Centennial of Naval Aviation #4

1920s Naval Parachute Demonstration

Here's some views (click on all to enlarge) of an interesting photo of a parachute jump circa 1925/26 over Naval Air Station North Island in San Diego. The photo, like those posted earlier, comes from my Grandfather's USS Langley Memories book, but I'm sure he acquired vs. actually taking the photo. It seems to have been quite popular among the fleet to swap ships photos, and I would assume this photo may have been taken from a squadron plane that would be assigned to North Island or the Langley. The caption only read 'Parachute jump San Diego', but confirming it was North Island was easy: see the Wikipedia photo of North Island (ostensibly in 1925) with the USS Langley tied up in the background as a bonus.

Closer examination of the photo shows the parachutist isn't so much as heading towards the base as he is probably just swinging widely in a pendulum back-and-forth: 

Even closer examination illustrates that this early parachute rig is either still 'un-twisting' at the risers or that this early rig provided absolutely no control to the wearer. If the latter is true, the jumper was completely at the mercy of fate after the ripcord was pulled. (Too bad about the scratch in the original.)

Here's a scan of the full photo as it sits in my Grandfather's album with no Photoshop (other than sizing):

DefenseTech Challenge Thread

Updated and Bumped!
(warning: what follows will be dry as dust unless you enjoy logic and tautology.)

I had a somewhat whimsical response to my challenge from a ‘JoeC’:

It's bad management because it's not on time or on budget and, so far, it doesn't work! I'm not sure what else you need in order to be convinced.

Of which, given the ground rules were clearly stated, prompted my reply:

Invalid Claim! [;-) (and you provide no definition of, much less evidence supporting 'doesn't work')

Then Joe C. responded with:

"Doesn't work" meaning it was banned from flying until recently. That fits my definition of "doesn't work"! :)

I work in software, so I'm well aware of how people tend to underestimate the time it takes to get things done. We're all very optimistic creatures at heart, I guess. I think some of that is what's going on in the F-35 program. It's also a result, as I've said before, of our Pentagon always wanting the newest, shiniest, most advanced toy instead of being satisfied with an incremental upgrade.

Since under the conditions I laid down in the challenge were not met, I could have just let Joe C’s wistful comment (including the outrageous unsupported claim concerning 'shiniest' jab) lay where it was, but I sensed this person was new to the discussion (i.e. probably not even a past lurker) and seemed somewhat naïve on the subjects of advanced technology and acquisition thereof. So I gave him some prompting so he would possibly go try to disprove, discover, or perhaps reply with more detailed questions, with a little hint as to the difference between aerospace and ‘other’ software development (my typos corrected):

Do you know what TRLs are? I ask because buying a weapon system isn't like buying a commercial product. EVERY weapon system sufficiently advanced to be worth developing and fielding with an expected operational life of 20-30-40 years requires the same effort and hits pretty much the same kinds of hurdles (depending on technologies involved). The F-35 program is actually doing better than a lot of its 'successful' predecessors, especially since it is really delivering 3 weapon systems in one. The only difference here is F-35 brand sausage is being made under a spotlight and rice bowls are threatened. The decision to first launch and then develop a new weapon system has been most definitely "requirements-pull" since the end of the Cold War so if an 'incremental' advancement was all that was needed, that is all that is pursued. Biggest problem with the incremental over existing is that on the modern battlefield, if you aren't low observable and connected, you are dead. As to 'software development' if we developed software like the commercial sector, we'd only need half the airbases - because most planes would just make smoking holes enroute to the next base. Kind’a hard on the Beta testers.

Thus I’d call the response to my challenge to this point ‘tepid’ at best. But shortly thereafter it got somewhat more interesting. A commenter after my reply, one ‘halcyon_ 33p’, decides to add two comments [I assume the DT space limitations probably drove the breaking of ‘one’ into ’two’ ]

SMSgt Mac,

So are you stating that because the F-35 is doing better than a lot of it's 'successful' predecessors there is no problem here? I notice you put successful in quotes as if you don't believe these unnamed predecessors were successful. If they weren't successful than even if the F-35 is better how does that serve as an argument that everything is fine with the F-35. Sounds like you are making the argument that because bad isn't worst, than it is good. If they were successful during deployment does that justify all the problems in development? Is it possible for a bad process to still produce viable results? I think all of this "history as a standard" and "Not worst, therefore good" argument stuff fails to take into account that the political climate is completely different today and that is the real deciding factor in this projects survival.

SMSgt Mac,

Your pro-F-35 arguments suffer from the following fallacies. I've included single line summaries of many of your arguments. IF you feel I am unfairly summing up your arguments please direct me to evidence that I am not being fair to you.

Appeal to Tradition - this is the way military projects always work http://www.nizkor.org/features/fallacies/appeal-to-tradition.html

Biased Sample - Because the F-35 program isn't as bad as these projects it is great http://www.nizkor.org/features/fallacies/biased-sample.html Appeal to novelty -- The F-35 is the greatest best thing therefore it must continue

http://www.nizkor.org/features/fallacies/appeal-to-novelty.html

Burden of Proof -- Detractors must prove the F-35 is not the best plane in the world for it's job http://www.nizkor.org/features/fallacies/burden-of-proof.html

I responded:

Given the space limitations on DT, I will Fisk your post at my place and let you know when it happens here (No earlier than Sunday- late). It would be earlier, but I have other pressing commitments this weekend. Kudos for the attempt and willingness to be specific and avoid logical fallacies, but unfortunately you employed several above. As a prequel -- think about the phrase 'it does not follow' as it may apply to what you've posted.

I will deal with halcyon’s comments above by repeating below with my response/observations inserted in [bold blue brackets]. But first I note that I came back last night to find that ‘halcyon’ had decided to add (in split posts):

Thanks for the reply, and I have great respect for your service, however since I am only summarizing your arguments and asking you to clarify I think you will have a very difficult time proving that my logic is not sound. Asking you to clarify your position and pointing out your logical fallacies can only be right or wrong, not a logical fallacy. I haven't even started to argue against your points. Only point out that many of your arguments don't hold up to the standard you have selected. The only point I have made here that might be considered an argument is that you are not taking into account the current political climate which is very different from 20-30 years ago. There is no logical fallacy there-- I haven't even asserted my own opinion. In fact logic will not help you in understanding the current political climate.
  ….

By the way in your post can you please answer my challenge that if I have misrepresented your position you provide evidence to show this. I am a clarity over agreement kind of guy. I don't care if we agree but I really don't want to slime you.

I will deal with the remains of this last response after I have dealt with ‘halcyon’s first assertions.

Note: for clarity I refer to the first two of 'halcyon’s' posts above as Part 1, and this last bit above as Part 2. I am completing this response before revisiting the original thread lest ‘halcyon’ added more that I would need to add below.

Ready? As promised, let the Fisking begin!

