KC-X: The Inevitable

Well, this post is only for the purposes of closing the loop (finally/hopefully/perhaps?) on the long drawn-out saga of the KC-X contract, in which we conclude that alas, Crony Capitalism wins another 'big one'. Sad.
The only good news is that the Boeing aircraft is tiny enough to almost make the KC-Y competition mandatory down the road. Of course that still sucks for the taxpayer.

Update: All I did was change my links to Will Collier's site instead. His quote from memory pretty much captures the entire saga within a paragraph. If you want the long story, click on my "Boeing BS Watch" link under 'Themes on this Site" to the right.

Northrop Grumman Takes a Pass

Northrop Grumman has declined to recompete for a contract they had already won - as I predicted in the comments here. (Not that it required any of my special mojo powers this time around).

Since the comment at the link may disappear someday, here is what I wrote on February 10th:

I realize that here and elswhere there are the proverbial ’some’ who view NG’s statements that if the RFP doesn’t allow them to be competitive that they won’t bid to be merely angling for an edge, but I would take it at their word. Read the bio of their new CEO. He’s Capital B ‘Business’. He’s not an ‘airplane’ but a ’space’ guy, so there is no ‘romanticism involved and this is a contract that they’ve viewed as already spent a good chunk of money pursuing and having won once only to have it ’stolen’ by political shenanigans. If there was ever a contract a company could expect no long-term customer-relations fallout of
‘no-bidding’, this is it. NG has every reason NOT to waste the effort if they think the ‘fix is in’ (again).

Forbes gets to the bottom line right away.

Boeing on 'Offshoring': Good For Me But Not For Thee

Steven Trimble's DEW Line wonders if Boeing's minions (he's a nice guy: he calls them 'supporters') will reign in their protectionist rants now that Boeing is shown to win defense contracts in part by offshoring defense work that would have been done in the U.S. if it had gone to a competitor (coincidentally Northrop Grumman was on the losing side in this one).

I have no problem with Boeing subcontracting A-10 wing panels to Korea; Aerospace is truly international nowadays. It's just that it is also sweet to think that Dicks, Murray and Tihart (D-M-T) might have to be a little more careful with the truth: lest they get called out to explain themselves. After all, 49 states will have money flowing into them over if this contract goes to the KC-45, and the D-M-T team only represent interests in two states. Yes...Sweet.

Air Force's KC-45 Legal Brief

The GAO's role in the tanker protest is still suspect. With what I'm reading, the GAO doesn't look any better or seem any more credible.

I'm reading the redacted-for-public-consumption version of the Air Force's legal brief (.PDF file at link) submitted after the GAO 'hearing'. The link to the brief was sent to me and who knows how many others on a mailing list by NG, but the AF would have had to give its imprimatur and make the release. This link was sent just before the GAO dropped the turd in the punchbowl, and I imagine NG is marshalling its forces to respond.

Interesting stuff, with very few surprises -- and very few holes we can't fill in ourselves or get the gist of from the surrounding test.

I like what I'm reading so far. I especially enjoy how the AF cites past GAO rulings and other precedents supporting their decision.

Update 2215 Hrs Central: First bombshell in the brief (to me anyway) comes around pages 86-90. In this part the AF shows how it in fact DID accept Boeing cost data, but also how Boeing did not provide other data that was requested of it, and how the AF made it clear all along that Boeing was NOT complying with the data requirement.

So Does the GAO Also Dance To Boeing's Tune?

.....Or to just the noisiest of those in Congress?

CNN just reported that the GAO recommended reopening the KC-X competition. If this is true (or just twisting of the news by the MSM?), and barring some heretofore unknown irregularity, I don't see how this can be seen as anything other than Boeing's strategy of winning via political machinations paying off.

Without details I won't jump to any final conclusions, but I smell a politically safe 'punt' by the GAO.

Update: Defense Tech has some info from a "pro Boeing" source. What I see is the same lame argumentum ad nauseum that Boeing has been trotting out for months. I REALLY smell a GAO 'punt' now. Watch Boeing's backer's in Congress enter phase II of trying to "Harumph!" (link is audio) their way to victory!

Boeing's KC-45 Protest: Minions on the Move

The IFPTE today released a so-called 'report' on the KC-45 contract award.

It isn't flattering to either the AF or Northrop Grumman (surprise!) but it is full of, and let me say this as delicately as possible: Crap. The same capital "C" Crap we've been hearing all along packaged not all that differently than it has been to date.

