Middle East Burning = Bad.

In case anyone was wondering why I don't seem all hep on our latest military adventure (but I'm willing to "get it on" over military efficacy during/over/in any conflict), it's just that I'm not crazy about toppling tyrants to make the world safe for Radical Islamic fascists, be they Muslim brotherhood or AlQueda or whatever. The title says it all:

Rebel Commander in Libya Fought Against U.S. in Afghanistan

Is this 'hope' or is it 'change'? Oh yeah.... it's 'Smart Diplomacy'!

Holding Back the "Cruise Missile Cultists"

I just know they're coming....a nefarious faction of the Opponents of Long Range Strike.

Sheesh. First at SNAFU, we get a winners and losers list with the B-2 and Tomahawks reversed and on the wrong lists (Sorry Solomon - I still love ya' bud). It gets linked to AvWeek's Ares' Blog 'Frago' post which also links to a doozy at Information Dissemination which in turn has an extract from, and link to, a cruise missile puff piece at National Defense Magazine .

Time for a short course in economics and the application of long range strike.

Why I'm the Guy to Give it....

This is the first air campaign (using the term loosely) that I've not been at least a small part of since 1991, or a significant contributor to since 1999. Between moi' and the sources above I'm probably the only person who has actually launched and tested cruise missiles, as well as understands their strengths and limitations. I'm also probably the only one to have done long range strike 'bang-for-buck' analyses and what-if scenarios for DoD campaign planning efforts and/or wrote his Master's thesis or capstone on the subject of the proper methodology for top-level conceptual design of next generation LRS platforms.

Ready? Here we go!!!!!!!!!!!

Lesson 1. There is no ONE best weapon for everything and cruise missiles are only the one best weapon at attacking a very small subset of the total target set in any conventional (non-nuclear) campaign. There are efforts to make them more effective against a wider subset of targets but that will add cost and probably complexity to their designs. The very best subset of targets for conventional cruise missiles are taking out 'soft' nodes of Integrated Air Defense Systems and Command and Control networks/Power Grids. They are 'enablers' that allow the non-stealthy aircraft in the force-mix to operate more freely over the battlefield and do that killing hoodoo-that-they-do so well....instead of getting shot down before their 'magic' happens. Valuable? Within a narrow confine, yes. Wonder-weapon? No.

Lesson 2. Cruise missiles are VERY expensive.... unless you never use them or if you use them, you won't miss them. Complexity costs money, and increases the probability of failure. The farther and longer a system has to operate to get to the target, the more the system is likely to fail on the way (see TLAM in Desert Storm note in the slides below).

Lesson 3. As long as the attrition rates are low enough, (and they don't even have to be THAT low) Direct Attack is ALWAYS cheaper and more effective than stand-off attack even if standoff attack has a PERFECT success rate.

I've dusted off and sanitized an extract of publicly available and unclassified data from a circa-2000 briefing I gave after Operation Allied Force. The exact dollars are 'off' now, but the relationships remain the same. Cruise Missiles are orders of magnitude more expensive to operate than using precision direct attack. BTW: These charts were all based upon 2000lb JDAM usage. Smaller JDAMs would be relatively cheaper and just as,or more, effective than TLAM Tomahawks.

Enjoy.


The TLAM accuracy and reliability have improved since Desert Storm, but it doesn't make any difference. It is a more complex machine than a JDAM, and must operate reliably for a much longer period of time. That line waaaay down at the bottom is the JDAM cost line. The cruise missiles are so expensive their real value comes in reducing risk to other systems: use as necessary - and no more.

In Operation Allied Force, the B-2 was dropping JDAMs using developmental software and it still had a 95% hit rate. The B-2 had the highest percentage of first-pass 'kills' of all the aircraft employed.
These dollar figures were probably mid-late FY 1990s when I used them in 2000. I notice TLAMS are even more expensive now, but JDAM kits are as well I suppose. As I noted at SNAFU in the comments, prices are very sensitive to lot buy quantities. So even if cruise missiles were 100% successful, and even if all aimpoints were suitable for cruise missiles, what would you spend your savings on using JDAMs?

All You Need To Know About the Sendai Quake Reactor Crisis

In case you aren't impressed with the US slinging $70m+ worth of TLAMS (@~$570K in FY99$ per) at Libyan targets of dubious value with questionable effect, and instead want to get the real scoop on the nuclear 'crisis' in Japan, all you need to read is found right here.

