Pierre Sprey: Expert?

Pffft! More Like POGO's 'Circus Barker'

(File Under "Know Your Reformer")
Hat tip 'munny' at F-16.net

Pierre Sprey: Old Whine in a Cracked Bottle

There's a new You Tube Video (link here) up with Pierre Sprey blathering his usual nonsense about 'complex' vs 'simple', 'heavy' vs. 'lightweight' fighter performance... blah... blah... blah. As if he ever knew d*ck about the topic at hand. Virtually everything he says is just as wrong or worse than the first time he spouted it off.  Remember, this is all part of the POGO P.A.C.E. propaganda strategy.

I left a few comments that were smaller than I would've liked because the format doesn't allow me to put together a larger coherent one such as:

Pierre Sprey has never ‘designed’ anything with wings, and he still doesn’t know diddley-squat about aircraft design OR air warfare . He played a bit role in developing top level requirements at OSD for a couple of years, basically parroting whatever John Boyd or Everest Riccione were hawking that day. His ‘expertise’, as well as much that which is claimed about the rest of the so-called ‘Reformers’ was pure fabrication by James Fallows. Those fabrications have been echoing in the halls of the anti-defense lairs for consumption by the useful idiots ever since.
Best summary* of Sprey I’ve read:

While working on the F-X, Boyd met Pierre Sprey, a weapons system analyst on the OASD/SA staff, whose background was similar to [Alain] Enthoven’s but much less distinguished. By his own account, Sprey was a dilettante with an engineering degree but no military experience. After graduation from Yale, Sprey became a research analyst at the Grumman Aircraft Corporation for space and commercial transportation projects. He came to OSD/SA in 1966, where he declared himself an expert on military fighter aircraft, despite his lack of experience. Sprey admitted being a gadfly, a nuisance, and an automatic opponent of any program he was not a part of.   

*Source: Pierre Sprey, Oral History Interview by Jacob Neufeld, 12 June 1971, K.239.0152-969, AFHRA, 9, passim. , as cited in THE REVOLT OF THE MAJORS: HOW THE AIR FORCE CHANGED AFTER VIETNAM, Marshall L. Michel III, 2006 (PDF).

Michel gets a little too 'Fighter Pilot Uber Alles' in his thesis, and I found myself having to force my eyes to read past those parts, but it still is a good read. If you want to read a really cold-blooded delivery of a takedown concerning the so-called ‘reformers’--including Sprey-- buy and read “Military Reform: the high-tech debate in tactical air forces” by Walter Kross.

Clearly POGO is focused on Canada as a 'weak link' in the JSF coalition at this time.

Charter Cable: Media Malpractice

Charter News, 'Isn't'

(Still working on a lengthy 'aircraft/F-35 maneuverability' post, but this HAS to go up tonight.)

Charter Cable is my cable provider. NO complaints about the internet speed or connectivity, not even though I suspect their move to 'all digital' last week wreaked havoc with signals (off and on) as thousands of users finally added even more thousands of cable boxes and cards to the network in just a few days. It now seems to have stabilized, so 'no problem'.

But Charter Cable's 'homepage' has a section with rotating 'news' headline pictures and captions. All too often the caption and photo make it appear that some tragedy has happened in the US or even just the 'Modern' world, and you click on the link talking about a school being bombed with what appears to be a typical American elementary school (they've done school buses too if I recall correctly) and the story is about a school in some war zone in a 'turd world' country. The Chief and I just chalked it up to lazy web content developers and editors.

Today, they went beyond 'lazy' and deep into 'media malpractice' . I got home and booted up the laptop to check the web and this is what greeted me (left headline):



Charter Home Page 9 April 2013 ~1920 Hrs CST

 



WTFO? "Veteran Kills 13"?

I clicked on the link, and this is what popped up:

Charter 'Article' 9 April 2013 ~1920 Hrs CST

Oh. A Serbian 'vet' in Serbia loses it and goes on a rampage. Tragic in it's own right. Why the 'trick' headline?

You would have to be either incompetent or agenda-driven to put this one up.  Either way it doesn't 'inform' but misleads and distorts several issues in one nice swoop.

Besmirching veteran's mental health? Check!

'Tragedy' as background for upcoming 2nd Amendment legislation? Check!

The Chief likes to try and calm me down when some unthinking slug nearly kills us because they're doing something clueless in traffic. She says something like "I'm sure they didn't see us". She forgets what makes me the MOST angry is the fact that they probably were clueless as to what was going on around them. If I assume Charter was just being 'brain dead' in this, it just p*sses me off more. tell me again: What business are they in? Do they have any standards?
 
Either way, Charter's website is Media Malpractice writ large in a Low Information Consumer world.

Are There ANY Adults At Charter Cable?

POGO’s Propaganda Circus: F-35’s “aft visibility will get the pilot gunned every time”

A Case Study in How the Project on Government Oversight (POGO) Demagogues Against National Defense Programs.

I’ve considered something similar to what you are about to read many times, but I never pulled the trigger because I hadn’t yet figured out how to cover it without either making most people’s eyes glaze over from too much psychological exposition on the one end of the spectrum, or oversimplifying to the point that the explanation does violence to the phenomenon on the other end. I was at a symposium this week that I believe provided me with a way to reach the middle ground I’ve been seeking. One of our Keynote Speakers (yes, there were several) spoke on the subject of how we humans ‘Innovate’ and how organizations and individuals can overcome barriers to innovation.

The speaker presented us with four fundamental characteristics of the human psyche that affect our ability to (among other things) be “insightful” and “innovate”. She also reviewed how those characteristics are inhibited or disrupted by outside influences. It occurred to me at the time, that what she was describing was, among other things, a pretty good explanation as to how propagandists are also able to manipulate public attitudes. Shortly afterward, I realized it would be helpful in achieving my goal of getting a substantial explanation as to how POGO/Winslow Wheeler and crew operate. By showing how POGO and fellow travelers manipulate the elements of Perception, Attention, Context, and Emotion (PACE) we are able to adequately grasp the manner in which they exploit human nature to further their agenda of subverting national defense acquisition programs.

P.A.C.E: A Tour Inside POGO’s Meme Machine

Winslow Wheeler and POGO have provided any number of examples of what I’m about to cover, but their latest machinations concerning the recent “F-35A Joint Strike Fighter Readiness for Training Operational Utility Evaluation” report is as perfect an example as any to use for this discussion.
The report in question was issued by DoD’s Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, J. Michael Gilmore, and is as close to being more of a political document than a technical one as any I’ve seen issued from that office (but that is another topic for another time). But the most interesting aspect to the report was in how it was apparently leaked to POGO/Winslow Wheeler ahead of the public release, and the ONE thing POGO/Winslow Wheeler chose to lift from that report to propagate was a statement by an evaluation pilot that the F-35’s “Aft visibility will get the pilot gunned every time”. That ‘money quote’ was then repeated throughout the mainstream media before anyone had the chance to really digest the contents of the report in their entirety.

POGO,Winslow Wheeler and “Perception”

In this example, POGO and Winslow Wheeler were continuing the long-standing practice of ‘poisoning the well’ against any positive perception that might arise from any public reporting on the F-35. In this case, the ‘report’ in its totality is remarkably unsurprising. What the OT&E evaluators found concerning the training program after a limited exposure to early configuration F-35s is pretty much what one would expect. But in highlighting a single comment in the report POGO made the report about the F-35 itself and not the status and readiness of the training program. The Director of OT&E was an enabler (codependent?) in this development due to the report’s excessive regurgitation of ‘old news’ that didn’t belong in this report, but POGO is the ‘perp’ that picked the forbidden fruit.
When each of us perceives something, it is estimated that only 20% of that perception is based upon what we actually sense as new, and 80% of the perception is due to what we’ve already experienced in life. As most people have little or no working knowledge of what it takes to field advanced technology and designs, that makes their ‘80% experience’ base highly vulnerable to any manipulation of the ‘20% new’ information. POGO selected and amplified a quote concerning how a pilot felt about rear visibility in a plane that does not yet have the key technology installed that makes such rear visibility concerns moot. That pilot brought his experience and training to a new aircraft and applied his old knowledge to a new situation. Without his experiencing what is the baseline F-35 EODAS and HMD capabilities that were yet to be delivered, his comments should have been noted in the backup data. But in an objective document this never would have been a feature in the report.
In cherry-picking the “get gunned every time” quote, POGO and Winslow Wheeler exploit the general ignorance of the public as to how the jets and training program are still in development, how the F-35 program is structured and how capabilities are scheduled to be brought on line by deliberately injecting into the public’s consciousness the misperception that the F-35s now being used for initial type training are representative of the capability that define the baseline F-35. This is only the latest in a long series of flagrant misrepresentations of F-35 truths, in effect LIES, committed by POGO, and the F-35 is only the latest in a long line of weapon systems to receive that special POGO/Winslow Wheeler ‘touch’. We can expect nothing but more of the same from POGO and Winslow Wheeler because they dare not let any positive or neutral development concerning the F-35 go without preemptory and presumptive criticism, as the façade of failure that they work so hard to build up from nothing requires constant maintenance to prevent it from crumbling around their ears.

