8th Blogiversary

To all of you who have e-mailed, commented, or just visited 'Elements of Power' over these past 8 years...

Thank You!
 

 

 

Journalists Who [Apparently] Have no Critical Reading Skills Either

(Formerly Titled 'Oddest Thing')

I was invited (challenged?) to comment on Ares concerning my last posting where I covered Bill Sweetman's latest assault on 'all things F-35'. I commented,  leaving a link to the post.

I considered the possibility that it was a setup of sorts, but wasn't concerned as much as curious as to what he had in mind. Tonight I checked back at Ares, and Sweetman had responded.  I was somewhat disappointed in the response and can dismiss it rather easily. So I tried to post a response tonight (Can't sleep, been sleeping all day and all weekend trying to get over the bug).

Odd thing happened though. My attempt to post the first part of a two-part response just seemed to hang up in the process. I had broken my response in two to match format limits, but that won't be necessary if I post it here. I'll try and post at Ares in the AM to see if the 'glitch' has cleared up. If not, I'll add it below, and change the title to "Journalists Who [Apparently] Have no Critical Reading Skills Either" .

Stay tuned....

Well,  I woke up in a hacking fit, rebooted the computer, and tried again a couple of hours later, STILL "No Joy". I provide my correction of Mr. Sweetman's counter-comment at Ares (Sweetman in Italics) with a few non-Nyquil additions in [brackets]. I'll come back and add links and labels when I next come up for air or feel better. I may just fold this whole thing into the bottom of the original post. My response begins below the line

*********************************************************************************

(Sweetman) You appear to be trying to make two points.

I did make two points.


(Sweetman) Rather than my $60m current URFC, which I based on three consecutive years in the most recent SAR, you claim the figure should be $80 million.

NO. I did not 'claim' the figure 'should be' $80M. I demonstrated that, just as Thompson indicated “by perusing the Pentagon’s Selective Acquisition Reports”, such information could be found.
I identified information in the latest SAR that I saw as perhaps clues to the $80M figure that could be found in an earlier SAR. Those clues led me to information in an earlier SAR: the immediately preceding 2011 SAR. Whether estimating then-year unit cost off the base year cost or simply dividing then-year total cost by the units – both arrive at a value close enough to be ‘about’ $80M.


(Sweetman)You base that number on one estimated 13-aircraft "close-out" buy in an older report. This is more accurate... exactly how?

It is more accurate:

• because it was in the program of record at the time.
• because it reflected actual expected annual quantity buy and costs [which are the most current values for cancelled 2014 buy].
• most of all because it reflected a single-year procurement price, as the previous years that you chose to ‘average’ include the benefit of a multi-year buy [and FMS price support].
• because it also reflected the fact that there were no E-18Gs programmed at the time (for the first time in years) and were therefore not also providing price support 'off the F-18E/F books'.

As an aside, though the 13 E/Fs disappeared for 2014 in the 2012 SAR, [we find] 21 EA-18Gs have been added for 2014 in the 2012 SAR. They, of course, are more expensive as well.
[As another aside, whereas I can point to definite drivers for the increased cost, "close-out" buy is vague, undefined, and in this case unsupported: a  'throwaway' term.]

My first point is therefore made: Facts are in evidence that indicate substance behind Thompson’s $80M figure and [intelligent people may deduce that] therefore indignation and/or incredulousness were unwarranted.


(Sweetman)Then, you dispute my estimate for the 2001 cost by using a different inflation factor, called "economy cost".

NO. My second point was explicit: “Without the quantification of all “the necessary electronics included”, or estimation method used Thompson’s figures aren’t really debatable.” I then added that whatever your estimation was based upon, “it still does not invalidate Thompson’s claims if he uses another recognized inflation adjustment method, SUCH AS that for ‘Economy Cost’.”  

[ If Thompson's numbers bothered me, my first instinct would be to send an e-mail to him first asking him "Hey, what do you base those numbers on? I guess I'm too inquisitive to be a 'journalist']



(Sweetman)But the Pentagon doesn't use it - and neither does anyone else. A Google search for the term (in quotes) does not show it as a method of calculating inflation in its first four pages. If I add the words "inflation method" to the search I get two hits - the source that you link to, and your page.

Since my point, again, was that without more data ANY evaluation is futile, this is pretty much a ‘red herring’,  but I’ll play along. You would have had better luck with Elsevier instead of Google but not by much. First, because ‘Economy Cost’ is a pretty esoteric term. Second, “Economy Cost” is one of those word combinations that will yield multitudes of results far more popular and unrelated or at best peripheral: akin to looking for information on the web concerning incubating eggs by typing in ‘hot chicks’.
In any case, the ‘website’ is part of a project run by two economics professors, with about a dozen international members--apparently all of them also economics professors--on their project advisory board. Ergo: ‘somebody’ uses it.
BTW and not that it matters either: DoD uses OMB inflation figures, it may be authoritative for DoD estimating but not necessarily ‘accurate’ for a 'true' perspective . In DAU it is taught that DoD estimating methods are often disconnected (lower) from methods used by the rest of the world, because “OMB inflation rates reflect policy goals rather than a consensus of forecasters”(link: a dot mil site: ignore warning to view). That's an interesting pedigree isn't it?


(Sweetman) Thanks for playing.

Oh No. Thank You. [Its always appreciated when the big boys come down and inspire the hoi polloi.]

F-35 Math is Hard. Analysis is Harder

Apparently Too Hard for Bill Sweetman Anyway

Bill Sweetman takes exception with Loren Thompson’s ‘math’. Let’s take a look at the complaint for any validity, shall we?
(Note: I’m not a big fan of Thompson or any ‘policy’ type for that matter that delves into the technical issues – they tend to grossly oversimplify the irreducible, but Thompson appears to be on target this time)

Taking a gander at the key bits of Sweetman’s editorial we find:

As Thompson says, “these numbers can be verified easily by perusing the Pentagon’s Selective Acquisition Reports.” The latest SARs for the F/A-18 and F-35 can be found here and here.

So let’s look at the key claims.

"Even if we include the electronic defenses and targeting systems not usually subsumed in a Super Hornet price tag, the unit recurring flyaway cost of a single-seat F/A 18 is about $80 million in today’s dollars. The corresponding cost for an F-35C is $130 million.”

The URFC of the F-35C is about right. But in then-year dollars, the URFC of the Super Hornet over 2011-13 averages $60 million (page 18 of the Hornet SAR). So what are the "electronic defenses and targeting systems” that would raise that number by $20 million? Targeting pods run about $2 million, and the ALQ-214 jamming system has been under $1 million per aircraft historically. (The SAR is not very clear as to whether those are included in the URFC.) The new Block 4 version of the jammer is higher, but any identifiable mods to the Super Hornet are still a fraction of the $20 million that Thompson is adding. Today, the F-35C costs more than two Super Hornets.

Swing and a miss!

