The F-35 and the Infamous “Sustained G” Spec Change: Part 2

(Part 1 Here)
I want to reiterate that this series of posts is for the purpose of developing an understanding of aircraft performance parameters and the factors that influence them. It is not at all about providing answers (we don’t have enough relevant information about the aircraft we’re surveying, much less how they were/are or will be employed) but it is about how to THINK about the questions in the first place.

Let’s begin this post with an updated version of the table I showed the last time:

Selected Legacy Aircraft Configurations

I’ve added an ‘F-18C Light’ configuration to the mix because I found enough information graphed in a General Dynamics handbook on Fighter Performance from a 1985 Fighter Weapons Symposium (FWS). The book is a recent find of mine from a used book store very near the old GD, now Lockheed Martin plant: the same Plant 4 where F-35 output is being ramped up and boutique batches of F-16s still issue forth form time to time. From what I can tell, General Dynamics hosted this event and distributed material to operational F-16 squadrons around the world for years.



GD fighter Weapon Symposium "Fighter Performance" Handbook, Circa 1986

We’ll take the sustained G numbers from the charts for the aircraft configurations above and then crank out the sustained turn rates and similar numbers for a hypothetical F-35A ‘Bowman’ configuration and operating conditions. We'll use the upper and lower bounds of possible F-35A Sustained G values (between 4.6 to 5.3) to give us a range of possible sustained turn rates for that F-35 configuration/set of conditions/assumptions. The formula is:

Turn Rate =Velocity Squared /(G *tan Ø)*
(G *tan Ø)/Velocity; where Ø is still, as shown in the previous post, the “bank angle”.

*originally mis-typed formula for turn radius, but all rate values presented used correct formula (I checked the spreadsheets). Hazards of changing direction in middle of analyses, I guess.

Note that I include 5.3gs as the upper boundary partly because we do not know how close the F-35 came to meeting that spec, but more because we know the ‘grade’ must be against some weight that includes some fixed aircraft dry weight, and we do not know how ‘light’ or ‘heavy’ the F-35 will be until after the final weight accounting that is sometime in the future. Right now, per the latest DOT&E report, we know as late as December the F-35A was nearly 1% below the projected weight needed to meet performance specs. If it comes in below spec weight, it will have sustained turn performance higher than what is currently ‘predicted’ based upon the spec weight. 


F-35A_H Sustained Turn Rates Derived From Possible Range of 'Sustained G' Capability of 'Bowman Configuration' (Corrected**)

**Table corrected to show only difference between 'High' and 'Low' F-35A_H is assumed Sustained G performance boundaries

We now have the high and low boundaries for the possible raw sustained turn rate for our hypothetical F-35 (To keep things concise, let’s call it the ‘F-35A_H’ from now on in this series) and can compare it to the derived Sustained Turn rates for our selected legacy aircraft configurations:


Sustained Turn: F-35A_H vs Legacy Aircraft

Don’t Go There

I presume the above is the kind of raw comparison that sets simple minds down the ‘F-35 can’t turn’ path. Don’t go there – you don’t know enough about what matters…yet. The next thing we need to do is highlight the relative importance or unimportance of the differences shown.

Since we are using the boundaries of our F-35A_H performance in covering the range of possible performance, I’m going to present the ‘low’ boundary evaluation first (Remember, among other things, we don’t really ‘know’ the altitude at which this spec change was applied, we are ‘assuming’ for 'learning' purposes only):

Sustained Turn: F-35A_H (Low) Estimation Vs. Legacy Aircraft

Determining Turn Rate Parity, Superiority and Dominance

The rules used for assignment of comparative parity, superiority, and dominance ranges above and to follow are not mine. Consulting Raymer* (page 105) provided me with my first indication:

An aircraft designed for air-to-air dogfighting must be capable of high turn rate. This parameter dѱ/dt or ѱ, will determine the outcome of the dogfight if the aircraft and pilots are evenly matched otherwise. When air-to-air missiles are in use, the first aircraft to turn towards the other aircraft enough to launch a missile will probably win. In a guns-only dogfight, the aircraft with the higher turn rate will be able to maneuver behind the other. A turn rate superiority of 2 deg/s is considered significant.

*Aircraft Design: A Conceptual Approach 3^rd Edition; D.P. Raymer;AIAA Education Series; 1999.

I had originally intended to use the ‘2 deg/s’ standard to evaluate which aircraft had ‘significant’ advantage over others when, in reviewing my ‘Fighter Performance’ handbook, I found an expansion on Raymer’s observations:




Sustained Turn Rate Equality, Superiority and Dominance

I can’t find the basis for the yardstick stated by Raymer and expanded upon in the FWS handbook, but I imagine it has to do with the typical engagement segment duration where a sustained turn difference would typically yield a ‘significant’ or even ‘dominant’ advantage.

Using the same methodology for our upper bound F-35A_H (High) configuration we find the F-35 fares quite a bit better in the comparison:


Sustained Turn: F-35A_H (High) Estimation Vs. Legacy Aircraft

So in closing Part 2, we see that the possible range of the 'Bowman' F-35A_H's Sustained G performance is broad enough that if the actual F-35 performance is just a little better than the new Sustained G spec value, it will yield turn rates on a "par" with all but the F-15C and F-16A. If the actual performance is closer to the 'old'  spec, the F-35A_H configuration we have modeled comes much closer to "parity" with our F-15C and F-16A configurations.

"What If"? (Parts 3 and 4)

These comparisons are rather static and one-dimensional and the relationships can change dramatically with changes to the armament and fuel carried. It is instructive to note the very large difference in F-18C sustained turn-rate performance based on the variation in weight (which is why I included the 'F-18C Light' data in the first place). Now consider the 'Bowman Configuration' assumption of 60% fuel on board for the F-35 also means that the F-35A_H's fuel load, as a fraction of the total weight, appears to be significantly larger than any of the other aircraft we are comparing. This hints that there may be equally 'realistic' if not more realistic F-35A configurations with far higher sustained turn capability than is attainable at the 'Bowman' weights.

I think it will be worthwhile (and fun) to look at things from a ‘1 v 1’ perspective with the two extremes of possible comparisons in our selected group: F-35A_H vs. the F-4E, and F-35A_H vs. the F-16A, and exploring the 'what ifs' of having slightly different configurations in our comparisons. I anticipate (but won't know until I get there) that I will be illustrating the F-4E at very light weights is not to be trifled with, and that the F-35A, when using comparable fuel weights, based upon equivalent fuel needs will be seen to have solidly 'respectable' sustained turn performance in comparison to other modern aircraft.