POGO, Winslow Wheeler and “Attention”

Long-time observers of POGO, Winslow Wheeler and other so-called ‘reformers’ will note that the ‘get gunned every time’ sound bite will be dropped fairly quickly and something else concerning the F-35 will be targeted as a ‘failure’, ‘mistake’ or ‘criminally negligent’ decision/design feature/performance characteristic, perhaps from the same report, or from one to come later. This is because POGO et al are acutely aware that an extended exchange or dialog with anyone who disagrees with them will expose the misdirection they (POGO et al) endeavor to sustain. POGO and Wheeler go for the sound bite to plant negativity into the public’s consciousness knowing that the general public’s attention span is short. By the time anyone dives deep into a POGO/Wheeler claim and cries “Hey! Wait a minute!” the public has moved on to other circuses. Such ‘Hit and Run’ tactics, along with their careful cultivation of media enablers, allow POGO/Wheeler relief from ever having their methods, biases and motives undergo serious public scrutiny. This is classic guerrilla warfare of the information domain.
Once the initial ‘buzz’ is past, if the ‘get gunned every time’ line is ever again referenced by POGO/Wheeler, it will be as only one item in a litany of similar perversions of reality in support of some general condemnation of the F-35 or as an introduction to the next misdirection issued by POGO/Wheeler. It is a clear testimony to POGO’s and Wheeler’s confidence in the public’s inability to critically examine information POGO/Wheeler spoon feed the media, that POGO and Wheeler have felt comfortable posting the source documents which they pervert at their own websites.

POGO, Winslow Wheeler and “Context”

If there is a hallmark to POGO/Wheeler PR announcements, it is that whatever is being decried or derided will be framed in as little context as possible. What context that is provided, will be selectively added to support the official POGO/Wheeler meme du jour. In this instance, the “get gunned every time” comment is highlighted without any reference to the inconvenient (to POGO and Wheeler) fact that the F-35s EODAS and Helmet are still being developed, the software releases to exploit these systems were not sold off for the aircraft used for the training readiness evaluation, or that if later version aircraft that are now flying had been available, the ‘get gunned’ claim would probably never have been uttered.
As individuals, we perceive reality in terms of context. When we see two circles, one drawn within the other, depending upon where our heads are at the time, or depending upon what else is drawn beside the circles determines whether we view the circles as representing a bagel, a wheel, a ring, or any number of other similarly- shaped objects. Stripping the context from the ‘get gunned’ comment allows POGO/Wheeler to insert their own meaning and relevance: a constructed perversion for consumption by the uninformed and only marginally-interested public.

POGO, Winslow Wheeler and “Emotion”

Indignation and inflammatory statements about defense acquisition programs are the stock and trade of POGO and Winslow Wheeler. Consider how in the original ‘story’ at TIME Winslow Wheeler attempts to paint a ‘horror story’:

Perhaps the biggest horror story is the poor showing of the Lockheed plane’s complicated, expensive helmet-mounted display system that distorts and obscures – rather than enhancing — the pilot’s vision and awareness of the outside world.

Wheeler seeks to elicit the reader's emotion by making an assertion that the F-35’s HMD’s performance is deficient (oh woe is us!), by obliquely referring to much (at least two years) earlier technical development challenges as if they were still current and relevant. Yet Winslow Wheeler, if he was honest when asked about the HMD, would have to acknowledge that the F-35 program is fairly confident in the current state of HMD performance and sees no ‘show-stoppers’ in delivering the desired capability. Lockheed Martin was discussing positive HMD developments nearly a year ago. It is notable that the latest GAO report did not highlight any definitive problems with the HMD system, only the usual ‘concerns’. When the ‘alternative’ just-in-case helmet being developed in parallel is cancelled (possibly this year), don’t expect any surrender from POGO or Wheeler on this point: “DOOM!” will always be just around the corner.
Using our neurons takes considerable (relatively) energy and it is estimated that we can only have about 2 ½ % of our brain active at any one time. When we are irate, our limbic system/amygdala can compromise, to varying degrees, our reason and judgment. Thus, when POGO, Winslow Wheeler, or others appeal to our emotions (Waste! Corruption! Conspiracy! War Mongering Military-Industrial Complex!) they are really attempting to subvert our ability to see through the flawed logic that binds whatever nonsense they are peddling at the moment.

Know Your Reformer Bonus Content: About Winslow Wheeler’s Move to POGO

I still consider Winslow’s move under POGO a positive development. In May of last year I noted the move from the Center for Defense Information (CDI) to POGO and as I also noted, I like it when targets bunch up. The tendency of radical activism to date has been to splinter and re-label itself when caught in the daylight. This may be a consolidation for survival (one can only hope).
CDI had been slipping for years but was often extremely entertaining to watch – it was like a zoo for disillusioned and misunderstood ‘military geniuses’ founded by possibly the biggest crackpot ever to reach ‘flag’ rank.
At the time, I didn’t know that the ‘Strauss Military Reform Project’ moved with Wheeler to POGO, so the same ‘photographer’ cum ‘radical chic’ trust-fund baby must still be paying Wheeler’s salary. The ‘Strauss Military Reform Project’ is little more than a one-job program for Winslow Wheeler. Strauss, when he isn’t producing forgettable photography, or financing disgruntled, ex-Congressional staffers’ caterwauling and rabble rousing, is the Chairman of the Board of Directors of that iconic bastion of American culture (/sarc) “Mother Jones”. How cliché can you get?

Gun Control

As chance would have it, yesterday was my Texas Concealed Handgun Law training course and qualification.  Two nights before, I was studying the latest Texas CHL manual online, and wincing as I went over the parts that delineated the 'gun free zone' areas, and thinking, in the wake of the Oregon mall shooting, in most cases it is pretty stupid to create what is actually a 'target rich environment' zone for the sick and twisted who would try and commit mass killing of innocent others.
While the rest of my family spent the day trying to avoid all the 'news' and constant revision thereof, concerning the elementary school killings that happened the day before, one of the first things we covered was WHY Texas was a CHL  'shall issue' state. Surprise! It was largely the result of  a mass killing, the Luby's Cafeteria Massacre on October 16, 1991, in Killeen, Texas, and the efforts of one of the survivors, Suzanna Gratia Hupp. Ms. Hupp's story and energy in making the laws more protective of the individual was a powerful weapon. Her testimony before Congress even managed to subdue the perennially pompous a** Chuck Schumer for a time:

Time will tell if Chuckie starts bloviating again as if the above never happened.

This was my Target and Scoring Used

Texas uses the B-27 target for qualification:

This is the Course of Fire:

Stage 1: Twenty shots (20) will be fired from 3 yards.
A. Five (5) shots fired in a “One Shot Exercise” 2 seconds allowed.
B. Ten shots (10) fired in a “Two Shot Exercise” 3 seconds allowed.
C. Five (5) shots fired in 10 seconds

Stage 2: Twenty shots (20) will be fired from 7 yards – fired 5 stages.
A. Five (5) shots will be fired in 10 seconds
B. Five (5) shots will be fired in 2 stages:
  1. Two (2) shots will be fired in 4 seconds
  2. Three (3) shots will be fired in 6 seconds
C. Five (5) shots fired in a “One Shot Exercise” 3 seconds allowed.
D. Five (5) shots fired in 15 seconds.

Stage 3: Ten shots (10) fired from 15 yards – fired in two 5-shot strings.
A. Five (5) shots fired in two stages:
   1. Two (2) shots fired in 6 seconds.
   2. Three (3) shots fired in 9 seconds.
B. Five (5) shots fired in 15 seconds.