F-35 Development and Transparency

Steve Trimble has a post up over at the Dew Line titled Top Ten List of F-35 Flaws and Fixes . I tried to leave what follows as a comment but I can't seem to get the DEW Line site's 'Captcha' feature to load on my laptop at the moment. Since I put a lot of thought into what Steve had to say, I wanted to at least get it committed to electrons someplace.

Steve,
I love ya’ man. I think you probably have the best instincts of any non-aviator journalist on a major stage out there and when you keep your distance from the “Ragin’ Hedge Baby from the Shires” you do your best stuff. I would suggest however that you start ‘tightening up’ the thoughts a little more before you start putting fingers to keyboard.

Problems with the ‘Ten flaws and fixes’ list:

First problem: I count at most 5 ‘flaws’ (ranging from minor to significant and all fixable), 3 ‘Risks’ and 2 (at least) development/maturation challenges. You might have characterized the descriptions and actions a little more accurately as well, but in the vernacular of the day, that shortcoming could be an ‘artifact’ of journalism’s deadlines and processes.

1. Bulkhead cracks: Flaw (Design – Correct!). But the description of the remedy as a ‘7-8lb patch’ is more accurately described as a structural ‘doubler’ – the use of which is an extremely common technique in aircraft structural design. When you take as much weight as possible out of a plane for the obvious reasons, sometimes you have to put a little back in here and there. If some Lockmart PR guy used ‘patch’ to describe it to you I’d blame him for the misnomer and urge you to try asking for the engineering terms when you feel someone is dumbing something down for you -- because someone may have dumbed it down for the guy telling you. A good rule of thumb is If it is described in a single syllable word, it’s probably not the correct terminology. BTW: A ‘patch’ is ad hoc and ‘slapped’ on, A ‘structural doubler’ is designed and has analysis and test behind it before it is ‘integrated’ into the design. BIG difference.

2. Vertical lift bring-back (VLBB): Risk (Incorrect). If LM defines it as “the F-35B has all the vertical thrust it needs to "bring back" the required load of weapons and fuel onto an amphibious carrier right now, but is concerned” – then there is a ‘risk’ that it MIGHT become a ‘flaw’. As you describe it, there are apparently both alternatives to mitigating that risk: weight control and increased thrust availability – so the Risk is apparently manageable and is being managed.

3. Auxiliary air inlet (AAI) doors: Flaw (Design – Correct!) No contest on this one because the program obviously wants to have the doors operating at 250kts. But if the program determines they can live with lower operating speed it is potentially a ‘nothing’ issue. There are no ‘solutions’ in life or aerospace: only ‘tradeoffs’. If the users insist LM needs to fix it, then as you point out the flaw is fortunately a relatively minor one that is easy to fix.

4. Parts reliability: Risk...and a rather broad brush assertion at that (So, Incorrect). Every system experiences birthing pains (think R&M ‘Bathtub Curve’). But if it is worth mentioning, then it is also worth mentioning that the program intends and has plans in place to extract high reliability out of systems via PBL support approaches and techniques over the life of the program.

5. Wing roll-off: Development/Maturation Challenge or Risk (Incorrect). As you wrote, it is “still on the list of concerns for the F-35C carrier variant”. Concern = Risk. I suspect this is a matter related to both the bigger wing of the C and the Navy’s fears after their F-18E/F adventures. The “squirrelly” bit can be true for all aircraft depending on their wing design, AOA and airspeed. I also suspect it has more to do fears of steep pressure gradient shift over the top of the wing (the F-18E/F problem) than anything else. Wing falloff in and of itself isn’t new or scary – it’s when you don’t know which way, when or how fast it is going to fall that gets meat-servo panties in a knot.

6. Driveshaft: Flaw (Minor Design – Correct) but also could be considered a Development/Maturation Challenge, since the program is still in SDD, the concept and system is unique/new/never-been-done. Since until the system is flown enough hours and in different regimes with real loads all the designer has to work with is simulations and estimates to start with, perhaps the effort in this area should be judged by what was reasonably probable to get exactly right, out of the box and is it 'tweakable' vs. against what is found to be needed? (and especially if this contingency was anticipated as a possibility they were prepared to deal with). After all, as I seem to have to frequently remind others elsewhere, SDD stands for System DEVELOPMENT and Demonstration.

7. Roll-post nozzle: Flaw (Minor Design – Correct) but could be viewed as a Development/Maturation Challenge as in 6 for the same reasons.