Part 3 will look at the F-35A_H vs F-4E.

BONUS GRAPHIC

From the Fighter Weapons Symposium Handbook, we see that the F-16A is/was about the 'cream of the crop' when it comes to Sustained G turns:

Sustained G: Thrust to Weight Matters Too 

So do you think the latest Sukhois do any better? IMHO they're probably more to the right on the X-axis but not any higher on the Y-axis compared to the 'old' Su-27s.

A Minor Note Concerning F-35B 'Bring Back' Weight

The UK's National Audit Office has a report out called "Carrier Strike: The 2012 reversion decision". In the report, the findings are generally positive: The UK switching back to the B model is seen overall as a "good thing".  That should be the end of the story. But.....

If someone didn't know squat about the science of flight, military flight operations, and the relevant physics involved, that someone-- and I'm not saying who -- might be tempted to cherry-pick a certain paragraph in a lame attempt to paint a new operational fact of life (now being dealt with) that comes with increased STOVL capabilities as a 'problem' with the F-35B. The "offending" report paragraph that 'might' be distorted 'might' be (emphasis mine):

3.10 An important enabler of the UK’s STOVL Carrier Strike capability will be the ability to conduct Ship-borne Rolling Vertical Landings (SRVL). This landing technique will be necessary where a conventional vertical landing is less likely to be possible without jettisoning large weapons or fuel load when in hot, humid or low pressure weather conditions. At present the technology is not proven with redesigns required to the carrier deck and aircraft software. The capability will be required for operations by 2020 and the Department included a provision to complete development as part of the cost of reverting to STOVL. The Department is confident it will develop the technique within the required timescale.

Fine (and 'Dandy')!

If someone were to pervert the above into something like: "The report says that the F-35B will have no vertical landing ability in hot, high density altitude, low pressure situations “without having to jettison heavy loads”, it might -once again- be helpful to provide some perspective showing that it is something new the F-35 program has to deal with because the ability to bring back a significant weapons load in all but the most benign conditions by a STOVL aircraft has never been possible before .

Let's take a look at the performance of the highest performing STOVL aircraft the F-35B is replacing: the AV-8B. From the AV-8B's Standard Aircraft Characteristics publication NAVAIR 00-110AV8-4 (1986), we first find the important 'weights' for the AV-8B:

The first key weight we'll note is the 'operating weight': 13,086 lbs. Now let's look at the maximum landing weights versus temperature chart for the AV-8B. The 'wet' thrust is assuming the water injection system was not used on takeoff, but on a hot day, we'll see later that this is pretty much a non-factor:

 The first thing these two charts tell us is that you aren't going to be vertically landing so much as vertically crash-landing the AV-8B on a 'hot' day unless you are on fumes with NO payload. Even then it is going to be 'sporty' to say the least:

But the really wild thing here is if you are operating off a deck afloat in the 'tropics' you had to do a rolling takeoff, using about 90%+ of the available flight deck, and you were only able to do it if you had 40 knots of wind over the deck. With less deck or wind you weren't leaving with what you wanted to take with you in the first place. You'd have to leave fuel behind and 'tank up' en route.

 From this last graphic, we can see chances are that on a heavy-hot-high mission, the AV-8B probably used its water injection system just taking off.

We can also infer that the current rolling takeoff spec for the F-35B of "600 foot" allows growth for much higher takeoff weights. This should make development of the "Ship-borne Rolling Vertical Landings" (SRVLs) an irresistibly attractive option for the USMC: If you can takeoff with 'more' you want to be able to land with 'more'. I suspect that the USMC will probably be on board with the concept before the Brits even begin operations. Pursuit of an SRVL recovery method is clearly more about eventually fielding MORE capability than currently planned and NOT about preserving current projected capabilities.     

The whole idea of vertical 'bring back' weight is mostly about meeting a 'cost' objective by lowering operating costs incurred by jettisoning stores and is NOT and never has been an 'operational' problem. The weights under what conditions were selected almost certainly on a cost/benefit basis. I would assume either the number of days in a F-35B's operating life where temperature and humidity would conspire to affect the normal 'bring back' weights as negligible or the cost to allow for them exorbitant. Otherwise, the requirement would have been factored into the specs in the first place.

Colin Clark: "Cost Estimates" and the F-35

Great article by Colin Clark at AOL Defense. Clark captures what weapon system 'cost estimates' really "mean" better than I've read anywhere else in the press.

If you can't visualize 55 years of Operations, don't pretend to be offended by the costs.

The 'F-35 H8ers' are no doubt dissing the F-35 and the article (and probably my comment on the thread come to think about it) as I type, but go, as they say, read it all here.

,,,and I can't post this graphic too often:

How the Anti-Defense 'Reformers' Practice 'Slash and Whine'

P.S. I'm almost done with Part 2 of the "F-35 G-Spec change" posts. Research is done. Crunching numbers now and will write it up soon.


Update 4 May: If I seem a trifle rough on some of the commenters at the AOL link, so be it. I cannot abide regurgitators of myths, poseurs, or what the Soviets used to refer to as the "govnoed".

The F-35 and the Infamous “Sustained G” Spec Change

PART 1

Introduction

I can’t remember when I saw so many media outlets, bloggers, and just general ‘people’ with their panties in a wad over something they didn’t really understand. Honestly, who among those ‘critics’ bemoaning the Sustained G turn requirement changing from 5.3 to 4.6Gs even know everything they need to know as ‘inputs’ before they could even begin to formulate an informed opinion on the topic? There is STILL insufficient information in the public domain to come to any conclusions, but there’s a heck of a lot of presumption and assumption in spite of it.

I was neck deep in a home improvement project when Dave Majumdar at FlightGlobal’s DEWline blog put up his “What's the operational impact of reducing the F-35's performance specs?” piece. Majumdar gave a pretty big voice to an ‘anonymous’ but ‘highly experienced ‘ fighter pilot that had all sorts of negatives to pass on to the public. (I believe if you view the Majumdar/Flight Global posts and articles that followed on the topic you’ll conclude the voice in question almost certainly was coming out of a Boeing F-18 test pilot). This ‘anonymous’ fighter pilot’s views were counter-balanced at the end by someone who had actual knowledge of the F-35.

