Nature Fakers (Enviros)

They've been around longer than most people realize.
I was just telling someone this week why, as a lifelong Conservationist, I hate Nature-Faking  'Environmentalism'. In the future, I'll just refer them to the link.

UAV Strikes in Pakistan Aren't Targeting Civilians

So they're not killing very many either.
When the evidence gets looked at closely we find Unmanned Air Vehicle strikes don't kill nearly as many civilians as collateral damage as the political opportunists in Pakistan or emoters in the United States try to lead us to believe.  There's a shocker for you (not).

There's nothing 'Sterile' about it.
Even the improper use of the descriptor 'Drone', which has now come into common usage as a label for all unmanned air vehicles seems to promote the 'thoughtlessness' meme. They are Unmanned Air Vehicles. I submit the human thought and decision process that go into deciding to launch a Hellfire missile off a Predator UAV are far more involved and rigorous than launching one off any other type of platform. People who carp about the 'sterility' of such strikes had ancestors who carried swords and lances and b*tched about the appearance of the longbow on the battlefield. No matter how far removed from the battle, combat involvment is not 'sterile' for the operator. Physically safer? Yes. Sterile and unthinking? NO.

Spare us the "Not One More Dead Child" bleating.
Civilian deaths are a burden our military and intelligence operators and decision-makers bear heavily. The only true unfortunates in this situation are innocent children and (most of) the women. They are the collateral damage that we can only mitigate but never eliminate when the perverse values in a primitive 'culture' prioritizes 'family' relationships over the fact that your relative is terrorist scum.  We work to minimize the collateral damage but some people seem to be unaware that "WAR!" isn't very nice.

F-35 Stores Testing: An Observation

...Or Two
(See Update Below)

H/T Solomon at SNAFU! for first pointing these out.

High resolutions pics available at ARES blog, but I believe (just an opinion here) ARES was more concerned with getting out the pics than getting the details down. The ARES article mentions:

It's not too evident on these images, but the AIM-9X pylons have an unusual outward kick that mounts the launch rail at an angle to the pylon, presumably to provide adequate clearance from neighboring stores.

That could be part of it, but since we're speculating, I think a major reason might have  more to do with the proximity of the AIM-9X (or other store) to the Flaperon edges.

Even if there wasn't a physical clearance problem, there might have been potential for some interesting acoustic environments generated locally. You could have the weapon causing buffet of the wing and flaperon or vice versa - maybe even affecting weapon release envelopes.
Who knows? It could even have a signature benefit from the side (I doubt it though).
I held off mentioning this because I was certain one of the local 'experts' at Ares would have caught the missile/control surface proximity, but it's 40 comments in and 'no joy'. Maybe they're focusing too much on 'clever' and not enough on 'smart'. Heck, ol' Bill even dumps on a commenter positing the possibility of multiple AMRAAMS on some of the pylons (possible if not practical or desirable) with a crack about the commenter forgetting the 'nuclear laser' option.
The pylons proximity to the flaperons does seem to have raised some (ahem) 'concern' in the comments.

While they appear to be longer (vertically) than the F-18 E/F's (excellent pics here), they also appear to be more streamlined than the F-18E/F pylons. The two inboard pylons appear identical, and such interchangeability would be a logistical advantage over many previous aircraft (like the F-18E/F). I suspect the F-35's pylons are lower drag installation than the F-18's because they look 'cleaner', but couldn't prove it either way without some design data.

Update 21Feb @2020Hrs.
I stopped by ARES again to see if anyone had picked up on the proximity of the flaperon edges to the outboard store station and didn't see anything related. I did notice that Ol' Bill must have inflamed the commenter he 'snarked' because the guy's first comment afterwards was deleted and he's on a tear about it. The other thing I noticed was someone with the handle of 'RAF' seems to REALLY want there to have been a decrement to the A/C model performance due to commonality with the B, and he works hard at selling the idea of the B's alleged 'optimization' for STOVL simply MUST have subverted the rest of the variants.