The press release that came with it is a hoot, with such horse nuggets as:

In the report, IFPTE finds that the USAF "hit a trifecta" in awarding the contract to France-based defense contractor EADS and its minority partner Northrop Grumman -- choosing the "more expensive, less capable aircraft in a manner that undermines our free trade laws."

and

"There is growing consensus on the political left and right that the tanker decision is a poster child for the fleecing of America."

Wow. Among other transgressions, the labeling of Prime Contractor Northrop Grumman as the 'minority partner' (an absolute LIE) is STILL in fashion I see.

Organized Labor Uber Alles ?

So what is the motive for this 'report'? Civic mindedness?
Hardly.
Let's look at a couple of excerpts from a CBS News blurb appropriately titled "More Tanker Trash Talk " that came out yesterday warning us of the impending release of this pap:

The brainstorming session and the white paper are aimed at motivating union members to stay on top of grassroots lobbying efforts, said Paul Shearon, the union’s secretary treasurer.
and ...
Members of the union were disappointed with the outcome in the House, said Matt Biggs, legislative director for the union. At this point, they are pinning their hopes on key appropriators – Washington Democrats, Sen. Patty Murray and Rep. Norm Dicks, and Kansas Republican Rep. Todd Tiahrt – to cut funding for the tanker program.

LOVE that last point. I guess we now know what is really important to the IFPTE leadership.....and it isn't National Defense.

The CBS News piece closes with:

The union’s white paper is bound to rankle opponents and provide fuel for pro-Northrop blogs, providing 10 pages of arguments about why the Boeing KC-767 would have made a better replacement for the Air Force’s Eisenhower-era tanker fleet

Hmmm. Ya' Think?

Update! 1912 hrs Central
Not just 'pro' KC-45 blogs have noted the problems with the 'report'. Check out a point by point rundown on the IFPTE Turkey at industry analyst Scott Hamilton's website here. Thanks to Mr Hamilton for saving me a lot of time and effort of doing the same!

KC-45 Protest: More Balance - Real Numbers

The constant regurgitation of Boeing talking points in comment threads at DefenseTech and elsewhere has prompted me to go ahead and provide this Northrop Grumman brief that I received last month from a Lockheed Martin source.

I am assuming this was the same brief for which NG offered to give me a backgound briefing. I declined NG's offer on the grounds I prefer to use open sources that everyone can access as much as possible, and I had this brief in hand already. Since I got this brief from a LockMart contact, it has obviously been widely disseminated so I guess it is alright to pass along some excerpts as 'public info'. It’s a pretty good representaton of NG's case and one slide in particular provides a good counterpoint to Boeing’s earlier ‘selectively- released’ scoring data in their serial protest ‘summaries’. The brief has also been out long enough that if Boeing had anything in their quiver to shoot at it I’m sure we would have heard about it by now (Shrinking violets they are not).

Skipping the Slide 1 intro, we see slide 2:
A little reminder that the NG/EADS team is meeting commitments and is on schedule as compared to... guess who? Boeing has been trying to make a little hay out of the boom flight test progression lately. Of course, the program is still working to schedule according to NG, and would it be too obvious to remind everyone the purpose of "test" is to find problems and fix them before they are fielded? It’s easy to shoot at a target when you don’t have anything for the competitor to shoot back at, I guess.

Next we have my favorite slide (because it has the most REAL data) :

‘Radar’ charts rarely work well in conveying info because people can be easily confused by chart formats they are not used to seeing and they contain more info on one chart than most people can assimilate easily. This is an exception and is an extremely good use of the type that would not have worked well if the KC-45 had not equaled or exceeded the KC-767, and the KC-767 not bested the KC-135 in every category (that would have involved crossed lines). Looking at the chart, the factors are in general order of priority beginning at the 12 o’clock position and going clockwise around the chart. It could be said to be slightly ‘biased’ of course, because it holds the KC-45 bas the norm and the visual impact emphasizes the differences between the KC-45 and the other two aircraft. If one wanted to emphasize how the competitors stacked up against the KC-135 they were vying to replace, the chart would have held the KC-135 as the norm and looked like this:

Relative scaling in the chart above seems to mask the true scale of differences in the more important factors, but clearly shows how superior the newer tanker contenders would be (with KC-45 being BEST) in the areas of pallets and passenger loading. What would just the first six factors (the ‘refueling factors’ if you will) look like without the other factors? Glad you asked. Here's a 'tanker' capability oriented chart of the same data:

This shows how much better the KC-45 was in ALL refueling factors. To me, the impressive thing in the relative grades was how the KC-45 beat the competitor in EVERY category. It is usually extremely difficult to optimize a platform such that the Customer gets everything they wanted and more. I also believe it is probably more a case of serendipity falling out from optimization of the A330 for a particular niche in the commercial airliner market that makes the KC-45 design the superior one. Sometimes you just get lucky, and the NG/EADS team seems to have worked from the position that you make your own luck. In short: they were apparently lucky AND good.
There’s lots of job claims and esoteric stuff in the slides as well but I just want to show three of the remaining slides because I personally find them interesting. Here’s Slide 5:

Slide 5 is a little selective in the categories, but I think follows the risk items for this program fairly well. What it really emphasizes is that there is no better risk reduction than actually building something to show the Customer you can actually do it. It doesn’t require much, if any, imagination to see one competitor had more manufacturing risk and the other had more technical risk: pick which would worry you the most.

I’ve included slide 8 for two reasons. One, it shows just how ‘international’ commercial aircraft programs have become and two, it shows a little factoid of unknown provenance asserting that Boeing’s unions assert there is actually less US content in the B767 than Boeing claims. Again, I hear no refutation on the airwaves from Boeing.

Slide 9 I like because it shows who builds what for the B767. I don’t really care, but it is sad to hear Congress-folk lamenting ‘French’ airplanes (that aren’t) while ignoring Chinese content in Boeing’s contender. As fickle as the French may be at times, I submit they are still more reliable than China.

Why 'Protest' Boeing? Why?

DefenseTech offers an explanation (which reads oddly similar to my earlier analyses and conclusions) as to why Boeing is really protesting the KC-45 contract award.
P.S. In the comments I make a minor point or two.

KC-45 Tanker Protest: Why So Warlike?

Scott Hamilton, of Leeham Co LLC, offers some interesting theories as to exactly why Boeing is using a "scorched earth" policy in pursuing a very public protest against the KC-45 contract award. At first glance, I find most of them somewhat appealing: as they all readily pass the Occam's Razor test. Maybe Boeing's reasons span more than one of the theories presented?

A 'good read' Mr. Hamilton!

KC-45 Contract Protest: How Low Will Boeing Go?

Geez. Boeing's mobilization of their unions to write Congress is pretty standard fare, but trying to use classified intel from the CIA to subvert the contract award?

Man! THAT'S LOW (and desperate).

Although in the article, the Boeing spokesman distances himself a bit from the story:

The CIA briefing and the issue of corporate bribery “has come up in conversations on the Hill, but is not the focus of our discussions,” said Douglas Kennett, a Boeing spokesman. “What we are pushing are the issues surrounding our protest.”

But then we get in another excerpt:

At least one lawmaker, Rep. Todd Tiahrt (R-Kan.), a strong Boeing supporter who was once employed by the Chicago-based company, requested and received the CIA briefing at the beginning of April.
The briefing discusses past practices involving a number of different countries and foreign-based companies, including the European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (EADS), which won the Air Force contract to build new refueling tankers with Northrop Grumman.
Tiahrt described it as highlighting practices sometimes used by foreign companies and countries to gain contracts, and said it was “not as specific as I had hoped.”

"Not as specific" as he had hoped? Hey! This guy isn't even trying to distance himself from the dirty deed.

Teaser: Still working the 'size' issue with this Goat-rope. I had a friend at Lockheed Martin send me a copy of a briefing Northrop Grumman is circulating on Capitol Hill (must be getting good circulation if it gets to me)that is pretty interesting: lots of yummy numbers to digest. I may post it tomorrow or the next day with commentary.

KC-45 Contract Protest: The Other Side

Well we're getting earfuls from Boeing--let's hear the other side for a change...

The other day I got an e-mail from the America’s New Tanker website (Northrop Grumman’s) that was written as a response to yet ANOTHER Boeing newspaper ad in Boeing’s Disinformatsia campaign. Since (based on my observations) I think mostly what Boeing is doing is providing factoids out of context to morph Boeing’s KC767 bid into something better than it was, I thought it would be interesting to look at the other side to Boeing’s ‘claims’. [My few comments are in bold and brackets]

In a full-page newspaper advertising, today, Boeing is, once again, presenting a misleading story about why the Air Force selected Northrop Grumman's KC-45 --America's New Tanker. The tag line is "Less capable, more costly." This is accurate - but only if applied to Boeing's losing bid. [Ouch!] Let's review the ad, point by point:

MYTH: Boeing claims that its losing bid received the "highest possible mission capability rating in meeting or exceeding key performance parameters."