Bill took his figures off a page (Page 18) titled “Annual Funding TY$”. For this report, we can use those numbers although I always prefer to use base year values and adjust. Sweetman’s fatal error was in not reading and understanding the totality of what he was trying to quantify,

On Page 28 of the same report, we find one entry under called “Quantity variance resulting from a decrease of 13 FA-18E/F from 565 to 552.” This entry, combined with the 2014 'blank' space in the table columns he was looking at should have prompted Sweetman to look at the previous F-18E/F SAR for more info.

It turns out, the FY2011 F-18E/F SAR had an entry (pages 17-19) for 13 units in 2014. Depending on which data you choose to use in the 2011 SAR, and in one case how you adjust from $FY2000 base dollars, it works out that those 13 units would cost between $78.9M and ~$80M each.

• Page 17 values are 13 units for $1.026B (Then Year Dollars) = $78.92308M each.
• Page 19 values, 13 units for $61.07M (Base Year 2000 Dollars) + adjusted for inflation to 2012 dollars* = $79.4M each.

*Inflation adjuster only goes to 2012, 2013 data not calculated yet

$78.92308M or $79.4M?

Call it “about $80M”, just as Thompson asserts. So why the unit cost jump? Look at the SARs. From a glance it looks to be all about Quantity and FMS price support.

Like They Say on TV: But Wait, There's More!

Sweetman goes on (in more ways than one):

Next: “When 100 single-seat Super Hornets had been produced, the unit recurring flyaway cost—with all necessary electronics included—was about $110 million in today’s dollars, which is where F-35C is likely to stand at the 100th airplane.”

The 100th Super Hornet was delivered in the Fiscal 2001 batch. According to the SAR, the then-year URFC was $61 million. A standard Pentagon inflation calculator raises that to $77 million in 2012 - $33 million less than Thompson’s figure. The F-35 is 43 percent more expensive if it is indeed $110 million.

I call 'Caviling'

Without the quantification of all “the necessary electronics included”, or estimation method used Thompson’s figures aren’t really debatable.

Sweetman citing a ‘standard Pentagon inflation calculator isn’t very descriptive, but the 2001 Superhornet values he chooses to use comes close to adjusting the 2001 F-18E/F URF the same as if using the Historic Opportunity Cost inflation adjustment ($77.6M), which is a far better choice than most make, but it still does not invalidate Thompson’s claims if he uses another recognized inflation adjustment method, such as that for ‘Economy Cost’.

Economy Cost adjustment of the 2001 URF yields $95.5M per aircraft (without electronics) in 2012.

If the Economy Cost method was used by Thompson, $95.5M without the 'electronics' probably would be equal to about ~$100M with electronics,

If anything, the Economy Cost is a more inclusive measure of a project’s value:

Economy Cost of a project is measured using the relative share of the project as a percent of the output of the economy. This measure indicates opportunity cost in terms of the total output of the economy. The viewpoint is the importance of the item to society as a whole, and the measure is the most inclusive. This measure uses the share of GDP

In Closing

Sweetman appears to be just trying to pile-on with the last complaint. Overall, his editorial fails to ‘disprove’ or cast doubt on anything except some people’s grasp of economics and defense spending. Perhaps Sweetman’s well-known target fixation on the F-35 was his undoing this time around? No doubt the innumerate will still be impressed.

UPDATE 28Jan13 : at the 'Ares' site, after trying more than once, it was still impossible to post a substantive rebuttal to Sweetman's mischaracterization of this post in the comment thread so I posted it here.   

Kahr PM40 Review

I’ve been wanting to post a short ‘practical’ (versus esoteric) review of my current ‘first choice’ among my carry weapons for bit, but as regular visitors know I have been ‘busy’.

During the latest gun/ammunition ‘scare’ I got tired of not being able to find either 9mm, or, especially .380 Auto ammunition (practice and defense). And the .380 is far more expensive to shoot to begin with. I like to keep a ‘comfortably’ proficient skill level, and you can’t practice shooting what you can’t get ammunition to put in it first. During the ‘rationing’ I noticed that two calibers in particular were always available: .40 and .45.

As “concealability” and “controllability” are co-equal in my mind, I ruled out the selection of small .45s, though I did hold up making that decision for a while until I could try out the Springfield Armory XDS. I shouldn’t have waited: the gun felt like a brick to me. Being left-handed, it also required too much opposite-hand manipulation for my taste.

The .40 cal ammo NEVER had the price spike, or empty shelves due to rarity where I live. In addition, the .40 caliber rounds stayed as cheap or cheaper as the 9mm before the run on ammo.

I wasn’t looking for a Kahr, but I found one.

What I like

I liked the way it fit my hand, always the first test a weapon has to pass. I found I could work the slide catch with a knuckle of my left-hand trigger finger while pulling the slide back with my right hand (we lefties adapt to the right-handed world). A real plus was the 'rightie' magazine release was positioned perfectly: In no way will I accidentally drop the magazine with even the tightest grip.
I read up on other's experiences with the Kahr and some were not very encouraging, but I liked the gun enough to give it a try, and already had an idea or two about what I would do if I experienced the same problems others had. As an engineer who had a lot of wrench turning experience, and have handled a lot of the older weapons, I understand that anything mechanical is subject to a ‘break in’ schedule.

I was intrigued most about the promised accuracy of the PM40’s barrel with its polygonal rifling. The barrel is also ‘crowned’. The polygonal rifling makes the inner diameter look like it was shaped by pulling a small stop-sign through it while twisting the sign all the way. There’s no real rifling in the conventional sense, just a twisting octagonal shape. It is said to be a ‘match target’ barrel compared to the less expensive CM40 with its conventional rifling –and based on my experience to date, I believe it.

OK, that’s ‘esoteric’ enough. I only mentioned the barrel specifics because I really do think it makes a difference. As does the DAO trigger, which only ‘feels’ DAO on the first round. All pulls for the remaining rounds are particularly smooth. Not as smooth as my Walther, but the Kahr is easily ‘second place’ in trigger pull category for what is in my gun safe. I really like the standard “drift adjustable, white bar-dot combat sights”. They’re very good in all but the lowest light conditions. I can get my sight picture very fast: just “dot the i”.

It runs most  of the .40 caliber ammo, and all of the defense rounds I’ve tried without difficulty, but I avoid the particularly wider-faced ball ammo, because it’s a tight fit for the offset feed ramp. Not a problem, I have a lot of different suppliers to choose from. 

What I Don’t Like

I really don’t like the ‘extended’ 6 round magazine. After the last round is fired, it is hit or miss as to whether or not the follower will come all the way up to lock open the slide. Needless to say, I don’t carry that mag—it is “range use only” until I ‘solve’ it. Besides, I don’t like the extension for concealment reasons. The extra bulk is not worth just being able to reload one round later. I had to de-burr a little bit of obvious metal off one of my 5-round Kahr mags (made in the USA!). Every other kind of malfunction has disappeared after about 200 rounds had been fired through it. This gun, unlike the Walther, had to be broken in. But it was worth it.