People evidently don't read any more, for as I noted at SNAFU! a while back in the comments:

From AIAA paper "The Genesis of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter" by Paul Bevilaqua:

This first-order analysis suggested that it might be possible to almost double the thrust of an existing F-119 engine with a dualcycle shaft-driven lift fan the same diameter as the engine. Such a variable-cycle propulsion system would provide high levels of thrust augmentation in the STOVL mode, with a cool low-pressure footprint, ample control power, and minimal effect on the design of the airframe. By placing the lift fan in line with the cruise engine, the bypass ratio would be increased without increasing the engine diameter. And because the cruise engine can be optimized for conventional flight, its performance is not penalized for its STOVL capability.

Everyone doesn't have access to AIAA archives, but everyone on the web should know what a frickin' search engine looks like. Bevilaqua also notes in more than one of his AIAA papers that the mid-mission CG of the B model is effectively the same as the A model. This is a critical point because one seeks to design the aircraft to have the best mass properties for maneuvering at mid-mission weights because that is the time when a combat aircraft needs its best maneuverability.

AR Project: A Functional Device

I have been scouring the web, several catalogs, and near weekly editions of Shotgun News these past few months trying to find a really 'good deal' to tip the balance either way in deciding to buy or build my 'upper'. I've also been picking the brains of a co-worker that has experience building up ARs in trying to decide the final approach and configuration.
I finally decided that I would go with a built up upper instead of piece parts, and that for the type of shooting I will be doing I should go for a 16" barrel in other than the full-bull stainless steel variety. There were several reasons on the barrel decision, not the least of which is that for the kind of light conditions in which I plan to use this weapon, I really wanted a flash suppressor-- and that the heavy stainless barrels that would fill the bill were either way too expensive or on perennial back-order.

I went to Cheaper Than Dirt today looking for one particular A3 Upper but found that the retail store had 2 of another model I had considered, but had not selected before, because the model had been listed as 'out of stock' according to the online catalog. I bought one.

It is a DPMS 5.56, 16" light barrel assembly with A2 flash hider, low profile single rail gas block, and complete with bolt/carrier assembly and charging handle. The in-store price was a little steeper than the catalog price, but still par for other sources, and as far as upper assemblies go, the main lesson I've learned in this project is the 'bird in the hand' maxim is in effect.

This build needs only the few bells and whistles I still want. Some of them I would have tried to pick up today if CTD hadn't been such a freaking zoo (the checkout lady told me that it was always this way on 'rainy' Saturdays).  

Remaining Checklist Items: Free Float Quad Rails, Flip-up sights, Sling (type TBD, leaning towards 3 point), Optics/laser (TBD), and possibly a vertical foregrip and ambidextrous charging handle.

So close.....

Han Shot First

Culture Wars? It's On!

     Bill Whittle on PJTV

Excellent Afterburner video from PJTV up at You Tube right now.

While the 'Evil Child-like Socialists' in power, their codependent Hollyweird sycophants, and the 'entitled' parasites falsely claiming to be "the 99%" are waging open war against American civilization, it is nice to see some 'push back'.

Bill Whittle, once again, does not disappoint, and while I generally agree with Solomon at SNAFU! about the downsides of 'Act Of Valor',Whittle points out a 'positive' for the movie that cannot be denied. His observations about the making of 'Act of Valor' may not be precisely 'correct' but they are forgivable in the greater scheme of things.

I may get one of those 'Han Shot First t-shirts myself.
 

LRS-B: The Next-Next Generation Bomber!

Old School Long Range Strike (Click on Pic For Larger)

Work kept me from catching this story earlier. News slowly coming out about the new Long Range Strike platform in the works isn't substantial enough yet for me to determine if I should call it a 'great idea' or a waste of time in the continuing saga of fielding a new long range strike asset. How I think of it will depend largely on the unrefueled range and payload numbers if it is like the 'LRS-A'  in all other respects.
Phil Ewing at DoDBuzz 'disappoints' in this observation (emphasis in original):

By relying on proven technologies and by planning to evolve the aircraft over time as threats evolve, similar to the B-52 legacy fleet, the up-front acquisition costs will be reduced significantly from the B-2 experience. The average procurement unit cost is anticipated to be about $550 million in FY 2010 dollars for a fleet of 80–100 aircraft. The Air Force plans to utilize an executive-level, highly streamlined, stable oversight structure to manage the program, and keep requirements manageable, tradable [sic] and affordable. Funding in FY 2013 is $0.3 billion and totals $6.3 billion from FY 2013 – FY 2017.