FACT: This statement ignores the fact that Northrop Grumman's KC-45 was rated equally as high and graded as "more advantageous." The KC-45 has even greater capability than Boeing's KC-767, with 30% more fuel off-load ability at range and more cargo capacity. Boeing's claim that the KC-767 can take off from more airfields is absolutely false. The KC-45 can launch from more of the world's air fields carrying more fuel. [I suspect the disconnect between the two positions is that Boeing’s calculations in claiming more airfields is their perceived advantage in going into smaller airfields, while NG’s numbers probably include airfields that are farther away than the KC-767 can use in specific scenarios. I also suspect that Boeing’s claimed advantage is due at least in part to their insistence in using the standard airfield spacing on the ramps vs. the contingency spacing the Air Force used in their modeling.]
Most important is the undisputed fact that the KC-45 was rated superior in 4 of the 5 major criteria that the Air Force reviewed and tied in the 5th. Northrop Grumman's tanker is, without question, more capable.

MYTH: Boeing claims greater "survivability."

FACT: Evaluating against 200 requirements, the Air Force found no survivability weaknesses with the KC-45, but did find unique strengths. Moreover, Boeing is correct that the self-protection system that would be aboard its KC-767, the Large Aircraft Infrared Countermeasures (LAIRCM) system, is the best the industry has to offer. We know this because LAIRCM is a Northrop Grumman product that will also be aboard the KC-45.

MYTH: Boeing claims better aerial refueling capability.

FACT: While Boeing's refueling capability did meet or exceed Air Force baseline requirements, the same is true for Northrop Grumman. In fact, the KC-45 was found to be superior to Boeing's offering.

More important, however, is the fact that Northrop Grumman has built and passed fuel through its boom refueling system. Boeing's exists only on paper. It has not been built. It has not been tested. It has not passed fuel. [Ouch-Ouch-Ouch!]

MYTH: Boeing claims better fuel offload capability.

FACT: Given that the Air Force determined that the Northrop Grumman KC-45 is six percent more fuel efficient and carries 20 percent more fuel than Boeing's proposed tanker, this is a completely misleading claim. Boeing calls the extra fuel the KC-45 can deliver "waste," suggesting that Boeing's wisdom is greater than the wisdom of the Air Force in determining what our men and women in uniform need. [This reinforces my first thoughts when Boeing made their claim in this area: It comes down to ‘efficiency’. Yes, the KC-45 burns more fuel than the KC-767 : BUT it does it while delivering proportionally more payload per mile and/or mission than the KC-767.]

MYTH: Boeing claims better airlift capability.

FACT: The KC-767 is, in fact, 69 percent more capable than the soon to be replaced KC-135. What Boeing fails to state is that the Northrop Grumman KC-45, America's New Tanker, is rated 81 percent more capable by the Air Force.

The fact is that Northrop Grumman was selected to provide America's New Tanker by offering a superior product. In its ad, Boeing includes a quote from Air Force Secretary Michael Wynne but Boeing fails to include his most important quote. In referencing the Boeing protest before the GAO, Secretary Wynne predicted that the GAO review "will conclude with the fact that the Air Force, in this case, did it right."

WIBW Lays Out Tiahrt 'Case' For Boeing

Alternative Views Not Welcome
I made a comment to a news story (Boeing Lays Out Case For Tanker) at a Kansas televison station website here yesterday.

Boeing "claims", Boeing bagman Tiahrt regurgitates it as 'fact', and so it must actually 'be' eh?

I'll listen to Boeing's claims when they stop cherry-picking factoids out of context. Want an example? Let's pick "Survivability" then. Would Boeing's claimed advantage be 'overall' or for any particular part or parts of the kill chain? Perhaps the KC767 is negligibly harder to detect on radar? Perhaps it was judged as being able to take 1 more cannon round in the end game? How important is that factor anyway in the overall scheme of things? Had a tanker shot down lately? Does the 'analysis' assume equal exposure to threats, even though the NG KC-45 can fly useful refueling orbits farther away from the threats? Who in the public realm knows? Answer: nobody.

