Centennial of Naval Aviation #1

Thought I'd post something special to commemorate the Centennial of Naval Aviation. There may be more. Here's a crop of a photo (copyright mine) that's never been published anywhere before.

Three sailors are relaxing on the flight deck of the USS Langley en route from Hampton Roads to their new home port in San Diego, CA in 1924. In the photo, the sailor on the left is a machinist's mate who fabricated parts for the embarked aviation assets as well as the ship. A 'Journeyman' of History: an Aviation Machinist's Mate before they were given the title. He would leave the Navy just in time for the Great Depression. Hard times took him back to the home he had run away from in Durango, Colorado in 1912 -- when he was 12. There he would 'cowboy' on a ranch and start his family. When war clouds loomed, he took his young family back to SoCal, where he was a machinist,fabricator, and tool & die man for a shop that was a Lockheed subcontractor through the end of WW2. Among other things, he fabricated manifolds (intake/exhaust) for the XP-38.


He is my late Grandfather -- my late Father's Father. He introduced me to Logarithms and Trigonometry before I knew what they were - and made certain I would never get a tattoo by pointing to his own many inkspots as dire warnings every chance he had.

KC-X: The Inevitable

Well, this post is only for the purposes of closing the loop (finally/hopefully/perhaps?) on the long drawn-out saga of the KC-X contract, in which we conclude that alas, Crony Capitalism wins another 'big one'. Sad.
The only good news is that the Boeing aircraft is tiny enough to almost make the KC-Y competition mandatory down the road. Of course that still sucks for the taxpayer.

Update: All I did was change my links to Will Collier's site instead. His quote from memory pretty much captures the entire saga within a paragraph. If you want the long story, click on my "Boeing BS Watch" link under 'Themes on this Site" to the right.

Performance Based Logistics vs. The Evil Empire

Military.com's DoDBuzz site had an interesting bit on a new projection for the F-35s support costs showing higher costs for the F-35 than the legacy systems it replaces. The article isn't entirely balanced (a sister site has a slightly less informative but more even-handed treatment of the topic) but it brings almost all of the major points out in the open. There are interests at the Government's depots that have a vested interest in killing F-35 PBL, and all similar PBL arrangements.

PBL creates public-private partnerships that to-date have performed superbly: all systems have saved money by all estimates, while enabling equal or better weapon system readiness.

The GAO has taken a couple of shots at PBL on behalf of its masters. Nearly 6 years ago Steve Geary and Kate Vitasek, two research and faculty associates at the Aerospace and Defense Clearinghouse at The University of Tennessee called it for what it is: "A War of Ideas".

GAO recommended that the Defense Dept. should “demonstrate whether performance-based logistics contracts are resulting in reduced costs and increased performance, develop procedures to track whether program offices validate their business-case decisions and verify the reliability of contractor cost and performance data.” The Pentagon is facing a budget crunch of epic proportions, and the best the GAO can come up with after reviewing a slew of successful PBL programs is to add red tape?

GAO’s headline could just as easily read: “Defense Management: PBL Contracts Meeting or Exceeding Weapons System Performance Goals; Costs Appear to be on Track.” Like the GAO, we have looked into PBL across a number of programs and companies. Though challenges remain, the results delivered by many of these programs are as compelling as the available case studies. PBL can work, and that’s what GAO should be talking
about. It’s a war of ideas.

No matter how complicated an acquisition becomes, the essential beauty of PBL shines through. PBL contracts fundamentally align the interests of contractors with the Pentagon. If both do the job right, contractors make more money. To do this, they find ways to deliver better system performance at lower total ownership costs, so the Pentagon wins, too.

The thing that I like about PBL, is that unlike a lot of other promising programs that come down the pike, we haven't had to get it right out of the box: it's working while we're still learning how to make it work. GAO may hate that they can't quantify the magnitude to their liking yet, but they can't ignore the vector.

As to the F-35's PBL, the DoD brought in an outsider to help shape the program. they must have done an OK job-- Guess what program was selected by Defense Logistics as having the 'Best Logistics Strategy' for 2010?