Note: I now notice that the entire post I commented on has been rewritten (down the memory hole, eh?) but the parts I lament in my comment seems to have been ‘reformulated’ elsewhere in an article here. (If I have a major complaint about FlightGlobal’s reporting, it is just this kind of ‘rewriting history’ stuff.)

I commented, in part, the following at that time:

The really disturbing aspect of this 'story' is how an anonymous "highly experienced" fighter pilot somehow is able to gin up some world-class doom and gloom from a few insufficient data points. The doom and gloom gets quoted here, and now this article is being passed around by the anti-JSF crowd-- zipping around the globe as some sort of authoritative source. However, all there is really are two insufficient sets of information that in all honesty should prevent someone from reaching any conclusion other than the program is being 'managed'.

First, let's deal with the changing of the maximum sustained g-force value for the different variant turn performance criteria.

All we know is that 1) The sustained turn g-force objective is a proxy for overall aircraft maneuverability (not even a KPP) and 2) For the particular speed, bank angle, weight, and altitude data points selected, the program office lowered the ‘g’ value after extensive testing and analysis.  

Aside from no real reason to assume the Program Office could or would do so without a good reason, or belief that the differences would not significantly impact operational performance, we should also consider the very real possibility that the F-35’s best sustained-g turn performance may have been found to lay outside the pre-selected test conditions. Perhaps by a little, perhaps by a lot. We don’t know. Not even “highly experienced” fighter drivers, unless they’re on the program, can divine the answer or what it means without more data.

On the one hand, I could have placed more emphasis on the ‘unknowns’: if only so a few of the others who were/are willfully ignoring them would have been perhaps a little less eager to jump on the ‘Lowering the Bar’ bandwagon. I COULD have typed “For the particular speed, bank angle, weight and altitude data points selected, [which are unknown to us] the program office lowered the ‘g’ value after extensive testing and analysis. On the other hand, I shed no tears for the self-identifying ignorami, and find the duping of a small number of media types merely... ‘unfortunate’.

Of course, the usual suspects took exception to my comments, and now the whole thread looks pretty silly as the article that I was critiquing, and others were defending (and OBTW also attacking me), is no longer even IN the article we all commented upon. But my prediction of the obvious, that the doom and gloom sound bites from a rather dubious source would spread like wildfire throughout the 'interwebs' while the factual counterarguments would remain alone and unloved proved all too true.

Fortunately, we have a few other data points that we can add to other information, including knowledge as to how programs and requirements ‘work’ and at least form one or more hypotheses as to what the relevance Sustained G spec change ‘means’-- based upon physics, publically released (vs. leaked) information (vs. unsubstantiated suspicions) about the F-35, and more importantly how everything relates to modern fighter design requirement priorities. We can make some assumptions (and identified as same) and use parametric modeling to more thoroughly understand the impacts of the changes, especially as they might either reflect or affect HOW the F-35 might ‘fight’ in the Within Visual Range (WVR) environment.

This post, as the title reflects, will concern itself with F-35 Sustained G-performance. I’ll get to the ‘Supersonic Dash’ spec change later.

“Sustained Flight”

Let’s begin with defining Sustained Flight, Sustained Level Flight, and what makes a ‘Sustained G’ Turn... a ‘Sustained G’ turn. If you know basic aerodynamics you can skip this section, and I don’t want to hear about anything I ‘leave out’ or ‘over-simplify’ in the comments if you don’t skip it. I’m not trying to ‘dumb it down’, I’m trying to leave out stuff I don’t need to explain to get to the larger points I’m trying to make.

‘Sustained Flight’ is the condition where airspeed, altitude, and load factor ”n” are all held constant. To be ‘constant’ Thrust “T” and Drag “D” must be equal, and Lift ‘L’ has to equal Weight ‘W’ x n. Straight and level (coordinated) flight is ‘sustained’ when lifting surfaces are level, the aircraft is not climbing or descending, neither is it accelerating or decelerating, and the bank angle is ‘zero’.

When flying straight and level, the load factor equals 1 (n = 1) as in “1 gravity” or 1g. But it is not actually ‘gravity’. The load factor n is dimensionless: the ratio of Lift to Weight (L/W), and each component has the same unit of measurement and are thus cancelled out (pounds/pounds, etc). Load factor is referred to in terms of ‘g’ because it is "perceived" as some ‘multiple’ of the acceleration of gravity on board the aircraft.

 A ‘sustained turn’ is a turn where not only airspeed, altitude, and load factor ”n” are all held constant, but also the (non-zero) bank angle of the turn is held constant. To be ‘constant’, Thrust “T” and Drag “D” must still be equal, and Lift ‘L’ has to equal Weight ‘W’ x n, but ‘n’ is no longer equal to 1 because of the vector change of the aircraft as the turn is being executed.

For this exercise (and simplicity’s sake), we’ll assume the earth is ‘down’ and the aircraft is right side up (not inverted) and just say n is now greater than 1 (n > 1). For an aircraft with a typical wing-body-tail planform to enter and sustain the turn, the pilot/controller provides input to the control system that deflects the control surfaces to induce and then hold a bank angle, while increasing angle of attack needed to increase lift generated per unit of wing reference area to keep it equal to the load factor times the weight (n x W).

This means for any given set of airspeed, aircraft weight, and density altitude values, the load factor- accounted for in terms of ‘g’s- is a function of bank angle. Specifically, g= 1/cosØ. For example, a 60 degree bank angle (Ø=60), the ‘g’ value would be 1 divided by the cosine of 60, or 1/.5 = '2gs'.

60 Degrees Bank Angle and Resultant 2g Load Factor 

Increase the bank angle, and in a steady level turn the  g’s increase as well. As the use of a trigonometric function implies, and the chart below illustrates, the relationship is NOT linear.


'G's as a Function of Bank Angle

From the shape of the curve, we can easily observe that ‘g force’ begins increasing at a faster rate than the bank angle is increasing at around 3gs (if you remember your math, it is the point on the curve where the slope (m) of a line that is tangent to the curve = 1). By the time the typical ‘hot-fighter’ max g rating of 9g’s is reached, the bank angle has increased to about 82.6 degrees.

So what is ‘happening’ in the specific region of the curve where the F-35s ‘Sustained g’ spec change occurred?

Bank Angles: 4.6 vs. 5.3 Gs

The Only Conclusion: Bank Angles.

After that we need to start making 'assumptions'.