Without proper CONTEXT, Boeing's claims are nothing more than marketing and salesmanship.

Interesting that they did not use it (factually loaded and confrontational), yet there are now four 'local' (half anti-NG and/or pro-Boeing) comments below the article.

I'm shocked. they need to play to the larger market on the web. One thing I HAVE noticed about Seattle and Wichita media comments from viewers/readers: Boeing gets higher negative responses where they live than in the Nation overall. Should that be telling us something?

Boeing's KC-45 Protest:That Dog Won't Hunt Part III

Boeing is trying to make a lot of hay in their ‘serial-protests’ about the AF 'improperly' crediting capability to the KC-45 that comes from its ‘larger’ size. The AF even got called in to testify about it this week by Boeing's Bagmen, and Former Spook did a good 'quick and dirty' post on the 'show'.
Boeing alleges that there was supposed to be no credit for exceeding key performance parameter (KPP) objectives and therefore the extra capability that comes from the KC-45 should not have been a factor in the scoring.

Are they correct? In a word: NO!

Their claim is based upon a fallacy: the latter (“extra capability shouldn’t count”) does not spring forth from the former (“exceeding KPP parameters do not get credit”). Seem counter intuitive? Only if you didn’t read the RFP and/or equate the KPPs with ‘all that is important’. Could and should Boeing have known the difference? Only if they actually read the RFP (My comments in [brackets] and relevant passage emphasis is mine.):

2.2.1 Subfactor 1: Key System Requirements Within this subfactor the Government will evaluate the proposal to determine that the offeror understands and has substantiated the ability to meet the requirements delineated in the SRD, except for the logistics requirements addressed in the Product Support section (Subfactor 3). All commitments to address at some level, meet, or exceed SRD requirements must be specifically reflected in the offeror's proposed system and aircraft specifications.

2.2.1.1 The requirements associated with the areas set forth in paragraph 2.2.1.2 below will be evaluated under this subfactor. The evaluation will be accomplished as follows:

a. All KPP thresholds in 2.2.1.2a through 2.2.1.2d below must be met. [Now, here comes Boeing’s basis for their big argument against how the proposals were scored in reference to size and capability…] Depending on substantiating rationale, positive consideration will be provided for performance above the stated KPP thresholds up to the KPP objective level. [And here comes Boeing's 'money shot'!] No consideration will be provided for exceeding KPP objectives. [Now immediately following Boeing’s ‘ace’ comes the HUGE 'but' they’re trying to keep people from noticing
because it cuts the legs off their case…] If there is no stated objective and, depending on substantiating rationale, positive consideration will be provided when the specified capability above the KPP threshold is viewed as advantageous to the Government.
[The RFP now goes further to elaborate on this in discussing ‘trade space’: the opportunity for offerors to optimize their proposed capabilities…]
b.All SRD requirements in paragraphs 2.2.1.2a through 2.2.1.2e below that are notKPP thresholds are desired, but are considered part of the offeror's design trade space. For non-KPP requirements, the Government may give consideration for alternate proposed solutions or capabilities below the stated SRD requirement, depending on substantiating rationale. The Government may give additional consideration if the offeror proposes to meet (or exceed if there is an objective) the SRD threshold or requirement, depending on substantiating rationale.

c. Within each of the paragraphs, 2.2.1.2a through 2.2.1.2e below, evaluation of the offeror's proposed capabilities and approaches against the SRD requirements will be made in the following descending order of relative importance: KPPs, KSAs, and all other non-KPP/KSA requirements.

d. For paragraph 2.2.1.2 e below, a collective assessment will be made for all the related SRD requirements therein.

2.2.1.2 The Government will evaluate the offeror's approach to meet SRD requirements as follows:

a. Aerial Refueling: The Government will evaluate the offeror's approach to meeting requirements related to aerial refueling. This evaluation will include: tanker aerial refueling, receiver aerial refueling, fuel offload versus radius range, drogue refueling systems (including simultaneous multipoint refueling), the operationally effective size of the boom envelope, the aerial refueling operator station and aircraft fuel efficiency.

b. Airlift: The Government will evaluate the offeror's approach to meeting requirements related to airlift capability. This evaluation will include: airlift efficiency, cargo, passengers, aero-medical evacuation, ground turn time, and cargo bay re-configuration. The offeror's airlift efficiency will be normalized against the KC-135R airlift efficiency calculated with the same ground rules. An offeror's airlift efficiency value greater than 1.0 will be viewed as advantageous to the Government.

