Well, the 'Ragin Hedge Baby from the Shires' tried to make a buzz (if link doesn't work it is because it is too long for Blogger) over the latest GAO report on the F-35 program almost exactly as predicted, including closing his piece trying to cite the GAO's 'Texas Sharpshooter' skills as proof of something or other.
The drumbeat is getting tiresome, and I'd 'Fisk' his entire post AND the GAO report, except I'm feeling sentimental at the moment having read an earlier magazine article online today written by Mr. Sweetman where he quoted an old colleague of mine who, sadly, passed away a few years ago, and who I am missing very much these days. So in lieu of a long parsing of the 'Ares' post, we'll just go with.....
A Short Quiz:
This is the latest GAO report on the F-35 program.
Joint Strike Fighter: Restructuring Places Program on Firmer Footing, but Progress Still Lags GAO-11-325, Apr 7, 2011
Now here are some older GAO reports:
The F-16 Program: Progress, Concerns, and Uncertainties C-MASAD-81-10, Feb 28, 1981
The Multinational F-16 Aircraft Program: Its Progress and Concerns PSAD-79-63, Jun 25, 1979
F/A-18 Naval Strike Fighter: Progress Has Been Made But Problems and Concerns Continue MASAD-81-3, Feb 18, 1981
Q1: Do you see a 'trend'?
If you want to get into the nitty-gritty, compare my predictions last week with the latest GAO report. Note the DoD response. Most of it falls under "We're doing that already".
BTW: The "F-16 Program: Progress, Concerns, and Uncertainties" and "The Multinational F-16 Aircraft Program: Its Progress and Concerns" reports are not that different from another report I used to illustrate pretty much this same point a few years ago.
Tuesday, April 12, 2011
Monday, April 04, 2011
Chappie James, Political Correctness, and the Current Libyan Problem
OR...
“How America’s first Black Four-Star General almost stopped the current Libyan regime in its infancy 42 years ago but you’d never know of it or any other of his major military accomplishments by his official Air Force Biography"
The 18th Fighter Wing Association website cites an “article by J.D. Haines in Retired Officer Magazine, February 2001” that “described the following events…at Wheelus AFB, Tripoli, in October 1969”.
Unlike every other AF senior military leader biography I’ve read, Gen James’ bio does not list his major military awards and decorations. The biography has literally paragraphs of the General’s civilian awards and honors received. Then it simply closes with the statement: “General James is a command pilot. He has received numerous military decorations and awards.”
The ribbons and devices below the General’s Command Pilot Wings represent the award of (from top to bottom and left to right):
Why am I making ‘a big deal’ out of this? It is a MILITARY biography. While one can argue for inclusion of the things the General was an important part of other than his awards and decorations, especially concerning his role in breaking down barriers within the Air Force and the United States, one cannot argue for the dearth of references to his actual military achievements in the bio.
This absence of General James’ military accomplishments led me to search for a biography that might tell me what at least some of them were and what they were for. I haven’t found one online yet (I have found some books I’ll keep an eye out for), but my search took me to the interesting bits above. Incidents that are quite relevant today, given the current ‘kinetic military action’ in Libya. James’ encounters with ‘Ghadafi’ and Co. speaks volumes about a tyrant’s cowardice and a General’s courage.
The Air Force needs to clean up General James’ biography to include a description of his military awards and decorations. He was an American Fighting Man: he deserves to be remembered as more than a civil rights ‘symbol’ in the abstract. For what is it he exactly symbolic of without acknowledging his actual military accomplishments?
“How America’s first Black Four-Star General almost stopped the current Libyan regime in its infancy 42 years ago but you’d never know of it or any other of his major military accomplishments by his official Air Force Biography"
The 18th Fighter Wing Association website cites an “article by J.D. Haines in Retired Officer Magazine, February 2001” that “described the following events…at Wheelus AFB, Tripoli, in October 1969”.
On Oct. 18, 1969, just six weeks after Col. Muammar Gadhafi of the Libyan Army had led a coup deposing Libya’s King Idris, he stood at the gates of Wheelus Air Force Base. Facing him was an American officer, also a colonel, named Daniel “Chappie” James Jr. However, any similarity between the two men ended with their military rank. Before the coup, 27-year old Gadhafi had been a mere lieutenant in the Libyan Army. As leader and chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council, Gadhafi was catapulted to Colonel overnight. In contrast, James, an African-American officer, earned his rank the hard way by overcoming racial prejudices and enduring air battles in Korea and Vietnam.
Few Americans recall the day that James faced down Gadhafi. The confrontation occurred when Gadhafi ordered a column of Libyan half-tracks onto Wheelus. The half-tracks blew past the gate guards and through the housing area at top speed.
When James was notified of the intrusion, he came immediately to the front gate and lowered the barrier to prevent more vehicles from entering. Standing a few yards beyond the barrier was Gadhafi with his hand resting on the butt of his pistol. James glared at him, his own .45 ready at his side.The article also recounted an earlier “Colonel James vs. the Libyans” incident:
"Move your hand away from that gun", James ordered. Much to everyone’s surprise, Gadhafi complied and probably prevented an early end to his dictatorship. As James later recalled, “If he had pulled that gun, it never would have cleared his holster". As if to punctuate the impression James had made, the Libyan Army didn’t send any more half-tracks after that incident.