It doesn’t look like the airplane is doing anything too ‘different’ (minimal y axis delta) on the curve to get that ‘g’ difference, does it? That’s the first surprise waiting for people who haven’t thought much about ‘Gs’: the difference in bank angle between the two ‘levels of performance’ is about 1.6 degrees bank.

The difference looks like this:

Depending on airspeed, the bank angle could translate into a ‘small’ or a ‘large’ difference in turn rate and turn radius. Without knowing for certain what the weight, speed, and altitude is for the ‘performance standard’ at either 5.3g or 4.6g, the difference in bank angle between the two figures is all we can conclusively determine. Everything else depends on the missing data.

 

A Couple of ‘Likely Truths’

I’m pretty comfortable making some low-risk assumptions on top of the one conclusion. The first one is that F-35 max sustained G capability for the unknown flight conditions and configuration is actually somewhere in between the 5.3g and 4.6g values. I’m comfortable in doing so largely because the program has already demonstrated conservative programmatic behavior with the B model’s “take-off roll” spec change.

[History Sidebar: For the takeoff roll spec change, the JSF Program Office didn’t just ease the requirement to make it so the B model would ‘pass’. They changed the requirement such that it both met military need AND would allow for further ‘bad’ surprises without having to revisit the issue. Because of this past program decision, and just using common sense, I suspect the actual performance difference between the original spec and current performance is even less than all the complainers realize.]

The second assumption I’m willing to make--with only slightly less confidence--concerns which ‘limit’ was hit going for 5.3 sustained ‘g’s under those mystery (can’t repeat it enough) conditions. Max Sustained Turn limits are either “lift limited” or “thrust limited”. I believe the ‘thrust limit’ was hit versus lift limit, for a couple of reasons, and it is important to note now that ‘thrust limited’ can be viewed as either insufficient thrust for the drag experienced at the specified conditions (weight, speed, and altitude) or higher than expected drag at the specified conditions.

I would almost bet, but have no information to confirm, that the drag rise was higher than expected for the selected set of 'spec conditions'. I remind readers again, we have no direct information as to what those flight conditions were.

Exercise: Exploring Comparative Sustained Turn Rate Performance

If we are to do ANY comparison of the JSF performance with any other aircraft benchmarks we are going to have to make what some (not me) might call a small leap of faith and presume the weight, armament, and fuel loads as well as the altitude and airspeed are the same as what is commonly referred to at F-16.net as the ‘Bowman' Paper or Brief.

[Personal Note: If there is any Cosmic Justice in this world I predict it will befall CDR Bowman for ‘phoning it in’ on his Air Command and Golf paper and the superficial analyses and ‘pronouncements’ within. If he is still active duty when the time comes, I look for him to standup one of the early F-35 squadrons, if Navy assignment desks are half as evil as Air Force assignment desks.]

For the purposes of our exercise therefore, let us ASSUME (and we all know how that word parses) that the flight conditions and the aircraft configuration for the Sustained G spec is as follows:

60% Internal Fuel  

2 AMRAAMS  

15000 Ft Altitude

Mach .8 Airspeed

I will proceed only in evaluating the ‘G-Spec’ change for the F-35A model and let others make their own analyses on other variants and other comparisons than the ones I will make. I also caution against assuming that the results for those conditions and aircraft configuration translate linearly to any other set of conditions (they don’t) and against assuming that the actual performance at that set of conditions/configuration was the ‘best’ possible at any one of the given conditions. Just one of the weight, speed or altitude parameters could vary slightly and sustained turn performance could go up or down in a manner out of proportion to the change. I’ve also noticed that while the specs usually look at a .8M sustained turn, from at least the ‘F-15 forward’ the best sustained G for US fighters at 10,000-20,000 feet altitude seems to reside somewhere between .85M and .9M.

 Keep these curves and data in mind when we move the discussion forward in the next post:

F-15 Turn Rates

These diagrams come from around the web and a personal reference I picked up at a used book store near Carswell JRB/Plant 4. The web sources are of uncertain provenance, but I found a good ref for the F-15 at a little different weight at 10K ft that correlates well to the F-15 data above. The F-18 data smells like public relations and is more nebulous. I can't tell you how many empty weight values I found for the F-18s, and early in the program the Navy was absolutely anal about couching internal fuel weights as fuel fraction percentages instead of just how much fuel would be carried internally.

The F-16 Blk15 is a good reference-probably the best available-as it has all that vaunted maneuverability the 'reformers' bemoan as ruined with later, heavier versions. The F-4 is a good data point because we have a distinct configuration attached to the performance numbers, and some disparage the F-35 as 'F-4 like'. The Mirage was interesting to me because it is a contemporary of the F-16 and represented the pinnacle of the delta-winged dogfighter (I remember reports of its debut at the Paris Air Show quoting a USAF General as saying "The French have finally perfected the F-106") until the Euro-canards started rolling off the line. In a perfect world, Sukhoi and Eurofighter will e-mail me their E-M diagrams before I go to press on the next post.

 I expect the next post to cause a furball all of its own.  

Since we’re working with ‘pictures’ and NOT real data, I’ve had to do some translating which may have brought associated minor errors with it. I don’t see anything remarkably out of place at the moment:



Aircraft Performance and Configuration Data Translated From Curves 

If anyone has problems with the table I’ve assembled below using the charts above, and can come up with either better authoritative released data or good reasons why I shouldn’t use this data, I’ll leave the door open to changes for a couple of days while I finish doing the 'turn rate' and other math.

I predict that analysis of the data, combined with certain ‘truths’ about what level of significance should be attached to differences in sustained turn rates, and other things we know about the F-35 and have already covered concerning Energy-Maneuverability in an earlier post will clearly indicate we should be thinking of the F-35 as probably being a ‘competent’ if not ‘solid’ “kinetic” dogfighter and definitely NOT ‘a Dog’ (as people who have 'agendas' or little understanding of 21st Century air combat and aircraft design would lead us to believe).

Next: Part 2  

Charter Cable: Media Malpractice

Charter News, 'Isn't'

(Still working on a lengthy 'aircraft/F-35 maneuverability' post, but this HAS to go up tonight.)

Charter Cable is my cable provider. NO complaints about the internet speed or connectivity, not even though I suspect their move to 'all digital' last week wreaked havoc with signals (off and on) as thousands of users finally added even more thousands of cable boxes and cards to the network in just a few days. It now seems to have stabilized, so 'no problem'.