Hey Phil? About that 'doing things differently' angle. If we would have bought 80-100 B-2s, in the first place the unit acquisition cost would have been far less than those "$550M" in 2010 dollars, and probably much less than that even in then-year dollars. CBO numbers for only 26 B-2s in the early 90s was $540M per plane. Northrop offered to sell the AF only half as many (40)  B-2Cs in 2001 for a fixed price of $545M/aircraft.

End Note:
Right behind an almost pathological ignorance (perhaps often feigned?) of the Logical Fallacies, the thing that bugs me the most about the state of the news media today is the absolute lack of (again, perhaps feigned?) awareness as to how math or economics are actually applied within the topics on they write so breathlessly.

[minor cut/paste errors corrected 2/17]

Airpower is Developed, Sustained, and Provided by an "Air Force"

Composite Photo of a Aerospace Power Dead End, a.k.a. A-10 N/AW

In thread over at SNAFU!, we find one commenter 'Lane" advocating the wet dream of 'Army über alles' types everywhere, i.e. the disbandment of the Air Force. I've invited him to read a couple of my older posts Space Force? and Space Coast Guard?  and have posted this to give him an opportunity to make his case a little better than he did over at Solomon's.

Thoughtful arguments (beyond 'because', 'because I say so', and 'there was this one time in band camp' please) for disbanding the AF are welcome, but will be countered even more thoughtfully. I predict and forewarn that IF I get any response, my most common references in countering will involve "Goldwater-Nichols" and the words 'Train and Equip'.

Oh!.. and please leave the 'we have x number Air Forces' B.S. for use as sound bites on some space limited I-hate-AF thread. The Army has trains and it isn't a railroad, and some say it has more floating assets than the Navy and no one claims it is a 'Navy'.  

If serious discussion on Airpower isn't your thing, then I refer you to a light-hearted romp on the subject of service roles and missions. See Harry Harrison's "Navy Day" ..........

The Army had a new theme song: "Anything  you can do, we can do better!" And they meant anything, including up-to-date hornpipes!

 

Just got back from Washington DC.

 Mmmmmm... 'Defense Cuts'

(So good to be back in America)

Fifth-Gen Kalashnikov

Seems more of an evolutionary 'tart-up' job than revolutionary and 'next-gen'.

Though in the old days, incorporation of Picatinny rails in the design would have been considered a Counter-Revolutionary  'gulag' offense.  Oh, they would have copied them, they just would have named it something else.

Hat Tip: The Unwanted Blog

Making 'Global Hawk' Brand Defense Sausage

Narrative Building in lieu of say, actual Defense Planning

RQ-4 Global Hawk Preflight at 0-Dark Hundred Hours

Exhibit 1
June 14, 2011. A Secretary of Defense Acquisition Memorandum released following a review of the Global Hawk program. The memorandum states:
1. “…the continuation of the program is essential to national security.”
2. “…there are no alternatives to the program which will provide acceptable capability to meet the joint military requirement at less cost.”

Exhibit 2.
January 27, 2012. Air Force To Cut 10,000; Global Hawks Get Warehoused

Hmmmm….

So what is the only thing that has ‘changed’ that could have caused such a shift in the Global hawk fortunes in the interim?

Oh yeah - A fatally-flawed world-view was fraudulently packaged into a document posing as a National Defense Strategy and unleashed to provide ‘cover’ for a ton of stupidity that we will experience between now and the end of the current Administration with which we are now plagued.

2013 can’t come soon enough.

BTW: Someone must have telegraphed the ‘Narrative’ early. Senator John Hoven of North Dakota (Where the Global Hawks were to be based) was calling for the Global Hawk to continue back in December ’11.

DoDBuzz Debuzzed, With A 'Major' Tool Running Amok in the Threads

I'm going hammer and tong (see comments to this article) with a poser (On Airpower & CAS in this case) going by the handle 'major.rod' over 'CAS Myths' and after I came back to the thread today I find he dropped another steaming 'pile' a  day or two ago. Suddenly DODBuzz isn't letting me respond to this guy's idiotic comments. DOD Buzz won't even let me post the following as a 'Reply' to one of my own comments:

F-35 Tail Hook Risks? Meh.