8. Lift-fan clutch: Flaw (Minor Design – Correct) but could be viewed as a Development/Maturation Challenge as in 6 for the same reasons

9. Generators: Flaw (Very Minor Design – Correct!) And evidently a new problem easily undone.

10. Price tag: Risk (Incorrect) Aircraft in work are tracking the cost curve predictions. The Royal Navy’s buy change has to be viewed as delta impacts on both the B and the C. Given higher commonality between the A and the B than the C (the C being more of an outlier in the design mix), the Royal Navy’s change is more boom for the Navy’s C model than bust for the Marine’s B model. Minor nit: The Marine’s B buy is not a reduction, but holds at the earlier assumed 340 number according to Defense News. The Marine’s ‘extra’ Cs are evidently coming out of the earlier presumed 340 number for the Navy’s C model. It’s a ‘wash’.

Kudos for framing the discussion with the positive ‘transparency’ point. Although there is no way the JSFPO or LM COULD conduct a program of this size and importance behind a veil, it’s good to give them credit for at least realizing it and using it as a philosophy.

Centennial of Naval Aviation #1

Thought I'd post something special to commemorate the Centennial of Naval Aviation. There may be more. Here's a crop of a photo (copyright mine) that's never been published anywhere before.

Three sailors are relaxing on the flight deck of the USS Langley en route from Hampton Roads to their new home port in San Diego, CA in 1924. In the photo, the sailor on the left is a machinist's mate who fabricated parts for the embarked aviation assets as well as the ship. A 'Journeyman' of History: an Aviation Machinist's Mate before they were given the title. He would leave the Navy just in time for the Great Depression. Hard times took him back to the home he had run away from in Durango, Colorado in 1912 -- when he was 12. There he would 'cowboy' on a ranch and start his family. When war clouds loomed, he took his young family back to SoCal, where he was a machinist,fabricator, and tool & die man for a shop that was a Lockheed subcontractor through the end of WW2. Among other things, he fabricated manifolds (intake/exhaust) for the XP-38.


He is my late Grandfather -- my late Father's Father. He introduced me to Logarithms and Trigonometry before I knew what they were - and made certain I would never get a tattoo by pointing to his own many inkspots as dire warnings every chance he had.

KC-X: The Inevitable

Well, this post is only for the purposes of closing the loop (finally/hopefully/perhaps?) on the long drawn-out saga of the KC-X contract, in which we conclude that alas, Crony Capitalism wins another 'big one'. Sad.
The only good news is that the Boeing aircraft is tiny enough to almost make the KC-Y competition mandatory down the road. Of course that still sucks for the taxpayer.

Update: All I did was change my links to Will Collier's site instead. His quote from memory pretty much captures the entire saga within a paragraph. If you want the long story, click on my "Boeing BS Watch" link under 'Themes on this Site" to the right.

Performance Based Logistics vs. The Evil Empire

Military.com's DoDBuzz site had an interesting bit on a new projection for the F-35s support costs showing higher costs for the F-35 than the legacy systems it replaces. The article isn't entirely balanced (a sister site has a slightly less informative but more even-handed treatment of the topic) but it brings almost all of the major points out in the open. There are interests at the Government's depots that have a vested interest in killing F-35 PBL, and all similar PBL arrangements.

PBL creates public-private partnerships that to-date have performed superbly: all systems have saved money by all estimates, while enabling equal or better weapon system readiness.

The GAO has taken a couple of shots at PBL on behalf of its masters. Nearly 6 years ago Steve Geary and Kate Vitasek, two research and faculty associates at the Aerospace and Defense Clearinghouse at The University of Tennessee called it for what it is: "A War of Ideas".

GAO recommended that the Defense Dept. should “demonstrate whether performance-based logistics contracts are resulting in reduced costs and increased performance, develop procedures to track whether program offices validate their business-case decisions and verify the reliability of contractor cost and performance data.” The Pentagon is facing a budget crunch of epic proportions, and the best the GAO can come up with after reviewing a slew of successful PBL programs is to add red tape?

GAO’s headline could just as easily read: “Defense Management: PBL Contracts Meeting or Exceeding Weapons System Performance Goals; Costs Appear to be on Track.” Like the GAO, we have looked into PBL across a number of programs and companies. Though challenges remain, the results delivered by many of these programs are as compelling as the available case studies. PBL can work, and that’s what GAO should be talking
about. It’s a war of ideas.