Responses to Part 1:

SMSgt Mac,
So are you stating that because the F-35 is doing better than a lot of it's 'successful' predecessors there is no problem here? [No, I am saying that not only do the challenges that the F-35 program has encountered to-date NOT rise to the level sufficient to label the F-35 as ‘failed’ , ‘doomed’ or any other of a number of terminal adjectives in criticisms of the program so carelessly slung about in the comments (and some articles) in Military.com, but that the technical and programmatic challenges to date are not even unique AND that the difficulties to date are not even remarkable for an advanced high performance fighter aircraft, and less than what many might consider ‘successful’ predecessors] I notice you put successful in quotes as if you don't believe these unnamed predecessors were successful [No, it was in quotes because ‘successful’ without explanation is a fairly abstract concept that may mean different things to different people]. If they weren't successful than even if the F-35 is better how does that serve as an argument that everything is fine with the F-35. Sounds like you are making the argument that because bad isn't worst, than it is good. If they were successful during deployment does that justify all the problems in development? Is it possible for a bad process to still produce viable results? [You thus begin down a slippery slope to create a ‘strawman’ argument as a prop in an attempt to make an argumentative point in what will follow. Read on.] I think all of this "history as a standard" and "Not worst, therefore good" argument stuff fails to take into account that the political climate is completely different today and that is the real deciding factor in this projects survival. [I wouldn’t know, I have never used this argument. If you are implying that I am using this argument, I would only point out that that if I am asserting the F-35 is doing better than many of its ‘successful’ predecessors, that “it does not follow” that I am claiming anything more, including anything to do with your ‘strawman’. (However I will note that as far as political climate goes: what is old is new again.)]

SMSgt Mac,
Your pro-F-35 arguments suffer from the following fallacies. I've included single line summaries [Strawmen Alert! Read on.] of many of your arguments. IF you feel I am unfairly summing up your arguments please direct me to evidence [Weak and transparent attempt to shift the Burden of Proof – more on this topic below] that I am not being fair to you.

Appeal to Tradition - this is the way military projects always work http://www.nizkor.org/features/fallacies/appeal-to-tradition.html

[Strawman!--Perhaps based upon an ‘It does not follow’ assumption that because I note the programmatic and technical challenges are met as well or better as successful programs?
In any case, considering my long-running and public beef with programmatic problems are with the status quo in how programs are funded and fiddled with and micromanaged by forces outside the program proper, I am hardly ‘appealing to tradition’ in that case.

Considering I do not comment on programmatic decisions unrelated to external forces (very few exist) that I am not in an informed position to question or comment or have public domain information in hand, call me ‘neutral’ in that respect.

Considering that my comments on technical challenges merely note they always occur in developing advanced systems is based upon the usually self-evident point that if they are ‘advanced’ they will have unknowns, many unknowable-beforehand elements involved, and that these challenges are to be expected as unavoidable. 

Remarkably, no one has ever questioned this point online before. Perhaps an excerpt of a paper and presentation I gave at a symposium about two years ago on the subject of conceiving, developing and implementing a Failure Modes and Effects Test (FMET) program for an advanced development program will help:

It does not require much imagination to perceive that perhaps complexity in any one of the three software, hardware, and operational/environment factors have the potential to fuel the complexity of the other two, and that this often results in an even more rapid increase in complexity of the overall system. Given that the overall complexity of modern systems already preclude the possibility of ever having enough time or money, even with automation, to test for 100% coverage 1 , the importance of bounding the scope and effort of an FMET test program will only become more important as systems become even more complex.  

1 Automated Software Testing, Dustan Rashka & Paul, 1999, pp.35-36, Addison-Wesley ]

Biased Sample - Because the F-35 program isn't as bad as these projects it is great http://www.nizkor.org/features/fallacies/biased-sample.html

[You’ve created another ‘Strawman’ based upon an ‘it does not follow’. I refute the assertion that F-35 is as its critics claim, ‘failed’ (or other euphemism for same). You take what is essentially my pointing to evidence to the contrary, including noting its successes and comparative relationships to past successful programs , and substitute (quoting the Nizkor page here) “a distorted, exaggerated or misrepresented version” of my position or substitute with an assertion that I say “that it is ‘great’”.]

Appeal to novelty -- The F-35 is the greatest best thing therefore it must continue http://www.nizkor.org/features/fallacies/appeal-to-novelty.html

[And you create yet ANOTHER ‘Strawman’. This time, I can only suspect it is based upon my consistently noting that the F-35 has the critical technologies (as identified by the users- the Services) of low observability and connectivity among other things, that existing aircraft and potential competitors do not, or similar supported assertion, and convert it into “a distorted, exaggerated or misrepresented” (this time an ‘overly simplistic’) “version” of my position.]

Burden of Proof -- Detractors must prove the F-35 is not the best plane in the world for it's job http://www.nizkor.org/features/fallacies/burden-of-proof.html

[Well, you ALMOST got this one right. Instead of employing the ‘best plane in the world’ Strawman , had you typed: “Detractors have the burden of proof and must prove fielding the F-35, as the current program of record, is not the best solution for its missions”. You would have accurately described my position on 'burden of proof'.

Now, let us address whether or not is it reasonable for me to require the critics to satisfy the burden of proof. Using Nizkor as our guide: 

In many situations, one side has the burden of proof resting on it. This side is obligated to provide evidence for its position. The claim of the other side, the one that does not bear the burden of proof, is assumed to be true unless proven otherwise. The difficulty in such cases is determining which side, if any, the burden of proof rests on. In many cases, settling this issue can be a matter of significant debate. In some cases the burden of proof is set by the situation. For example, in American law a person is assumed to be innocent until proven guilty (hence the burden of proof is on the prosecution). As another example, in debate the burden of proof is placed on the affirmative team.

By either standard, the “Burden of Proof” in my challenge is on the CRITICS of the F-35 (plane and program).

The legal standard would have to be applied metaphorically: Is the F-35 ‘guilty’ or ‘innocent’ of (fill-in-the-blank)? Since on the Military.com boards I never see anyone viewing F-35 as ‘succeeding’ and ‘guilty’, the burden of proof would have to be on those who see the F-35 as ‘failing’ and ‘guilty’.

By the more appropriate ‘debate’ standard (for that is what we are engaged in - albeit too often poorly), when I posited the question: “How about one of you (or all of you) working from the philosophical position that the F-35 suffers from 'bad management' actually cite an example of same?” I am CORRECTLY placing the “burden of proof” on those who "affirm" that the F-35 suffers from same.

I dissect and dismiss criticisms of the F-35 with reasoning (why the criticisms are lacking), or I make assertions supported by fact (burden of proof!). If what I type does not fall into either of those categories, you will see caveats, such as ‘I believe’, ‘as far as is known’, ‘I’m fairly certain’ etc. Barring copy-paste errors or typos, and with the possible exception of the occasional hyperbole for shock value, you will NEVER see an assertion made by me that cannot be backed up by a hard fact or verified by a reader themselves if they are willing to do the research.]