c. Operational Utility: This evaluation will consist of an assessment of the contractor's approach to meeting the requirements relating to operational utility, including the following: aircraft maneuverability, worldwide airspace operations, communication/information systems (including Net-Ready capability), treaty compliance support, formation flight, intercontinental range, 7,000 foot runway operations, bare base airfield operations, and growth provisions for upgrades.

d. Survivability: This evaluation will consist of an assessment of the contractor's approach to meeting the requirements relating to survivability, including the following: situational awareness, defensive systems against threats, chemical/biological capability, EMP protection, fuel tank fire/explosion protection, and night vision capability.

e. Other system requirements: The Government will evaluate the proposed approach to address all SRD requirements not in a, b, c or d above or in Subfactor 3.

Boeing’s argument that the advantage in KC-45 capability should not be counted is specious. I have to believe they know it is specious, since the information showing it to be false begins in the very next sentence after their protest ‘hook’.

So now we have eliminated the ‘size’ issue from the capability grading standpoint. Next we start talking relative sizing. Homework reading assignment: how do airlines around the world view the A330 airframe vis a vis B767? Are they 'really' THAT different?

Boeing's KC-45 Protest:That Dog Won't Hunt Part II

Ah! Another ‘redacted’ summary is out? Mmmmmmmm. Must get one.

"We continue to update and expand our protest," McGraw said during an April 3 teleconference in which he walked reporters through a 13-page redacted summary of the updated protest. "As the team discovers things, they're going back and adding to the supplemental protests."

He said some of the protest points are being expanded and clarified as more information from Northrop's proposal and the Air Force's decision-making process is revealed to Boeing's protest team. In the additional documents, Boeing continues to argue that the air service's concerns about boom safety and maturity and "Northrop's very complex build plan" and "risky" schedule should have lowered their competitor's score further than it actually did.

Boeing also argues that costs were not accurately compared. "It seems like a lot of our commercial data was not accepted, our fixed-price data was not accepted as fixed," McGraw said. But Northrop's data was more readily accepted in spite of "grossly understated" military construction costs, he said. "In general, there seems to be a significant leveling of costs at the 11th hour."

Let me predict what the revised (expanded?) protest says. I tried outlining the last ‘summary’ and got tired of writing:

Wrong size!
Changes made!
Penalized for commercial costs!
Graded us too hard!
Graded them too easy!

Over…. and over…… and over……

So I'm guessing it's just more of the same [ note: I checked: it is --- except it has that freshly 'lawyered' smell.]

I smacked Boeing down on the heart their ‘commercial cost’ claim in the original summary here. This is not to say that Boeing won’t find a sympathetic ear someplace because the FAR DOES allow the contracting official some leeway in determining if something Is ‘commercial’ or modified to the point that DoD-grade cost/price data is necessary. Some second-rate, second-guesser COULD disagree with the responsible acquisition official, but in a proper review that wouldn’t be enough to uphold the protest. Boeing is ‘piling-on’ in the hopes of getting enough ‘second-guessing’ going to provide their helpmates in Congress do that voodoo that they ‘doo’ (not a typo).

They have two other 'cost' issues having to do with 'learning curves' and O&S estimates (click to enlarge):

Now, the 'learning curve' disagreement has to do with mandating credibility. Can Boeing DEMAND its Customer believe their numbers? Is it Boeing's position that the Customer's analysis CAN'T be right?
In reality, all that is important to the legality and propriety of the contract award is that the AF has a reason for not believing the 'learning curve' number or believing in their own estimation more.

The O&S costs claim is probably the most overtly specious argument Boeing makes in the original protest summary. It is quite common knowledge in the logistics field that the most important support driver of any aircraft weapon system is HOW it is used. Boeing's insistence that Delta Tech Ops has more insight into Tanker O&S costs than that provided by the fleet of KC-135Rs is ludicrous. As old as the Rs are, their avionics and propulsion systems are closer to the age and technology of the 767 design than Boeing would like to acknowledge. Since avionics and engines are typically the major cost drivers on non-LO aircraft, I would prefer using KC-135R data over a predicted 767 extrapolation from civilian operations as well. The only part of the KC-135R supportability that probably wouldn't translate easily is the heavy structures contribution: something the AF should be able to factor for quite easily from their own experience. It is really hard to tell if this complaint is just 'piling on' or actually a manifestation of Boeing's hubris.