No matter how complicated an acquisition becomes, the essential beauty of PBL shines through. PBL contracts fundamentally align the interests of contractors with the Pentagon. If both do the job right, contractors make more money. To do this, they find ways to deliver better system performance at lower total ownership costs, so the Pentagon wins, too.

The thing that I like about PBL, is that unlike a lot of other promising programs that come down the pike, we haven't had to get it right out of the box: it's working while we're still learning how to make it work. GAO may hate that they can't quantify the magnitude to their liking yet, but they can't ignore the vector.

As to the F-35's PBL, the DoD brought in an outsider to help shape the program. they must have done an OK job-- Guess what program was selected by Defense Logistics as having the 'Best Logistics Strategy' for 2010?

Almost forgot. I had an interesting (and LONG ) exchange in the Buzz comments (may be still going on for all I know) with someone I've come to think of as "The Cost Accounting Kid". He's brimming with confidence in his ideas, hawking a self-published book full of them. Almost all of his ideas seem to be in common use already, with an exception that will require a change in the FARs - and we never got around to talking about it in detail as we seem to have gone everyplace else -even into "Bush"-es. He'll either learn or reality will break him. Yep... I was pig wrasslin' again. My favorite part was where he expressed gratitude that I didn't have the ear of 'politicians and generals'. Heh. One thing we do have in common is the opinion on cost accounting as it is currently practiced: It sucks. Beyond that, I'd just be happy if everyone played by the rules, including the laws of physics.

Happy Fifth Blogiversary!!!

Five years ago my first post was put up. This is #386. I have two major drafts in work. One IEDs/EFPs and Persistence, and the other is on Close Air Support Myths. Hope to get them out soon.

Thanks for all the comments. Roughly 96% are via e-mails. I may loosen up the comment rules to make it easier for those who've asked.

"What Military-Industrial Complex?" Update

Just updated and expanded the What Military-Industrial Complex? post below.

Chuck Schumer Watch: Vol. 1, Ch.1

In a bid to become the Senior Ranking Clown on the Senate Select Committee for Hybris, Chuck Schumer trots out yet another, horrible, ill-conceived, moronic and yes even 'stupid' idea. 'Former Spook' has the whole sad story.


...And yes! I've decided to give Chuckie his very own special ''watch' category for a while.

50 Years Later: WHAT Military Industrial Complex?

Today is the 50th Anniversary of President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s 'Farewell Address'. A speech most famous for coining the now trite phrase: "Military-Industrial Complex".

A vital element in keeping the peace is our military establishment. Our arms must be mighty, ready for instant action, so that no potential aggressor may be tempted to risk his own destruction. Our military organization today bears little relation to that known of any of my predecessors in peacetime, or, indeed, by the fighting men of World War II or Korea.

Until the latest of our world conflicts, the United States had no armaments industry. American makers of plowshares could, with time and as required, make swords as well. But we can no longer risk emergency improvisation of national defense. We have been compelled to create a permanent armaments industry of vast proportions. Added to this, three and a half million men and women are directly engaged in the defense establishment. We annually spend on military security alone more than the net income of all United States corporations.

Now this conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience. The total influence -- economic, political, even spiritual -- is felt in every city, every Statehouse, every office of the Federal government. We recognize the imperative need for this development. Yet, we must not fail to comprehend its grave implications. Our toil, resources, and livelihood are all involved. So is the very structure of our society.

In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist. We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes. We should take nothing for granted. Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and goals, so that security and liberty may prosper together.

Times change. Eisenhower’s warning was actually against too much government spending – spending which suppresses the private sector activity which actually generates revenues. It was just at the time, the defense budget had not yet wound down from WW2 and Korean War levels, and the post war consumer spending was very low. Replace Eisenhower-Era spending threats with modern day ones and you would have to rewrite this speech warning against the Social Spending-Entitlement Complex. This new complex has managed to fence itself largely from that most deceptive category: discretionary spending. Yet it is still there, waiting for some people of courage to whittle it down to size.

To commemorate this anniversary, I’ve updated information from a past posting. Once again, we ask: What Military –Industrial Complex? It doesn’t exist. Even if some of these rubes might insist that it does.


What Military Industrial Complex?: 2010 Edition

Here's a graphic showing the 2010 Fortune 500 Companies and their 2010 revenues. Included are defense and non-defense companies and revenues.


See a M-I Complex sitting there? Neither do I. Let's look closer.....