Responses to Part 2:

Thanks for the reply, and I have great respect for your service, [I’m wondering now how new you are to these boards. My active duty service is FAR in the past and other than the core program management experience and initial knowledge concerning advanced weapon system development it gave me, not very relevant to the discussion at hand] however since I am only summarizing your arguments and asking you to clarify I think you will have a very difficult time proving that my logic is not sound [Hopefully, not true by now.]  Asking you to clarify your position and pointing out your logical fallacies can only be right or wrong, not a logical fallacy [Sure, if only you could have succeeded AND avoided employing logical fallacies in attempting doing so.] I haven't even started to argue against your points. [re-read this post again if you still believe what you typed afterwards. Repeat as necessary] Only [attempted, and failed to] point out that many of your arguments don't hold up to the standard you have selected. The only point I have made here that might be considered an argument is that you are not taking into account the current political climate which is very different from 20-30 years ago. There is no logical fallacy there-- I haven't even asserted my own opinion. [You just did, I am almost curious. Were you around 20-30 years ago?] In fact logic will not help you in understanding the current political climate [Another opinion, unsupported by fact- I’ll let it go] .…. By the way in your post can you please answer my challenge that if I have misrepresented your position you provide evidence to show this [See all of above]. I am clarity over agreement kind of guy. [We should get along swimmingly then] I don't care if we agree but I really don't want to slime you. [I am kind to those who are kind].

Any bets on whether or not we will be entering the realm of Argumetum ad nauseum very soon? I won't go there, as alas I have bigger fish to fry...and that work pays much better returns.

---------------------------------Original Post Below this Point------------------------------------------------

There's a post up at DefenseTech calling for opinions as to whether or not the F-35 can be 'turned around'. This an obvious case of working from the philosophical position that the F-35 NEEDS turning around (begging the question). I laid down a gauntlet that I doubt will be picked up by very many, but it could prove interesting if my challenge is accepted instead of subjected to the usual furious 'thumbing down' given comments that do not follow a certain 'groupthink' guide. I wrote:   

A modest proposal. How about one of you (or all of you) working from the philosophical position that the F-35 suffers from 'bad management' actually cite an example of same?
Please post as a separate post instead of a reply. It is a long weekend and if the F-35 is as poorly managed as those asserting it is, we should be able to run up the count to a new DT record for our hosts!
There are only three criteria for a claim to warrant a response other than "Invalid Claim!":
1. Single sentence description of the "bad management" decision/action.
2. Identification of those responsible (names are best) for the "bad management" to at least a) the Government (DoD office or equivalent and higher) or Corporate/Industry leadership level responsible--for 'actors' OUTSIDE the program, and/or b) Identification of those responsible (position or name) WITHIN the program.
3. Single sentence description of WHY it was a bad management event/action.          

Valid claims will be evaluated/critiqued using only three sources: RAND's "Sources of Weapon Systems Cost Growth", DAU's Defense Acquisition Review Journal peer-reviewed papers, and the NIzkor Project Logical Fallacies website.

Enjoy!

We'll see if anyone takes up the challenge.

BTW: Contrast the DT piece with Dave Majumdar's facts-only story on an F-35 structure fix at Defense News with what will no doubt soon be breathlessly announced with Wagnerian 'doom' music in the background at AvWeek, Military.com, and elsewhere.

Libyan Rebel Leader Admits to Al Qaeda Ties

H/T Instapundit

A Libyan 'Rebel Leader' admits to Al Qaeda Ties? I'm shocked! Shocked I say!
Ok, not really...
Hey Rubes! Told ya! (Which should have been a 'Captain Obvious' call)

Oh Those 'Tricky' Cost Numbers

(I await the day that Flight Global gets their ‘captcha’ feature worked out.)

In two back-to-back posts, Steve Trimble channels that doyen of defense malcontents, one Winslow Wheeler, yet AGAIN, on a defense topic near and dear to my heart: O&S costs. Using data acquired ‘somehow’ by Mr. Wheeler (now, ask yourself: where might a “I-know-defense-better-than-the-DoD”-cawing magpie who worked decades inside the Congressional Staffer Club ‘might’ have gotten a hold of such information, if real?  You get three guesses…), DEWLine presents graphics representing data we are not provided, and data I suspect that no one in Flight Global was qualified (who was also available) to interpret. In short, other than for its shock! value effect on the innumerate, the information is worthless as presented, and while it may raise a question or two, it answers NONE of them.

DEWLine blog notes:

Writing about "costs" is always tricky. Numbers can vary dramatically depending on what gets included. In this case, we're talking about operational costs. This includes operations costs, including fuel, parts and maintenance, as well as interim contractor support and manpower. It excludes modifications funded by procurement accounts. The total cost number is divided by the total number of flight hours flown by the fleet, and that is the operational cost per flight hour.

Steve Trimble nails the part about costs being ‘tricky’. It may be even said to be ‘trickier’ than he realizes. Here is the complete list of general O&S cost categories, with areas with the largest potential for huge confounding factors noted in red :

1.0 MISSION PERSONNEL
  1.1 Operations
  1.2 Maintenance
  1.3 Other Mission Personnel
2.0 UNIT-LEVEL CONSUMPTION
  2.1 Pol/Energy Consumption
  2.2 Consumable Material/Repair Parts
  2.3 Depot-Level Reparables
  2.4 Training Munitions/Expendable Stores
  2.5 Other
3.0 INTERMEDIATE MAINTENANCE (EXTERNAL TO UNIT)
  3.1 Maintenance
  3.2 Consumable Material/Repair Parts
  3.3 Other
4.0 DEPOT MAINTENANCE
  4.1 Overhaul/Rework
  4.2 Other
5.0 CONTRACTOR SUPPORT
  5.1 Interim Contractor Support
  5.2 Contractor Logistics Support
  5.3 Other
6.0 SUSTAINING SUPPORT
   6.1 Support Equipment Replacement
   6.2 Modification Kit Procurement/Installation
   6.3 Other Recurring Investment
   6.4 Sustaining Engineering Support
   6.5 Software Maintenance Support
   6.6 Simulator Operations
   6.7 Other
7.0 INDIRECT SUPPORT
7.1 Personnel Support
7.2 Installation Support

Aside from the plentiful catchall ‘Other’ categories, there is quite a bit more in this list than “operations costs, including fuel, parts and maintenance, as well as interim contractor support and manpower”. I think Mr. Trimble may want to revisit his ‘list’.

If one views the graphics provided with an eye towards ‘what is different’ between ‘comparable’ weapon systems, it should lead one to consider WHAT is driving these differences? Without the actual data in hand I am left with these questions:

RE: WC-135W O&S Increase in 2006. I have a feeling there is no mystery here, but how much did this spike have to do with preparation/upgrade/equipping then forward deploying the WC-135W forward to monitor the NoKo's nuclear testing debut? 

RE: VC-25 O&S increase in 2009. As overseas deployment of AF One involves a major logistics planning and execution overhead, how much of the 2009 bump was due to President Obama visiting more countries that year than a lot of Presidents do in four years? It is not as if no one noticed. Or were there upgrades on the bird that went into PDM that year? How much of the increased cost came from transitioning to a new support contract with Boeing Wichita?

RE: That 'Wild' B-2 O&S increase from about 2004. Yes, 2004. The charts ‘smoothing’ function combined with cyclical cost events tend to mask what could be the costs of implementing an upgrade program in PDM. What percentage of these ‘increases’ are (primarily) related to implementing the challenging yet wildly successful AHFM upgrade? I ask, because the ‘curves’ appear to strongly mimic the PDM AHFM upgrade implementation timing. I suspect some of the 2010 B-2 data also has all the costs involved to get the bird that caught fire in Guam in 2010 back home. Expect future depot costs to show up in the out-years for other upgrades.