But Charter Cable's 'homepage' has a section with rotating 'news' headline pictures and captions. All too often the caption and photo make it appear that some tragedy has happened in the US or even just the 'Modern' world, and you click on the link talking about a school being bombed with what appears to be a typical American elementary school (they've done school buses too if I recall correctly) and the story is about a school in some war zone in a 'turd world' country. The Chief and I just chalked it up to lazy web content developers and editors.

Today, they went beyond 'lazy' and deep into 'media malpractice' . I got home and booted up the laptop to check the web and this is what greeted me (left headline):



Charter Home Page 9 April 2013 ~1920 Hrs CST

 



WTFO? "Veteran Kills 13"?

I clicked on the link, and this is what popped up:

Charter 'Article' 9 April 2013 ~1920 Hrs CST

Oh. A Serbian 'vet' in Serbia loses it and goes on a rampage. Tragic in it's own right. Why the 'trick' headline?

You would have to be either incompetent or agenda-driven to put this one up.  Either way it doesn't 'inform' but misleads and distorts several issues in one nice swoop.

Besmirching veteran's mental health? Check!

'Tragedy' as background for upcoming 2nd Amendment legislation? Check!

The Chief likes to try and calm me down when some unthinking slug nearly kills us because they're doing something clueless in traffic. She says something like "I'm sure they didn't see us". She forgets what makes me the MOST angry is the fact that they probably were clueless as to what was going on around them. If I assume Charter was just being 'brain dead' in this, it just p*sses me off more. tell me again: What business are they in? Do they have any standards?
 
Either way, Charter's website is Media Malpractice writ large in a Low Information Consumer world.

Are There ANY Adults At Charter Cable?

A Backgrounder on Energy-Maneuverability

Because if you learned all you know about E-M from Boyd, you’re only about a half-century behind the learning curve

Housekeeping

The first two things to remember in this kind of discussion are:

1. Performance metrics are used as PROXIES for what is important in a Weapon System under acquisition or already fielded. The metrics are NOT important in and of themselves. They are only as important as the degree to which they inform developers and operators on the system’s true versus desired capabilities.

and...

2. Weapon system specifications are initially established based upon what is believed to be needed and what is believed to be feasible within the projected budget and schedule before the development is given the ‘go-ahead’. There are only varying degrees of assumed confidence in the ability to achieve what is seen as feasible, and this depends much on perceived technology maturity. Only after the project is underway will the need and/or feasibility, given the actual maturity and budget, begin to be revealed, and it may be only truly knowable towards the end of development. Adjusting the specifications as new information is acquired, while still meeting Warfighter needs is sound engineering and management. It is NOT (as someone in the POGO crowd or ‘low information media’ might claim) “cheating” or a sign of “failure”.

Beyond Boyd: A Quick Survey of the Evolution AFTER the E-M Revolution

I’ve picked two AIAA papers on the subject to illustrate the post-Boyd reality: one from the 1980’s and one from the 1990’s. There are a fairly large number of scholarly papers concerned with the inadequacy of the traditional Boyd ‘E-M diagram’ that lead right on up to the present day, but as T. Takahashi observed just last year in a paper proposing yet another ‘better way’ to visualize E-M:

For aircraft whose missions demanded combat maneuverability, the United States Air Force required production of Energy-Maneuverability (E-M) plots. The design of the F-14, F-15, F-16 and F-18 was tailored by designers working to better the E-M capability of Soviet aircraft. In this context, a government oversight driven tradition developed where industry was required to plot many aerodynamic and aircraft performance parameters as functions of speed and altitude.

To begin our review, I think one of the better overviews of how E-M factors evolved post-Boyd is encapsulated in a paper by Skow, Hamilton and Taylor (1985). They observed:

“In the late 1940's and early 1950’s, with the advent of jet propulsion, radical new wing designs and greatly expanded flight envelopes, a corresponding need for more definitive measures of merit for aircraft performance comparisons was generated. When the "century series" fighters were developed and rear-aspect IR missiles became the principal air-to-air combat weapon, point performance comparisons were found to be inconclusive and insufficient to predict superiority. Out of this need, energy-maneuverability (E-M) concepts were formulated and developed. In the 1960's. E-M came into widespread use by aircraft designers and fighter pilots. E-M provided an analog picture of a fighter's performance capabilities over a range of velocities and altitudes. It gave quantifiable credit to measures of merit which allowed the advantages of speed (energy) and turning (maneuverability) to be balanced. These measures of merit were shown to be dominant in determining the outcome of an air battle at that time.  

 ...

But, as they say, time marches on, and in the past 10-12 years, several significant advancements have been made in the capabilities of fighter aircraft and air-to-air weapons. Three of these advancements; the all-aspect IR missile, greatly improved weapons delivery systems, and high thrust-to-weight engines have dramatically altered the character of the air battle, especially the close-in fight. The modern air battle is characterized by (1) time compression – shorter duration maneuvering required and (2) harder maneuvering - nose position at the expense of energy vs. nose position with energy conservation…

Air combat trends have expanded to ever increasing altitudes and speeds for beyond visual range (BVR) combat and conversely have tended to a lower and sometimes slower arena for close-in, within visual range (WVR) combat. … …This changing complexion of air combat, primarily due to the all-aspect IR missile, has altered the relative significance of the various performance characteristics with which we judge relative merit. Table 3 depicts the more common agility characteristics with some relative rankings.”  

Table 3 Reconstruction from “Advanced Fighter Agility Metrics”

In 1992, Cox and Downing featured Befecadu (BF) Tamrat’s 1988 metric of Combat Cycle Time in the proposed system of “functional agility metrics” they evaluated for use in measuring aircraft maneuverability: Combat Cycle Time, Dynamic Speed Turn Plots, and Aircraft Energy State. The impetus for searching for these new metrics?

During the Korean War and the Vietnam conflict, jet fighter aircraft emerged with greatly expanded altitude and Mach ranges. This era also saw the advent of the short range heat seeking missile. These missiles required maneuvering to achieve a rear-aspect firing position. The measures of merit, altered to match the increase in aircraft capability, were advanced point performances (thrust-to-weight ratio, maximum Mach number, sustained turn rate, etc.) and the energy-maneuverability performance method. In recent years, the level of fighter aircraft and weapon system technological sophistication has reached new heights; the most critical advance being the development of the all-aspect infrared missile. This missile negates the requirement of maneuvering to achieve a rear-aspect firing position and concurrently has caused the traditional point performance measures of merit to become deficient for determining the combat effectiveness of a fighter aircraft. To remedy this deficiency, new measures of merit are being investigated which examine aircraft maneuver and control capabilities not previously quantified.