Almost forgot. I had an interesting (and LONG ) exchange in the Buzz comments (may be still going on for all I know) with someone I've come to think of as "The Cost Accounting Kid". He's brimming with confidence in his ideas, hawking a self-published book full of them. Almost all of his ideas seem to be in common use already, with an exception that will require a change in the FARs - and we never got around to talking about it in detail as we seem to have gone everyplace else -even into "Bush"-es. He'll either learn or reality will break him. Yep... I was pig wrasslin' again. My favorite part was where he expressed gratitude that I didn't have the ear of 'politicians and generals'. Heh. One thing we do have in common is the opinion on cost accounting as it is currently practiced: It sucks. Beyond that, I'd just be happy if everyone played by the rules, including the laws of physics.

Happy Fifth Blogiversary!!!

Five years ago my first post was put up. This is #386. I have two major drafts in work. One IEDs/EFPs and Persistence, and the other is on Close Air Support Myths. Hope to get them out soon.

Thanks for all the comments. Roughly 96% are via e-mails. I may loosen up the comment rules to make it easier for those who've asked.

"What Military-Industrial Complex?" Update

Just updated and expanded the What Military-Industrial Complex? post below.

Chuck Schumer Watch: Vol. 1, Ch.1

In a bid to become the Senior Ranking Clown on the Senate Select Committee for Hybris, Chuck Schumer trots out yet another, horrible, ill-conceived, moronic and yes even 'stupid' idea. 'Former Spook' has the whole sad story.


...And yes! I've decided to give Chuckie his very own special ''watch' category for a while.

50 Years Later: WHAT Military Industrial Complex?

Today is the 50th Anniversary of President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s 'Farewell Address'. A speech most famous for coining the now trite phrase: "Military-Industrial Complex".

A vital element in keeping the peace is our military establishment. Our arms must be mighty, ready for instant action, so that no potential aggressor may be tempted to risk his own destruction. Our military organization today bears little relation to that known of any of my predecessors in peacetime, or, indeed, by the fighting men of World War II or Korea.

Until the latest of our world conflicts, the United States had no armaments industry. American makers of plowshares could, with time and as required, make swords as well. But we can no longer risk emergency improvisation of national defense. We have been compelled to create a permanent armaments industry of vast proportions. Added to this, three and a half million men and women are directly engaged in the defense establishment. We annually spend on military security alone more than the net income of all United States corporations.

Now this conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience. The total influence -- economic, political, even spiritual -- is felt in every city, every Statehouse, every office of the Federal government. We recognize the imperative need for this development. Yet, we must not fail to comprehend its grave implications. Our toil, resources, and livelihood are all involved. So is the very structure of our society.

In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist. We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes. We should take nothing for granted. Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and goals, so that security and liberty may prosper together.

Times change. Eisenhower’s warning was actually against too much government spending – spending which suppresses the private sector activity which actually generates revenues. It was just at the time, the defense budget had not yet wound down from WW2 and Korean War levels, and the post war consumer spending was very low. Replace Eisenhower-Era spending threats with modern day ones and you would have to rewrite this speech warning against the Social Spending-Entitlement Complex. This new complex has managed to fence itself largely from that most deceptive category: discretionary spending. Yet it is still there, waiting for some people of courage to whittle it down to size.

To commemorate this anniversary, I’ve updated information from a past posting. Once again, we ask: What Military –Industrial Complex? It doesn’t exist. Even if some of these rubes might insist that it does.


What Military Industrial Complex?: 2010 Edition

Here's a graphic showing the 2010 Fortune 500 Companies and their 2010 revenues. Included are defense and non-defense companies and revenues.


See a M-I Complex sitting there? Neither do I. Let's look closer.....

Here's a closer look at just the Fortune 100. Lockheed Martin is the Number 1 defense contractor. So we have to go down the list of America's largest companies about half way (#44)and well into the long-tail of the listing to get to the biggest of the defense contractors. Only 6 of the top 10 defense contractors even make it into the Fortune 100, and about half of those wouldn't be there without their non-defense revenues.

Update 22 Jan 2011: I should have also mentioned some things you probably don't know about the makeup of the current (2010) list of the Top 100 US Defense Contractors.