Boeing is still playing heaviliy with the scoring system inside their Disinformatsia campaign. What they’re doing is siimply “oversimplifying to obfuscate” . For example, In the original protest ‘summary’ they show this (click to enlarge):

Which means absolutely nothing without the weighting factors for each area, difficulty or ease in improving (risk) in each area, OR relative scores in each area.
For example, the 5 NG so called ‘Weaknesses’ could have been in the least important requirement in 5 different sections and each might require very little effort to change or correct.

The 13 Boeing ‘Major Discriminators’ could have been for the 13 least important factors and NGs 12 ‘Major Discriminators’ could have been the top 12 weighted factors. The ‘lessor [sic] discriminators’ for each contractor could have all been very close to each other for each line item.

Now did it happen exactly that way? Probably not. But it happened close enough to this way for the AF to select NG for the contract.

Boeing doesn’t like their score. Boo Hoo. Help them Congress(not)!

When I get to Part III, I want to get past the ‘grading’ issue and get on to the ‘size’ issue because I’m getting really tired of Boeing’s misrepresentation of how the candidates match up, including the one Boeing didn’t even bid, but keeps talking about: the B777.

KC-45 Protest: Boeing Backing Off?

Flash:

The GAO just:

"denied motions filed by Northrop Grumman Corporation (NOC) and the United States Air Force calling for a partial dismissal of Boeing Corporation's protest of the Air Force decision in the KC-45 Tanker acquisition process."

Why, pray tell?

"The denials came after a supplemental filing by Boeing Corporation that streamlined its original protest and eliminated many of the elements that were central to the Air Force and Northrop Grumman motions"

Ohhhhh.

OK, so what's left?

Update: Well, NOW Boeing claims it DIDN'T 'narrow' the protest. Riiight.

KC-45 Protest: CATO's Friedman Off Target- Collateral Damage Occurs

I found this at the faux blog "tankerblog.com" (I don't link to fakes) and it kind of tickled me a little bit because tankerwar were quite effusive in their praise for those zany Libertarians they don't quite understand. Those boys at tankerblog covered a bit of territory in citing Mr. Friedman: cherry picking a lot of stuff out of the 'CATO blog' piece including at least one erroneous assertion . Funny, the one thing the Boeing shills at tankerblog didn't mention was this part:

The Air Force says EADS’s tanker is better than Boeing’s. I believe them. It would be reckless to choose an inferior product given the likely protest from the loser and what happened in 2004.

Which of course, is immediately followed by something stupid:

But while getting the best plane for the least money is essential, when it awards contracts, the Pentagon should be able to consider their effect on the political landscape, because that landscape drives future contracts.

First: Like politics never happens already? (Funny!)
Second: Are you sure you are a Libertarian Mr. Friedman?

I may destroy the pieces that tankerbog selected for their spin later. Right now I have better things to do.

In the meantime, enjoy Richard Aboulafia's thoughts on the situation, as they are far more lively and cogent than the CATO piece.

KC-45 Win: Not a 'Foreign' First

I've run into a lot of buzz on the internet where people were bemoaning a 'foreign' aircraft winning the KC-X competition. I even read someone's comment wondering what the past leaders of the AF, the 'Founding Fathers of Airpower' as it were, would think about the US NOT selecting the American competitor when given the chance. One does not have to wonder: they did it first.

The KC-45 win is at least the second time this has happened with a United States military aircraft program. The first was the Canberra, fielded by the US as the B-57. There is a lot of B-57 history that is glossed over or ignored in this country, possibly due to the ‘Cold War era’ when it was fielded, and the circumstances of how Martin ended up building the B-57 as the last ‘loser’ standing in a A-26 ‘night intruder’ replacement competition.

The USAF was so impressed with the English Electric Canberra when they took their first good look at it in August 1950, they invited EE to compete for the A-26 replacement contract in early ‘51, which included a fly-off of sorts (not as extensive but certainly more dramatic than those we have today). The RAF loaned EE an airplane for the competition, which in coming to the US broke a trans-Atlantic speed record AND was the first jet aircraft to fly across the Atlantic unrefueled. In the flyoff, The B-57 beat the B-45 Tornado, AJ-1 Savage, Martin XB-51, and the Canadian Avro CF-100.