Miscellaneous

1. They say this is a 3.1” barrel, but by my measure it looks more like a 2.9”

2. I use an UpLula mag loader for the Kahr, because the magazine springs are stiffer than any gun I’ve ever seen. The first time I put a couple of hundred rounds downrange my fingers were sore afterwards. I’ve never had that happen before, so I got a loader for the next time. Kahr suggests inserting a small punch or screwdriver through a hole in the side of the magazine to restrain the spring during disassembly--you will still deal with flying parts if you are not diligent.    

3. Without the extended magazine, this weapon is very compact (~5” long). I can carry it comfortably in any pant pocket that I can carry my .380 TCP.

4. Charging the weapon reliably requires technique. Once I figured out you have to really slap the slide back, I've had zero miss-feeds charging the weapon. The recoil spring is incredibly stiff like the magazine springs.

5. The only thing I’ve done different for pocket carry compared to the little TCP, was I put a wrap of Kydex, shiny side out, around the Uncle Mike’s ambidextrous pocket holster to stop ‘printing’ in certain pants (jeans) when I sit down. I had planned to ‘rivet’ where the Kydex practically touches, but the shape holds the holster all on its own and only comes off if I pull it off. The other side, not shown, is of course ‘flat’ and from the outside, it looks more like my phone in a pocket than my phone does.

5. Since it’s a larger weapon than the .380, you're aware of the Kahr in your pocket longer than when you carry the .380, but not by much.

6. The gap between the magazine and the bottom of the magazine well bugs some people, It doesn't bother me a bit. The stop is positive: you know when it is seated.   

How’s it shoot?

Better than I do. I’m not one of these internet zero-MOE shooters that seem to populate every corner of the virtual world. I suppose I could be if that was all I wanted to ever do, but I don’t. I just want to shoot with less than one ‘human-minute-of-error’.

The Kahr does that for me. Doing ‘slow fire’,  even before my eye surgeries, I could cut 10-ring sized holes out of stuff at 7 yards. (You HAVE to slow-fire at 3 yards because the muzzle blast blows the hanging target horizontal every time.) After the Chief and I did some basic target practice (she had a marksmanship class last term) I wanted to do some rapid fire (defined as 'shoot as soon as my sight picture is reacquired') practice. I loaded up the 6 round magazine and shot two 3-shot groups with a correcting pause between them at a series of six targets. Here’s a pic to give you an idea of the sight picture.

This was six magazines shot from 7 yards at 6” targets in the order numbered.

I was experimenting with grip and timing. As you can tell, after I totally blew it going too fast on my 2nd target, setting loose one round (3rd of 6) waaaay down below the #3 target, I regrouped to shoot my ‘best of six’ at the #3 target, with all 6 rounds under 3” as a group.

This is a standard silhouette size target shot at 15 yards. (It's not one of the B27 targets because those are more about 5 times more expensive a pop than the 'house' targets)

I shot rapid fire 6 shots twice at the torso. The results prompted me to try and shoot the last 6 round magazine in two 3 round rapid-fire groups at the head. I made a conscious effort to “aim small to miss small” and factoring for range, my angular error in aiming was smaller at 15 yards than it was at 7 yards. The 17th of 18 rounds would have been non-lethal.

Concealable, Controllable, Reliable. I can live with that.

Debunking Close Air Support Myths, 2nd Edition: Part 8a,8b,8c…

The AF "had to" buy a CAS plane?

I confess. I wanted to do this post first in this “2nd Edition” series to keep things in chronological order, but I believed at the time that this myth required some significant off-site research of Government and other documents; it required deeper investigation of the original sources than the myth we exploded in Part 7. Part of the delay in completing my research also came from the Government Shutdown Theater last year, and an off-line 40K word writing project I completed on New Year’s Eve. Today, we go back to the roots of the modern CAS mythology to examine what drove the ‘birth’ of the A-10.

Myth: 'The Air Force only started/proceeded with the A-X/A-10 because they 'had to' due to external pressure. “Insidious” I find this myth insidious because it contains perversions of truth, and those perversions in turn have been:
1. Used to mask or obscure the greater truths that lay behind it and…
2. Employed both by the incompetent and the malevolent to create ‘cartoons’ of history.

There is no doubt that the Air Force factored in the ‘external’ pressures into its decision-making. There are always many forces when shaping major decisions, and we will be covering only a few of them. But external pressure was hardly the only or even primary reason. Nor does the mere existence of the ‘external pressures’ mean those pressures were legitimate, honest, or well-founded. I believe we can show that many, if not most of them, can be filed under ‘none of the above’.
I’ve seen variations on the ‘had to’ claim go so to such extreme wording as to actually read that the Air Force was “shamed” into fielding the A-10. I’ve purposely phrased the myth definition in this discussion as the broadly stated “due to external pressure” to allow readers to discriminate between, and discuss the nature and sources of pressure individually as well as explore their interrelationship along with some common roots as we proceed.

The myth is also tough to nail down and debunk because it is so poorly defined: there is a level of abstraction that could mean different things to different people. To deal with this complication, we will break this myth down into what I have found to be the two commonly intended meanings behind the myth. Thus, we will be exploding two myths instead of one to make sure we address the multiple wrong-headed ideas behind the statement above. If there are other meanings, I do know what they might be. But if they exist, I’m certain somebody will let me know.
The two most commonly intended meanings that I’ve encountered can be stated as something to the effect of:

'The Air Force never wanted the A-10 specifically. They 'had to' buy it.
And...
'The Air Force only procured a dedicated (generic) attack aircraft because they were ‘made’ to do so.

The first myth can be considered a specific example of the second, but we will deal with each as a separate point, because they both have been repeated often enough for each to have taken on a provenance all their own. They appear to me to exist independently in some people’s minds: one, the other, or perhaps sometimes both. By addressing both versions, we can avoid the ‘yes but’ argumentation from those who would first argue one point, then upon being shown where they are either completely wrong or oversimplifying, try to avoid facing up to the facts by simply running to the other meaning.

There is a large set of undefined “or else” implications behind both these assertions. No doubt some of those consequences factored into the Air Force’s decision-making process (no defense decisions are ever made in a vacuum), but in both cases we can show that in every step of the evolution in Air Force close air support ‘thought’ from 1960 onward the Air Force decision-makers were always focused on providing the best possible ‘Close Air Support’ to the Army within the externally imposed limits of available technology, defense policy direction and budget-limited force structure, and show that CAS capability was pursued according to the rapidly evolving criteria by which ‘best possible’ was defined.