1. Ten of the Top 100 'defense industries' are energy/oil companies. (The GWOT burns a lot of gas, eh?)

2. Five of the Top 100 'defense industries' are Health Care/Managment companies. (TriCare Anyone?)

3. Four of the Top 100 'defense industries' are Governments: Canada, Germany, and two Native Alaskan "corporations".

4. The combined 2010 revenues of JUST the top ten Fortune 500 companies that have NO "Top 100" defense revenues is nearly TEN POINT EIGHT TIMES (~10.72963255)
greater than the combined defense revenues of all 100 top defense companies ($2,616,482.90M vs. $243,856M).

5. Walmart revenues alone are about 1.6 times the total defense revenues of the Top 100 Defense Contractors.

6. Warren Buffet's Berkshire Hathaway has 46+% the revenues of the defense revenues of the Top 100 Defense Contractors. How many shareholders does Berkshire Hathaway have? How many have 'control' of the company? 20? 10? 1? I'd say any of those choices could be called a concentration of economic influence and power.

...and don't forget we've got a war on boys and girls.


Time for the social-engineering/anti-defense crowd to get a new Bogeyman. I repeat: WHAT Military-Industrial Complex?

Stealth References

It seems like we're starting to see even more misinformation (or is it dezinformatsia?) on the JSF than usual on the web. It almost feels like a concerted movement to undermine the whole program. I'll give a specific example of such disinformation: "The F-35 is Very Low Observable (or Low Observable) from the front (or similar limited qualification)". I've run into this kind of statement more frequently ever since a certain Australian website published some cartoons of the F-35 with drawn patterns illustrating guesses at RF signature patterns based upon eyeball estimation of the effects of the F-35's Outer Mold Line shaping....and called it a 'study'.

There is absolutely nothing official and available on the F-35's RF signature (surprise? duh!) that would support such an assertion. All that I have been able to locate as sources for such information are speculation, allusions and inferences. While at the same time, one can find multiple 'official' programmatic sources stating the F-35 RF signature characteristics are described as "Very Low Observable"(VLO), "All Aspect"*, or "All Aspect VLO". I have an idea these misconceptions come from a basic ignorance of what 'Stealth' is, how it 'works', and how it now shapes the battlespace where radar once dominated.

*Note: The F-22 is commonly described as 'all aspect' as well, but in using this term for fighters it often excludes/excuses the signature an angle, as narrow as possible, to the direct rear of the aircraft.

The following commentary is taken almost verbatim from a comment I made on another site a while back, concerning what you need to know - as a minimum - to even begin intelligently discussing the fundamentals of Low Observables (Stealth). I'm posting it here now because I have a feeling I'm going to need to point people to this kind of information more and more.

____________________________

If one insists on discussing or opining on Low Observable "technology", one would do well to begin by reading Paterson. In his Survivability Benefits from the Use of Standoff Weapons by Stealth Aircraft(AIAA 1999-0105503), Figure 2 is a nice graphic with a range of objects, their estimated signature return in flat plate square meters and equivalent dBsm. On the high end we find a warship with 10000 sq meter return (about 40 dBsm). On the low end we have a small insect at .0001 sq meter return equivalent (about -40 dBsm). In Paterson's 1997 paper Measuring Low Observable Technology's Effects on Combat Aircraft Survivability (AIAA 97554) his figure 3 has a 'notional' Radar Cross Section (RCS) listing for various aircraft from Howe's Introduction to the Basic Technology of Stealth Aircraft: Part 1 & 2 (see Paterson for full citation) There we see that Howe estimates the B-1B return at .75 sq meter, or over an order of magnitude less than has been speculated on elsewhere.

Reading these resources will give one some proper perspective on how one should think about the effects of the relative RCS of different objects on their detectability. If you have the time and the math background, get a copy of Radar Cross Section by Knott, Shaeffer & Tuley. This resource will also give you some background on how RCS objectives are selected, optimized and implemented in an aircraft's design to satisfy mission requirements.

But none of the above actually tells us what the challenges are in operating in a threat environment. I only know of one public source that deals with it, and we're in luck: RAND has been really expanding its ".pdf file" archives online of late and the little Route Planning Issues for Low Observable Aircraft and Cruise Missiles is once again available, although somewhat dated. [Update from original: Dr. Rebecca Grant's The Radar Game has been reissued online under the auspices of the AFA's Mitchell Institute. The Radar Game should be considered a standard primer on the history and development of radar and it's antithesis: 'Stealth' for the general readership.]