In July 1969, while James was at Wheelus AFB, he displayed an example of his diplomatic talents.You’ve probably never heard of these anecdotes because of all the ‘politically correct’ framing of his illustrious career, including that which can still be found in his 32-year old Air Force Biography (last updated shortly after the General’s death a month after he retired).
America’s relations with Libya had continued to slide downhill as Gadhafi pressured the U. S. Government to withdraw its military presence. But the Libyans wanted the Americans to leave behind expensive technical equipment to keep the base running. The Americans resisted and planned to remove the material from the base. A serious confrontation almost took place when several Libyan colonels demanded an audience with James.
James invited the officers to his home to discuss the issue of the base equipment. Tensions were already high as the Libyans entered James living room. As the Libyan officers sat down, their driver entered the room carrying a submachine gun. James immediately glowered at the Libyan officers.
“I’m going to count to three”, he said, “and if that man is not out of my living room by that time, I will physically throw him out”. The driver made a hasty retreat.
Unlike every other AF senior military leader biography I’ve read, Gen James’ bio does not list his major military awards and decorations. The biography has literally paragraphs of the General’s civilian awards and honors received. Then it simply closes with the statement: “General James is a command pilot. He has received numerous military decorations and awards.”
General Daniel 'Chappie' James
(AF Official Photo)
If you can’t decode the ‘fruit salad’ on the General’s chest in the official photo, you would never know what those military awards or decorations were. As it is, I can’t even tell with 100% certainty if some of the General’s oak leaf clusters are silver or bronze (For civilians: ‘silver’ indicates 5 separate additional awards of the medal or ribbon and ‘bronze’ represents 1 additional award). 
The ribbons and devices below the General’s Command Pilot Wings represent the award of (from top to bottom and left to right):
Defense Distinguished Service Medal
Distinguished Service Medal (AF) , Legion of Merit (x2), Distinguished Flying Cross (x3)
Meritorious Service Medal, Air Medal (x24), Army Commendation Medal, Presidential Unit Citation (X4?)
AF Outstanding Unit Award (x4?), Combat Readiness Medal, Army Good Conduct Medal, American Defense Service Medal
American Campaign Medal, WW2 Victory Medal, WW2 Occupation Medal, Nat’l Defense Service Medal (x2)
Korean Service Medal (x5), Vietnam Service Medal (x4?), AF Longevity Ribbon (x8), Armed Forced Reserve Medal
AF Small Arms Expert Marksmanship Ribbon, ROK Presidential Unit Citation, UN Service Medal, Republic of Vietnam Campaign Ribbon
Why am I making ‘a big deal’ out of this? It is a MILITARY biography. While one can argue for inclusion of the things the General was an important part of other than his awards and decorations, especially concerning his role in breaking down barriers within the Air Force and the United States, one cannot argue for the dearth of references to his actual military achievements in the bio.
This absence of General James’ military accomplishments led me to search for a biography that might tell me what at least some of them were and what they were for. I haven’t found one online yet (I have found some books I’ll keep an eye out for), but my search took me to the interesting bits above. Incidents that are quite relevant today, given the current ‘kinetic military action’ in Libya. James’ encounters with ‘Ghadafi’ and Co. speaks volumes about a tyrant’s cowardice and a General’s courage.
The Air Force needs to clean up General James’ biography to include a description of his military awards and decorations. He was an American Fighting Man: he deserves to be remembered as more than a civil rights ‘symbol’ in the abstract. For what is it he exactly symbolic of without acknowledging his actual military accomplishments?
Ragin’ Hedge Baby on the Loose!
Forget that missing zoo cobra (they found it last week). This is much worse.
That “Ragin’ Hedge Baby from the Shires” (aka Bill Sweetman) is beating his ‘Anti-JSF’ drum again. This time, it appears he’s laying the groundwork for more negative F-35 stories in April:
The implied claim that the GAO’s reports may have predicted anything on the F-35 since 2007 is unadulterated BS: GAO warns about ‘maybes’, ‘mights’, ‘coulds’, and ‘if-thens’. They never predicted anything – that would make them too easily accountable and subject to direct ridicule.
GAO reports (at least since Mr. Sweetman’s 2007 date) concerning the F-35 have been typical of most GAO reports on defense acquisition programs. They wail and moan over ‘risk’ as if it was THE most important concern. Contrast this with program managers who must manage the risk to cost, schedule, and performance while actually executing the program to meet a stated mission NEED. …And by the way, program managers make this point clear at every opportunity. They understand their charter and work to fulfill it – they do not work to make a GAO auditor’s day.
The two entities, the GAO and the JSF (or just about ANY) program simply talk past each other on the subjects of risk and “what-ifs”. The difference is, that while the programs deal with reality, and actually seek to identify and manage the risks that exist in all enterprises -- without certain knowledge of all possible futures, the GAO on the other hand, does a ‘drive-by’ on programs. The GAO then barfs a laundry lists of risks that they assert as needing avoidance. In later follow-on reports the GAO will point and cackle whenever some risks (rarely unforeseen and/or mitigated by the program’s management as well) become ‘issues’.