Side question: How much does the B-52 still benefit from having the Attrition Reserve fleet collocated (if it is still) that enables the collocated operational wing to rotate hard-broke birds off the operational books for maintenance and rotate fresh birds from the Attrition Reserve pool into the unit?

RE: F-22 and V-22 O&S costs. This is my favorite. How much of the drop in F-22 O&S comes from the learning curve and Performance Based Logistics since the airplane went IOC late in 2005? And shouldn’t any numbers before IOC be excluded? How much of the rise in V-22 O&S comes from the fact that it is a little more expensive to operate in Iraq and Afghanistan than CONUS?

These are just a few of the most obvious questions raised, but I would be remiss if I did not also warn the reader against the world-class ‘chartsmanship’ contained in the DEWLine graphics. I particularly enjoy the use of the ‘smoothed’ line function that make ‘Highs’ seem ‘higher’, ‘Lows’ seem ‘lower’, and the swings between the two seem more dramatic. The use of line vs column is a minor nit, but it promotes the idea that the data is continuous instead of in discrete annual snapshots. Most egregious of all is the use of non-zero baselines which amplify the differences in the data within each chart.

If I had to offer one piece of advice to the Flight Global crew it would be to stop hauling the mail for Winslow Wheeler and CDI. Winslow may look like the Tech-savvy engineer of the future Montgomery Scott (i.e. “Scotty”) on Star Trek, but to these eyes (ie IMHO) he operates more on the level of Harcourt Fenton Mudd. 

F-89 : A Much Underappreciated Weapon System

I 've been fascinated with the F-89 Scorpion for years. Partly because of its history with the 57FIS, my old F-4E outfit in Iceland, and my late Father-In-Law having flown the F-89 in the same unit 20+ years earlier. Part of my fascination is because it was an all-weather fighter/interceptor and was so different than any of its day-fighter contemporaries such as the F-86 and F-94, which are far better known (especially the beautiful F-86).  But the F-86s and F-94s did not actively serve on the front lines for the United States nearly as long as the F-89 did, which really only was pulled from Air Defense duties after the F-101s, F-102s, and even the F-106s were active in numbers. Finally, the last interesting thing about the F-89 was how advanced and complex it was compared to its contemporaries, yet it has been labled as not being very 'innovative'.

I will expand on the topic later, but for now, what I want the reader, especially one who has never seen an F-89 in person, to take away from this post is just how BIG the F-89 actually is. Here is a scale graphic comparing the F-89 to the perhaps better-known jets developed closest to the same timeframe:

Another comparison can be shown illustrating the relative sizes of the F-89 and the F-102 and F-4 - the planes that replaced the Scorpions between 1960 and 1982 in the 57FIS.

 And for the younger among us who haven't seen an F-102 or F-4 with a good scale reference, here is the F-89 as compared to the F-22:

The F-89 was truly unique, and had an amazing, if largely unknown operational service history.

F-35 Jobs & Logical Fallacies

Steve Trimble has a little blurb up on the Commerce Dept numbers for F-35 job creation and closes with the following:

"This doesn't mean that 127,000 people will suddenly lose their jobs if the programme goes away. Using the same methodology, Lockheed warned two years ago that 100,000 jobs would be lost if F-22 production was not extended. The F-22 line is scheduled to shut down next year, but Lockheed is actually adding jobs in Marrietta, Georgia, as other programmes, including C-130J, C-5M and F-35 ramp up."

Trimble is better than this.

"It Does Not Follow"
This makes absolutely no sense. The first sentence is not supported in ANY way shape or form by the rest of the paragraph.

I am dying for Flight Global to fix their 'Captcha' widget. I'm a direct approach kind of guy and this feels too much like skulking around behind someone's back. But if I were "Emperor of the World", Columbia and all other J-Schools would have to have a series of courses on Logical Fallacies and not just as a section in the odd Technical Writing class,

There are some serious aspects to this story not brought up by Mr. Trimble, or for that matter anyone I am aware of, but I'm tired and it is late.  Maybe later.

Question of the day

Here.
(The comments were great.)

Answer: Yes. Yes it is.

Full disclosure: I am of the school that the best choice is the one you are most likely to have with you.

Another F-35 and V-22 'Two-fer'

First, 'Hat Tip' to Steve Trimble at DEW line for a link to a V-22 editorial that, aside from the same sort of minor technical faux pas that kept me from buying the Editorialist's book 'new', drives home the point that the Marines know Best Value when they see it.

Then, direct from Steve Trimble: "F-35 grounding explained by Australian Aviation". Factual. Attributed quotations, Snark-free. Hope some other blog folks are taking notes.

Bipartisanship Ain't What It Used to Be: F-35 & V-22 Edition

“The word bipartisan means some larger-than-usual deception is being carried out”
In this case, it includes the article 'covering' the claim.

I had a bifurcated response to Steve Trimble’s latest post “The vast bipartisan conspiracy against F-35 & V-22”

My first response focused on the use of “Bipartisan”:
In my head I replayed Inigo Montoya: ” You keep using that word. I do not think it means what you think it means.”

Then I remembered a favorite George Carlin quote: “The word bipartisan means some larger-than-usual deception is being carried out”

After I really studied Trimble's post, I decided the latter response was most applicable.

Within his post Trimble iterates (Warning: English-English spelling ahead):
“Our review of eight budget reduction proposals by a hodge-podge of centrist, leftist and libertarian think tanks reveals a startling insight: All of them agree that two military aircraft programmes should be terminated or scaled back, and all of them agree those two programmes should be the BellBoeing V-22 and the Lockheed Martin F-35.”

My next thought was someone needed to tell Mr. Trimble that the opposite of ‘leftist’ isn’t ‘libertarian’. Do you see what is missing from that “centrist, leftist and libertarian think tanks” list? That’s right: “Conservative”. If we are talking spectrum of priorities on ‘defense thinking’ conservative is to ‘approve’ as leftist is to ‘disapprove’ as to libertarian is to ‘ambivalent’. [A ‘centrist’ BTW is just voting ‘present’.]

I won’t pick the nit that ‘bipartisan’ involves ‘two parties’, and only bing it up to prevent any grammar police showing up in the comments and counting coup.

ONLY after leading us down a fabulous ( in the 3rd and 4th definition of the word) definition of ‘bipartisan’ at the end of his post does Mr. Trimble mention the ‘on the other hand’:  
There remain some -- such as the Heritage Foundation, American Enterprise Institute and House budget committee chairman Rep Paul Ryan -- who oppose any significant budget cutbacks beyond those already identified in former Secretary of Defense Bob Gates',,,

Ah! The ubiquitous ‘some’ of the more conservative bent finally appear.

Now…..About the ‘substance’ of that list of ‘bipartisan’ groups:

1. RE: Fiscal Commission co-chairs?
AKA “Democrat Tool and a RINO Fool.” Those findings weren’t exactly embraced ‘bilaterally’ were they? Wasn’t Paul Ryan on the Commission as well? I’d say he is a lot more representative of the ‘conservative’ half of the ‘bipartisanship’ here.