I could have made this a very short post, if I just wanted to focus on the Air Force’s decision to specifically buy, and then defend the A-10. But this would explode only the superficial aspects of the myth. So I choose to provide the short and easy response for the typical ‘drive-by’ complainants, and then go into a more detailed follow-on discussion of the history to describe how the Air Force came to seek fielding the A-10 to satisfy the CAS mission given the following:
1. The then-current state of the necessary technologies and threats
2. The imposed presumption of a relatively permissive combat environment

Approach

I’m going to cover this myth using a different approach than Part 7. Instead of starting at the present and following the thread backwards in time, for this installment we’ll start with the moment the A-X program was initiated, covering who, what and why. Then we’ll ‘flash back’ in time to look at the activities of key actors, first picking a convenient starting point in the past and then look at their activities running up to the decision. This approach is warranted because there were many threads of concern and action, including those involving the A-7 as the ‘interim’ CAS plane acquisition program. These threads converged to create the whole history. ‘Convergence’ for our purposes is the point where the AF leadership decided to undertake development of what would become the A-10. We’ll also go a bit further to show how the AF defended the A-10 program after it was underway to further remove any reasonable doubt.


After exhaustive investigation, at the root of all the decision-making I found that the three most important players in this story were the Army ‘Airmobile’ Advocates (of course), their enablers in the Kennedy/Johnson Administrations, and a noisemaker or two in Congress. There were even deeper roots to what was happening at that time-- Roots going back to even before the Korean War. But we will spare ourselves from running down the rabbit hole it took me over two months of research to navigate just to get back to this point. The time I consider as well spent, but on top of all the other research I’ve done and experience I’ve gained on in this topic over decades, I’m pretty sick of CAS ‘hardware’ issues right now . We’ll save discussion of that earlier time for perhaps a later installment… or twelve.


Myth Meaning A: 'The Air Force never wanted the A-10 specifically. They 'had to' buy it.

The A-10 Decision: Who, When and Why

Loooooooog post after the fold. Ye be Warned.

Avoiding the Evil Eye

I normally don’t go into my personal life beyond whatever public behavior I advocate, enjoy or regret, but this is a private behavior ‘regret’ post. The only thing that makes it suitable for publication here is that I feel I must warn others not to do what I did.

I delayed getting some surgery done, which might adversely affect my final healed-up post-surgery state. The surgery was delayed, because not only did I not get a third opinion, I SHOULD have gotten that opinion…in a different state, or at least in a different part of the state I was in.

I noticed I was having trouble in my right eye about 5-6 years ago when I was on temporary assignment in California. I saw an eye doctor who diagnosed my right eye as having “cellophane maculopathy” AKA “macular pucker”. He told me that it occurs in about 5% of people without diabetes in my age group. (very much higher rate for people over 70) and referred me to a retina specialist, with a warning he could probably not help me. The specialist repeated what the first eye doctor told me. Yes, he could do a surgery, but it had a very low probability of improving my vision.
Why get surgery with little hope of success? I’m not masochist, and my other eye was working ‘fine’.  My left eye has always been dominant anyway. I passed on the surgery and the disparity in my eyesight did cause me some minor problems, but it was tolerable. I forgot about ever getting the eye fixed.

Well, after being back in ‘Merica (Texas) a few years, ‘Old Man Cataracts’ started making his presence known. 7-8 Months ago I had cataract surgery which really made an improvement in my vision. Of course, when the new doc looked in my eye he saw the old problem and asked me if I was having problems seeing detail in the right eye. ‘Duh!’ I said, and told him about my earlier experience.

New Texas Doc said he he was surprised—he thought the surgery had a pretty good success rate, rarely getting 100%, but often in the 90%+ improvement range. He referred me to a retina specialist in Fort Worth for another round of tests. I repeated the story about being told success rates for this kind of surgery as being low, and the Retina Doc looked stunned, shaking his head ‘no’ the whole time. At the end of my recap, Retina Doc tells me ‘No’, they usually get in the 90%+ improvement range if there are no other problems (glaucoma, macular tears, holes, etc—none of which he saw on me). Then he asks “Where were you again when you were told there were low success rates?” I told him People’s Republic of Kalifornia.

This got me an ‘Ohhhhhhh, that explains it’ expression and the comment (quoting as best as I can remember )“I know they don’t get as much practice most places in California as we do because they don’t have as many people with good insurance plans. They may have lower success rates than we do because they don’t get enough practice.”

I’m certain if I had been in a big city in CA, I eventually could have found a doc with the skills, but how would I have known I got the right one ahead of time? Better to go where success is a presumption, rather than an exception if you need work done.

Well I’m now two weeks post-op. Doc says I’m doing ‘excellent’, and by my estimation, I’m already in the 80-90% improvement category with the problem up close with expectations of further improvement as I heal.

When the Retina Doc went in he found a small retinal tear caused by the pulling of the vitreous membrane he was fixing. It was at the top of my retina where I never would have noticed until it got bigger, so it was ‘lased’ while he was inside my eyeball. I’m certain it eventually would have had to have been taken care of for reasons of its own, so this was a good decision: even if I didn’t get an improvement, I prevented serious damage.

But I’m kicking myself for not getting that third opinion right after the second. If you have morbid curiosity and a strong stomach, this is the procedure I had done. Fortunately I don’t have any other problems like macular degeneration that the patient in the video has, so my recovery is (so far) remarkably fast.

Bottom Line:

Don’t assume that because you can’t find a doctor that can help locally, that you won’t find one someplace else.

P.S. I backdated this so as to not run over the CAS post that I want to keep at the top for a bit.

"Using Slave Labor is Never a Good Idea"

An interesting and illuminating convergence of my interests and hobbies  occurred this week...

Today, I was visiting X-Ray Delta One's Flikr archive to see what was new, and found this very powerful artwork (full size here):

Source: X-Ray Delta One

The masterful use of ink (is it pen [probably], blockprint or scratchboard?) only makes the subject more powerful. The illustration, especially the defiant man to the left, instantly reminded me of what I found the other day while I was looking into the background of several key players in the A-7/A-10 selection and development story. Lt General Howard Fish's recollection of WWII service (Video) led me to off track to other bomber stories (you know how it goes), where I found this on the EAA website:

Elmer Bendiner, B-17 navigator during World War II, tells this story of a bombing run over Kassel, Germany, and the unexpected result of a direct hit on the plane's fuel tanks.

Our B-17, the Tondelayo, was barraged by flack from German anti-aircraft guns. That was not unusual, but on this particular occasion our gas tanks were hit. Later, as I reflected on the miracle of a 20-millimeter shell piercing the fuel tank without touching off an explosion, our pilot, Bohn Fawkes, told me it was not quite that simple. 

On the morning following the raid, Bohn had gone down to ask our crew chief for that shell as a souvenir of unbelievable luck. The crew chief told Bohn that not just one shell but 11 had been found in the gas tanks; 11 unexploded shells where only one was sufficient to blast us out of the sky. It was as if the sea had been parted for us. A near miracle, I thought. Even after 35 years, so awesome an event leaves me shaken, especially after I heard the rest of the story from Bohn. 