I find GAO 'defense' reportage in most cases a most cynical form of the 'Texas Sharpshooter” fallacy', and holding up a GAO report as the ultimate word on just about any defense program topic is as big a misplaced appeal to authority as you can make. The GAO can crunch numbers, but if their track record on predicting anything related to Defense topics can be called “consistent”, it is ONLY in the sense that they always predict there’s ‘too much risk’ and that things are or will be ‘bad’. The GAO is hardly alone in the naysayer role. Today’s programs must run a gauntlet of criticisms and predictions of doom from eternal experts and pundits, but since they are not inside the program day to day, usually their commentary is of little use, and is typically ignorant and unhelpful (a point I believe I sufficiently drove home in an earlier post on B-2 development).
The GAO also gets to cherry-pick ‘worries’ based upon whatever task their Masters have assigned while carefully avoiding implicating their Masters as having a role in creating the worries in the first place. For instance, the GAO can bemoan the immaturity of F-35 production processes year after year in their ‘Selected Acquisition’ Reports without ever having to reference the Congressional funding decisions made annually that deliberately slow production, and the GAO can avoid mentioning without recrimination that the F-35 program is in Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) ramping up to Full Rate Production, which is actually when production processes are EXPECTED to be mature. We need a GAO: we just don’t need the GAO we have*.
Sweetman’s piece, like oh-so-many of his recent posts, is focused on discrepancies between various ‘Cost Estimates’. It also, like oh-so-many of his recent posts, carefully avoids noting that of all the ‘estimates’ of costs, actual unit costs to-date are most closely tracking to (and actually beating) Lockheed Martin’s cost-curve estimates. This includes up to and including the latest LRIP 4 aircraft lot buy, which is under a Fixed Price with Incentive (FPI) contract.
This ‘FPI’ contract arrangement is significant.
This is the first time in the history of modern defense acquisition that I am aware of that a contractor agreed to a Fixed Price contract while the program was still in the LRIP phases. This includes the equivalents in the paradigm before (back when SDD was ‘sorta’ EMD) the current one. In fact, according to my Defense Acquisition University course materials, the first Full Rate Production contract is where the transition from 'Cost Plus' to a Fixed Price contract structure is supposed to occur. Right now the program is about halfway through the planned LRIPS, although that could change if the lot buys keep getting reduced up front. Since ‘costs’ seem to be a really big issue** with Mr. Sweetman, I find this transition, occurring years ahead of what should be expected under traditional timelines, as curiously absent from his chant as his lack of willingness to give weight to the fact that actual costs are even beating the most optimistic (LM’s) estimate curves. Like climate models, cost estimates that cannot predict the present cannot be relied upon for predicting the future. And it must always be kept in mind that even ‘good so far’ estimates are subject to revision when new data becomes available and must be continuously revised, albeit less and less as more of the risk of a program falls in the past and issues are avoided and put to rest.
Sweetman closes with a sort of curious ‘damning with faint praise’ comment concerning the Australian Williams Foundation that now urges Australia to ‘delay’ their F-35s, apparently to Mr. Sweetman’s surprise. If one follows the link provided, it takes the reader to an earlier post by Mr. Sweetman where he questions the foundation’s objectivity based upon their funding sources. If this current article is somehow a nod to his earlier, apparently unfounded questioning of bias on the part of the foundation, and an expression of his subsequent regret, it was pretty weak. But it was an indication that the ‘logical fallacy’*** might be a tool that Mr. Sweetman will reach for all too frequently on the subject of the F-35, and that subsequent events just might highlight the use of the fallacy.
*I’m tempted to preemptively neutralize accusations that I am committing a logical fallacy in my criticism of the GAO, but I’m curious enough to see if any materialize and am in an evil-enough mood to enjoy debunking any such claim. BIG Hint: relevance of evidence factors large in determining if something is a ‘fallacious argument’ or not. If I was arguing the GAO’s performance on Defense issues was an indication of their performance on say, Housing and Urban Development issues, would that be different?
**BTW: The program is being managed to minimize total ownership cost (TOC), which allows for increased unit costs if the costs are offset with equal or greater savings when operating and supporting the F-35. Q: Why does no one discuss TOC in detail? A: TOC requires understanding of 'Cradle-to-Grave' Program Management, i.e. Too Hard?
***I’m torn on categorizing this one. It comes down to ‘intent’. If Mr. Sweetman’s primary purpose was to cast doubt about what the Foundation was asserting at the time, it was a commission of the ‘Genetic Fallacy’. If his primary target was the Foundation’s future statements, it could be considered ‘Poisoning the Well’.
Disclosure: Me and the F-35
Since I’m posting a lot about the F-35 these days, and the controversy that SOME in the Aviation Press seem intent on promoting doesn’t make it look like that is going to change any time soon, to help readers more completely understand where this source (moi) is coming from and in the interest of ‘disclosure’, I should remind readers of the following:
1. As with all my posts, I never discuss anything that isn’t open source and public. Fortunately, much of the F-35 is in the public domain and can be easily referenced….even if it is generally spun and twisted by the critics.