This was my 'grouping':

IMHO, not bad, especially since the 50 rounds represent about a fifth of all the rounds I've put downrange with this weapon. I've decided it shoots a 'tidge to the right and will be adjusting the sight appropriately.

This was my 'score':

Texas only records Pass/Fail. The 249 out of 250 only serves to make this shooter cry in his beer. 'Dang! So close...'.  I took comfort in acing the written though.

The above is an example of  'Gun Control'

BTW, Have you heard? Evidently the Oregon Mall shooter only shot two people before he took his own life BECAUSE he was confronted by a person licensed to 'concealed carry'. 

 

F-35 and the "Crackpots of Doom" (Redux)

(Updated and Bumped for comparison.)

Gee, has it been a year already?
In the original post below, among other things I demonstrated/showed:
1) That the official F-35 cost projections at the time had been  complete 'fails' and that production costs were tracking closer to LM's projections than anything else and much lower than the CAIG's.  
2) That there was a disconnect between what the Government was 'budgeting' and what they expected the costs to be.
3) The scary Mod dollars that will be needed to retrofit LRIP 1-4, when added to the initial costs appeared to STILL be within reasonable estimation of LM's production numbers.
  
The USG has negotiated the LRIP 5 production numbers and it looks like the trend continues. Here's the relevant part of the official news release (Bold italics mine):

Principle Agreement Reached on Fifth production lot of Lockheed Martin F-35s WASHINGTON, D.C., Nov. 30, 2012 – The U.S. Department of Defense and Lockheed Martin have reached an agreement in principle to manufacture 32 F-35 Lightning II stealth fighters as part of Low-Rate Initial Production 5 (LRIP-5). The contract will also fund manufacturing-support equipment, flight test instrumentation and ancillary mission equipment.
“It’s been a long journey, but I’m pleased we’ve achieved an agreement that is beneficial to the government and Lockheed Martin,” said Vice Admiral Dave Venlet, F-35 Program Executive Officer. “Production costs are decreasing, and I appreciate everyone’s commitment to this important negotiation process. The LRIP-5 agreement will end the year on a positive note and sets the table for the program to move forward with improving business timelines for the greater good of all the nations partnered with us.”

Under the contract, Lockheed Martin will produce 22 F-35A conventional take-off and landing (CTOL) variants for the U.S. Air Force, three F-35B short takeoff/vertical landing (STOVL) variants for the U.S. Marine Corps and seven F-35C carrier variants (CV) for the U.S. Navy. Aircraft production was started in December 2011 under a previously authorized undefinitized contract action.

There's already the usual crowd trying to do 'math' beyond their ken, simply dividing the total by the number of jets, and not realizing that not all in the $ amount is accountable against the unit cost. You've also got the usual mixing of cost numbers in the usual quarters.

But lets play the 'stupid' game for a moment and just divide the total by the number of jets like a Rube, thus averaging the cost of the variants in the process shall we? Using a 'popular' source we get a total cost of $3.8B for the buy, which translates into a $118.75M 'estimate' for the LRIP 5 jets. Now trace down to the graphic below from last year (I'll post an updated version with the latest actuals later) showing an official Canadian government chart with cost projections and actuals for just F-35A (the least expensive) aircraft.

That's right. Even using the inflated simpleton-math estimation method above, the F-35 is STILL tracking to slightly below LM's lower cost predictions and nowhere near the 'feared by some and hoped-for by others' "official" numbers.    

Oh dear. What WILL the 'haters' do by LRIP 9 or 10? Accuse the F-35 program of hiding costs?

**********************Original Post Begins Here***************
12/2/11 8:08 PM CST

Skip the breathlessly headlined Bill Sweetman "Article of Doom" for now (it will make it just that more entertaining if you go back to it) and go to slightly less 'vapourous' article he linked to as the source at AOL  (I know! Whooda' guessed AOL was still around?).
There are many parts of the original article that I find most interesting, given the responses to it in the blog comments I've seen so far.
In no particular order:

But slowing production would help reduce the cost of replacing parts in jets that are being built before testing is complete, Venlet said. Although fatigue testing has barely begun -- along with "refined analysis" -- it's already turned up enough parts that need to be redesigned and replaced in jets already built that the changes may add $3 million to $5 million to each plane's cost.
The price of the F-35, being built by Lockheed Martin Corp. in three variants, has averaged roughly $111 million under the most recent Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) Lot 4 contract.

So now the unit retrofit mod costs estimates are 50-70% lower than the previously "feared" $10M/unit costs that were 'estimated' only three months ago? Hey! That's 'Crack-ing' GOOD news! And since the LRIP contract costs to-date have BEAT predictions, that means that even with the retrofit costs, it looks like the the total unit costs are coming in at or near program predictions and are still nowhere near the widely circulated B.S. CAPE estimates.
But doesn't this 'Cracks of Doom' thing kind of' support the assertion that the F-35 is the (to quote a Sweetie*) "most incompetent and wasteful fighter program in history"? Umm - no.

*A member of the 'Sweetman' Tribe

Nor are the weaknesses surprising in the world of fighter jets, he added. The discoveries are "not a quote 'problem with the airplane,'" Venlet said. "It's a fighter made out of metal and composites. You always find some hot spots and cracks and you have to go make fixes. That's normal.

Gee. I wish I had known that. Oh yeah. I do. The article doesn't go into the 'why' this is so, but it is simple enough. For performance reasons you have to make the plane's structure as light as possible and it is always easier to put weight in where it is needed than take it out. Structural tweaks are usually a mix of both in the end, with the emphasis on adding structure for durability.
When Vice Adm Venlet is claimed to be calling for 'slowing down' F-35 production. In what "way" is it meant? 

Venlet declined to say how much he thinks production should be slowed. Earlier plans called for the Pentagon to order 42 F-35s in fiscal 2011, but that was cut to 35 and more recently it was dropped to 30. Previous plans, which Venlet's comments and the unprecedented pressure to cut the defense budget make clear will change, had been to ramp up orders to 32 in fiscal 2012, 42 in fiscal 2013, 62 in fiscal 2014, 81 in fiscal 2015 and 108 in fiscal 2016 before jumping to more than 200 a year after fundamental fatigue and flight testing is done

.The Admiral is concerned about the steeper ramp up that exists as a result from Congress cutting the buys on the front end? Surprise! (Not.) (Think of trying to climb a flight of stairs where the first 5-6 steps have been lowered but the rest still lead to the top floor). This approach has risk advantages and it has risk disadvantages (as from time to time I've had to expand upon for the some of the more obtuse among us), and must say that I disagree with the idea from a 'risk' and 'total cost' POV. I disagree because I believe it is better to aim high and possibly fall a little short 'sooner' than to aim lower and only possibly hit your target 'later'. The reason being is that the near term risks are always better known than those that might transpire in the future. Vice Admiral Venlet knows this as well, so what would REALLY drive him to consider it?
This next bit is the most bothersome part for me.

Venlet also took aim at a fundamental assumption of the JSF business model: concurrency. The JSF program was originally structured with a high rate of concurrency -- building production model aircraft while finishing ground and flight testing -- that assumed less change than is proving necessary. 

"Fundamentally, that was a miscalculation," Venlet said. "You'd like to take the keys to your shiny new jet and give it to the fleet with all the capability and all the service life they want. What we're doing is, we're taking the keys to the shiny new jet, giving it to the fleet and saying, 'Give me that jet back in the first year. I've got to go take it up to this depot for a couple of months and tear into it and put in some structural mods, because if I don't, we're not going to be able to fly it more than a couple, three, four, five years.' That's what concurrency is doing to us." But he added: "I have the duty to navigate this program through concurrency. I don't have the luxury to stand on the pulpit and criticize and say how much I dislike it and wish we didn't have it. My duty is to help us navigate through it."

I find it hard to accept this passage as written. The second paragraph containing the quote is harmless (though kind of emotional for a PEO of a major weapon system program) as it stands, but the first paragraph that prefaces it smells of willful misdirection. Most people would read the passage as Venlet is asserting 'concurrency' was a miscalculation. But more likely the passage should be read as estimates of the amount of change that would be needed as the program progressed was a miscalculation. Why do I believe this? Because 'concurrency' itself has been analyzed and studied to death (Though Congress uses it as an effective bogeyman). I'm certain Venlet wanted to deliver the first jets in final configurations, but certainly he has the training and background to be aware of the realities in the job. I wonder what, if anything, the author of the original article is leaving out?
The AOL article closer has the bottom line:

"The question for me is not: 'F-35 or not?'" Venlet said. "The question is, how many and how fast? I'm not questioning the ultimate inventory numbers, I'm questioning the pace that we ramp up production for us and the partners, and can we afford it?"

