinner' it would be stealthier. He should have asked them: how many LO weapon systems they've fielded to-date? There are two houses that really ‘get’ LO: ‘Northrop’ and ‘LockMart’. Boeing is playing catch-up, and OBTW they benefitted greatly in the LO department when they bought McDonnell Douglas who benefitted from exposure to Northrop’s LO expertise on the F-22 and JSF programs. If the Borg (my Lockheed Martin colleagues’ favorite name for Boeing) hadn't bought Rockwell and McDonnell Douglas, they would be even farther behind than they are.

Classic Boeing Hybris
My favorite line from the article though has to be: "How could Northrop, with what they strongly believed was inferior software, possibly pull off a robotic carrier landing cheaper than Boeing?"
WTFO? Sounds as if the Borg ‘believe’ it, then it just HAS to be true, doesn’t it? Not on your life. Boeing's explanation on the cost differential doesn't hold water for a variety of reasons I won’t (can’t) go into either. Suffice to say the X-47A first flight was also the first flight for the Navy’s Shipboard Relative GPS (SRGPS) system aka ‘Navy JPALS’. Read the entire article at the SRGPS link – there’s lots of info on what Northrop Grumman actually accomplished (on their dime) with that little self-funded ‘Phase 1 ’ hop.

Raytheon BTW, has since selected Northrop Grumman’s IMU as the heart of their JPAL System. So perhaps Northrop isn’t as 'hapless' when it comes to navigating UAVs around the patch as big bad Boeing would like the unwashed masses to believe? Maybe Northrop Grumman has resources to draw from beyond their airplane-building sector that Boeing chooses to selectively ignore?

Axe was fed a  treble hook on a 100lb-test line this time. If he is not careful, he is well-positioned for continued use as a Boeing pawn in Boeing's ever-more desperate attempts to be relevant on the combat aircraft scene.

I fear Boeing will eventually start winning 'something' just to keep them in the game. Expect to hear even more woe-is-me BS from Boeing as production contracts near for a Naval UCAS. But I had to listen to Boeing tell the world it was they who really did the software and integrated the B-2, and now LM gets to hear the same crap over the F-22. Boeing shouldn’t be allowed to rewrite history on UCAS programs as well.

06/15/11 Update:I'm starting to get e-mail correspondence on this post pointing out other problems with 'the story' as Boeing narrated and Danger Room presented. One commenter noted that Axe got the first flight date of the X-47A nearly a year later than it actually occurred. The X-47A first flew on 23 Feb 2003 and NOT "January 2004" as claimed in the Danger Room article. One way this milestone might have been screwed up could be that the reference of the February 2003 flight was pulled from a reference to it posted/published in January 2004.

Bob Cox Still Milking the 8 April 2000 MV-22 Crash

"I know little of military aviation, and even less of experimental flying, which is perhaps the most inspiring and yet fateful of all".

 -Ernest K. Gann, in the preface to Fate is the Hunter 

US Marine Corps photo by Sergeant Mark Fayloga

There is just so much wrong with this hit piece posing as an  'article' I want to frickin' scream!

I want to ask the bereaved widows why it is a 'stain' on the memory of their husbands that 'human factors' were a finding in the crash, when the Marine Corps doesn't consider it a 'stain':

A Marine spokesman, Capt. Brian Block, said the finding of "human factors" as the cause of the accident should not be equated with pilot error or blaming the pilots.


"Whenever a mishap like this occurs, we owe it to our Marines to take an honest, dispassionate look at all possible contributing factors to ensure it does not happen again," Block said. "The investigations into this mishap revealed that human factors contributed to, but were by no means solely responsible for, this mishap.


"These findings in no way impugn nor denigrate Maj. Gruber and Lt. Col. Brow's reputations as Marine officers, Marine aviators, and MV-22 pioneers. Maj. Gruber and Lt. Col. Brow were selected as pilots for what, at the time, was a brand new airframe precisely because of their courage, skill, and impeccable records."


Navy spokeswoman Lt. Cmdr. Tamara Lawrence said Mabus reviewed the crash investigation reports and "determined their conclusions still stand: that it was a result of a chain of events which, taken together, resulted in the loss of very talented and brave Marines."


A spokesman for Fort Worth-based Bell said "it would be inappropriate to comment on an internal Marine Corps matter."

I want to ask Bob Cox:
1. What made him think asking the aircraft manufacturer for a comment on a human factors finding in a USMC accident investigations wasn't inflammatory and inappropriate in the first place? Or did he ask knowing it was? 
2. If he recognizes the contributing role he and other jack-jawed 'journalists' played in the pressure put on the program to perform since, as he wrote in the article, the V-22 was "In development since 1981, at a cost approaching $15 billion, the Osprey was a troubled program. It had been the target of critics inside and outside the Pentagon..."?

I want to ask Lt.Col. Shaefer how much of his desire to clean a record that does not need cleaning, comes from some guilt he (wrongly, I believe) carries inside:

From his position several miles away, Schafer said he knew the two aircraft were too high as they began to descend.

For safety reasons, any pilot or co-pilot on that mission could have called a halt to the plan.


"I could have stopped that crash. I could have called a wave-off. I was the most experienced [pilot]. I had the most hours in the V-22 of the test team," Schafer said. "I've been in their position and been too high in a V-22, and that airplane isn't friendly when you're trying to descend fast."

Most of all, the article gives me (again) the urge to kick Bob Cox's macabre little voyeuristic a**.

On the Death of Evil Ones: Enemies Within and Without

H/T Michael Totten posting at Instapundit.

Being military-minded and somewhat experienced in these sort of things, I find no "joy" in Osama Bin Laden's death. I do find satisfaction and relief in the way his death was brought about, and wish my brothers-in-arms in the long continuum of those who have served, are serving, and will serve, continued safety and success in this long war against those who would bring upon us another Dark Age.
On the other hand, when this guy finally croaks (hopefully through natural causes) I'm throwing a freakin' party.

Read his opinion piece at the link. We could play either 'Logical Fallacy' or 'Delusional Leftist Meme' Bingo with his drivel.

 Noam Chomsky. Intellect not only held captive by Ideology, but Intellect perverted by Ideology. The ultimate Useful Idiot.
If you're too busy or lazy to follow the link at the top and read Totten's Yon's comment, it was a short one:

JUST ONCE I’d like to read an article by Noam Chomsky that isn’t faux brilliant in its moral and political idiocy, one that suggests he does, in fact, live in the same world as the rest of us, but he can’t even manage it after Osama bin Laden is killed

Don't hold your breath Michael..

19 Jun 12: Correction on source who was guest-blogging at Instapundit at the time. Thanks to the commenter who just pointed this out, .