2. I don’t work for LM but have vested interests in LM and the F-35. They’re not as deep as they used to be (since I’ve minimized ALL my publically-traded stock exposure).
3. I’m not a ‘fighter fan’. I’m a ‘guided-weapon/kill-the-enemy-as-efficiently-as-possible’ guy. If a brick works best – then throw it. But as a general rule, I think fighters get way too much attention to the detriment of everything else. I assert: “Fighters make noise and kill things. Bombers make policy and change governments.”
4. Having said #3, the current situation we are in (having to replace a lot of assets at once) was caused by three things:
6. The mix the US is pursuing IS the best mix that is most executable now. This is fortunate, because a reset would be even more un-executable.
That “Ragin’ Hedge Baby from the Shires” (aka Bill Sweetman) is beating his ‘Anti-JSF’ drum again. This time, it appears he’s laying the groundwork for more negative F-35 stories in April:
"The Canadian debate will be influenced by the second April news story, the release of the full Government Accountability Office annual report on the program. Notwithstanding all the standard criticisms leveled at the GAO -- "It's old data", "The GAO criticized the F-16/M-1/Bradley/Trojan Horse etc" -- the fact remains that the GAO since 2007 has predicted the trajectory of the program much more accurately than the program's managers."This represents what IMHO is among the most disingenuous ploys common to partisan journalism. Can you say ‘poisoning the well’ boys and girls? I find this a rather transparent attempt to preempt and diminish any criticism of the GAO ‘report’ once it is released. I must say it causes a part of me to wonder: does Mr. Sweetman already know that it is going to be, in the current vernacular of the White House, a ‘turd sandwich’? Nah. It's that's probably just my old C-I mojo acting up.
The implied claim that the GAO’s reports may have predicted anything on the F-35 since 2007 is unadulterated BS: GAO warns about ‘maybes’, ‘mights’, ‘coulds’, and ‘if-thens’. They never predicted anything – that would make them too easily accountable and subject to direct ridicule.
GAO reports (at least since Mr. Sweetman’s 2007 date) concerning the F-35 have been typical of most GAO reports on defense acquisition programs. They wail and moan over ‘risk’ as if it was THE most important concern. Contrast this with program managers who must manage the risk to cost, schedule, and performance while actually executing the program to meet a stated mission NEED. …And by the way, program managers make this point clear at every opportunity. They understand their charter and work to fulfill it – they do not work to make a GAO auditor’s day.
The two entities, the GAO and the JSF (or just about ANY) program simply talk past each other on the subjects of risk and “what-ifs”. The difference is, that while the programs deal with reality, and actually seek to identify and manage the risks that exist in all enterprises -- without certain knowledge of all possible futures, the GAO on the other hand, does a ‘drive-by’ on programs. The GAO then barfs a laundry lists of risks that they assert as needing avoidance. In later follow-on reports the GAO will point and cackle whenever some risks (rarely unforeseen and/or mitigated by the program’s management as well) become ‘issues’.
I find GAO 'defense' reportage in most cases a most cynical form of the 'Texas Sharpshooter” fallacy', and holding up a GAO report as the ultimate word on just about any defense program topic is as big a misplaced appeal to authority as you can make. The GAO can crunch numbers, but if their track record on predicting anything related to Defense topics can be called “consistent”, it is ONLY in the sense that they always predict there’s ‘too much risk’ and that things are or will be ‘bad’. The GAO is hardly alone in the naysayer role. Today’s programs must run a gauntlet of criticisms and predictions of doom from eternal experts and pundits, but since they are not inside the program day to day, usually their commentary is of little use, and is typically ignorant and unhelpful (a point I believe I sufficiently drove home in an earlier post on B-2 development).
The GAO also gets to cherry-pick ‘worries’ based upon whatever task their Masters have assigned while carefully avoiding implicating their Masters as having a role in creating the worries in the first place. For instance, the GAO can bemoan the immaturity of F-35 production processes year after year in their ‘Selected Acquisition’ Reports without ever having to reference the Congressional funding decisions made annually that deliberately slow production, and the GAO can avoid mentioning without recrimination that the F-35 program is in Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) ramping up to Full Rate Production, which is actually when production processes are EXPECTED to be mature. We need a GAO: we just don’t need the GAO we have*.
Sweetman’s piece, like oh-so-many of his recent posts, is focused on discrepancies between various ‘Cost Estimates’. It also, like oh-so-many of his recent posts, carefully avoids noting that of all the ‘estimates’ of costs, actual unit costs to-date are most closely tracking to (and actually beating) Lockheed Martin’s cost-curve estimates. This includes up to and including the latest LRIP 4 aircraft lot buy, which is under a Fixed Price with Incentive (FPI) contract.
This ‘FPI’ contract arrangement is significant.