After the flyoff, the B-57 (then of course not yet called a B-57) was the hands down favorite: having performed all the required flight demonstration over Andrews AFB more quickly than the evaluators thought possible and then performing a few more displays of performance - all within the alloted time limit.

But the AF would not commit solely to the Canberra until the British MoD would certify that EE could make delivery to both countries on schedule. EE had an agreement in place to build 300 Canberras for the USAF pending MoD approval, and the AF ‘down selected’ to just the XB-51 and Canberra until the guarantee came through. When the UK MoD would or could NOT guarantee that USAF Canberras would be delivered to meet USAF schedule needs, the USAF still preferred the Canberra so strongly that it had a backup plan in place and arranged for a licensing agreement whereby an American company would build Canberras in the US.

Since Martin had been the 'runner-up' they got first shot at the plane. After Martin got their hands on two pattern aircraft (crashing one due to pilot error) and copies of all the engineering, they proposed SO many changes to it that it was almost unrecognizable. The AF had to practically force Martin to build it ‘to print’.

The changes that did come in the end we are mostly familiar with (tandem cockpit, 2-man crew), but most interesting is the rotary bomb bay concept/design: taken directly from the losing XB-51.

There you have it, a foreign competitor beating aircraft from two other countries including the domestic favorites: a plane that was so superior we HAD to have it even though then-little English Electric couldn’t build enough to spare us any. (However, EE did get a 5% royalty on every plane Martin built.)

References:
Canberra: The Operational Record by Robert Jackson, 1989, pp 113-114
English Electric Canberra by Barry Jones, 2006, pp 99-101
Update:
Found a resource today with a lot of the same info at the Glen L. Martin Maryland Aviation Museum website.

KC-45 Contract Protest: Counter Maneuvers

Reuters reports Northrop Grumman has filed a counter-protest:

Los Angeles-based Northrop said Boeing waited too long to raise its challenge of various issues related to the capability of the Northrop tanker and the Air Force's use of a complex computer model to assess the competing bids.

In addition, Northrop argues that Boeing's challenges to the Air Force's assessment of the companies' past performance, and the issue of government subsidies, were either not a proposal requirement or should have been addressed earlier.

Boeing also knew long before it filed its final proposal how the Air Force had increased its cost proposal and evaluated its proposed development schedule, Northrop said.

The Air Force is now seeking relief from Boeing's more 'strident' claims as well.

Spokeswoman Lt. Col. Jennifer Cassidy said the Air Force had filed the motion for partial summary dismissal of the Boeing protest, but declined to give any details.

"In order to protect proprietary information and respect the GAO protective order, we cannot provide further details," Cassidy said.

Perhaps the AF is getting a little tired of Boeing's PR insurgency while they must operate under strict 'rules of engagement'?

Boeing: making friends and influencing people.

Oh Yeah...

Boeing's Disinformation Campaign Getting Noticed

Hey! I'm not the only one that noticed Boeing's proxies set up a fake blog shilling against the KC-45. Graham Warwick at "FlightGlobal.com" noticed as well.

Northrop Grumman Disputes Boeing's V-22 Claim

Did Boeing Mislead Hugh Hewitt? Say it Ain't So!
My lunchtime reading lead me to this article where Northrop Grumman disputes Boeing's claim that the KC-45 won't be able to refuel the V-22:

In the protest, Boeing said the Northrop tanker had "significant shortcomings" including the inability to refuel aircraft like the V-22 Osprey. The Osprey takes off and lands like a helicopter, but flies like an airplane. Northrop director of business development Marc Lindsley said that claim was false.

"The Northrop KC-45 can refuel the V-22," he told Reuters.

The ability to refuel the V-22 was not a mandatory requirement in the bidding competition, according to industry sources.

Both the Northrop KC-30 tanker and Boeing's 767 tanker include a center refueling boom, hose and drogue refueling equipment on the wingpods, and a center-line hose and drogue.

A drogue is a system that allows the tanker to pass fuel into the receiving aircraft using a retractable hose. It differs from the boom system, which has a long pipe that hangs under the plane and mates up with the receiving aircraft.

But neither company has flight tested the center line hose and drogue that would be used to refuel the V-22s, which the Marine Corps is now using in Iraq, according to industry sources.

And with that last sentence in the quote, this article became the closest thing to 'the whole truth' published to-date in the mainstream media about either KC-X competitor's ability to refuel the V-22.