We could dive deep into discussion on each metric proposed in this paper, but I would like to focus on Tamrat’s Combat Cycle Time, as it is what differs most from the pioneering but simpler Boyd-Era POV of E-M, and the authors ably describe how Tamrat builds on same:

Traditionally, the need to achieve a rear-aspect position for a gun or missile firing opportunity led fighters to engage in battles lasting several minutes. These engagements were characterized by sustained maneuvering. This type of combat made the turn rate verses Mach number diagram (doghouse plot) useful for determining one fighter's advantage over another. When maneuvering for a rear-aspect firing solution, the interior of the doghouse plot is important. This interior region is represented by the sustained turn rate line and is typically dictated by available thrust and the lift to drag ratio of the aircraft. The compressed time scales of today's air combat arena have made sustained maneuvering less critical. The desire for a first shot opportunity leads to fights dominated by transient load factor/lift limited maneuvers. The emphasis then is shifting toward more dynamic maneuvering or the exterior of the doghouse plot. Figure 1 shows these critical regions on a conceptual doghouse plot.



From "Evaluation Of Functional Agility Metrics For Fighter Class Aircraft"

The first region is the dynamic pressure limit line (A) along which pitch rate is used to load the aircraft to enter a turning situation. Next, flight path and nose pointing maneuvers occur along the limit load factor and lift limit boundaries (B). The time to unload the aircraft is shown as the region in between the lift limit line and the 1-g line (C). The last critical region shown is the 1-g acceleration (D) in which an aircraft regains lost energy to leave the engagement or enter a turn to pursue another target. The Combat Cycle Time metric, developed by B.F. Tamrat combines these four critical regions into a single parameter. The time for each maneuver segment is calculated and then summed to obtain a time for the entire maneuver cycle. The critical regions, segment times, and corresponding maneuvers are:  

A t, pitch up to load factor limit  

B t, turn along load factor and lift limit 

C t3, unload from elevated AOA/load factor  

D t4, regain original energy level  

The Combat Cycle Time metrics offers an advantage over traditional measure of merit for turning maneuvers. The doghouse plot shows the sustained and instantaneous turn rates for only one flight condition (i.e. specified power setting, mach, altitude, altitude, weight, etc.). The Combat Cycle Time, however, is characterized by a continually changing flight condition constrained within structural, lift, and power limits.

What it All Means

If there are recurring themes over the years in all the proposed metrics that move beyond Boyd/ Christie’s E-M diagram paradigm, it is 1) All-aspect missile attack changed the game and 2) the proposed metrics try to account for the missing values of the speed of ‘transition’: the time needed to point the aircraft in a desired direction from another, the ability to decelerate as well as accelerate in vertical and the horizontal, to change pitch, roll and yaw.

 The lingering deference to standard E-M charting in the operational world springs more from their relative ease of understanding by non-engineer aircrew and government bureaucrats than from their utility. The E-M diagrams benefit from the fact that what really counts, is harder to explain. So we lumber along with the deficient E-M charting and rely on the ability of the untrained/uninterested to recognize the important nuances.

One of the biggest impacts on aircraft E-M performance that isn’t in the vehicle’s dynamics vis a vis the external environment (but sometimes dealt with in the OODA loop) is the man-machine interface: how fast the pilot perceives a change/threat and reacts to or preempts the effect of the change/threat by changing the vehicle dynamics. How well can the crew execute the mission in light of all the factors that could diminish the pilot’s ability to manage change and threats? Factors such as: How much attention does he have to pay to not bending or breaking the airplane or keep from departing controlled flight while engaged in the fight?

 

Limitations of Boyd-Era E-M Proxies and the F-35

A good example of the limitations of the traditional metrics is found in the caterwauling over the recent change in the F-35’s sustained-g turn standard from 5.3 to 4.6gs at some pre-selected altitude and speed. So much hang-wringing and finger-pointing—coming from those who not only do not know how important or unimportant the change was to needed/desired overall aircraft performance, but for the most part also have no idea what the change meant in and of itself, in ‘performance’ terms.

That, friend Reader, is a good lead-in for my next post (or two). Examine the reconstructed ‘Table 3’ above and ponder how the F-35 (especially the F-35A) performance stands up in the post-Boyd air combat world.

We'll soon engage in some speculative analysis on the F-35, but the speculation will be based upon logic, facts, physics, and experience.

References:

AIRCRAFT CONCEPT DESIGN PERFORMANCE VISUALIZATION USING AN ENERGY-MANEUVERABILITY PRESENTATION; Timothy T. Takahashi; AIAA 2012-5704

ADVANCED FIGHTER AGILITY METRICS; Andrew M. Skow, William L. Hamilton, John H. Taylor; AIAA-A85-47027

EVALUATION OF FUNCTIONAL AGILITY METRICS FOR FIGHTER CLASS AIRCRAFT; Brian W. Cox, Dr. David R. Downing; AIAA-92-4487-CP

POGO’s Propaganda Circus: F-35’s “aft visibility will get the pilot gunned every time”

A Case Study in How the Project on Government Oversight (POGO) Demagogues Against National Defense Programs.

I’ve considered something similar to what you are about to read many times, but I never pulled the trigger because I hadn’t yet figured out how to cover it without either making most people’s eyes glaze over from too much psychological exposition on the one end of the spectrum, or oversimplifying to the point that the explanation does violence to the phenomenon on the other end. I was at a symposium this week that I believe provided me with a way to reach the middle ground I’ve been seeking. One of our Keynote Speakers (yes, there were several) spoke on the subject of how we humans ‘Innovate’ and how organizations and individuals can overcome barriers to innovation.

The speaker presented us with four fundamental characteristics of the human psyche that affect our ability to (among other things) be “insightful” and “innovate”. She also reviewed how those characteristics are inhibited or disrupted by outside influences. It occurred to me at the time, that what she was describing was, among other things, a pretty good explanation as to how propagandists are also able to manipulate public attitudes. Shortly afterward, I realized it would be helpful in achieving my goal of getting a substantial explanation as to how POGO/Winslow Wheeler and crew operate. By showing how POGO and fellow travelers manipulate the elements of Perception, Attention, Context, and Emotion (PACE) we are able to adequately grasp the manner in which they exploit human nature to further their agenda of subverting national defense acquisition programs.