Other than using the word ‘blame’ in the headline to draw the reader’s eye there’s a pretty good piece at the Navy Times on the F-35 tail hook ‘issue’.
While I don’t know who made the “claim” mentioned within this excerpt, this seems to contain a series of reasonable observations:

Richard Aboulafia, an analyst at the Teal Group, Fairfax, Va., said the claim that the F-35C could never land on a ship was always highly dubious. ''They turned the YF-17 into a carrier plane, why couldn't they correct carrier-hook problems here?'' he said. ''This does not appear to be a killer problem.'' Flight testing is designed to uncover and fix problems with a new aircraft, Aboulafia said. ''This is the kind of problem that might come out during the flight testing of a carrier-based plane,'' he said.

Lest someone think arresting gear functionality should have been a ‘slam dunk’ out of the box, “History” has shown it more to be something that has to be worked out with every plane. See this excellent blog for a pretty decent survey of past designs and challenges. Even if the 'first round redesign' doesn’t provide the final ‘answer‘ to the problem, it will probably provide more data to support further tweaking of the arresting gear. But if the problem isn’t fixed the first time, I can almost guarantee there will be near-instantaneous 'doomsayer' claims that something much more draconian/costly/delaying 'will have to be done’. I am just mentioning it now so you can get some ear protection before the caterwauling commences. I'd wait to get the data from the next round of tests, and get excited only if the data told me I should.
PS: I’d discuss the technical challenges of successful arresting gear development in more detail, (beginning with the fact that when it comes to an aircraft system interacting with the ship system what we are talking about is essentially a chaotic meta-system) but most people’s eyes would glaze over before I was finished. OK, I admit it, since I deal with this kind of stuff from 9 to 5 it would be no fun for me either. The article linked above covers what may be the critical bits in this case anyway.
Just think about ALL the variables that might be involved and you’ll get the idea.

Nice short F-8 tail hook...but a loooooong way back from the landing gear. Image from Wikipedia Commons

Why The Public is So Poorly Informed...

(about on just about da** near everything)

It is the convergence of the Chump Effect with the Gell-Mann Amnesia Effect.

Providers and Consumers: there's plenty of 'blame' to go around.

H/T Instapundit.

Sweetman Goes "All In" on F-35 QLR

I think maybe he is trying to 'nag' his way onto the F-35 program.
(But it's just too much fun watching him flail around)

Bill Sweetman has his spleen vent set to ‘Full Snark Mode’ in an ongoing series of posts that tail-twist the F-35 program over the F-35 Quick Look Report and what (he thinks) 'it all means’ from the Ragin’ Hedge Baby from the Shires© perspective. I noticed that in the manner of Brave Sir Robin said gadfly decided to go deep (as in shovel ready) on this topic while the Aerospace industry in general is in its ‘end of year’ hiatus. I have had more important things to do (and kill) than negative memes over the Christmas break, so I haven’t given too much attention to the uninformed ruminations of itinerant journolistas, their codependent Non-State-Actor friends, or the rest of the merry Anti-JSF tribe until tonight.

I hit the ARES blog looking for details on the latest Saudi/F-15 deal before I head back to work tomorrow and what do I find? Yeah…. another Sweetman ‘piece’ taking a swipe at the F-35 and ‘its supporters’ titled: “F-35 Proponents Say The Darndest Things”. No snark there eh?
The article is as full of the simplton-ian analysis we’ve come to expect from the source, but what really caught my eye was the closer:

So where do all these tales come from? Check out an Australian government audit report, released on December 20. In its discussion of Australia's JSF program (p261), it notes that one of 11 "major challenges" to the project, on the same level as dealing with schedule and cost changes, is to

"appropriately manage JSF misinformation in the media".

Do they mean correcting misinformation, or maintaining misinformation at an appropriate level?

Since Mr. Sweetman is apparently at a loss (in more ways than one) as to what the Australian GOVERNMENT AUDIT (i.e. outside the JSF program) report means, let us use a suitable example of media misinformation to help correct misinformation and perhaps clarify for Mr. Sweetman to what the Australian Government seems to be referring.