Now turn to Ball's AIAA classic textbook on 'Survivability': The Fundamentals of Aircraft Survivability Analysis and Design. You can get the first edition used cheap these days, but as it predates the public arrival of Stealth, LO is not a separate topic - you have to read between the lines. The second edition gives an overview but does not focus on stealth per se, but it is covered. Most importantly, both editions thoroughly examine and explain the 'kill chain' which will provide one some perspective on what all this 'low observability' actually does to disrupt the kill chain. LO can break the chain at every link, and be used to exploit even the smallest bit of RF clutter, confusion, or gap, as well as natural perturbations in the environment.

F-35B Status, Challenges

If you want to acquire some useful information on the current state of the F-35B 'technicals' skip fact-free speculation and simple handwringing and go read Stephen Trimble's piece at Flight Global. It's still got a little gloom in it, but the facts presented make an old engineer feel more upbeat about the F-35B's future.

Ain't nothing in there I can see that can't be fixed with reasonable time and dollars: two years and the announced budget should cover it. Let's just hope there are no show-stoppers yet to be uncovered.

Getting Helos Back in the Fight

'Solomon' at SNAFU! has an interesting post covering the return to service of two HH-60 Seahawks that had a little 'accidental contact' in late 2008. Interesting story and photos.

The Crash of Moccasin 02.
Snafu's post reminds me of a mishap a buddy of mine had on a H-53 Pave Low III after Desert Storm. This bird already had repaired combat damage from the SS Mayaguez rescue operation on it's logs (Most people have no idea how many times the Pave Low III airframes had been 'remanufactured' and had seen action from Vietnam to their retirement).

Initially, this was listed as a Class A mishap. By the final review of the accident and through judicious scrounging in the Boneyard, it had been revised down to a 'Class B'. I checked the records again years later and a miracle had occurred: it was then listed as a 'Class C'. A lot is broken with the Air Force, but the Pilot Protection System is apparently running just fine.

File this under "I got my 1000hrs 'Pave Low'. I got my war. I got my crash. - I'm outta here!"

This little meeting with a sand dune broke the boom off, scattered a lot of piece parts, rolled the FLIR ball backwards into the belly.

This episode provided me with enough material for three term papers on Human Factors, System Safety, and Cockpit Resource Management while pursuing two different college degrees. I probably know more than I should about this crash, not because I know one of the survivors, but because somebody did an awful redaction job in response to a FOIA request.

When I'm certain all the parties are no longer flying anywhere, I'll publish the whole, sad tale.

Long Range Strike Moves Forward.....Finally?

...and is it in the right direction? Tech. Sgt. Shane A. Cuomo / Air Force

I'll reserve judgement until after the details inevitably emerge.

In today's announcement President Obama's Most Useful Idiot (why there seems to always be someone who until asked is NOT-generally-a-tool willing to be the front-man giving cover to Administrations that are malevolent and destructive to the national defense , I'll never understand) had this to say at least:

Finally, a major area of new investment for the Air Force will be a new long-range, nuclear-capable penetrating bomber. This aircraft, which will have the option of being remotely piloted, will be designed and developed using proven -- using proven technologies, an approach that should make it possible to deliver this capability on schedule and in quantity.

It is important that we begin this project now to ensure that a new bomber can be ready before the current aging fleet goes out of service. The follow-on bomber represents a key component of a joint portfolio of conventional deep-strike capabilities, an area that should be a high priority for future defense investment, given the anti-access challenges our military faces.

Of what was explicitly stated, I would only call the 'optionally-manned' criteria as 'gross stupidity' - and probably a product of an internal AF/DoD political schism . Being of a highly suspicious nature on this topic for some reason, we'll see what the emphasis on 'existing technology' means: could be 'good' but with this crowd one never knows.

The issue as to what kind of long range platform is needed and the open questions surrounding it were covered fairly well in a recent Air Force (Air Force Association) magazine article. The same source has a pretty good backgounder on the status quo here.

I might comment on the remaining gems and turds in this punchbowl of an announcement elsewhere. Alas, there's a few of the former and piles of the latter.

Hope Springs Eternal: 2011 edition

New Year.... New Pic

HAPPY NEW YEAR???