Here's a closer look at just the Fortune 100. Lockheed Martin is the Number 1 defense contractor. So we have to go down the list of America's largest companies about half way (#44)and well into the long-tail of the listing to get to the biggest of the defense contractors. Only 6 of the top 10 defense contractors even make it into the Fortune 100, and about half of those wouldn't be there without their non-defense revenues.

Update 22 Jan 2011: I should have also mentioned some things you probably don't know about the makeup of the current (2010) list of the Top 100 US Defense Contractors.

1. Ten of the Top 100 'defense industries' are energy/oil companies. (The GWOT burns a lot of gas, eh?)

2. Five of the Top 100 'defense industries' are Health Care/Managment companies. (TriCare Anyone?)

3. Four of the Top 100 'defense industries' are Governments: Canada, Germany, and two Native Alaskan "corporations".

4. The combined 2010 revenues of JUST the top ten Fortune 500 companies that have NO "Top 100" defense revenues is nearly TEN POINT EIGHT TIMES (~10.72963255)
greater than the combined defense revenues of all 100 top defense companies ($2,616,482.90M vs. $243,856M).

5. Walmart revenues alone are about 1.6 times the total defense revenues of the Top 100 Defense Contractors.

6. Warren Buffet's Berkshire Hathaway has 46+% the revenues of the defense revenues of the Top 100 Defense Contractors. How many shareholders does Berkshire Hathaway have? How many have 'control' of the company? 20? 10? 1? I'd say any of those choices could be called a concentration of economic influence and power.

...and don't forget we've got a war on boys and girls.


Time for the social-engineering/anti-defense crowd to get a new Bogeyman. I repeat: WHAT Military-Industrial Complex?

Stealth References

It seems like we're starting to see even more misinformation (or is it dezinformatsia?) on the JSF than usual on the web. It almost feels like a concerted movement to undermine the whole program. I'll give a specific example of such disinformation: "The F-35 is Very Low Observable (or Low Observable) from the front (or similar limited qualification)". I've run into this kind of statement more frequently ever since a certain Australian website published some cartoons of the F-35 with drawn patterns illustrating guesses at RF signature patterns based upon eyeball estimation of the effects of the F-35's Outer Mold Line shaping....and called it a 'study'.

There is absolutely nothing official and available on the F-35's RF signature (surprise? duh!) that would support such an assertion. All that I have been able to locate as sources for such information are speculation, allusions and inferences. While at the same time, one can find multiple 'official' programmatic sources stating the F-35 RF signature characteristics are described as "Very Low Observable"(VLO), "All Aspect"*, or "All Aspect VLO". I have an idea these misconceptions come from a basic ignorance of what 'Stealth' is, how it 'works', and how it now shapes the battlespace where radar once dominated.

*Note: The F-22 is commonly described as 'all aspect' as well, but in using this term for fighters it often excludes/excuses the signature an angle, as narrow as possible, to the direct rear of the aircraft.

The following commentary is taken almost verbatim from a comment I made on another site a while back, concerning what you need to know - as a minimum - to even begin intelligently discussing the fundamentals of Low Observables (Stealth). I'm posting it here now because I have a feeling I'm going to need to point people to this kind of information more and more.

____________________________

If one insists on discussing or opining on Low Observable "technology", one would do well to begin by reading Paterson. In his Survivability Benefits from the Use of Standoff Weapons by Stealth Aircraft(AIAA 1999-0105503), Figure 2 is a nice graphic with a range of objects, their estimated signature return in flat plate square meters and equivalent dBsm. On the high end we find a warship with 10000 sq meter return (about 40 dBsm). On the low end we have a small insect at .0001 sq meter return equivalent (about -40 dBsm). In Paterson's 1997 paper Measuring Low Observable Technology's Effects on Combat Aircraft Survivability (AIAA 97554) his figure 3 has a 'notional' Radar Cross Section (RCS) listing for various aircraft from Howe's Introduction to the Basic Technology of Stealth Aircraft: Part 1 & 2 (see Paterson for full citation) There we see that Howe estimates the B-1B return at .75 sq meter, or over an order of magnitude less than has been speculated on elsewhere.

Reading these resources will give one some proper perspective on how one should think about the effects of the relative RCS of different objects on their detectability. If you have the time and the math background, get a copy of Radar Cross Section by Knott, Shaeffer & Tuley. This resource will also give you some background on how RCS objectives are selected, optimized and implemented in an aircraft's design to satisfy mission requirements.