Let’s see. How about a corrective rewrite of of Bill Sweetman’s “Why the QLR is News” piece, so that it is a little less ‘misinformative’? (Corrections and new content in Blue)

-------------

There is no faster way for an adept flack to kill take 'cheap shots' at a story program than to conflate a the "nothing really new on the technical front” report into a “this program is as bad as we wished” gambit. We've seen a good deal of that in the six days since the Quick Look Review report escaped from its cage.
A typical story might use a report that quotes an unattributed analyst as saying that:

"the F-35 was turning out to have the same schedule, cost and technical issues suffered by most aircraft programs, including Boeing's new 787 Dreamliner. 'It's not a pleasant picture, but it's far from a terminal one either'."

and diminish the impact of said quote by adding something like:

If "most programs" had the Dreamliner's issues, this would be one depressingly incompetent industry to work in. And the 787's problems so far have translated into strategic failure: The goal was to bury Airbus in the mid-market, but the old-school A330 is still alive and kicking, while Airbus outmaneuvered a distracted Boeing in the narrow-body segment.

Notice the overt obfuscation of the main “same schedule, cost and technical issues suffered by most aircraft programs” point by focusing on an alleged Dreamliner failure? So what if the final Dreamliner story is yet to be written? It would appear that it is apparently within “someone’s” journalistic license to ‘beg the question’ even when employing misdirection.
Using evidence in hand, and avoiding unsubstantiated speculation, a disinterested observer would have to conclude that the JSF problems are not may or may not be terminal, and he or she would be cautious concerning a report that was built upon largely antiquated data and not assert that but the idea that a major take-away from the first full year of flying (F-35s this year have flown twice as many sorties as the program had notched up a year ago) is that the production ramp-up needs to be stopped is something new, and not normal. After all, greater concurrency has been seen more often since at least WW2.
For the F-35, it's also not news that a critical report leaked as ‘fast’ as it did. That Such a leak in this day and age can just as readily be  usually an indication of a malcontent in any of the program office, test, operational, or competing (F-18?) communities rather than evidence of any high-level dissent. It could even be evidence of political hardball coming from the office of the Acting Undersecretary’s office (After all, it was, Jame G. Burton, one of the less famous and perhaps less capable but slightly more honorable of the so-called ‘reformers’in the 70s-80s who observed (to paraphrase) ‘Acting’ Something-secretaries tend to very much want to be permanent Something-secretaries.
Most Some of the press coverage to-date misses the point of the report’s incomplete nature on the subject of concurrency,and instead the coverage seems to be focusing on building a narrative which is asserts there is an unusual and the looming collision between discovery in flight and fatigue testing and planned production increases .
If one desired to build a narrative around the meaning of the QLR supporting a ‘negative’ POV, they might focus on the report’s concerns that Ggiven the status of testing, and the lag time in developing and implementing fixes, the report concludes that there is:

"a high risk that rework and retrofit costs... will continue to be realized across the entire LRIP production flow" - including LRIP-9 deliveries in 2017. Those aircraft are due to be ordered just after high-angle-of-attack flight tests are completed, and while second-lifetime fatigue tests are still under way.”

While the previous is 'true' (to a point), informed and balanced reporting would also note that the QLR does not take into consideration the risks and associated costs of NOT proceeding as planned and the threats those risks pose to the program. It is not as if the fact that the technical aspects of a program pose far less total cost risk to a program than programmatic aspects is not well known. The largest drivers have been shown to be #1: quantity changes (22 percent), #2: requirements growth (13 percent), and #3: schedule changes (9 percent).
Competent reportage would take into consideration what is missing from the QLR and what the impacts of following the recommendations might afflict on the program. The QLR recommends changing quantities and schedule, two of the three largest cost drivers? Where is the reportage asking the hard questions on that apparent conflict?

A cynical member of the press might attempt to counter the fact that the The ‘play-down’ reports also invariably note that the report did not recommend terminating production. Such an approach might employ a snark-laden false allegory such as:

That's the good-news story? "Hi, dear, how was the check-up?" "Fantastic! I don't have Ebola yet!"