2. RE: Debt Reduction Task Force plan?
The one from the so-called “Bipartisan Policy Center” founded in 2007 “by former Senate Majority Leaders Howard Baker, Tom Daschle, Bob Dole and George Mitchell”?
Yeah THAT Tom Daschle and THAT George “I’ve been trying to slash the military for decades” Mitchell. Call this RINOs and Radicals Part II

3. RE: Galston-MacGuineas Plan
Well this is one I’d never heard about, but as I suspected, it is just repackaging the ‘same-o sam-o’ ideas from the ‘same-o same-o’ people.

MacGuineas is an apparatchik of the New America Foundation, a leftard organization masquerading as ‘moderate’. It is where ‘Progressives’ go when they don’t want to be seen as such. Note that at the NAF link we find a story where George Mitchell above used a BS poll to try to pressure Israel into giving up even more concessions that they were willing to make in the 'peace' talks with Palestinians.  

Galston is now a Brookings (left-leaning and used to be farther left) Institutition operator, currently working on “designing a new social contract and the implications of political polarization” and (of course) is also a Clintonista.

4. RE: Center for American Progress?
Oh C’mon! they’re a front for the Democratic Party

5. RE: Cato Institute.
Libertarian. They like defense as long as it is cheap or free and runs towards believing America should have a passive voice in the world. If they were stronger on defense, I could be a Libertarian, but if they were, then they would be good Conservatives.

6. RE: Roosevelt Institute.
“Carrying forward the legacy, values, and spirit of Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt” . I especially 'enjoyed' their ‘campus network’ page: “A national student initiative that engages new generations in a unique form of progressive activism that empower young people as leaders and promotes their ideas for change”.
Oooooo ‘big’ ideas. Ask them about The Forgotten Man.
sheeesh - frickin'  'retreads'.

7. RE: Economic Policy Institute
Another Leftard organization posing as ‘non-partisan’. Ask George Soros how much they cost.

8. RE: Sustainable Defense Task Force
OK, this one comes from the Project For Defense Alternatives, which given their record, translates into Project For Alternatives TO Defense. Who is the ‘task force’ (besides the basically one-half of a two-man PDA shop of Carl Conetta) ?

Carl Conetta, Project on Defense Alternatives
Benjamin H Friedman, Cato Institute
William D Hartung, New America Foundation
Christopher Hellman, National Priorities Project
Heather Hurlburt, National Security Network
Charles Knight, Project on Defense Alternatives
Lawrence J Korb, Center for American Progress
Paul Kawika Martin, Peace Action
Laicie Olson, Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation
Prasannan Parthasarathi, Boston College
Miriam Pemberton, Institute for Policy Studies
Laura Peterson, Taxpayers for Common Sense
Christopher Preble, Cato Institute
Winslow Wheeler, Center for Defense Information

Recognize any organizations we have already covered? It is easier to list the ones we haven’t. How about that eternal weapons program denouncer Winslow Wheeler? And I just KNOW I want ‘Peace Action’ on the front lines of defense recapitalization (Not).

PS. If that d***ed 'captcha' feature of Flight Global worked with modern security software, I would have commented at the post.

F35B Agitprop ala Sweetman

Bill Sweetman ran what I would characterize as an ‘opposition propaganda’ piece yesterday (Ares Blog: A Cat is Not a Dog). He bemoaned the Marine’s touting of the F-35B program as their 21st Century solution for the “Air” half of their Future Air-Ground Task Force as “propaganda”:

“The Marine propaganda offensive in support of the F-35B, carried on through events like last Friday’s media visit to Patuxent River, and through Marine-friendly websites, pounds relentlessly on the advantages of short take off and vertical landing.
It has to, because that’s the only respect in which the F-35B is not inferior to the F-35A and F-35C. Avionics are identical. The weapon load and range are less and it is (according to the UK) the most expensive of all the versions.“

Sweetman was taking what turned out to be a fairly gratuitous swipe at the F-35B’s raison d’être. Gratuitous, because he immediately changed the subject for the rest of the post with an awful(ly) lightweight critique of the ‘LHA/D-as-aircraft-carrier’ idea. I won’t dwell too much on what turned in to the main thrust of his agitprop in this post. Instead, I’d like to focus on his ‘damning with faint praise’ sucker-punch on the B’s STOVL capability as quoted above.

Comparing the F-35B STOVL to the CTOL (A) or CV (C) Models is a Red Herring.
The relevant comparison is the one that was NOT made by Mr. Sweetman: that of comparing the capabilities the F-35B brings to those of the plane it is replacing – The AV-8B. Could that have been because the disparity in total performance between the F-35B and AV-8B is the greatest of all in the F-35 vs. ‘legacy’ comparisons, with the F-35B blowing away the AV-8B ? In combat configuration the F-35B is supersonic, low observable, network-centric warfare capable, AND easy to land vertically for starters. The AV-8B is… ‘none of the above’.

About that ‘most expensive’ assertion Mr Sweetman then makes (and cites the UK as the source). We’ll assume that is true from a unit cost POV, but how do you account for the net equivalent combat power of a B model with forward basing vs. an A or C model staged more remotely?
Fortunately, this is an easy one to answer. The difference is found in the Sortie Generation rate KPPs of the three variants: The F-35B, as it is planned to be operated, will be capable of generating 4 sorties/day in a surge which is 33% more ‘surge’ sorties per the specification than either the A or C model as they are planned to be used. In a sustained operating environment the B model will be providing 50% more sorties per aircraft per day than the CTOL (F-35A) or CV (F-35C). The Marines, by operating ‘forward’ get a lot more 'Bang' out of their F-35 'Buck' than if they operated an A or C model from the big deck carriers or a main operating base farther from the fight.
    
This ‘forward operating’ capability advantage is not simply hypothetical. From an Armed Forces Journal article last year, as object lessons we find three conflicts with instances of the Marines exploiting ‘Forward Basing’ (emphasis mine).

Desert Storm
During Operation Desert Storm in 1991, shore-based AV-8B Harriers initially operated from a 10,000-foot runway at Sheik Isa Airbase in Bahrain. This resulted in a 45-minute transit to Kuwait with in-flight refueling, yielding a 30-minute time on station. The aircraft then moved to King Abdul Aziz Airstrip, a 4,000-foot asphalt runway 90 miles from Kuwait. With the addition of a flight line made of AM-2 matting, this forward operating base (FOB) housed 60 AV-8Bs for eight months. It was often referred to as “the soccer stadium” since the Marines set up headquarters and billeting in the adjacent stadium; from there, the transit to Kuwait was reduced to 20 minutes, yielding the same 30-minute time on station without aerial refueling. This reduced the burden on tanker aircraft, increased sortie generation rates and allowed these aircraft to be more responsive to ground forces.