He was told that the shells had been sent to the armorers to be defused. The armorers told him that Intelligence had picked them up. They could not say why at the time, but Bohn eventually sought out the answer. 

Apparently when the armorers opened each of those shells, they found no explosive charge. They were as clean as a whistle and just as harmless. Empty? Not all of them! One contained a carefully rolled piece of paper. On it was a scrawl in Czech. The Intelligence people scoured our base for a man who could read Czech. Eventually they found one to decipher the note. It set us marveling. Translated, the note read: 

This is all we can do for you now... 

Using slave labor is never a good idea.   

Indeed 

DD-1000 Update: Wow! Indeed

Great pics HERE.
(Note: Still working on next installment of the CAS Series, but this couldn't wait)

The USS Zumwalt now looks like a real ship. I tried to leave a comment in response to first commenter who parroted a cliché I'm sure he's heard from some other naysayer. He snarked:

With the 19th century bow design, this class of ship is going to spend a lot of time under salt water. There was a good reason why this bow type went away over 100 years ago. Good luck.

I tried to post a response:

The seas aren't any more violent than they were in 1900, and seakeeping gizmos are certainly more  effective these days. The DD-1000's better center of buoyancy vs center of gravity arrangement, overall lower mass distribution (remember a lot of the superstructure volume above the bridge is empty space) higher freeboard, higher fineness ratio (length to beam) and overall much larger size of the Zumwalts should mean these ships will have very little in common with the experiences of the Pre-Deadnought, wave piercing/tumblehome designs

.

But the thread wasn't taking my comment. At least I couldn't tell if it was taking (not even a 'thanks, a moderator will review..." kind of feedback).

Just HOW different is the DD-1000 Class from the 'old' designs?

Here's the SMS Brandenberg, circa 1902:

SMS Brandenberg Source: Wikipedia

Here it is shown relative to the DD1000 in profile (all waterlines at the red line shown):

DD1000 vs SMS Brandenberg  Comparison 

Here's the French warship Jauréguiberry:

French warship Jauréguiberry; Source Wikipedia

 Here is the Jauréguiberry of 1897 shown relative to the Zumwalt:

DD1000 vs Jauréguiberry Comparison 

Last example...
Here's one of the larger Pre-Dreadnoughts, Russia's Andrei Pervozanny. A wave-piercer, but (comparatively) only slightly tumblehome:

Russian Pre-Dreadaught Andrei Pervozanny ; Source: Wikipedia

 And here is the Andrei Pervozanny  compared to the Zumwalt in profile:

DD1000 vs Andrei Pervozanny Comparison 

  The beams (width) of all these hulls vary less than you might think. The skinniest is the Brandenberg at 64 ft, the widest (only slightly so) is the Zumwalt at 80.7 ft.  The really big 'dimensions' difference is found in hull fineness (ratio of length to beam), the absolute height of the decks above waterline, and the distances between the forward armament and bow. The DD-1000 should shake off seas that would rock-and-roll the 'oldies'

Hull Fineness Comparison

CUDA Update: More Revelations

More Possibilities

I missed this AFA Symposium news in the wake of all the buzz and tears being shed over the possible retirement of the A-10.

Bill Sweetman kinda’ buries the lede in a story about the CUDA missile concept. Getting past the cute “Halfraam” moniker, the REAL news here seems to be there appears to be an ‘extended range’ version in the mix.

On show for the first time at AFA is a model of Lockheed Martin’s Cuda, a so-called “Halfraam” weapon about half as long as an Amraam [sic] and compact enough to fit six missiles into each bay of the F-35 or F-22. Cuda draws on the hit-to-kill technology used on the PAC-3 missile, is designed to have a radar seeker and has both movable tails and forward attitude control motors for high agility. The company is not disclosing Cuda’s design range, but one variation of the concept is a two-stage missile with a similar total length to Amraam [sic], presumably with the goal of covering a wide range envelope with a single missile design.

“Similar total length”. Hmmmmm. Perhaps something like this?:


Extended Range CUDA? Here's one possibility in a universe full of them. 

The world awaits further details.

Debunking Close Air Support Myths, 2nd Edition: Part 7

Sourcing ‘AF Hates A-10’ Nonsense

We tackled the ‘big’ myths in a while back Parts 1-6. This post, at the root of things, is about the little myth that if the Air Force retires the A-10, that somehow means the Air Force doesn’t care about the mission, the Army, or both. I believe it is based upon other little myths that are sometimes based upon big lies and/or uniformed opinions more than anything else. The lies and opinions get planted as ‘fact’ in places where they line up neatly with already well-entrenched points of view. Then over time, if they get repeated often enough, they become ‘facts’… that aren’t.

The Current Sequester ‘Crisis’ and Close Air Support

At last week’s Air Force Association convention Air Force Leadership statements, acknowledging the reality of how Defense Sequestration was making the military a hollow force. As reported by Defense News:

With the F-35 coming online to take over the close-air support role, the venerable Thunderbolt II will be a likely target, Gen. Mike Hostage told reporters at the Air Force Association's Air and Space Conference.
“This is not something I want to do,” Hostage said, explaining that no decisions had been made.
Hostage said he had already talked to Army officials about losing the A-10 and using other jets to take over the close-air support role. The Army was “not happy” about the possibility, Hostage said.
“I will not lose what we have gained in how we learned to support the Army,” Hostage said. “I had to make sure the Army understood that I am not backing away from the mission.”
Hostage said the service can do the close-air support role with the F-35, but it would be more expensive and “not as impressive” without the famous GAU-8 Avenger 30 millimeter gun.
“In a perfect world, I would have 1,000 A-10s,” Hostage said. “I can’t afford it. I can’t afford the fleet I have now. If I cut the fleet in half, do I save enough to get through this problem?
“My view is, while I don’t want to do it, I would rather lose the entire fleet and save everything I do in the infrastructure.” 

Hostage’s comments follow similar statements from both acting Secretary of the Air Force Eric Fanning and Chief of Staff Gen. Mark Welsh that single-mission aircraft would need to be cut if budgets continue to decrease.

“If we go into [fiscal year 2014] with sequestration still in effect, and we need to achieve those savings, you have to look at cuts,” Fanning said Monday…

What is facing the Air Force right now is same for all the services: they must plan on doing ‘less with less’ because of the current ‘budget reality’ [Though it is arguable that is really about a lack of defense-as-a-national-priority ‘reality’]. Within the framework of the ‘budget reality’, the services have to figure out how can they fulfill as many of their responsibilities, and to what extent, with the ‘less’ budget they will be left to work with going forward.

The Lesser of Evils?