This is the first time in the history of modern defense acquisition that I am aware of that a contractor agreed to a Fixed Price contract while the program was still in the LRIP phases. This includes the equivalents in the paradigm before (back when SDD was ‘sorta’ EMD) the current one. In fact, according to my Defense Acquisition University course materials, the first Full Rate Production contract is where the transition from 'Cost Plus' to a Fixed Price contract structure is supposed to occur. Right now the program is about halfway through the planned LRIPS, although that could change if the lot buys keep getting reduced up front. Since ‘costs’ seem to be a really big issue** with Mr. Sweetman, I find this transition, occurring years ahead of what should be expected under traditional timelines, as curiously absent from his chant as his lack of willingness to give weight to the fact that actual costs are even beating the most optimistic (LM’s) estimate curves. Like climate models, cost estimates that cannot predict the present cannot be relied upon for predicting the future. And it must always be kept in mind that even ‘good so far’ estimates are subject to revision when new data becomes available and must be continuously revised, albeit less and less as more of the risk of a program falls in the past and issues are avoided and put to rest.
Sweetman closes with a sort of curious ‘damning with faint praise’ comment concerning the Australian Williams Foundation that now urges Australia to ‘delay’ their F-35s, apparently to Mr. Sweetman’s surprise. If one follows the link provided, it takes the reader to an earlier post by Mr. Sweetman where he questions the foundation’s objectivity based upon their funding sources. If this current article is somehow a nod to his earlier, apparently unfounded questioning of bias on the part of the foundation, and an expression of his subsequent regret, it was pretty weak. But it was an indication that the ‘logical fallacy’*** might be a tool that Mr. Sweetman will reach for all too frequently on the subject of the F-35, and that subsequent events just might highlight the use of the fallacy.
*I’m tempted to preemptively neutralize accusations that I am committing a logical fallacy in my criticism of the GAO, but I’m curious enough to see if any materialize and am in an evil-enough mood to enjoy debunking any such claim. BIG Hint: relevance of evidence factors large in determining if something is a ‘fallacious argument’ or not. If I was arguing the GAO’s performance on Defense issues was an indication of their performance on say, Housing and Urban Development issues, would that be different?
**BTW: The program is being managed to minimize total ownership cost (TOC), which allows for increased unit costs if the costs are offset with equal or greater savings when operating and supporting the F-35. Q: Why does no one discuss TOC in detail? A: TOC requires understanding of 'Cradle-to-Grave' Program Management, i.e. Too Hard?
***I’m torn on categorizing this one. It comes down to ‘intent’. If Mr. Sweetman’s primary purpose was to cast doubt about what the Foundation was asserting at the time, it was a commission of the ‘Genetic Fallacy’. If his primary target was the Foundation’s future statements, it could be considered ‘Poisoning the Well’.
Disclosure: Me and the F-35
Since I’m posting a lot about the F-35 these days, and the controversy that SOME in the Aviation Press seem intent on promoting doesn’t make it look like that is going to change any time soon, to help readers more completely understand where this source (moi) is coming from and in the interest of ‘disclosure’, I should remind readers of the following:
1. As with all my posts, I never discuss anything that isn’t open source and public. Fortunately, much of the F-35 is in the public domain and can be easily referenced….even if it is generally spun and twisted by the critics.
2. I don’t work for LM but have vested interests in LM and the F-35. They’re not as deep as they used to be (since I’ve minimized ALL my publically-traded stock exposure).
3. I’m not a ‘fighter fan’. I’m a ‘guided-weapon/kill-the-enemy-as-efficiently-as-possible’ guy. If a brick works best – then throw it. But as a general rule, I think fighters get way too much attention to the detriment of everything else. I assert: “Fighters make noise and kill things. Bombers make policy and change governments.”
4. Having said #3, the current situation we are in (having to replace a lot of assets at once) was caused by three things:
a. The simultaneous procurement of the AF’s High-Low mix (F-15 & F-16) in the 70s-80s. It should surprise no one that concurrent acquisition increases probability of concurrent obsolescence. The F-16s are in a little better shape wear-and-tear-wise than the F-15, but the Stealth Revolution and advances in near-peer fighter and air defense technology is bringing obsolescence to both fighters at about the same rate.5. I think the best mix of offensive airpower would have been (when it was doable) for the AF to buy ALL the F-22s they wanted, 30-40 more B-2Cs, and 700-750 F-35As, with the Navy minimizing their ‘stop-gap’ F-18E/Fs and buying many, many, more F-35Cs and F-18Gs. But that mix isn’t doable anymore.
b. The failure of the Navy to execute the A-12 program. A large gaping hole was created in Naval Strike when that program failed and after the A-6s were retired.
c. An earlier Congress pressing on combining Air Force and Navy needs, then requiring the absorption of the Marine Harrier replacement effort. This forced three efforts that could have been developed at their own pace which would have spread out the costs and risks to be rolled into one schedule and one set of budget line items paid for at the same time. Combining three efforts into one creates program complexity that should be avoided if it can be avoided, but given a. and b. above, this arrangement became unavoidable. You can argue the ‘unavoidable’ part only if you are willing to assume a completely different set of risks as acceptable. The DoD doesn’t believe it was/is avoidable and I don’t either.
6. The mix the US is pursuing IS the best mix that is most executable now. This is fortunate, because a reset would be even more un-executable.
Thursday, March 31, 2011
Stars and Stripes Lets the Military Down… Again
S & S has a ‘Flack’ at Misawa Air Base
As if anyone need any reminding that today’s Stars and Stripes is NOT the same paper of World War II fame, here’s a list of articles that a Stars and Stripes ‘reporter’, the delightfully-named J.D. Flack, has written since the Sendai Quake occurred.