We'll see..... (Still waiting).

I got time.

F-35B: Second Guessing the Marines

...Is this the latest fad?
Well, there seems to be no end of people who are second guessing the Marine Corps over their desire for the F-35B and how they plan to use it.

At Defense Tech (here) I'm having an exchange in the comments with an earnest young man (I’m guessing age mid-20s, probably a ‘gamer’) who is a prime example of what I’m talking about. He seems to really want his questions answered, so I thought I’d oblige him. His ‘questions’ were:

[1] “What scenario do you envision that requires a $100+ million-dollar V/STOL aircraft for air superiority?”
[2] “How do you expect eight of said aircraft to be able to secure that airspace and still deliver meaningful CAS?”
[3] “Why have a CAS aircraft that can't actually operate in a stealth configuration with a real weapons load?

My ‘short’ answer, after asking if he REALLY wanted answer was:

Sorry for the delay (been away having a life).The short answer is: your questions are flawed, irrelevant, simplistic or some combination thereof. The first question hinges on what is, according to data in evidence, a falsifiable assumption (F-35B variant unit cost) that is presented as fact and contains an implication that some previous claim was made for an F-35B in the ‘air superiority’ role . I’ll set aside the inflated cost claim, and the ‘air superiority’ aspect poses no problem. The ‘meaningful’ qualifier is ambiguous and problematic by itself. [RE: “V/STOL”- I assume you made a simple transposition error as there are very obvious differences between a V/STOL and STOVL (F-35B) system]. The second question presumes a scenario whereby eight F-35B’s are the total number of aircraft available. Again, not a problem, but more probable force structures should be discussed. The third question can be construed as containing an attempt to ‘poison the well’ in asserting the F-35B can’t operate in a CAS role in a Day One (stealth) configuration, while using another ambiguous modifier (‘real’) attached to ‘weapons load’ in an attempt to write off the internal capability as inadequate, without also providing quantifiable justification. My answers will be provided as part of a coherent narrative, with specific points tied to the ‘questions’ through the use of brackets “[ ]” with the relevant question number(s) within. When necessary, explicit observations relative to the questions will be provided. Given space limitations here at DT, the response may be posted elsewhere and a link provided here.

Since the ‘short’ answer required two posts, I’m providing a more full response as follows. (I’ll place a link at the thread.)