It now appears that part of the best way (or least ‘worst way’) forward, involves the possibility of retiring the entire (such as it remains) A-10 fleet

Aside from the sentimentality of General Hostage’s statement, I have no problem with it, and there is one part that sums things up perfectly:

“My view is, while I don’t want to do it, I would rather lose the entire fleet and save everything I do in the infrastructure.”

Got that? Retire selected weapon systems and save all the capability (“everything I do”).

The A-10 is Going Away Anyway

This is certain to cause a groundswell of emotion and irrational fear in some quarters if the A-10 fleet is forcibly retired. I would say ‘retired early’ but that would be less correct than stating ‘earlier than planned’, as we have kept the A-10 past it’s freshness date. the A-10 was considered as rapidly obsolescing AND rapidly aging when the Air Force first proposed replacing it with A-7Fs and A-16's the first time in the late 1980's. All but the last A-10s built (~1983-84) were manufactured with known deficiency in structural strength to begin with.

A-10s in AMARG: The Largest Supply Source for Keeping Operational A-10s Flying.  

"...fourteen airplanes sitting on the ramp having battle damage repaired, and I lost two A-10s in one day..."

Desert Storm Air Boss Made the Call: Pulled A-10s Off the
Iraqi Republican Guard Due to High Attrition

Tales of  the A-10's effectiveness in Desert Storm overshadowed it's shortcomings, which no one wanted to talk about (see Gen Horner's observations in Part 6 of this Debunking CAS Myths Series ) . Between Desert Storm and Congressional dabbling in matters they did not understand, the A-10 got a reprieve. The reprieve has lasted this long because we have not had to fight a war like Desert Storm again (Yes, there were significant differences between then and Operations Allied Force, Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom).

Once again, there will be the ubiquitous ‘some’ who will complain that the AF is abandoning the needs of the Army by abandoning the Close Air Support (CAS) mission. In reality, the complaint will/would be over little more than a ‘hardware’ and ‘tactics’ change in the mission, NOT a retreat from the mission itself. Let us note here, that such complaints ignore the fact that the current plan already has the F-35 replacing the A-10 in the CAS role. If the A-10 fleet is retired due to sequestration, then sequestration is only causing a change in schedule for something that was going to happen anyway and NOT changing an inevitable end-state (not that changes themselves are good things, they usually cause chaos and added costs themselves).

Here We Go Again

With this emerging probability that the A-10s will finally be retired, we can expect a repeat of past experience: someone (or rather, many someones) will, in their ignorance, decry such a move as yet another example of the Air Force trying to get rid of the A-10 ‘they never wanted’ in the first place. Never mind that the reason for retiring the A-10 is clearly articulated in the present time: In the future the mythology will be that it was just another exhibit of ‘proof’ that the Air Force has ‘never wanted the A-10’ or never ‘took CAS seriously’. One in a laundry list of other examples. The problem is that laundry list, is a list of myths as well: a compendium of untruths, perversions of the truth, and biased opinions promoting a theme masquerading as the truth.

And I can back up my claims with hard evidence.

Taking Down the Myths, One Myth at a Time

To me, one of the most annoying myths about the Air Force and the A-10 is the one that asserts that when the AH-56 Cheyenne program was cancelled, the Air Force “tried to back out of the A-10 commitment” but it was “made” to keep it by some greater outside force, See "Close Air Support: Why all the Fuss?"  (Garrett, P.10) .

 I’ve picked the ‘Garrett’ (Thomas W. Garrett) reference to use as a starting point for a few reasons. First, when he stays away from the politics involved and deals strictly with the whys and wherefores of the logical division of responsibilities and missions between the Army and the Air Force, the paper is quite admirable. (His snarky delivery however, which no doubt raises a chuckle or two in Army quarters, comes across as snide and mean-spirited in its essence when experienced by this Airman.) Second, He reprised his War College paper in the Army War College quarterly Parameters under a different title (Close Air Support: Which Way Do We Go) . Over a dozen papers written later directly cite these two Garrett papers, and even more papers spring from these.
Third, the paper was written shortly before Desert Storm when Garrett was a Lt. Colonel. Later in Desert Storm “he commanded, trained and led the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) Aviation Brigade, the largest Army Aviation rotary wing task force in conventional land warfare history”. Garrett also served in Vietnam, retired as a Major General, and has been inducted into the Army Aviation Hall of Fame, so he has sufficient ‘street cred’ to be a reliable reference on this topic.

Myth: The Air Force Tried to Kill the A-10 After the AH-56 Cheyenne Program was Cancelled.

When you go to the bibliography to find the source of the claim as quoted in Garrett above, you are taken to a reference:

Horton and David Halperin, "The Key West Key," Foreign Relations. Winter 1983-1981, pp. 117.

This source took me longer to find than I thought it would, because the citation is wrong (It should read “Foreign Policy” ). I initially thought it was some State Department trade publication, but instead find it was in a magazine we’ve all probably seen many time at Barnes & Noble. A magazine that describes itself thusly:

“Since its founding in 1922, Foreign Affairs has been the leading forum for serious discussion of American foreign policy and global affairs. It is now a multiplatform media organization with a print magazine, a website, a mobile site, various apps and social media feeds, an event business, and more. Foreign Affairs is published by the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), a non-profit and nonpartisan membership organization dedicated to improving the understanding of U.S. foreign policy and international affairs through the free exchange of ideas.”

References to the web, mobile, apps and social media aside, I suspect their self-perception hasn’t changed much since the Halperin & Halperin ‘article’. Put succinctly: Foreign Policy is a magazine for self-identified ‘movers and shakers’. In the referenced article we find multiple complaints and examples of “interservice rivalry” causing ‘problems’. Close Air Support was but one example:

The Army next tried to build the Cheyenne, a large antitank helicopter priced at $8 million. This time the Air Force feared that the Army, with its new weapon, might be able to acquire officially the close-support function. While the Air Force still had no interest in providing close support, it wanted to protect its bureaucratic territory. Thus it developed the Fairchild A-10, which Easterbrook notes, "many aircraft observers believe is one of the best planes ever built." And priced at $3 million, the A-10 could do a far better job than the Cheyenne at less than one-half the cost. 

The Cheyenne was canceled. But having headed off the Army, the Air Force saw no further use for the A-10 and attempted to cut the plane from its budget. Congress has insisted that the A-10s be built. But Air Force reluctance has sent the Army back to the drawing board, once again in the no-win realm of the helicopter.

There’s A LOT wrong with the above besides the claim the Air Force tried to ‘back out’ of the A-10, such as tying what would become development of the AH-64 Apache to some sort of Air Force ‘reluctance’ ‘Halperin x 2’ were apparently unaware the Army began pursuing what would become the AH-64 the day after the Cheyenne was cancelled. The Air Force was fast in those days, but it wasn’t that fast. The Army simply went back to the drawing board trying to replace perhaps the longest-lived interim system ever: the AH-1 Huey Cobra. But we’ll let the niggling things slide and keep our focus on the task at hand.