One of these Headlines is Not Like The Other…
Can you tell which one? The list is from oldest to newest:
• Misawa residents stock up on supplies as they await electricity 3/12/11
• Power restored in Misawa City; base still down 3/12/11
• American rescue teams arrive at Misawa 3/13/11
• Base up and running, Misawa now faces off-base heating oil shortage 3/16/11
• Misawa leaders want quick answer on how many residents plan to evacuate 3/18/11
• First flight carrying U.S. families out of Japan expected to leave Yokota Air Base on Saturday 3/19/11
• First military evacuation flight leaves Japan 3/19/11
• Misawa's 14th Fighter Squadron looking to deploy to stay sharp 3/20/11
• Misawa residents pull clean-up duty at nearby fishing port 3/17/11
• Relief supplies rolling into Misawa 3/20/11
• Misawa educators reach out to students as base schools reopen 3/21/11
• Navy crews reach quake victims with life-sustaining humanitarian aid 3/23/11
• Reagan air crews pause relief operations to decontaminate 3/23/11
• Snow slows Navy relief efforts at Misawa 3/26/11
• Navy races to clear port so needed supplies can reach land 3/25/11
• Families who choose to return to Japan do so at their own risk, military officials say 3/29/11
• Voluntary departure program: A safe haven or a free vacation? 3/29/11
That’s right. This S & S 'reporter' managed to string together about 2 1/2 week’s worth of actual articles on what was going on in Japan in general and Misawa specifically, before caving in to the more base instincts of the ‘profession’.
Hit Piece
Flack’s latest amounts to little more than a hit piece on the families (from all the bases in Japan) who elected to accept voluntary evacuation. No deference to or insight into survivor psychology. No enquiries into the benefits to the well-being and effectiveness of the active-duty personnel who can now focus on the mission instead of worrying about loved ones. No questions as to the ‘net’ costs or benefits: the costs and benefits of maintaining a dependent population in a disaster zone with a strained infrastructure vs. the costs and benefits of getting the dependents away from the area. No consideration as to what kind of strain such a callous article might place on the military communities at Misawa et al as things otherwise return to a new ‘normal’.
The ‘article’ was apparently executed with the help of a S&S someone named ‘Sam Amrhein’, whom I suspect was the ‘juice-boxer’ doing the leg-work in Hawaii trolling for those upbeat impressions on fun-seeking ‘Quacationers’.
‘Congratulations’ to Stars and Stripes.
I hope you enjoyed the story access you had up until now, Mr. Flack, because I suspect from here on out most of the U.S. military community in Japan will be telling you EXACTLY where to put those pursed, red lips of yours.
As if anyone need any reminding that today’s Stars and Stripes is NOT the same paper of World War II fame, here’s a list of articles that a Stars and Stripes ‘reporter’, the delightfully-named J.D. Flack, has written since the Sendai Quake occurred.
One of these Headlines is Not Like The Other…
Can you tell which one? The list is from oldest to newest:
• Misawa residents stock up on supplies as they await electricity 3/12/11
• Power restored in Misawa City; base still down 3/12/11
• American rescue teams arrive at Misawa 3/13/11
• Base up and running, Misawa now faces off-base heating oil shortage 3/16/11
• Misawa leaders want quick answer on how many residents plan to evacuate 3/18/11
• First flight carrying U.S. families out of Japan expected to leave Yokota Air Base on Saturday 3/19/11
• First military evacuation flight leaves Japan 3/19/11
• Misawa's 14th Fighter Squadron looking to deploy to stay sharp 3/20/11
• Misawa residents pull clean-up duty at nearby fishing port 3/17/11
• Relief supplies rolling into Misawa 3/20/11
• Misawa educators reach out to students as base schools reopen 3/21/11
• Navy crews reach quake victims with life-sustaining humanitarian aid 3/23/11
• Reagan air crews pause relief operations to decontaminate 3/23/11
• Snow slows Navy relief efforts at Misawa 3/26/11
• Navy races to clear port so needed supplies can reach land 3/25/11
• Families who choose to return to Japan do so at their own risk, military officials say 3/29/11
• Voluntary departure program: A safe haven or a free vacation? 3/29/11
That’s right. This S & S 'reporter' managed to string together about 2 1/2 week’s worth of actual articles on what was going on in Japan in general and Misawa specifically, before caving in to the more base instincts of the ‘profession’.
Hit Piece
Flack’s latest amounts to little more than a hit piece on the families (from all the bases in Japan) who elected to accept voluntary evacuation. No deference to or insight into survivor psychology. No enquiries into the benefits to the well-being and effectiveness of the active-duty personnel who can now focus on the mission instead of worrying about loved ones. No questions as to the ‘net’ costs or benefits: the costs and benefits of maintaining a dependent population in a disaster zone with a strained infrastructure vs. the costs and benefits of getting the dependents away from the area. No consideration as to what kind of strain such a callous article might place on the military communities at Misawa et al as things otherwise return to a new ‘normal’.
The ‘article’ was apparently executed with the help of a S&S someone named ‘Sam Amrhein’, whom I suspect was the ‘juice-boxer’ doing the leg-work in Hawaii trolling for those upbeat impressions on fun-seeking ‘Quacationers’.