P.A.C.E: A Tour Inside POGO’s Meme Machine

Winslow Wheeler and POGO have provided any number of examples of what I’m about to cover, but their latest machinations concerning the recent “F-35A Joint Strike Fighter Readiness for Training Operational Utility Evaluation” report is as perfect an example as any to use for this discussion.
The report in question was issued by DoD’s Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, J. Michael Gilmore, and is as close to being more of a political document than a technical one as any I’ve seen issued from that office (but that is another topic for another time). But the most interesting aspect to the report was in how it was apparently leaked to POGO/Winslow Wheeler ahead of the public release, and the ONE thing POGO/Winslow Wheeler chose to lift from that report to propagate was a statement by an evaluation pilot that the F-35’s “Aft visibility will get the pilot gunned every time”. That ‘money quote’ was then repeated throughout the mainstream media before anyone had the chance to really digest the contents of the report in their entirety.

POGO,Winslow Wheeler and “Perception”

In this example, POGO and Winslow Wheeler were continuing the long-standing practice of ‘poisoning the well’ against any positive perception that might arise from any public reporting on the F-35. In this case, the ‘report’ in its totality is remarkably unsurprising. What the OT&E evaluators found concerning the training program after a limited exposure to early configuration F-35s is pretty much what one would expect. But in highlighting a single comment in the report POGO made the report about the F-35 itself and not the status and readiness of the training program. The Director of OT&E was an enabler (codependent?) in this development due to the report’s excessive regurgitation of ‘old news’ that didn’t belong in this report, but POGO is the ‘perp’ that picked the forbidden fruit.
When each of us perceives something, it is estimated that only 20% of that perception is based upon what we actually sense as new, and 80% of the perception is due to what we’ve already experienced in life. As most people have little or no working knowledge of what it takes to field advanced technology and designs, that makes their ‘80% experience’ base highly vulnerable to any manipulation of the ‘20% new’ information. POGO selected and amplified a quote concerning how a pilot felt about rear visibility in a plane that does not yet have the key technology installed that makes such rear visibility concerns moot. That pilot brought his experience and training to a new aircraft and applied his old knowledge to a new situation. Without his experiencing what is the baseline F-35 EODAS and HMD capabilities that were yet to be delivered, his comments should have been noted in the backup data. But in an objective document this never would have been a feature in the report.
In cherry-picking the “get gunned every time” quote, POGO and Winslow Wheeler exploit the general ignorance of the public as to how the jets and training program are still in development, how the F-35 program is structured and how capabilities are scheduled to be brought on line by deliberately injecting into the public’s consciousness the misperception that the F-35s now being used for initial type training are representative of the capability that define the baseline F-35. This is only the latest in a long series of flagrant misrepresentations of F-35 truths, in effect LIES, committed by POGO, and the F-35 is only the latest in a long line of weapon systems to receive that special POGO/Winslow Wheeler ‘touch’. We can expect nothing but more of the same from POGO and Winslow Wheeler because they dare not let any positive or neutral development concerning the F-35 go without preemptory and presumptive criticism, as the façade of failure that they work so hard to build up from nothing requires constant maintenance to prevent it from crumbling around their ears.

POGO, Winslow Wheeler and “Attention”

Long-time observers of POGO, Winslow Wheeler and other so-called ‘reformers’ will note that the ‘get gunned every time’ sound bite will be dropped fairly quickly and something else concerning the F-35 will be targeted as a ‘failure’, ‘mistake’ or ‘criminally negligent’ decision/design feature/performance characteristic, perhaps from the same report, or from one to come later. This is because POGO et al are acutely aware that an extended exchange or dialog with anyone who disagrees with them will expose the misdirection they (POGO et al) endeavor to sustain. POGO and Wheeler go for the sound bite to plant negativity into the public’s consciousness knowing that the general public’s attention span is short. By the time anyone dives deep into a POGO/Wheeler claim and cries “Hey! Wait a minute!” the public has moved on to other circuses. Such ‘Hit and Run’ tactics, along with their careful cultivation of media enablers, allow POGO/Wheeler relief from ever having their methods, biases and motives undergo serious public scrutiny. This is classic guerrilla warfare of the information domain.
Once the initial ‘buzz’ is past, if the ‘get gunned every time’ line is ever again referenced by POGO/Wheeler, it will be as only one item in a litany of similar perversions of reality in support of some general condemnation of the F-35 or as an introduction to the next misdirection issued by POGO/Wheeler. It is a clear testimony to POGO’s and Wheeler’s confidence in the public’s inability to critically examine information POGO/Wheeler spoon feed the media, that POGO and Wheeler have felt comfortable posting the source documents which they pervert at their own websites.

POGO, Winslow Wheeler and “Context”

If there is a hallmark to POGO/Wheeler PR announcements, it is that whatever is being decried or derided will be framed in as little context as possible. What context that is provided, will be selectively added to support the official POGO/Wheeler meme du jour. In this instance, the “get gunned every time” comment is highlighted without any reference to the inconvenient (to POGO and Wheeler) fact that the F-35s EODAS and Helmet are still being developed, the software releases to exploit these systems were not sold off for the aircraft used for the training readiness evaluation, or that if later version aircraft that are now flying had been available, the ‘get gunned’ claim would probably never have been uttered.
As individuals, we perceive reality in terms of context. When we see two circles, one drawn within the other, depending upon where our heads are at the time, or depending upon what else is drawn beside the circles determines whether we view the circles as representing a bagel, a wheel, a ring, or any number of other similarly- shaped objects. Stripping the context from the ‘get gunned’ comment allows POGO/Wheeler to insert their own meaning and relevance: a constructed perversion for consumption by the uninformed and only marginally-interested public.

POGO, Winslow Wheeler and “Emotion”

Indignation and inflammatory statements about defense acquisition programs are the stock and trade of POGO and Winslow Wheeler. Consider how in the original ‘story’ at TIME Winslow Wheeler attempts to paint a ‘horror story’:

Perhaps the biggest horror story is the poor showing of the Lockheed plane’s complicated, expensive helmet-mounted display system that distorts and obscures – rather than enhancing — the pilot’s vision and awareness of the outside world.