"Can we afford it?" Ah! There's the rub. It strikes me that from earlier in the article there's a kernel of what might be the 'real' cost problem.

"We negotiated the LRIP 4 contract with a certain amount of resources considered to pay for concurrent changes," Venlet said. "We were probably off on the low side by a factor of four. Maybe five. And we've discovered that in this calendar year, '11, and it's basically sucked the wind out of our lungs with the burden, the financial burden."

That is most interesting in the sense that the comment relates to what was 'budgeted' and not what was 'estimated'. Remember this chart? (It's in some of the linked material above as well.)

I suspect the budget shortfall has as much to do with how the costs have been amortized across fiscal years as it has to do with the fact that the contracts were negotiated for amounts less than even the JSF projected cost curve. Notice when this chart was made, the LRIP 4 jets were to cost approximately $128M in the end. Use the dollar figures provided in the AOL article: $110M plus $3-$5M for the retrofits. What is 'missing' from this equation?  The LRIP 4 share of the weight reduction effort? [I cannot let an opportunity pass to also remind readers, once again, that even WITH all the "costs" being thrown about so carelessly, the totals to date STILL more closely track the lower internal program estimates than any other estimate and the B.S. CAPE estimates are still the outlier by far.]

This whole 'slow the ramp up' story IMHO is a narrative constructed to explain constraining the program more for reasons of immediate budgetary convenience than anything else. The program's successes this year may have brought about the need for the narrative.

"Cracks of Doom"?  Heh. The 'beat' goes on......

"Barack Obama Told the Nation"



This was sent to me by a friend who is also in the 'Defense Industry'. Given the latest news on the Defense Sequestration found here, and here  for examples– I thought it apropos.

Barack Obama told the nation:
Have no fear of sequestration!
From EVERYONE, a Corp-o-ration ROBS!
Though I cannot say ‘twas really smart
RIF hundred thousands? - Just a start!
To ‘save’ Americans from... their jobs?

Now a homeless shelter resident
I oft’ wonder ‘bout the President,
Yeah I know Barack, he ‘loves’ me so.
Yet how sadly I remember
Way back yonder in November,
When he said my job would “never go”

Barack Obama told the nation
Have no fear of sequestration!
From EVERYONE, a Corp-o-ration ROBS!
Though I cannot say ‘twas really smart
RIF hundred thousands? - Just a start!
To ‘save’ Americans from... their jobs!!!!!?
 
C'mon and SING it!

NO apologies to JUST another aging Hippie that I’m waiting for to die off and who wrote the original "Lyndon Johnson told the Nation"

And then-- the 'idjiit' updated it with this:

Dooooooosh.

 

Sequestration Cage Match: WSJ Puts a Beat-Down on DoD Buzz

Contrast the following:

1. Phil Ewing’s take on the state of the ‘Defense Sequestration’fiasco at DoD Buzz….

Wednesday’s now-infamous hearing of the House Armed Services Committee, which broke from its standard script of “where’s mine” to an unusually rancorous airing of partisan talking points, showed the depth of frustration in the defense world. A few years ago, defense was a prince of Washington interest groups. With two hot wars underway and a unanimous “support our troops” mentality in the country, the Pentagon, its allies and dependents got whatever they wanted, times two, yesterday. Now that same cohort has become just another victim in today’s politics of hostage-taking.

2. Kimberley Strassel’s observations at the Wall Street Journal on who’s ‘winning’ the ‘sequestration’ war of ideas….   

When Barack Obama has lost even liberal Ohio Sen. Sherrod Brown, the White House has a problem. In Washington, that problem is known as the "sequester." In the rest of the country, it's becoming known as a jobs disaster.

Jobs, and his own re-election, were on Mr. Brown's tortured mind this week, when he publicly called on the president to do something about Defense Department cuts that threaten to shutter his state's Mansfield Lahm Air National Guard Base—and with it, 1,000 jobs. The cuts might be "penny wise," griped the senator, but they were "pound foolish."

And (my favorite part)...

The White House is clearly starting to worry. In a sign of panic, the Obama administration this week moved to hide the coming job losses. The Labor Department directed defense contractors to ignore the law and skip layoff notices, since sequester remains "uncertain." (Companies may well send them out anyway, since Labor can't protect them from lawsuits for failing to give due warning.)

And the president knows his ranks are getting twitchy. Congressional Democrats cracked this week, signing on to Republican legislation that gives the White House 30 days to detail the sequester cuts; they aren't willing to risk looking like White House pawns for secrecy. Republicans are ratcheting up the pressure, with ads targeting vulnerable Democrats in defense-heavy districts, town halls to highlight the sequester threat, and governors calling on Mr. Obama to step up and lead.

Democrats heading home for the August recess will hear an earful from their local defense contractors. And the party is getting equally worried about the other half of the sequester, which will strip hundreds of billions out of their own cherished domestic programs. If this environment gets hot enough, Mr. Obama could find himself alone on the stand-firm-on-sequester ship.

Read both pieces and form your own opinion.

Any bets as to whether more politicians read the WSJ, and more of their constituents read Instapundit than DoD Buzz?

Pssst: Don’t tell Phil: I’d say it would bum him out, except I think he knows he’s whistling past the graveyard when it comes to how this is going to play out in the end.

Postscript:
My ‘take’ stands. The Evil Party suckered the Stupid Party (again). This time, the Stupid Party believed (surely!) NO ONE would be Evil enough to jeopardize National Defense, even if they deign to play games with it. But the Evil Party was too clever by half (as they are really the Evil Hybris-ridden Party).

Solution?
Banish the Evil Party entirely and fire the Stupid Party Leaders (which would make it the ‘Smart Party’ overnight).

Hat tip for the WSJ Story: Instapundit

Double-0 POGO and the F-35: Update 2

Mr. Smallwood (Eventually) Responded

Lt. Col. Eric Smith (left) congratulates Lt. Col. Lee Kloos on becoming the latest qualified joint strike fighter pilot and DOD’s first non-developmental test pilot to qualify, May 31 at Eglin Air Force Base, Fla. After completing his flight, is now a qualified instructor pilot for the F-35 Lightning II. Smith, the director of operations with the 58th FS and the first Air Force qualified pilot, served as Kloos' flight evaluator. (U.S. Air Force photo/Maj. Karen Roganov)

And the response was pretty much as expected:

“Your comments seem to suggest the F-35 has actually been completely tested and is fully ready for combat. Since it isn’t even halfway there, I’ll take your comments — barely legible as they were — with a healthy dose of skepticism. Further, since you have openly suggested on your website that I’m working for POGO itself I will go ahead and play turnabout: You strike me as nothing more than a front for the defense industry — the kind of guy paid-off to act like an independent and fill the debate with tripe to make people think twice about what is obvious. What is obvious: the plane is an overpriced piece of crap, and will never be a staple of the American Air Force. Your boys at Lockheed are on borrowed time using the Pentagon as a marketer and purchaser all at once because America is broke. Best invest that money elsewhere.” (screen capture to left)

Notice the lack of any real attempt to engage on the validity of the ‘debunking’ itself? I must say I find the notion that I’m a sort of paid secret ‘front’ for the defense industry (I’m a ‘highly-compensated’ engineer/analyst, bucko!) scouring the web for evil-doers on the behalf of the F-35 for bounty….hilariously conspiratorial.  I do the scouring for free! I suspect Mr. Smallwood probably also operates under the delusion that there actually IS a ‘Military-Industrial Complex’.