‘Congratulations’ to Stars and Stripes.
I hope you enjoyed the story access you had up until now, Mr. Flack, because I suspect from here on out most of the U.S. military community in Japan will be telling you EXACTLY where to put those pursed, red lips of yours.
J.D. Flack, S & S Reporter
Update 1April 23:48 Hrs: When my family in Misawa was offered the 'voluntary' evacuation (they have stayed) and I learned it was only for 'up to 30 days', I thought: "What's the use of that if the reactor situation actually gets much worse?" But I forgot about the psychological effect that the ongoing aftershocks might have until I saw this map. I was reminded of the sinking feeling I felt with every aftershock experienced after the Northridge Quake in SoCal, and the swarms of tremors we would experience at Elmendorf AFB from time to time in the mid-70s. As of this update, Japan has had 884 quake/aftershocks since March 11, and just under half of them (409) have been over 5.0 on the Richter Scale. Watch the map linked to above as the timeline progresses and tell me most people, especially the children, couldn't use a break from the shakedown they're getting and ask yourself how such a break can be oversimplified by a media outlet to the point someone could accuse them of having "too good" of a time getting away.
Tuesday, March 29, 2011
Another Chuckie Schumer Moment
H/T: Instapundit
From the NY Times:
Read the whole thing.
From the NY Times:
"Moments before a conference call with reporters was scheduled to get underway on Tuesday morning, Charles E. Schumer of New York, the No. 3 Democrat in the Senate, apparently unaware that many of the reporters were already on the line, began to instruct his fellow senators on how to talk to reporters about the contentious budget process."
Chuck Schumer: Smartest man in the room......as long as everyone else is attending by phone.
Read the whole thing.
Sunday, March 27, 2011
All F-35s Flying Again? Update: Yes.
Updated (27 Mar 11) and Bumped (and painfully ... Blogger is acting up)
NEW:
Ares Blog has info pretty much confirming the DEW Line story, and the comments are full of precious moments (Hat Tip: SNAFU! ) .
ORIGINAL:
At Steve Trimble's DEW Line Blog this morning there was a link to a blurb on all F-35s are cleared for flight again. the link took you to a 'page does not exist' response. This evening, the link was still there but still takes you to the 'missing link' bin.
I first saw it this AM and the story had been picked up by several people's twitter et al feeds, but they all just linked to same missing story, except one mention on F-16.net's forum boards: [Posted Mar 23, 2011 - 02:41 PM]
If 'true' this IS interesting
So all of this round of hyperventilating over the F-35 by the 'haters' boils down to a maintenance error? Earlier references to this incident being related to a 'design artifact' of the newer generators on the later aircraft (remember the 7 early aircraft were cleared for flight almost immediately) makes me wonder if the 'error' was due to the fact that the new system has a lower oil capacity?
In any case, it seems to reinforce the assertion that the purpose of 'test' is to learn about problems or potential problems, and since we have humans involved, those problems can come from just about anywhere. Also interesting is that the story appears to have been pulled. Perhaps for further 'development'? Or was it not corroborated/verified yet? Or probably its just a broken link?
No doubt there will be some who will still put a more negative spin on this even if it is true and it sounds like the system redundancy worked as designed. People will b*** about anything: from it "should never have happened in the first place" to "the pilot should have known/realized sooner" to "it took you how long to figure out how something as simple as this was the problem?".
In this case, since the aircraft made it back to the nest safely, this can only be viewed as a 'failure' if we didn't discover something new about the aircraft or we don't have any idea how to make sure it doesn't happen again.
NEW:
Ares Blog has info pretty much confirming the DEW Line story, and the comments are full of precious moments (Hat Tip: SNAFU! ) .
ORIGINAL:
At Steve Trimble's DEW Line Blog this morning there was a link to a blurb on all F-35s are cleared for flight again. the link took you to a 'page does not exist' response. This evening, the link was still there but still takes you to the 'missing link' bin.
I first saw it this AM and the story had been picked up by several people's twitter et al feeds, but they all just linked to same missing story, except one mention on F-16.net's forum boards: [Posted Mar 23, 2011 - 02:41 PM]
All F-35s cleared to resume flight tests By Stephen Trimble DATE: 23 March 2011 SOURCE: Flight International http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/20 ... tests.html
Five Lockheed Martin F-35s have been cleared to resume flying after being grounded for two weeks because of an in-flight generator failure on 9 March. The clearance means that all 12 flying F-35s, including 10 flight test and two production models, have returned to flight status, with seven aircraft already flying since 16 March. A root-cause investigation revealed the cause of the power outage involved a maintenance mistake, programme officials say. Too much oil was poured into the generator system, causing the oil to overheat and shut down the power system, Lockheed says. As a "more-electric aircraft", the F-35 relies on two engine starter-generators to power not only the avionics and sensors, but also the flight controls instead of a hydraulics system. Identifying the cause as a maintenance error means the design of one of the F-35's most critical flight-safety components is not in question. Programme officials do not expect the two-week grounding of five aircraft, including three test models, to have an impact on the overall flight test schedule. Lockheed has committed to complete 872 flight tests this year, more than double last year's total of 410 flights. The failure occurred onboard the conventional take-off and landing (CTOL) AF-4 test aircraft, which is among five models in the test fleet equipped with a new version of the starter-generator. Those five aircraft remained grounded after 16 March while the root-cause investigation continues.