First, who were the authors of this ‘article’ and who was this ‘Easterbrook’ they were citing?

The Halperins

Around that time including before and after, Morton Halperin was the Director of the Center for National Security Studies, on the board of the ALCU, and a Brookings Institute ‘scholar’. He was nominated to be THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR DEMOCRACY AND PEACEKEEPING under Les Aspin (Spit!). When nominated in 1993, he was a very well known ‘quantity’. It did not go well.

The other ‘Halperin’ was his son David, then a senior at Yale, and he has not fallen very far from the tree. By the way, Nowadays ole’ Morton is running George Soros’ Open Society Institute. So one might file this data away for future consideration: Perhaps this Father-Son duo were/are not that keen on defense in the first place?

 

We Keep Pulling the Thread: What is The Halperins’ ‘Source’

The ‘Easterbrook’ above was one Gregg Easterbrook writing for the Washington Monthly. The current WM website describes the publication thusly:

The Washington Monthly was founded in 1969 on the notion that a handful of plucky young writers and editors, armed with an honest desire to make government work and a willingness to ask uncomfortable questions, could tell the story of what really matters in Washington better than a roomful of Beltway insiders at a Georgetown dinner party. In our cluttered little downtown DC office, we’re still doing what we have done for over forty years, and what fewer and fewer publications do today: telling fascinating, deeply reported stories about the ideas and characters that animate America’s government.

When you get right down to it, the Washington Monthly is a political ‘alternative’ news outlet. It has been largely run, and overrun, by people like James Fallows whose merits I briefly noted in a sidebar here. So file that away for future consideration as well.

Easterbrook’s ‘article’ was called “All Aboard Air Oblivion” in which he rambles through a no-holds-barred screed: 

• Decrying the wastefulness of hugely-vulnerable helicopters, 
• Asserting the Air Force with a penchant for technology was requiring an expensive unnecessary “smart bomb” called the AGM-65 be carried on top of the internal 30mm gun.
• Laughably describing the Maverick as having only a “15%” probability of kill per “pass” and being impossible to operate effectively in combat.
• Making baseless claims that the Air Force Chief of Staff only pursued the A-10 because of the Army's Cheyenne.
• Citing James Fallows’ writings criticizing the TOW missile, and mocking the idea that the next missile in the works, the Hellfire in combination with the “Son of Cheyenne” (AH-64 Apache) will be any better.

 Among many, many other transgressions against logic and truth. 

And buried inside Easterbrook’s nonsensical diatribe is this little gem of our real interest:

With the Army challenge deflected, anti-close-support generals once again ascended within the Air Force. They wanted to stop wasting money on an Army-oriented project and reserve all Air Force funds for superplanes like the F-15 and B-1. So each year, the Air Force tried to cut the A-10 from its budget. Fortunately, each year politicians put the funds back in. (This year, for, example, the Air Force cut 60 A-10s, but Defense Secretary Casper Weinberger reinstated them.) Next, the Air force shunted 72 of the first 400 A-10s straight to the National Guard, the only front-line aircraft ever assigned directly to the Air National Guard

ALL the above is patently, and demonstrably untrue. All of it.
Beside there being no evidence of ‘anti-close-support’ generals in the Air Force (names?), the ‘tried to cut the A-10 from its budget’ isn’t supported by the history either. I know from a personal friend that briefed the AF budget to Members of Congress (Circa 78-79) that there was constant pressure to increase the original objective of 600 planes to something greater. The numbers WERE increased, because they had to be: just to get the budget past a Committee Chairman or two. Three years after this article was published, at the end of production there were 715 A-10s. So yeah, after the Air Force got all they originally wanted, MAYBE then they stopped asking for more. So what?

Here’s another little factor to consider. Since we don’t know the number from which Easterbrook is subtracting that 60 A-10 figure, perhaps at least some of the 60 aircraft that the Easterbrook alleges the Air Force tried to have taken out (in 1980-81) was related to the 1979 GAO report that ‘came down’ on the Air Force for buying too many total A-10s? From the GAO Report:

… We believe that our current work on reducing Defense aircraft time in maintenance further demonstrates the necessity to reevaluate aircraft needs for depot maintenance float. We focused on the potential procurement of 61 A-10 aircraft as substitutes for aircraft undergoing depot maintenance--currently called backup aircraft inventory for maintenance. Specifically, we found that: 

--Even though the A-10 is being procured under a concept designed to eliminate the need for depot overhaul, the Air Force is still using a 10-percent factor to justify the purchase of 61 A-10 aircraft for maintenance float purposes.
--While Air Force criteria also allows substitutes for aircraft undergoing modifications, the full extent of the modification program for the A-10 is not known.
--In developing the lo-percent maintenance float factor Defense has not systematically determined how quickly aircraft In the depot could be "buttoned up" and returned to their units under a wartime compressed work schedule and the influence of this rapid return on the requirements for maintenance float aircraft. 

The A-10, as well as other newer weapon systems, are being procured under a concept designed to eliminate the need for depot overhaul. New design features and reliability-centered maintenance concepts have improved maintainability and reliability so that work which used to be performed in depot facilities can now be performed in the field and at intermediate facilities. In spite of this change, we find that the planned procurement for the 61 A-10 maintenance float aircraft is still being justified using a 10-percent factor. Historical experience has been used in the past to justify the procurement of float aircraft as substitutes for those aircraft undergoing periodic overhaul. Since the A-10 is not scheduled to undergo periodic overhaul, the justification for 61 A-10s is questionable…


Funny how we never hear about this little development, eh? Congress' "watchdog" complains about too many A-10s one year, and a drive-by journalist hammers you the next. Such is life.

 

Finally, everyone and anyone who has ever played the 'budget game' knows that if someone up the chain is going to support buying system X, whether you want it or not, you can let that someone spend political capital getting more of system X, so you can spend it on system Y. Congress makes the rules, everyone else just plays the game. If the Air Force ever chose to reduce numbers of the A-10 to be bought in an annual budget, it was part of a larger strategy.

As to the characterization the Air Force “shunted” A-10’s to reserve units, and doing so was 'without precedent', the A-10 WAS the first ‘front-line’ system to go directly to reserve units, but hardly the ‘last’. The year after this article was printed, it was announced that the first F-16s would be going to reserve units beginning in 1984. I presume it would be Easterbrook’s argument that the F-16 was ‘shunted’ as well? My damning counterargument to any accusations that anybody in the Air Force was ‘shunting’ anything would be to point to a little thing we (the Air Force) had going on with a full head of steam at the time: Making Total Force a viable force.