My comments “seem to suggest the F-35 “has actually been completely tested”? No. I cited an expert operator from outside the acquisition/development program who is now fully qualified to fly and instruct other pilots in the F-35. HE says the F-35 is as maneuverable as an F-16 (or better). HIS  statements are an overmatching counter-weight to the tired old claims made by ignorant activist ‘reformers'.
Alas, I fear Mr. Smallwood’s insufficient language skills may be a barrier to meaningful communication, as he also asserts that I “ have openly suggested on" (my) "website that I’m working for POGO itself”.
No Mr. Smallwood. Perhaps you missed the part in my initial post where I wrote: “I’ve noticed a marked uptick in the foreign blog and online alternative newspapers containing references to POGO’s pet ‘expert’ commentators. POGO ‘special operators/fellow travelers’ seem to be most active in F-35 Partner nations where economic conditions are tightest and in countries that represent existing or emerging markets for F-35 Foreign Military Sales (FMS).” What I openly asserted is that Mr. Smallwood was spoon-fed the drivel he regurgitated, and I also suggested that Mr. Smallwood was furthering POGO’s aims: a 'de facto' agent at the very least. I left open the issue as to whether or not they also further his own interests until now. Hence the “a special operator/fellow traveler” reference.
Mr. Smallwood then uses this mischaracterization to then postulate he could also view me “as nothing more than a front for the defense industry — the kind of guy paid-off to act like an independent and fill the debate with tripe to make people think twice about what is obvious” ?
Assuming Mr. Smallwood is a principled man (why not?), I can only conclude from this statement that he has never been exposed to disciplines that are based upon consequential knowledge and the application thereof. Otherwise, would he not have been able to attach proper value to claims made by competent experts in their field (forget nameless ‘me’, what about Lt Col. Kloos)? And could he then not shrug off the political machinations of agent provocateurs who are paid by an anti-defense Non-State Actor that is funded largely by left-wing foundations and aging hippies--however sympathetic he might be to their flawed ideologies?
Sigh~I suppose for some, it would be far easier to shrug off the fact that the ever-increasingly larger circle of people with ACTUAL F-35 experience typically speak very highly of it than change any preconceived or ill-informed decision. 'They' would rather cling to the shrill prevarications of outside critics with no relevant or insufficient expertise and experience, all in order to preserve some philosophical blind spot.

Kudos to ‘SpudmanWP’,  a visitor who is also a “SNAFU!” regular, for attempting to reach out further to Smallwood in the comment thread...and for engaging on behalf of evidence and logic. I’d take more of an interest myself, if I thought there was any hope. As I see it, Smallwood’s just an outlet for the real troublemakers. I want to keep my 'eyes on the prize'.

In Closing: By "barely legible", should we assume he meant my debunking was ‘barely intelligible’? Aside from an "it's/its" typo that got by me I didn't find anything too egregious. I ask, because I thought ‘dumbed it down’ as far as I dared without doing violence to the meaning within:

Sydney J. Freedberg Jr. Steps in 'It'...Again.

Sydney Freedberg Jr. Just Isn't Having a Very Good Week.

You can be ignorant of the fact that something you believe is a myth. No problem.

What you shouldn’t be able to do is recycle old tropes as if they were fact, in your manifest ignorance of what you are attempting to write about with impunity, but it is done way too often these days concerning Defense in general, and Low Observability specifically. To foster myths as a ‘journalist’ is perhaps typical,  but it is disturbing. And that goes double for an ‘Editor’. You want to write about things? Fine Sydney. Just pick a topic you know something about.

Freedberg, fresh off of having to backtrack ‘big-time’, undone by his mad skillz with creative headlines, is back today with a new ‘piece’ titled “Lockheed Dismisses $1 Trillion Estimate For F-35 JSF”, just couldn’t resist opening the ‘red meat’ section of his post with the following (emphasis mine) :

Stealth aircraft are notoriously expensive to maintain, with the radar-absorbing coatings on the B-2 prone to disintegrate in the rain, but Rubino argued that F-35 is a different animal. "We have learned a whole lot over the last 20 years as far as maintaining stealth," he said. "We built this airplane to be able to have very robust stealth, to the point where you can ding it, you can scratch it" and it does not lose its radar-evading properties. Even if you dismiss Lockheed's claims about F-35's maintainability, there are still serious questions about…[blah blah blah]

The F-35 LO design IS completely different (see slide to left) from all other systems, and the ‘maintainability headache’ aspect of LO systems from B-2 onward is another myth for another time. But the “radar-absorbing coatings on the B-2 prone to disintegrate in the rain”  crack is a pure myth that can be exploded easier than most.

The Source of the B-2 Coatings ‘Disintegrate’ Myth

The myth comes from the fusion of the wording in a 1997 GAO report, and the anti-B-2 crowd’s willful misrepresentation of same (OK we’ll give them the credit for merely being illiterate). If one does a roll-call, one will find many of the same Illiterati making the most noise over the F-35. One name on both lists is the source of much of the B.S. found in Freedberg’s article. (Not naming names, but his initials are “WW”). I leave the reader to draw their own conclusions on that point.
The GAO report In question was “B-2 Bomber: Cost and Operational Issues, GAO/NSIAD-97-181 August 1997. The offending passage usually cited (if any are cited at all) in claiming the myth is that the B-2 ''must be sheltered or exposed only to the most benign environments -- low humidity, no precipitation, moderate temperatures.''
 
What the journalists back then NEVER mentioned was the DoD response in the SAME REPORT:

Notice the reference to the ‘Block 30’configuration? In the report elsewhere is this little observation:

The Air Force is currently testing the B-2 and plans to complete the production program, including planned block 30 modifications, by July 2000.

This was an August 1997 report. The FIRST Block 30 aircraft was delivered on 5 August 1997. Block 30 was the final production configuration, and the final configuration wasn’t even fielded yet.
the GAO was basing it's guesses on stale data (again) on interim designs.
The GAO got the last word in commenting on the DoD response (Emphasis mine):

Design requirements for the B-2 include provisions for the B-2 aircraft to be deployed, without shelters, in all types of temperatures and climates. The operational test report for the interim B-2 concluded the B-2 must be sheltered or exposed only to the most benign environments (low humidity, no precipitation, moderate temperatures). According to B-2 Combined Test Force officials, permanent shelters at deployed locations are required. Therefore, while DOD commented that it is possible to deploy the B-2, it appears that effective operations from a forward operation location will require additional facilities and equipment not included in the original plan. The Air Force is still working to identify these additional requirements.

Yes. My goodness. Shelters are required because you can’t do body work or paint in the rain or high humidity. Go to your nearest Auto Body shop and ask them if they think this is worth mentioning. Aside from the passage being somewhat inaccurate in itself (different materials will ‘like’ different temps and humidity) you will also note there is not one, single, solitary, indication that the coatings “will dissolve in the rain”. THAT leap in logic sprang from the febrile minds of the anti-defense left and naïve isolationist/ peaceniks who then spoon-fed it (like SO many other myths) to their fellow-travelers: the all too willing 'Journalistas'.
Think about the “B-2 Rain Dissolves B-2 Coatings Myth” the next time you read something unofficial about the F-35.
EPILOGUE: So how’d the Block 30 B-2 do? Haven’t heard a thing about melting B-2s since 1997 have you? Air Force Magazine 1998:

Two B-2s deployed from Whiteman AFB, Mo., to Guam for a 10-day exercise in March and April. They achieved a 100 percent sortie success rate, flying almost 90 hours during the exercise. Because of recent damage to hangars at the base, one of the B-2s had to be left outside, exposed to the weather, which included driving rainstorms. The Air Force said that most maintenance, including that of low observables coatings, was performed outdoors. A spokesman for the 509th Bomb Wing said this "shot a hole" in the wild news reports last year that the B-2's stealthy coatings melt away in the rain.

Yet the 'myth' persists because the Luddites wish it so.

F-35 PAUC and APUC

Sheesh. I shouldn't surf the web after midnight (or at least not comment)

What I MEANT to type last night while commenting on a very good F-35 "Costs" article:

Kudos.
You honestly expand on a difficulty where many have seen opportunity to sow confusion.
PAUC among other things includes RDT&E and all costs associated with production of the item such as hardware/software, systems engineering (SE), engineering changes and warranties plus the costs of procuring technical data, training, support equipment, and initial spares. But there is one aspect of PAUC that can make it VERY inappropriate for telling people what something WILL cost them: PAUC includes ‘sunk’ cost.
Most notably, in the F-35’s case, it includes the percentage of the RDT&E, Production, Engineering, and Technical Data costs that have already been incurred. Since the primary production line and RDT&E capabilities for the F-35 are already stood up, and all the suppliers' engineering and production capabilities are running in place waiting for the higher production demand, this has to represent a huge chunk of PAUC [though APUC is still correct and part of PAUC I meant to type the latter] that is already sunk cost.
Try explaining to the man in the street that the PAUC went up because of conscious decisions to defer higher rates of production and stretch development to ‘reduce risks’ and NOT because the Contractor is jacking up the price. People’s eyes will glaze over if you try and explain everything that goes into the PAUC or APUC: Many of the costs tacked on to the PAUC would make no sense to the average citizen because we don’t buy things like a government does. Example: The Man in the Street doesn’t add the cost of a new garage to the cost of his new 4x4 because it is too big to put in the garage he already has. He pays the money and then observes he has bought a new 4&4 AND a new garage.
While PAUC is considered ‘true' costs of the plane by ‘some’, it isn’t. It is just an aggregation of a lot of direct costs that are then booked against each plane by dividing by the number of units. Obviously it includes the costs of infrastructure, new technology, and new knowledge. Much of it will invariably be used to advantage elsewhere – it just gets BOOKED against the program of record.
On the other hand URF is something people will understand because it’s the dollar cost number to buy ‘just one’. Just like the store down the street.
If you must, use both numbers. But only PAUC requires extensive explanation to prevent misrepresentation. And once you have significant sunk costs, to be completely honest with the public, you should also provide the PAUC for producing NO more units, including cancellation costs. If the requirement demands a new program after a cancellation, add the estimated PAUC for that program as well. Let the public see the true cost tradeoffs involved.