Wheeler seeks to elicit the reader's emotion by making an assertion that the F-35’s HMD’s performance is deficient (oh woe is us!), by obliquely referring to much (at least two years) earlier technical development challenges as if they were still current and relevant. Yet Winslow Wheeler, if he was honest when asked about the HMD, would have to acknowledge that the F-35 program is fairly confident in the current state of HMD performance and sees no ‘show-stoppers’ in delivering the desired capability. Lockheed Martin was discussing positive HMD developments nearly a year ago. It is notable that the latest GAO report did not highlight any definitive problems with the HMD system, only the usual ‘concerns’. When the ‘alternative’ just-in-case helmet being developed in parallel is cancelled (possibly this year), don’t expect any surrender from POGO or Wheeler on this point: “DOOM!” will always be just around the corner.
Using our neurons takes considerable (relatively) energy and it is estimated that we can only have about 2 ½ % of our brain active at any one time. When we are irate, our limbic system/amygdala can compromise, to varying degrees, our reason and judgment. Thus, when POGO, Winslow Wheeler, or others appeal to our emotions (Waste! Corruption! Conspiracy! War Mongering Military-Industrial Complex!) they are really attempting to subvert our ability to see through the flawed logic that binds whatever nonsense they are peddling at the moment.

Know Your Reformer Bonus Content: About Winslow Wheeler’s Move to POGO

I still consider Winslow’s move under POGO a positive development. In May of last year I noted the move from the Center for Defense Information (CDI) to POGO and as I also noted, I like it when targets bunch up. The tendency of radical activism to date has been to splinter and re-label itself when caught in the daylight. This may be a consolidation for survival (one can only hope).
CDI had been slipping for years but was often extremely entertaining to watch – it was like a zoo for disillusioned and misunderstood ‘military geniuses’ founded by possibly the biggest crackpot ever to reach ‘flag’ rank.
At the time, I didn’t know that the ‘Strauss Military Reform Project’ moved with Wheeler to POGO, so the same ‘photographer’ cum ‘radical chic’ trust-fund baby must still be paying Wheeler’s salary. The ‘Strauss Military Reform Project’ is little more than a one-job program for Winslow Wheeler. Strauss, when he isn’t producing forgettable photography, or financing disgruntled, ex-Congressional staffers’ caterwauling and rabble rousing, is the Chairman of the Board of Directors of that iconic bastion of American culture (/sarc) “Mother Jones”. How cliché can you get?

Homework Completed

Finally finished the shower project. 6 weeks of evenings and weekends on top of long workdays. 2 weeks of waiting for parts sprinkled throughout. 8 weeks total.

Up next? How about observations on "POGO: The Tiresome Disinformatzia Machine"? Their overt machinations the past couple of weeks  have been rather transparent.
GAO report coming up? = POGO et.al. get busy shaping the mushheads!

Look for a post in the next day or two, followed by some analysis on the F-35A's 4.6 vs 5.3 Sustained G spec. That might be it for a while as I'm also preparing to give a presentation on seducing and subverting the current requirements system (for its own good) in the next few weeks.

And hey! 'Thanks for hanging in there with me!

What I've Been Doing Instead of Blogging

I had hoped to get to skip this post, but time is marching on faster than I'm progressing on an "emergency" home repair project that I'm working on, when not working long hours for a salary. As some folks have also enquired as to what I'm up to, I thought I at least owed regular visitors an explanation. It is a pretty boring story, but I'm getting to the end of the project.  I also had no idea how many people came here until the e-mail questions started coming in. Thanks!

Jan 30 2012: The "Guard Shack".

Nice big, boring, master bathroom shower.  But all is not well. Introducing: The Sink Hole:

Tile cracked and when you stood on the drain, you feel the plumbing flex underfoot. Not good.

Only one way to get to the bottom of this: Get to the Bottom of the shower:

Ah. the problem. Besides using "green board" where cement "backer board" should have been, not filling in the foundation hole for the plumbing with 'sand mix' [but using dirt (mud), rocks, and broken tile instead], not pre-sloping the pan, not using a waterproof membrane between the pre-slope and final bed (and skipped the final 'bed' step all together), it was a perfect tile job! The only thing keeping our feet from going through the floor was about 1 1/2" of 'sand mix' completely unsupported underneath. It took an entire bag of mix to fill the hole. I ended up taking out all the tile and treating for mold, put in cement backer board where it need to be, used the 'fixed' bed as the preslope to raise the floor with another drain about 2".


The 'Grotto' ready for grout:

Why do it myself? I've tiled a little in the past, and from talking to others who've recently paid to have their showers redone, I figure I am saving about $5-$6K doing it myself. And I know that while it won't look quite as nice as a 'pro', I at least know it was done RIGHT.

Whats left? Grout and putting back the glass (which was also improperly installed by the way).

DoD Buzz-Job

"Buzz-Job".
1. Noun: A colloquialism for what happens when commercial military-oriented websites  "disappear" their mistakes down a memory hole instead of acknowledging them.
2. Verb: The act of erasing an e-publishing mistake on the internet in leiu of admission of same.

Usage: "Hey! They just pulled another "Buzz-Job" by posting that lame article called "Phantom Bombers Weigh Down Military Budget" and then pulling it without comment."

The "Phantom Bombers Weigh Down Military Budget" that, apparently, "aren't".

I'd link to the 27 December DoD Buzz article by Michael Hoffman that has the title as in quotes above, except it isn't "there" anymore. (Update: See end of this post for a link to Hoffman's 'do-over').

I noticed the link to it was missing from the DoD Buzz main page on the 4th of January. Thinking I must have incorrectly remembered where it was , I went looking for it elswhere. Nope. It WAS on DoD Buzz as the screen capture below of the 'Google cached' version then showed:

At the time, Google showed over 1500 hits for "Phantom Bombers Weigh Down Military Budget":

Here's a screenshot of the article as it was when it was 'disappeared'.

Here's my comment made the day it was posted.... with +33 'thumbs up'? (on DoD Buzz? Surprising, I know):

As of 6 January, the Google 'cache' link leads us to:

No preview available, and no web bots allowed. Tsk.

So the article is REALLY disappeared now. Except of course for the screenshot above.

One of the few merits of having a printed 'press' is the inherent accountability from not being able to recall their mistakes once distributed. The inverse of the same is the great scourge of e-journalism. They can make mistakes, relay falsehoods and publish propaganda press releases as 'news', complete do-overs, or even just lie.

They can do these things because in the end they can always just pretend it never happened if they can 'pull' the offending piece... and nobody notices.

Hey! Just checked again and DoD Buzz's Hoffman now has a ''Do-over" article up. In it he acknowledges his earlier 'mistake' - something I wish more journalists would do. I still think a correction to the original would make a better audit trail.

Feel free to compare the two stories.