Operation Iraqi Freedom
During the first phases of the war in Iraq in 2003, Marine Harriers were the first aircraft to conduct sustained operations from an airfield inside Iraq and the only tactical air aircraft to conduct combat operations from a road. In the first two weeks of the conflict, Marines established an FOB on the remains of the Iraqi airstrip at An Numinayah, just 60 nautical miles south of Baghdad. Damage to the runway rendered it unusable to other tactical fixed-wing aircraft. The FOB at An Numinayah facilitated forward positioning of aircraft to stand ground alert as well as a forward arming and refueling point for Harriers supporting combat operations in and around Baghdad. Eliminating the need for Harriers to reserve fuel for a lengthy return flight to ships or bases in Kuwait, the FOB at An Numinayah allowed the AV-8Bs to extend time on station without placing a logistical burden on aerial refueling assets. With an airfield in such close proximity to the forward edge of the battle area, Harriers stood a credible ground alert and reduced response times from one to two hours to less than 15 minutes.

Operation Enduring Freedom
The war in Afghanistan is the most recent example of the effectiveness of STOVL operations. In the last year, Marine AV-8Bs have routinely operated from FOB Dwyer, a 4,300-foot expeditionary airfield built by the Marine wing support squadrons. Just a few miles from the town of Marjah, FOB Dwyer was constructed to facilitate rapid logistical support and fire support for Marines operating in the southern Helmand River valley. Launching from their main base at Kandahar, Harriers recovered to Dwyer after completing a time on station and were able to quickly rearm and refuel while talking to ground commanders. A basing option in such close proximity to the supported unit enabled longer times on station and rapid ordnance reload capability, in addition to reducing the burden on airborne refueling assets.

Basing AV-8Bs at FOB Dwyer during the fight for Marjah resulted in 65 percent of their sortie duration being spent on station. In comparison, aircraft based at Kandahar spent 55 percent of their sortie duration on station while aircraft operating from a carrier spent only 25 percent of sortie duration on station. Over the service life of an aircraft, the real benefit of STOVL aircraft is more time in support of ground forces with less time in transit to and from the fight.

As they say on the big blogs, read it all here.

In the meantime, the Marines will keep leaning (and basing) forward.

Centennial of Naval Aviation #3

1926 'Bare Base' Naval Operations
Here's a post for the "maintainers". I know it might be hard to believe for some, but Hawaii was once a 'frontier', where all the trappings of modernity were not available when and where they might be needed. This must have presented challenges, especially when dealing with the 'high tech' of 1920's aviation. 85 years ago, this was what 'bare base' operations looked like:

Photo taken by my Grandfather, Machinist's Mate on the USS Langley, taken in 1926 while the Langley was operating out of Hawaii. The caption in the photo album reads: "Naval Aviation Camp".
It is actually printed backwards in the original print. I flipped the image for this post.

Here's an interesting detail I extracted from the original (click to enlarge):

Nice 'hangar'-- (and check out the living quarters in the background).

-Photos Copyright SMSgt Mac at www.elementsofpower.blogspot.com

Debunking The Close Air Support Myths: Part 6

CAS, the Air Force, and the A-10
Part 6: A-10s 'Forever' ?
(scroll down for links to Parts 1-5 and 'Sidebars)

As noted previously, the A-10 design was from the very start designed to be operated in a ‘permissive environment’. This limitation had been a concern of AF planners since the A-10’s inception, and its vulnerability to weapons larger than those it was designed to encounter became more of a concern with the advent and proliferation of Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADs) such as the SA-7 (and successors) as well as increases in numbers and types of larger mobile systems that filled the gap between short range low-altitude MANPADs and longer-range high-altitude fixed site systems (SA-2/3s and successors). Before the A-10 was even out of flight test, evidence that the battlefield was getting a lot nastier was seen in the 1973 Arab-Israeli ‘October War’:

Egyptian SAMs (SA-2s, SA-3s, and SA-6s) along with 23-mm ZSU23-4 antiaircraft cannons destroyed some 40 Israeli aircraft in the first 48 hours of the war, or 14 percent of the frontline strength of the IAF.3 In contrast, only five Israeli aircraft were destroyed in air-to-air combat during the entire conflict. Coupled with the high number of aircraft lost to ground-based air defenses in Vietnam, the results of the October War prompted some analysts to ask whether tactical aircraft had outlived their usefulness on the modern battlefield.(link)

Air planners saw the world’s Integrated Air Defense Systems (IADs) evolving at an alarming rate and anticipated that flying low-and-slow would soon be a poor survival strategy. 
Other developments were also occurring that would influence AF attitudes and decisions concerning future CAS capabilities:

1. Israeli successes with the F-16 in the Osirak Reactor Strike (air-to-ground) and the Bekaa Valley (air-to-air) “reenergized proponents of fast multi-role fighters”.

2. The emergence of the Army’s Air-Land Battle doctrine which “envisioned a faster and freer-flowing battlespace without a traditional battle line”. This was a doctrine that clearly favored use of a faster aircraft and operations that were less reliant on air-ground coordination.

3. The discovery that the A-10’s structural design life was significantly less-than-specified, and that would require remedy either via an extensive and expensive modification program and/or replacement of much of the A-10’s structure or the development of a replacement aircraft far earlier than anticipated.

All these factors contributed to the Air Force considering an A-10 replacement that was a ‘fast mover’ and viewing an F-16 variant as a good candidate for that replacement. Making aspersions that the Air Force ‘doesn’t want to do Close Air Support’ because it has sought (and seeks) to perform the mission using resources more survivable than a relatively ‘low and slow’ platform such as the A-10 says more about the ignorance of what is necessary in performing the CAS mission by those making such accusations than anything else. 
If one were to make a list of all the things that the A-10 brings to the battlefield that make it a good CAS platform, none of them are directly dependent upon the ability to fly ‘low and slow’ : its ability to fly low and slow enables it to provide timely and effective CAS in  many cases...in a highly permissive environment, but timely and effective CAS can be provided in any number of different combinations of weapon systems and tactics See here and here for examples. 

General Chuck Horner, the 'Air Boss' in Desert Storm, gets to have the last word on whether the A-10 or an A-10 'like' platform qualifies as the 'best' CAS tool in the future (LINK):

Q: Did the war have any effect on the Air Force's view of the A-10?
A: No. People misread that. People were saying that airplanes are too sophisticated and that they wouldn't work in the desert, that you didn't need all this high technology, that simple and reliable was better, and all that.
Well, first of all, complex does not mean unreliable. We're finding that out. For example, you have a watch that uses transistors rather than a spring. It's infinitely more reliable than the windup watch that you had years ago. That's what we're finding in the airplanes.
Those people . . . were always championing the A-10. As the A-10 reaches the end of its life cycle-- and it's approaching that now--it's time to replace it, just like we replace every airplane, including, right now, some early versions of the F-16.
Since the line was discontinued, [the A-10's champions] want to build another A-10 of some kind. The point we were making was that we have F-16s that do the same job.
Then you come to people who have their own reasons-good reasons to them, but they don't necessarily compute to me-who want to hang onto the A-10 because of the gun. Well, the gun's an excellent weapon, but you'll find that most of the tank kills by the A-10 were done with Mavericks and bombs. So the idea that the gun is the absolute wonder of the world is not true.