But none of the above actually tells us what the challenges are in operating in a threat environment. I only know of one public source that deals with it, and we're in luck: RAND has been really expanding its ".pdf file" archives online of late and the little Route Planning Issues for Low Observable Aircraft and Cruise Missiles is once again available, although somewhat dated. [Update from original: Dr. Rebecca Grant's The Radar Game has been reissued online under the auspices of the AFA's Mitchell Institute. The Radar Game should be considered a standard primer on the history and development of radar and it's antithesis: 'Stealth' for the general readership.]

Now turn to Ball's AIAA classic textbook on 'Survivability': The Fundamentals of Aircraft Survivability Analysis and Design. You can get the first edition used cheap these days, but as it predates the public arrival of Stealth, LO is not a separate topic - you have to read between the lines. The second edition gives an overview but does not focus on stealth per se, but it is covered. Most importantly, both editions thoroughly examine and explain the 'kill chain' which will provide one some perspective on what all this 'low observability' actually does to disrupt the kill chain. LO can break the chain at every link, and be used to exploit even the smallest bit of RF clutter, confusion, or gap, as well as natural perturbations in the environment.

F-35B Status, Challenges

If you want to acquire some useful information on the current state of the F-35B 'technicals' skip fact-free speculation and simple handwringing and go read Stephen Trimble's piece at Flight Global. It's still got a little gloom in it, but the facts presented make an old engineer feel more upbeat about the F-35B's future.

Ain't nothing in there I can see that can't be fixed with reasonable time and dollars: two years and the announced budget should cover it. Let's just hope there are no show-stoppers yet to be uncovered.

Getting Helos Back in the Fight

'Solomon' at SNAFU! has an interesting post covering the return to service of two HH-60 Seahawks that had a little 'accidental contact' in late 2008. Interesting story and photos.

The Crash of Moccasin 02.
Snafu's post reminds me of a mishap a buddy of mine had on a H-53 Pave Low III after Desert Storm. This bird already had repaired combat damage from the SS Mayaguez rescue operation on it's logs (Most people have no idea how many times the Pave Low III airframes had been 'remanufactured' and had seen action from Vietnam to their retirement).

Initially, this was listed as a Class A mishap. By the final review of the accident and through judicious scrounging in the Boneyard, it had been revised down to a 'Class B'. I checked the records again years later and a miracle had occurred: it was then listed as a 'Class C'. A lot is broken with the Air Force, but the Pilot Protection System is apparently running just fine.

File this under "I got my 1000hrs 'Pave Low'. I got my war. I got my crash. - I'm outta here!"

This little meeting with a sand dune broke the boom off, scattered a lot of piece parts, rolled the FLIR ball backwards into the belly.

This episode provided me with enough material for three term papers on Human Factors, System Safety, and Cockpit Resource Management while pursuing two different college degrees. I probably know more than I should about this crash, not because I know one of the survivors, but because somebody did an awful redaction job in response to a FOIA request.

When I'm certain all the parties are no longer flying anywhere, I'll publish the whole, sad tale.

Long Range Strike Moves Forward.....Finally?

...and is it in the right direction? Tech. Sgt. Shane A. Cuomo / Air Force

I'll reserve judgement until after the details inevitably emerge.

In today's announcement President Obama's Most Useful Idiot (why there seems to always be someone who until asked is NOT-generally-a-tool willing to be the front-man giving cover to Administrations that are malevolent and destructive to the national defense , I'll never understand) had this to say at least:

Finally, a major area of new investment for the Air Force will be a new long-range, nuclear-capable penetrating bomber. This aircraft, which will have the option of being remotely piloted, will be designed and developed using proven -- using proven technologies, an approach that should make it possible to deliver this capability on schedule and in quantity.

It is important that we begin this project now to ensure that a new bomber can be ready before the current aging fleet goes out of service. The follow-on bomber represents a key component of a joint portfolio of conventional deep-strike capabilities, an area that should be a high priority for future defense investment, given the anti-access challenges our military faces.

Of what was explicitly stated, I would only call the 'optionally-manned' criteria as 'gross stupidity' - and probably a product of an internal AF/DoD political schism . Being of a highly suspicious nature on this topic for some reason, we'll see what the emphasis on 'existing technology' means: could be 'good' but with this crowd one never knows.

The issue as to what kind of long range platform is needed and the open questions surrounding it were covered fairly well in a recent Air Force (Air Force Association) magazine article. The same source has a pretty good backgounder on the status quo here.

I might comment on the remaining gems and turds in this punchbowl of an announcement elsewhere. Alas, there's a few of the former and piles of the latter.