POGO Wrongly Cries “Foul!”... While Sniping in a Ghillie Suit

Guerrilla Reformers Falsely Accuse Defense Industry of Guerrilla Tactics 

UPDATED AND BUMPED 9 July 2012 (UPDATE BELOW: Look for the RED) 

Last week, POGO’s Ben Freeman posted another fact-free and ideologically-driven screed, this time at the ‘Puffington Host’ (You know where I mean. I try not to ever link to that swamp) titled “The Guerrilla Warfare of Pentagon Contractors”. To give you the flavor of the misdirection he peddles within, here’s a clip that gives a pretty good summation [emphasis mine]:

Last week Politico reported that defense contractor's new plan is to "threaten to send out layoff notices -- hundreds of thousands of them, right before Election Day." This threat is intended to frighten incumbents into rolling back the impending Budget Control Act sequestration, which would reduce Pentagon spending by roughly ten percent per year for the next ten years.

Despite the doomsday rhetoric and contractor funded "studies" reporting grossly overinflated job losses they claim would result if the Pentagon's more than half a trillion dollar budget is cut, there is absolutely no reason these companies would need to have massive layoffs. This is nothing more than a political stunt.

One would think POGO should know a stunt when they see one, but they either fell short this time or are willfully prevaricating. Perhaps it is because they aren’t too familiar with parts of acquisition law concerning Government contracting and labor rules? I do suppose there’s no exposure to the workings of the current monopsony in POGO’s exclusive digs in the Ivory Tower end of Castle 'Non-Profit'?

Contrast POGO’s flippant dismissal with this excerpt from a recent Defense News article:

Panetta’s meetings come a week after the heads of Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman and Pratt & Whitney met with top Office of Management and Budget officials seeking greater clarity on the government’s plan for implementing nearly $500 billion in mandatory defense cuts over the next decade that are scheduled to start Jan. 2.

OMB told the executives it does not plan to issue sequestration implementation guidance until after the November elections, sources said. The meeting was requested by Aerospace Industries Association President Marion Blakey.

Although defense industry leaders have long said that planning for sequestration will be difficult given it is unclear what the specific impact of automatic cuts will be, they have become increasingly vocal that job losses would be unavoidable starting in January.

And they’ve stressed that federal guidelines require them to notify their workers of potential mass layoffs at least 60 days in advance — that would be on the eve on the election.

Source: AEI

Having been one of the many people in the industry long enough to have found themselves on the receiving end of one of those federal ‘60 day notices’ when just one Government program was cancelled or cut back, and having witnessed many others, POGO’s dismissive attitude speaks volumes as to their indifference and/or ignorance. Multiple programs being suddenly cut/cancelled/impacted for reasons other than cause can only cause chaos in the industry. Carrying out such pointless cuts every year over a period of years? Sounds like POGO/Leftard heaven and National Defense Hell. Ask anyone who’s been around Defense Aerospace ‘more than a minute’. They’ll tell you: POGO is full of Sh*t.
Freeman’s POGO puff piece is irritating, but it is more important to keep in mind what this whole sequestration gambit is really about: Democrats playing political games with National Defense.

-------------------------

 Quick Sidebar: Hey! I see from their website that not only has Winslow Wheeler moved his shingle under the POGO rubric, he seems to have brought not only the Strauss Military Reform Project but also the Center for Defense Information with him (link)! I suppose this tells us something about how Reformers are dealing with a diminishing donor base. As I noted earlier: I love it when targets bunch up. On the downside, it seems “the radical trust fund baby cum 'photographer’[ HASN’T] got tired of paying his salary”.

-------------------------

Well Lookee’ Here!  POGO’s got Their Own ‘Snake Eaters’ On Point  

So While POGO’s Freeman is claiming the Defense Industry is employing ‘Guerilla Tactics”, I’ve noticed a marked uptick in the foreign blog and online alternative newspapers containing references to POGO’s pet ‘expert’ commentators. POGO ‘special operators/fellow travelers’ seem to be most active in F-35 Partner nations where economic conditions are tightest and in countries that represent existing or emerging markets for F-35 Foreign Military Sales (FMS). What a surprise (Not!). The most recent one to catch my eye was an English-version of a Korean ‘alternative’ paper article by one delightfully named ‘Stuart Smallwood’ who also mirrored most of his piece at his own blog.
Smallwood’s entire post reads like a POGO press release, and it is quite obvious from his phrasing and the conclusions surrounding his commentary that Mr. Smallwood (a ‘grad student’ in "Asian Studies" out of Canada now mucking around in other people’s cultures, Eh?) that he hasn’t a freakin’ clue as to what he is writing about. In the comments thread of his ‘blog’ last night I posted a challenge:

Heh. If I demonstrate that your post is erroneous on at least one or more key points, will you promise to never again publicly opine on defense topics about which you are ill-informed and not equipped [to discuss*]? And if so, will you also give POGO back the spoon with which they have been feeding you this stuff?

*I have an oversensitive touchpad on my laptop (that I keep turning off and Microsoft keeps turning on whenever they push updates) that causes me no end of typo and edit problems. I didn’t catch two words had dropped until after I posted my comment.


When I went back today to see if my kind offer was accepted I find not only was it rejected, but it seems to have been deleted (shocker). Not much of a Snake Eater after all, eh?
In the last comment on the short Smallwood thread, a thread which had quickly devolved into fantastic familial allegations about ‘bullying allies’, you will see as of this posting a comment (from his Mom?/Sister?) proclaiming: “bullying is everywhere!”. Perhaps Ms. Smallwood, perhaps. But it appears to be not nearly so widespread as intellectual cowardice. It’s to be expected under the circumstances I suppose. I have found that among the professions, the thick thinness of the skin is inversely proportional to the intellectual rigor required of its practitioners. [/snark ]

**************************** 

Update/Correction: Seems Smallwood's Got Game (Good on Him)

My comment has 'reappeared' in the thread:

I take back half the things I've said already. If he chooses wisely...Well. we'll see about the rest later.
Which point will I select for debunking?  I'm leaning towards "the myth of stealth". Stay tuned.

(Special thanks to my reader who e-mailed me the "head's up" on this development)

************** END OF UPDATE**************  

On a More Serious Note

Catching POGO in their machinations could be simply left as a case of blaming others for what they are guilty of: akin to when a grifter gets caught in the 'act'. But in the war of words, POGOs moves are a cross between Rules For Radicals and at least one of the best military theorists.

“If your enemy is secure at all points, be prepared for him. If he is in superior strength, evade him. If your opponent is temperamental, seek to irritate him. Pretend to be weak, that he may grow arrogant. If he is taking his ease, give him no rest. If his forces are united, separate them. If sovereign and subject are in accord, put division between them. Attack him where he is unprepared, appear where you are not expected.” 

—Sun Tzu

Their biggest disadvantage is that they scurry like vermin when the light hits them. 

P.S. Anyone else about had it with Blogger's formatting quirks?

Strange Silence on GAO F-35 June 2012 ‘Report’

F-35A USAF Photo

There’s evidence the report is either a blatant political hack job or there are absolutely NO experts on Reliability at the GAO. Take your pick – either reason is equally damning.