Q: This conflict has shown that?
A: It shows that the gun has a lot of utility, which we always knew, but it isn't the principal tank-killer on the A-10. The [Imaging Infrared] Maverick is the big hero there. That was used by the A-10s and the F-16s very, very effectively in places like Khafji.
The other problem is that the A-10 is vulnerable to hits because its speed is limited. It's a function of thrust, it's not a function of anything else. We had a lot of A-10s take a lot of ground fire hits. Quite frankly, we pulled the A-10s back from going up around the Republican Guard and kept them on Iraq's [less formidable] front-line units. That's line [sic] if you have a force that allows you to do that. In this case, we had F-16s to go after the Republican Guard.

Q: At what point did you do that?

A: I think I had fourteen airplanes sitting on the ramp having battle damage repaired, and I lost two A- 10s in one day [February 15], and I said, "I've had enough of this." ....

The Air Force Tried to Give the A-10 to the Army?
One of the most recent episodes fueling the “Air Force Doesn’t like CAS” myth often pops up in real and virtual discussions on the subject as a form of 'proof' or evidence is the simplistic claim that “the AF tried to give the A-10 to the Army”. This argument has its roots in a singular event after Desert Storm, when General Merrill McPeak, shortly before his retirement as Air Force Chief of Staff, proposed a radical change in DoD and Service responsibilities based upon his particular view of “roles and missions”. The A-10 ramifications were collateral damage in the scheme of things. It was McPeak's view that such a restructuring would reduce redundancy and exploit each Service’s strengths to the most effective level.

Per 'Learning Large Lessons' (p.197), McPeak asserted:

In my view, modern land warfare can be seen as containing four “battles”—the rear battle, which includes all the base and supporting elements; the close battle, in which the main opposing ground forces engage one another; the deep battle, which includes hostile territory well beyond the line of contact; and the high battle, the arena of air and space combat. . . . The rear and close battles should be the responsibility of a ground forces commander, an Army or a Marine Corps officer. His forces should be capable of relatively autonomous operations—they should be capable of engaging the enemy in the friendly rear and immediately in front of them, without a lot of outside help. True, the ground commander has a deep and abiding interest in what goes on overhead in the high battle or over the horizon in the deep battle and he may even have some capability to get into these fights. But, his forces are not the most effective for the high or deep battle. Air assets provide the best, most often the only capability to operate in these parts of the battlefield. . . . [T]his approach to dividing battle space provides a logical starting point for identifying unnecessary overlap and duplication. If you accept the scheme I just laid out, it follows that the commander with responsibility for the close battle does not require systems or capabilities that reach across the boundaries into the deep and high battles. If there are such systems in the field or on the drawing board, they might be good candidates for retirement or transfer to another service. Alternatively, the commander with responsibility for the deep battle does not need forces that are configured for direct support of close combat operations. If there are any, they too could be transferred out. 

McPeak called for the Army to give up the ‘deep battle’, the Air Force to give up ‘close battle’, and called for, among other things, the other services to get out of ‘space’ operations. His proposal (thankfully) went nowhere with the other services nor anyone else in the Air Force. Thus, the ‘give CAS to the Army’ was the idea of one man – now long gone and most definitely ‘not missed’, as part of a complete realignment of service roles and missions, essentially dictated by geography of the battlespace.

There were very large problems with inter-service cooperation and conflict that McPeak saw and was trying to solve. The challenge was real, but his solution would have created as many problems as it would have solved, even without entrenched interests subverting such an effort (and there would be). Desert Storm experience, if it did nothing else, clearly exposed the Army’s parochial and incorrect view that Airpower is nothing more than a support element. When in reality it should be viewed as a maneuver element.
Updated and expanded references 7/28: Some excellent papers on differing Airpower-as-manever-or-support views (large .pdf files at links):

Thunder and Lightning: Desert Storm and the Airpower Debates (1995)
Airpower and Maneuver Warfare (1994)
Integrating Joint Operations Beyond the FSCL (1997) (Army POV with AF POV Intro)
Unity of Effort: Crisis Beyond the FSCL (1999) (Army POV on resolving ambiguities in Joint Doctrine)

Conclusions

Thus we have found:
 
1. The Air Force supports the CAS mission better now than when it was part of the Army.

2. The Army was the primary antagonist in creating inter-service friction over CAS post-WWII and in it's Army-Centric way of war it continues to generate friction to this day.

3. CAS is a mission NOT a platform.

Post Script: 
There were a lot of sub-topics we could have pursued and I was/am tempted to further explore the effects of organizational culture and tendencies of the services on the CAS debate, but I fear that will drive the discussion down a ‘rabbit hole’ from which there may be no return. There are also some interesting dynamics now changing the Army’s way of fighting that could lessen the perceived friction between the services, but I am content to simply monitor them for the present time. I could have also expanded greatly on what makes up 'Effectiveness' for a CAS mission. Finally, the Marines insistence on being the primary provider of CAS as an organic USMC function is another topic for another time.

Update 7/27/11@~19:45hrs: Added part of a response that Gen Horner made in the Q&A above that had been dropped in copying the file from a word document to Blogger.(Now the answer makes sense.)

Part 1: The “Big Two” Close Air Support (CAS) Myths
Part 2: Those "not so good old days”
Part 3: Vietnam and the Rise of the “No-CAS Air Force” Myth
Part 4: Origins of the A-X Program
Part 5: Defining a New CAS Platform: the Evolution of the A-10
CAS Myths Sidebar: The A-10 and the 'Cult of the Gun'
CAS Myths Sidebar: Army-Air Force Views on CAS and Airpower
Second Edition: 
Part 7: Sourcing AF Hates A-10 Nonsense
Part 8: The AF 'Had To" Buy a CAS Plane?

CAS Myths Sidebar: Army-Air Force Views on CAS and Airpower

(scroll down for links to Parts 1-6 of CAS Myths and another 'Sidebar')

The current (IMHO myopic) Army view of airpower persists in relegating the AF to a permanent supporting force, and is highlighted by an incident just before the Desert Storm ground campaign kicked off (boldface emphasis mine):

A few days before the ground war commenced in February 1991. . . he [General Schwarzkopf] met with his subordinate commanders to discuss the land offensive. General Horner explained his Push CAS modus of flowing airplanes to the battlefield twenty-four hours a day (rather than keeping them idle while sitting alert). When General [Frederick] Franks ignored what Horner had said and demanded that VII Corps be allotted hundreds of CAS sorties per day (whether needed or not), the airman angrily disputed the allocation of air power in that manner and reiterated his Push CAS procedures. Horner believed it important for unity of command to let his anger show as he vehemently rejected Franks’s claim for so much unfocused air power. He remembered his outburst having no effect: “Everyone looked at me and said, ‘Well, he fell on his sword; isn’t that quaint.’” General [Walt] Boomer jumped in and requested as many dedicated sorties for his Marines, and General [Gary] Luck joined the “run on the bank” and demanded as many CAS flights for his XVIII Corps. The ground commanders argued for their sorties, but after a while Schwarzkopf called a halt to the debate, reminding all present, “You people don’t understand. It’s all my air, and I’ll use it any way I please.” “That ended the argument,” Horner recalled, “and we maintained centralized command.” The CINCCENT [commander in chief of Central Command] depended upon his JFACC to ensure that all the ground commanders received adequate air support.  