So we’ve now pulled this thread, whereby it is claimed the Air Force “tried to back out of the A-10 commitment” all the way to it's frazzled, unattributed end. We've found NO substance to the claim at all, only B.S. 'hearsay'

 

Do I Have Suspicions? Feh. Its 'The Usual Suspects'

I don’t think you have to be much of a detective to read between the lines for Easterbrook’s sources. Aside from referencing Fallows, I see some of the same verbiage that’s been thrown around by Pierre Sprey and Winslow Wheeler for years. I also don’t find it much of a coincidence that this article found it’s way into a particular compendium of lunacy, a copy of which I own. A little book of perversions produced by the predecessor to Project on Government Oversight (POGO) in 1983; the much more verbose “Fund for Constitutional Government”, under their so-called “Project on Military Procurement”.

The title? “More Bucks: Less Bang: How the Pentagon Buys Ineffective Weapons” (If you buy a copy for goodness sake buy a used copy will you?). In this little (in more ways than one) book many weapon systems come under fire. I would say there were only 3 ‘reports’ (out of 30+) that I would call 'materially accurate'. One of those was written post facto: about the tribulations of the by-then long-fielded M-16 so it doesn't count as 'prophetic'.
The rest? Among all the other tall tales, written by a who's who of muckrakers, activists, and 'reformers', we learn that the Trident submarine and Aegis Cruisers won’t work, the Stealth Bomber is a ‘joke’, Low Probability of Intercept Radar is a ‘homing beacon’, the Abrams and Bradley are failures, and the Maverick, Pershing and Tomahawk missiles will be useless.

I marvel at the 'expertise' on display within.(/sarc)

I suspect Easterbrook was spoon-fed his article’s scary parts from the so called ‘reformer’ camp. His output then later gets rolled into the Reformer Noise Machine which then echoes down the years.

Lather. Rinse. Repeat. That is how these myths are born.

I further suspect the next thread I pull will lead me right to the same noisemakers as I found this time.

The Next Myth? (Part 8)

'The Air Force only started/proceeded with the A-X/A-10 because they 'had to' due to external pressure.

Note: I'm having formatting (font and case mostly, with some copy/paste gaps) issues with Blogger on this post for some reasons. Please bear with me as I find problems and make adjustments.

    

South Korea Passes on Dead Parrot

Decides Not to Buy F-15 'Silent Eagle'

H/T F-16.net
In the competition to procure a new South Korean fighter to replace their rapidly obsolescing F-4s and F-5s, push came to shove, and military requirements trumped costs.

It is a "No Decision"

South Korea did the only thing they could do under their acquisition laws when the only competitor to make the price point didn't make the performance cutoff: they went back to the drawing board:

South Korea decided not to select Boeing's F-15SE as the country's next fighter jet Tuesday amid concern the sole-remaining candidate for the 8.3 trillion won (US$7.2 billion) project is not suitable as it lacks stealth features....

...Locked in competition with Lockheed Martin's F-35 and EADS' Eurofighter, Boeing was close to winning the deal with a cheaper offer than its rivals. But its fourth-generation aircraft finished in second place behind the F-35 stealth jet in comprehensive assessments, leaving questions over its combat capabilities...

... "A majority of the committee members agreed to reject (F-15 SE) and restart the project, taking into consideration the recent security situation including North Korea's third nuclear test and latest aerospace technology development,"...

... "They agreed that South Korean Air Force needs fifth-generation combat jets to keep pace with the latest trend and to deter provocations by North Korea." ... 

...Their rejection on the verge of the final selection illustrates pressure felt by the military and the government to buy 60 jets from the F-15 family with improved features as experts and former Air Force chiefs have expressed concern over the jet's stealth capabilities. As the F-15 SE failed to get approval at the last minute, the DAPA will restart the procurement program, which is expected to further delay the replacement of South Korean Air Force's aging fleet of F-4s and F-5s. ...  

... Boeing tried to highlight its conformal weapons bay as one of the key radar-evading features, but it failed to quell questions over its capability against F-35, which is originally designed as a stealth jet.

The Borg Never Quit

With Boeing, the 'Parrot' is never REALLY dead, "it's just pining for the fjords". Boeing's big problem with the Silent Eagle now is other possible shoppers will be asking themselves :What does South Korea know about the F-35 and F-15SE that we don't?

Admin Note: To cut down on possible flaming by 'F-15 Fanboys' and 'F-35 Haters', if you want to assert the F-15 deal was scuttled for reasons other than those the South Koreans have stated in the comments, fine --bring evidence to back it up at the same time.
If not...'Snip'. (you can go libel people someplace else).  

And Now For Something Completely Different Part 2

Today's Stop: National Museum of Naval Aviation
As a change of pace, and to allow me time to do some research on a major project I have going right now, I thought we'd get away from the daily grind of smacking down "F-35 Hater" stories and post a series of travel pics from some various museums I've visited in the last year.

These were taken in the middle of last month. I really like the NMNA, it is one of the few around that have sufficient light for most picture taking. This was the first time in 20 years or so that I've been back. The last time, the main building was finished but there were rare treasures sitting in the uncut grass outside. The Chief and I spent 5 hours there this time and we could have spent even more time. We will be back

P.S. If you see 'ghosts' it is because I'm using Photoshop to merge photos into collages and panoramas.



USMC S4C Scout on Floats

 







NC-4 Seaplane. 6 Engines: 3 Pushin', 3 Pullin'



Underneath the seaplane wing we find a Boeing F-4B

 

Sopwith Camel

The Navy obtained six Camels after WWI for experiments performed at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, operating planes aboard ship using wooden platforms built over the forward turret guns of battleships.  this plane has markings replicating those of a Camel operating off the Battleship TEXAS.  Normally, launched aircraft were flown ashore, but were also equipped with inflatable air bags underneath the wings to keep the aircraft afloat in the event of a water landing.

 

"Pacific Maintenance", FM-2 Wildcat

I really enjoy dioramas like this one.

 

PBY Catalina

The museum has a great full-size 'cutaway' display of a PBY. Can you imagine loooong patrols with the engines (hopefully) droning? I never knew about the 'penthouse' station at the wing attachment point.

 

A-1 Skyraider

They had a few different versions of the 'SPAD' on display. Note here and elsewhere the tail-hooks of planes past used for sign stanchions. This highlights another great thing about this museum: the ability to get close to the exhibits and REALLY see them.

 





Lockheed TV-2 : Two Seat, Carrier Operable, version of the Air Force P-80



In reality, this is an Air Force T-33 modified to replicate a TV-2. The Navy acquired quite a few of the TV-2s as their first jet trainer, so it is kind of surprising they didn't have a real one available to display. How'd you like to have to polish it while asea?

 

Upper Deck Panorama: Lockheed L-10 Electra Center, JRC-1 Left 

The JRC-1 was the Navy's version of the Cessna T-50, the Army Air Force's AT-17

 

 

Lunch at the 'Cubi Bar Café'

When the Navy shut down operations at Subic Bay, the museum requested some mementos for posterity. What they got was the whole bar, now the museum's restaurant. Food was good, reasonably priced and the atmosphere priceless.

 

Check out the National Museum of Naval Aviation virtual tour here.