Has anyone else noticed the comparative ‘silence’ over the last F-35 GAO report compared to the previous releases? Other than the rather strange and rambling “F-35 by the Numbers” at DoD Buzz and the usual unattributed fear-mongering about “Costs!” at AOLPOGO Defense , this time around there hasn’t been much caterwauling coming out from under the usual rocks. My first thought was perhaps the POGO et al crowd was winding up to deliver another integrated PR attack against the program across a broad far-left front.

I decided to take the time to actually read the report itself in hopes of perhaps getting a preview of the latest Doomsayer topic du jour. Imagine my surprise when I found……not much: no blockbuster surprises, and surprisingly little hard information. There’s no ‘there’ there. It is “Same Sh*t. Different Day” in GAO-land.

There is a lot of unmitigated puffery and bull-hooey in this latest edition from the GAO. A good portion of it hinges on understanding the little ‘something’ within (as well as the missing associated bits) the report that strikes this experienced eye as more than a trifle ‘odd’. It is bizarre to the point it raises my suspicions that the F-35 program may either progressing better than ‘some’ would have us believe, or at least NOT doing as poorly as those same ‘some’ WISH we would believe.

If the GAO’s failings in this report are due to incompetence and inexperience, as is always my first instinct, I think that speaks of an even more unfortunate situation. We can overcome intrigue with the light from facts, figures and reason. But institutionalized incompetence? That can be a much tougher nut to crack. It was the part of the report that I found dubious. Quite frankly, it makes me wonder what it is doing in this report at all, unless its entire purpose is to prop up the rest of the report:

According to program office data, the CTOL and STOVL variants are behind expected reliability growth plans at this point in the program. Figure 9 depicts progress of each variant in demonstrating mean flying hours between failures as reported by the program office in October 2011 and compares them to 2010 rates, the expectation at this point in time, and the ultimate goal at maturity.  

As of October 2011, reliability growth plans called for the STOVL to have achieved at least 2.2 flying hours between failures and the CTOL at least 3.7 hours by this point in the program. The STOVL is significantly behind plans, achieving about 0.5 hours between failures, or less than 25 percent of the plan. CTOL variant has demonstrated 2.6 hours between failures, about 70 percent of the rate expected at this point in time. The carrier variant is slightly ahead of its plan; however, it has flown many fewer flights and hours than the other variants.

JSF officials said that reliability rates are tracking below expectations primarily because identified fixes to correct deficiencies are not being implemented and tested in a timely manner. Officials also said the growth rate is difficult to track and to confidently project expected performance at maturity because of insufficient data from the relatively small number of flight hours flown. Based on the initial low reliability demonstrated thus far, the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation reported that the JSF has a significant challenge ahead to provide sufficient reliability growth to meet the operational requirement. 

The explicit characterization “the CTOL and STOVL variants are behind expected reliability growth plans at this point in the program” can only spring from willful distortion and misrepresentation of the facts in hand OR -- more likely-- from a pack of feral accountants and auditors nobly working around a gaping chasm in their own consequential knowledge as to how aircraft reliability programs actually ‘work’. Only someone who had no idea of the true relevance of the data they had in their unprepared little hands would make such a statement. In demonstrating how aircraft reliability programs proceed, measurements are made, and performance is evaluated and graded, we will reveal the ludicrous, unintentional and laughable silliness of the GAO report excerpt above. That there apparently was no one in the Program Office that could have disabused them of this ignorance is even more disconcerting. 

For future reference then, I offer an introductory tutorial on how aircraft 'reliability' programs work, I’ll focus mostly on the F-35A numbers, but what is true for the F-35A is even truer for the F-35B and C as they have even fewer flight hours.

Aircraft Reliability Isn’t Graded in the Cradle

 Let’s begin by noting that by the end of October 2011, the timeframe given above, only approximately 2000 total flight hours had beenflown by all three F-35 variants. Given the F-35A had been flying more and in larger numbers than the other variants through to that timeframe, we can safely assume the F-35A flight hours make up at least half of the 2000 hour total (~1000-1200 hours?). The failure rates shown for the CTOL version include those flown by AA-1, the de facto F-35 prototype which was markedly different from later aircraft (and is now retired from flight and undergoing live fire testing). Given that the typical operating hours accumulated before aircraft type designs are considered ‘mature’ enough to evaluate and grade system reliability is 100,000 fleet flight hours (RAND TR-763Summary, Pg xiii), just mentioning an F-35A reliability metric at the ~1% mark is pointless. Assigning any meaning to the same value and framing a narrative around it demonstrates profound stupidity and/or a hostile agenda.
As there are three major variants of the F-35, and the chart above shows values for all three variants, I would assume there was cause for the program to take some composite approach to benchmarking the F-35, whereby a value lower than 100,000 hours for each variant may have been selected due to commonality and overlap between systems (100000 hours for each variant, while more statistically pure for benchmarking performance would have probably seemed as overgenerous and overkill to non-R&Mers… especially ‘bean counters’). Unless the program is supremely confident in the parts of the F-35 that are unique to each variant, they should keep the 100,000 hour benchmark at least for those unique variant aspects, but given the complexity of tracking partial and full system reliability, I doubt any program would view such an approach to reliability as workable. This means that when they get to a point late in the maturation process, that if the unique systems and features of the variants aren’t measured against a 100,000 hours benchmark, they had better be ‘ahead of the curve’ for what normally would be expected in their reliability performance.

How Programs Track Reliability Growth

One may ask: How programs achieve target reliability benchmarks in their maturity if they aren’t being ‘graded’ on their progress as they go forward? The answer is they ARE evaluated; it is just that they are evaluated in terms of trends for discovering and eliminating root causes, as well as in relation to other metrics to arrive at what the performance ‘means’ as part of the process of achieving required system reliability . Depending upon how far along the program is in maturing the system; the reliability performance at the time will mean different things and require different corrective or reinforcing actions. To illustrate what is evaluated, how a system is ‘matured’, and why it is impossible for a system to be ‘mature’ when it is first fielded, it is helpful to employ a typical reliability chart format with notional data for further reference and discussion. The following chart plots out a hypothetical weapon system’s Mean Time Between Critical Failure (MTBCF) performance, as I suspect the GAO report incorrectly refers to as ‘Mean Time Between Failure’, though all the observations we are about to make concerning same are true in either case. ‘Conveniently’ for our purposes, the hypothetical weapon system in this chart has the identical 2.60 hours MTBCF at 2000 hours, with the ultimate goal of 6 Hours MTBCF at 100000 flight hours, the same as noted in the GAO report for the F-35A.

Notional MTBCF Plot: Copyright 2012 Elements of Power

The reader should immediately note that the chart above is plotted in a ‘Log-Log’ format: both chart axes are plotted using a logarithmic scale. This has the effect of allowing the clear display of early values, where wider variations in data are to be expected and of showing trends (and deviations from same) more accurately. As more statistically relevant data is accumulated, on through to where the system maturity point is selected for determination as to whether or not the system meets the reliability requirement, the deviation from the mean value should lessen (more about that later). The reader should also observe that there are three values logged after the notional 2.60 ‘measurement’.

These values illustrate that the ‘current’ value evaluated at any point in time is usually a few measurements behind the latest measurements because the latest values will have to be “adjudicated” to ensure they are error free. Adjudication can be a daunting, time-consuming process (voice of experience) that often requires iterative communications between the Reliability and Maintainability group and units in the field before the data is purged of errors.

Some actual examples come to mind that illustrate how errors are introduced. On one of my past programs, there was an episode where there appeared to be a sudden increase in failures and subsequent removal and replacement of a cockpit component. It was only through careful review and correlation of several months’ worth of event data that impossible crew sizes (you can’t get 20+ people in a cockpit at one time) were revealed, which led to R&M eventually finding out that the maintainer organizations were running a series of training events and incorrectly logging them against the aircraft.

The adjudication process itself may also contribute to the eventual improvement of the weapon system’s reliability score. One category of maintenance logged against an aircraft is ‘For Other Maintenance’ (FOM). “Once upon a time” a certain weapon system was showing excessive low observable “Red X” events which flagged a certain area of the plane as experiencing frequent Low Observable outer-mold line (surface) failures (this also generated an inordinate amount of aircraft ‘downtime’ affecting another metric). Through inaccurate logging of the ‘How Malfunctioned’ (How Mal) code, the data masked the fact that the LO maintenance was driven by the need to restore the surface treatments to complete the removal and replacement (R&R) of a component located behind the surface that required restoration. This incorrect data not only pointed the program R&M efforts in a wrong direction, it helped mask the impact, and delayed the ‘fixing’, of what was considered prior to this discovery to be a low priority “nuisance” software glitch. Priority was then given to fixing the ‘glitch’ and along with a change to tech data, a maintenance and reliability ‘high-driver’ was completely eliminated.