But having failed to divide Airpower into subordinated chunks prior to the ground war, after the ground offensive kicked off Army ground commanders insisted on placing their Fire Support Control Lines so far ahead of their forces that it hindered the Air Force’s ability to engage interdiction targets once the ground war started (source: Revolution in Warfare: Airpower in the Persian Gulf, Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen (1995), pp. 133–134 and partially cited in “Learning Large Lessons”):  

FSCL, Coalition aircraft could attack only under direction from ground or airborne controllers. This procedure could cost time to coordinate the actions and required suitable weather conditions and the presence of a controller to execute the attacks: far less weight of fixed-wing air power could be brought to bear under such circumstances. . . .

Because the FSCL definition said little about coordination of weapons employment beyond the FSCL the corps commanders considered supporting fires beyond the line as “permissive,” requiring no further coordination. That is, they resisted any restrictions on employing missiles or helicopters beyond the line and saw attempts to include such strikes in the ATO as efforts to put their organic firepower under JFACC control. To avoid JFACC control, XVIII Airborne Corps advanced the FSCL well north of the Euphtates River on 27 February and thus reserved an area for attack helicopter operations unconstrained by any requirement to coordinate with the JFACC. The effect of this was to hamper air power’s ability to destroy escaping Iraqi ground forces until the FSCL was finally pulled back after several hours.
Corps commanders at times set the FSCLs for their respective corps at different distances. which sowed confusion and complicated air-ground coordination. This practice continued until Gen Horner established a Desert Storm operation-wide FSCL that approximated the distance that corps commanders could effectively engage the enemy with their indirect fires including the MLRSs.       

The Army POV of the FSCL and its placement was of course quite different and focused on the limitations imposed on them prior to the kickoff of the ground war:   

....[b]ecause the Air Force absolutely would not fly short of the FSCL before G-Day, we kept the FSCL in close to facilitate air attack of division and corps high priority targets. This caused two problems. Every [artillery] fire mission or AH-64 [attack helicopter] attack beyond the FSCL had to be carefully and painstakingly cleared with the Air Force. Even counterfire required this lengthy  process. Equally bad, air sorties beyond the FSCL were completely the domain of the Air Force. VII Corps could nominate targets beyond the FSCL, but could never be sure they would be attacked.

Two points of view. One takes into account the entire battlespace and the other is centered on the individual corps forces. The corps commander's focus on their responsibilities is perfectly understandable..to a point. I leave it to the reader to decide which POV holds the greater effectiveness and potential for victory.
Part 1: The “Big Two” Close Air Support (CAS) Myths
Part 2: Those "not so good old days”
Part 3: Vietnam and the Rise of the “No-CAS Air Force” Myth
Part 4: Origins of the A-X Program
Part 5: Defining a New CAS Platform: the Evolution of the A-10
Part 6: A-10s 'Forever' ?
CAS Myths Sidebar: The A-10 and the 'Cult of the Gun'

CAS Myths Sidebar: The A-10 and the 'Cult of the Gun'

The A-10 and the 'Cult of the Gun'
(scroll down for links to Parts 1-6 of CAS Myths and another 'Sidebar')

The AGM-65 Maverick missiles launched by A-10s were one of the most effective weapon combinations in Desert Storm.  This point should come as no surprise within the A-10 community, but again we are fighting against human notions and human emotions. During TASVAL 79, where the A-10's fundamental operational concepts and tactics were born, 57TFW (Tactical Fighter Weapon Center)  pilots initially tended to prefer attacking with the GAU-8 gun over the AGM-65 Mavericks. The short story is: They DIED...alot. TASVAL scenarios were very intense: realistic fluid battlefronts, and real and simulated threat systems that drove nap-of-the-dirt maneuvering, usually pop-up engagements, and coordinated attacks either with a four-ship A-10 flight, or a similar force working with Army attack helos. Towards the end of the deployment, experienced pilots would advise the replacement pilots to press with the Mavericks against the Air Defense first, use their missiles up THEN press with the gun. When they followed the old hands advice they lived. When they followed the 'Cult of the Gun' they were the only A-10 drivers 'killed'.

I never knew for certain if the 'lessons learned' from TASVAL had been carried forward until Douglas Campbell wrote about it in his (~9575%) definitive book [10/28/13: Just finished dissecting Campbell's thesis the book is based upon and now have serious reservations concerning the quality and selectivity of his sources] on the history of the A-10 "The Warthog and the Close Air Support Debate". His book has the first references I've ever read of  TASVAL (other than an Army Mental Health paper on the extraordinary divorce rates among Army participants at Fort Hunter Liggett) and confirms the lessons DID go forward.

But though the lessons went forward, so did the Cult of the Gun. Using the 'Gun' is visceral. I had conversations on this topic with my late Father-in-Law who flew the first F-4Es in SEA out of DaNang. He flew with the 4th TFS 'Fuujins' , then with the 366th TFW "Gunfighters". His favorite air to mud configuration was 20mm centerline and 2 more 20mms on the wings on top of his 20mm cannon in the nose. He likened the satisfaction of attacking with the gun to reaching out and touching the target.

I believe some of the same feeling he conveyed can be found in this C-Span Video interviewing Eric 'Fish' Salomonson and his wingman John 'Karl' Marks (Segment starts about 1:30 into the clip). These pilots 'killed' 23 tanks (and 10 damaged) flying three missions in one day. I remember watching this video the first time it aired. The 'pool' reporter asks some hilariously stupid questions at times so the whole video is pretty entertaining. At first I thought that the kill mix was 12 'gun' and 11 'missiles' because Salmonson mentions he had a 'bad Maverick' (~7:41) on the last sortie, but less than 10 seconds later he's asked about the mix and Salomonson tells the reporter the ratio was 17 kills with the Maverick and 6 kills with the gun. Keep that in mind as you watch the pilot's reaction at the ~11:20 mark when the reporter asks what it looks like when 'a Maverick hits one of the tanks' and listen to their comments: "huge explosion", "turret blew completely off", "spinning through air" etc. Then about the reporters ask (about the ~21:17 mark) about the effect of 'the cannon' and get in response: "not quite as big a boom", just "see flashes", "usually a little bit of a delay if it does light off"... etc ,,and then about 30 seconds of commentary on how it's harder to use (takes more skill).  But when they get asked (~21:54) about "of all the weapons" which weapon do they they prefer?

Lt Marks closes his eyes, smiles and then Salomonson says: "The Gun".

 Salomonson elaborates further including closing his eyes for a moment as if to relive the feeling in his head as he says....

"There's nothing like it."

There's no better example of the visceral power of 'the gun' than this interview. 16 (oops) 17 certain nearly instantaneous kills with missiles vs. 6 'slow cookers' and 10 'possibles' with the GAU-8...and they prefer the gun.

We're such irrational beings aren't we?

Part 1: The “Big Two” Close Air Support (CAS) Myths
Part 2: Those "not so good old days”
Part 3: Vietnam and the Rise of the “No-CAS Air Force” Myth
Part 4: Origins of the A-X Program
Part 5: Defining a New CAS Platform: the Evolution of the A-10
Part 6: A-10s 'Forever' ?
CAS Myths Sidebar: Army-Air Force Views on CAS and Airpower