The Long Answer
The USMC’s philosophical basis for Warfighting is the overarching operational concept ‘Operational Maneuver From the Sea’ (OMFTS), which builds upon the Navy’s littoral warfare concepts. It integrates the USMC’s ideas on future amphibious operations and maneuver warfare. Within OMFTS, the basic building block for all expeditionary operations is the Marine Air to Ground Task Force (MAGTF). MAGTFs are always ‘task organized’: that is to say their composition and scale are dictated by the operational objectives. Since their composition and scale are determined by mission, the only time a MAGT would deploy with a small number of F-35Bs would be if the mission only required a small number of F-35Bs [2] . If a small number of F-35Bs were deployed (ex: 6-8), this would suggest a limited, probably single-facet mission (ex: Air-to-Air OR Air-to- Ground) or sequential allocations of single-facet missions (ex: Air-to-Air THEN Air-to- Ground) as part of an operation that is far below the level of effort that is required to conduct a major assault, perhaps as part of providing security for an humanitarian aid, disaster relief or evacuation operation [1,2] . For large scale military operations, such as that similar to a Desert Storm, a relatively large number of F-35s (20+ per LHA/D as modern versions of “Harrier Carriers) could be provided.
It is important to keep in mind that in whatever role/mission the USMC F-35Bs will perform; they are performing their mission as part of the Air Combat Element (ACE) in an integrated Combined Arms combat action. As such, F-35 operations are intrinsically tied to the MAGTF effort, and will conduct their missions in support of the MAGTF effort as a maneuver element of the MAGTF. The scale of the F-35B operational responsibilities is thus scaled to the MAGTF effort in such a way that all missions and sorties flown (SEAD/DEAD, Interdiction, ISR, Air Superiority and Close Air Support) are conducted on a scale no larger than that needed to perform their mission as part of the overall MAGTF mission. For example, when the Marines talk ‘Air Superiority’ they are talking LOCAL Air Superiority: protecting a three dimensional airspace sufficient to provide protection to the Ground Combat Element (GCE) from air attack (and in concert with MAGTF Air Defense units). This is a distinctly different concept of ‘Air Superiority’ than the Air Force’s concept.
The Air Force plans and executes the mission of providing Air Dominance (Air Superiority to the ‘nth degree’) in any theater it is tasked, and manages its assets to meet that mission best on a theater-wide scale. If needed, the F-35 provides the Marines the capability to move from an Air-Air engagement to Air-Ground mode or vice versa without any reconfiguration: a capability that in itself allows for using fewer aircraft to do the same mission than in the past [1,2,3] . The Marine MAGTF concept of operating from austere fields reduces dependencies on large runways and increases operational flexibility. The Marines have determined that ‘operational flexibility’ is an overarching requirement for their expeditionary forces and have shown a willingness to give up other force attributes for the sake of gaining that flexibility. Note: An excellent example of how the Marines have operated in austere conditions while leveraging the operational flexibility of the far less capable and more logistics intensive AV-8B (than F-35) can be found here . The Marines created and have sustained their Expeditionary Logistics capability as a unique effective asset for supporting such operations. They use the forward positioning and logistics to leverage more sorties out of their aircraft by reducing transit times to the fight. As a result, fewer aircraft can provide more support than larger numbers operating from distant locations [1,2] .
The ability to cycle aircraft on and off station quickly means that smaller payloads have less of an effect on the availability of munitions/firepower in position at any one time for any mission, but for missions such as CAS and Interdiction the reduced size of munitions (like SDB) that provide 500 lb class effects, means that in most circumstances, even in a ‘Day One’(Full Low Observables) configuration, there is still the potential to have same number of aimpoints held at risk per airframe in any one time period as before [3] . As it has been noted that the 95% of aimpoints the MAGTF will encounter are suitable for ‘1000 lb class’ attention or less, the Marines do not find the 1000lb bomb upper size limit an unacceptable limitation.
It should also be mentioned that the F-35 is the first aircraft in history that is not only designed to fight as an individual weapon platform by the pilot, but also as a networked component of a larger virtual weapon system by the ACE commander. Survivability, Proximity, reliability, payload, configurability, network-centricity: all these features will give the F-35B system in the hands of the Marines the ability to project force well out of proportion to an equivalent number of legacy CTOL and STOVL multi-role aircraft.

End Note: I completed the two-year USMC Marine Command and Staff College (Non-Resident) program in 1992. At the time it was the only program of its type available to Air Force Senior NCOs. I am also told that at the time I was one of only a handful of AF SNCOs to complete the program. Since then, I understand more opportunities to attend such schools, even in residence, have been made available of SNCOs. I would heartily recommend any Senior NCO with the inclination and ability to attend such schools if at all possible to add to the breadth and depth of their military knowledge. My coursework in MCSC helped me understand the changes (and how much things haven’t changed) in Marine operational doctrine as they have occurred since that time.

Further reading:

MAGTF Aviation and Operational Maneuver From the Sea

The MAGTF in Sustained Operations Ashore

Marine Aviation and Operational Maneuver From the Sea

Operational Maneuver from the Sea: A Concept for the Projection of Naval Power Ashore

Operational Maneuver from the Sea (Krulak)

Yee-Effin' Haw - THIS is America dammit!

From Bloomberg: EPA-Texas Feud Escalates Over New Carbon Regulations.
This appears to be a still-evolving story, as Bloomberg is still updating it. Latest update added a nice quote from a Sierra Club shill.

This signals the Obama movement to legislate away America is now moving into the 'Regulate- America away' phase.
Bring it, Rubes.

Merry Christmas... and Count Your Blessings!

Merry Chistmas to all. Hope you have time to give thanks for any and all Blessings that you may have in your life today, large AND small. Taking time to think about things when they are good helps keep the head straight when the vagaries of life aren't so pleasant.
I am fortunate. It seems this year at this time I have more large Blessings to be thankful for than small. I'm home for Christmas as more than just a visitor for the first time in three years, D3 is safely back with Son and Granddaughter instead of in Afghanistan, and I'm recovering nicely from surgery, to name a few. I see many many small Blessings and news of Blessings to Come.
Life is Good. Thank God.