The values shown at individual points on the chart above are not the cumulative value from current and all previous data points. They represent a value arrived at from a regression analysis of the last 3-6 data points (usually taken monthly) and the latest snapshot trends are used for further evaluation in conjunction with other performance data to determine true progress and problem trends. I’ve placed markers at various flight hour totals to illustrate points where the possible half-way and full reliability flight hour measurement periods might be for our hypothetical program to illustrate just how far away 1000-1200 flight hours are from any likely MTBCF ‘grading’ point. 

Dominant Factors When Experience is Low

‘Failures’ logged and tracked fall into three broad categories: Inherent or Design-Driven, Induced, or No Fault Found/Cannot Duplicate (NFF/CND) aka ‘false alarm’. When the flight hours of a new weapon system are few, the data tends to be more representative of operator and program learning curves than actual aircraft reliability, to the point that ‘No Fault Found’ and ‘Induced’ often represent one half to two-thirds of the total ‘failures’ so it is entirely within the realm of the possible that this is true at this time for the F-35. If the F-35 failure rate was driven by design problems we would expect to also see the GAO warning of undesirable ‘mission readiness rates’, ‘maintenance man-hours per flying hours’ or other negative performance measures. Without these kinds of details, any standalone MTBCF number is meaningless. Given there is no mention in the (GAO) report what we would expect to see if the F-35’s ‘failures’ to-date were dominated by design problems, I suspect the design reliability might be seen as ‘pretty good’ at this point in time by the R&Mers (Program Managers will always want ‘more’-and ‘sooner’-- so one will ever claim ‘good enough’ until all the reliability measurement hours are adjudicated).

US Navy Photo

STOVL Sidebar

The GAO report notes the STOVL ‘reliability’ figure as being even farther below the ‘expected’ value. As the first production F-35Bs were delivered in January of 2012 after the period ‘graded’, and the total hours flown must be far less than even the ‘A’ model’s paltry ~1000-1200 flight hours, the GAO even showing the numbers, much asserting that the “STOVL is significantly behind plans” is pitiable ignorant, but still useful for two reasons I’m certain the GAO didn’t intend.
First, the GAO’s statements clearly tie the numbers presented to a ‘plan’, Whether this ‘plan’ they refer to is the calendar schedule (which I suspect is true) or they are referring to planned flight hours through October 2011, both are inappropriate to use for MTB(C)F. The ACTUAL hours are what are relevant to the metric, and we’ve already covered how limited experience means less meaningful data.
Second, the STOVL observations help highlight something I’ve dealt with previously in managing small fleet performance improvements: something I call “The Tyranny of Small Numbers”. The very limited number of aircraft evaluated means that even a single ‘early’ failure event for one aircraft carries larger penalties than for a larger fleet. May we expect many more years of ‘behind plan’ reports from the GAO as a result of the ‘concurrency’ bogeyman used as an excuse to stretch the program?
At the end of the period covered in the GAO report was when the B models were getting some pretty important part number rollovers implemented.  Besides also highlighting the fact GAO is always way behind in reporting compared to the current status and thus always out of date, perhaps this was the source of the “because identified fixes to correct deficiencies are not being implemented and tested in a timely manner” cheap shot in the GAO report? (More about that below.) 

How Programs Manage Reliability Growth to Maturity

In viewing the chart above, the reader will see three dashed lines. The ‘red line’ is established at a level where the program sets a value where the program has decided any time the metric moves below the red line will trigger extra attention as to determining root causes, evaluating corrective actions in work and/or possibly decide additional actions are warranted. The ‘blue line’ represents the level of desired or expected reliability performance at every point along the timeline. As the program proceeds the values recorded should cluster progressively tighter at or above the blue line. Both the red and the blue line may be straight lines as shown, or curved. They may also incorporate ‘steps’ to reflect intermediate thresholds that the program office is expecting to meet. If the system performance moves much above the ‘green line’ representing the weapon system’s specified reliability requirement, believe it or not the program may review the weapon system to eliminate the ‘extra’ reliability if the extra reliability is achieved by incurring associated higher costs. 

Value and Tradeoffs

It must be remembered that every performance specification requirement is arrived at during the requirements process by making tradeoffs between performance values and the costs to achieve those values to meet mission requirements. If any single performance metric, such as MTBCF fails to achieve the specified levels, the real impact of same is not understood by just looking at the metric as a standalone. MTBCF is one of the more interesting metrics in that once the MTBCF rises above the expected (and designed) sortie length, the relevance of the metric begins shifting more towards its implications for and impacts to other metrics. By way of example, if our hypothetical program achieves 5.9 hours MTBCF, the probability of successfully completing the mission is reduced by an insignificant amount compared to the specified 6.0 hours. If the Mean Time to Repair (MTTR) is but a fraction of the allowable time and/or the Maintenance Man-Hours Per Flying Hour (MMH/FH) is lower than the maximum allowable, the program office would have to determine the value (cost vs. benefit) of pursuing that last 6 minutes between failures before deciding to ‘go after it’. By ‘value’ I mean if such metrics as the MTTR and MMH/FH are better than the predicted and required levels, the program will have to examine the impact of the increased material costs (if any) from that 6 minute 'shortfall' over the life of the program in balance against all the other factors.  
Since the GAO report fails to highlight the existence of poor MMH/FH and MTTR numbers, AND we know from the program announcements that flight test operations are ahead of current schedule for flights and test points, we can be almost certain that the internals of the performance data shine a better light on the program performance than the GAO is attempting to cast.
 
Of course even if all the data were known, this doesn’t mean a hypothetical POGO-like organization or sympathetic ‘news’ outlet wouldn’t, in their manifest ignorance and/or pursuit of a non-defense agenda, still bleat false claims of ‘cheating’ on the requirements. (Remember what I said earlier about institutionalized ignorance?).

Early in any program, there may be at any one time, one particular subsystem or component, or even false or induced failures that are standout ‘problems’ (Note: these days it is usually because systems do so well overall. Want to talk REAL maintenance burden? Pick something fielded before the 80s). In such instances the program may maintain and report two or more reliability number sets and plots showing trends for the overall system and the impacts of the offending parts or induced failure events on the overall performance as part of developing a corrective action. These contingencies very often need no more attention other than monitoring and are eventually cleared up through carrying out previously planned part number ‘rollovers’, completing the training of personnel, or updating technical data. The point again, is: mere snapshots of reliability performance without knowing trends and the ‘internals’ of the data are useless.  
The GAO comment above stating “JSF officials said that reliability rates are tracking below expectations primarily because identified fixes to correct deficiencies are not being implemented and tested in a timely manner” is “priceless”--for two reasons. First, given that early MTBCF data is tenuous at best, this may again highlight GAO (and possibly F-35 Program) naiveté on the subject. Reacting prematurely with very little data to implement fixes to things that may not be a problem is a recipe for wasting money. Second, if the ‘fixes’ haven’t been implemented ‘yet’ it is probably due to the F-35 Program Office priorities in having them implemented: planes fielded to-date are needed for other program requirements and this would prevent ‘instant’ fixes.

I seriously doubt the Program Office can’t get the contractor to do anything that it wants them to do given the budgets allocated and number of aircraft available. My experience tells me otherwise. If the GAO citation is correct, then shame on the Program Office for foisting the blame on the contractor.
Competent evaluation of program performance and sober observations resulting from such observations hardly drive web traffic, bring donors, or sell periodicals these days. (Just sayin') So while there are seeds above for quite a few questions that a curious ‘reformer’ or journalist (if either  even exist) might use these seeds to ask the GAO some pretty hard questions if they were interested in understanding and reporting what might be really going on within the F-35 program. 

Given the record of many of those so-called ‘reformers’, commercial websites and periodicals, we probably shouldn’t expect any sober observations. Given their demonstrated willful ignorance on the topic to-date, whether or not we could believe the answers reported is another question in itself.  

F-35A, USAF Photo

Personal Note: My apologies for not posting more lately, but my personal priorities place family needs and work ahead of play, and the need for attending to my family and work have been fairly high the last week or so, and I anticipate the situation to persist for at least a month.