When a truer, albeit far less entertaining, one might read:

“That's the good-news story? "Hi, dear, how was the check-up?" "Doc says I have to work on things but nothing that we don't think we can work out."

Of course, why bring up the allegory at all if it doesn’t support the negative meme drivng a story in the first place?
Let's look at that the wording in detail (page 7). The QLR team separated the program issues into four categories. Category I: "Areas where a fundamental design risk has been identified with realized consequences sufficient to preclude further production."
They didn't find any, but those with bias, or insufficient technical backgrounds and experience might brush this point off by asserting something akin to:

"it would have been a damning indictment of program management if they had. For a team of outsiders to walk in and, in 30 days, discover an unfixable problem sufficient to terminate the program on the spot would point to ineptitude at best."

 When in reality, a problem of that magnitude on a program as far along as the F-35 is more often as plainly obvious to an experienced program manager as the nose on any obdurate journalist’s face.
As noted above, the categories were set by the QLR team on the basis of what they found. Also, the team's original charter was not to determine whether the program should be whacked, but to investigate concerns about testing delays, and concurrency costs.
It would be beyond the pale, but alas I fear not beyond the limits of some in the aerospace trade press to read into the QLR something that is not there: to create a ‘absence of evidence is evidence of something’ argument. Perhaps by contriving a question similar to:

So if they didn't find any Category I issues, why is there a Category I at all - except to provide the program's defenders with a soundbite? If anyone has a brilliant alternative answer to that question, I'm all ears.

But you may ask “Certainly, no journalist, not even one apparently having an axe to grind on this particular topic, would fail to grasp that when one organizes information, the FIRST step is to create the categories for what you MIGHT find and THEN categorize what is found, as it is found, by the predetermined categories?”

Apparently not.

 -------------

"Happy New Year" indeed

Merry Christmas To All GIs Everywhere

(Bumped: Originally posted Christmas Eve 2007 & time hasn't changed a thing)

Just after Thanksgiving every year I start thinking about how Christmas in the military can be a little different than the average American’s. Maybe it is because when you join up, you gain another family to think about: and you think about them every year, whether we’re at war or at peace.
I get particularly sappy about it I guess, because I worked my first 10 Christmas Eves and Days.
My first Christmas Eve with my new family was when I was still in Basic Training. We were far enough along in the program that on “non-training” days we had some liberty in the immediate area of our WWII-era barracks (only the wusses were in the 1000-man dorms at that time ~wink). We actually built a Christmas tree of sorts, out of 7-Up and Coke cans on a picnic-type table while waiting our turn to call home from an adjacent bank of payphones. I spent my first Military Christmas Eve sitting around the aluminum can tree exchanging family Christmas traditions and stories.
My second Christmas was when I learned about “SP Augmentees”. I spent 12 hours guarding a stateside bomb dump with a brick (radio) and an empty M-16. The single guys pulled ‘the duty’ on Christmas Eve and Day so the married guys could be with their families and the married guys who “didn’t party” pulled the duty on New Year’s Eve and Day. It was a ‘win-win’ for everyone. For the next eight years it was usually the same thing. In Alaska and Iceland, the Godless Soviets liked to exercise the Air Defense Intercept Zones on holidays -- So we’d spend Christmas building, fixing, and hauling weapons to the flight line or, if we were lucky, we’d just spend all night plowing and re-plowing the road between the munitions storage and alert facilities IN CASE the Bears came to town. Now in the end we weren’t getting shot at, and we were always pretty thankful for that. But we knew it could have been different any time some world leader cleared his throat or tripped over his own feet.
The public tends to forget how close we came to Armageddon several times over the length of the Cold War, if they ever noticed at all, and the American Military is what lets them get away with such poor situational awareness and a peculiar forgetfulness. As our brothers and sisters now serving can attest, a lot of the Public doesn’t really like to think too much about how dangerous the rest of world is, and some of the less gifted in the populace actually think it isn’t that dangerous of a world at all.
Thank you to all of those now serving EVERYWHERE for joining and becoming part of the continuum: forever protecting the appreciative and the oblivious alike and without reservation. May you have a most merry and memorable Christmas with many, many, more to come.
(original photo was ABC News)