If 'true' this IS interesting
So all of this round of hyperventilating over the F-35 by the 'haters' boils down to a maintenance error? Earlier references to this incident being related to a 'design artifact' of the newer generators on the later aircraft (remember the 7 early aircraft were cleared for flight almost immediately) makes me wonder if the 'error' was due to the fact that the new system has a lower oil capacity?
In any case, it seems to reinforce the assertion that the purpose of 'test' is to learn about problems or potential problems, and since we have humans involved, those problems can come from just about anywhere. Also interesting is that the story appears to have been pulled. Perhaps for further 'development'? Or was it not corroborated/verified yet? Or probably its just a broken link?
No doubt there will be some who will still put a more negative spin on this even if it is true and it sounds like the system redundancy worked as designed. People will b*** about anything: from it "should never have happened in the first place" to "the pilot should have known/realized sooner" to "it took you how long to figure out how something as simple as this was the problem?".
In this case, since the aircraft made it back to the nest safely, this can only be viewed as a 'failure' if we didn't discover something new about the aircraft or we don't have any idea how to make sure it doesn't happen again.
Friday, March 25, 2011
Middle East Burning = Bad.
In case anyone was wondering why I don't seem all hep on our latest military adventure (but I'm willing to "get it on" over military efficacy during/over/in any conflict), it's just that I'm not crazy about toppling tyrants to make the world safe for Radical Islamic fascists, be they Muslim brotherhood or AlQueda or whatever. The title says it all:
Rebel Commander in Libya Fought Against U.S. in AfghanistanIs this 'hope' or is it 'change'? Oh yeah.... it's 'Smart Diplomacy'!
Thursday, March 24, 2011
Holding Back the "Cruise Missile Cultists"
I just know they're coming....a nefarious faction of the Opponents of Long Range Strike.
Sheesh. First at SNAFU, we get a winners and losers list with the B-2 and Tomahawks reversed and on the wrong lists (Sorry Solomon - I still love ya' bud). It gets linked to AvWeek's Ares' Blog 'Frago' post which also links to a doozy at Information Dissemination which in turn has an extract from, and link to, a cruise missile puff piece at National Defense Magazine .
Time for a short course in economics and the application of long range strike.
Why I'm the Guy to Give it....
This is the first air campaign (using the term loosely) that I've not been at least a small part of since 1991, or a significant contributor to since 1999. Between moi' and the sources above I'm probably the only person who has actually launched and tested cruise missiles, as well as understands their strengths and limitations. I'm also probably the only one to have done long range strike 'bang-for-buck' analyses and what-if scenarios for DoD campaign planning efforts and/or wrote his Master's thesis or capstone on the subject of the proper methodology for top-level conceptual design of next generation LRS platforms.
Ready? Here we go!!!!!!!!!!!
Lesson 1. There is no ONE best weapon for everything and cruise missiles are only the one best weapon at attacking a very small subset of the total target set in any conventional (non-nuclear) campaign. There are efforts to make them more effective against a wider subset of targets but that will add cost and probably complexity to their designs. The very best subset of targets for conventional cruise missiles are taking out 'soft' nodes of Integrated Air Defense Systems and Command and Control networks/Power Grids. They are 'enablers' that allow the non-stealthy aircraft in the force-mix to operate more freely over the battlefield and do that killing hoodoo-that-they-do so well....instead of getting shot down before their 'magic' happens. Valuable? Within a narrow confine, yes. Wonder-weapon? No.
Lesson 2. Cruise missiles are VERY expensive.... unless you never use them or if you use them, you won't miss them. Complexity costs money, and increases the probability of failure. The farther and longer a system has to operate to get to the target, the more the system is likely to fail on the way (see TLAM in Desert Storm note in the slides below).
Lesson 3. As long as the attrition rates are low enough, (and they don't even have to be THAT low) Direct Attack is ALWAYS cheaper and more effective than stand-off attack even if standoff attack has a PERFECT success rate.
I've dusted off and sanitized an extract of publicly available and unclassified data from a circa-2000 briefing I gave after Operation Allied Force. The exact dollars are 'off' now, but the relationships remain the same. Cruise Missiles are orders of magnitude more expensive to operate than using precision direct attack. BTW: These charts were all based upon 2000lb JDAM usage. Smaller JDAMs would be relatively cheaper and just as,or more, effective than TLAM Tomahawks.
Enjoy.
The TLAM accuracy and reliability have improved since Desert Storm, but it doesn't make any difference. It is a more complex machine than a JDAM, and must operate reliably for a much longer period of time. That line waaaay down at the bottom is the JDAM cost line. The cruise missiles are so expensive their real value comes in reducing risk to other systems: use as necessary - and no more.
In Operation Allied Force, the B-2 was dropping JDAMs using developmental software and it still had a 95% hit rate. The B-2 had the highest percentage of first-pass 'kills' of all the aircraft employed.
These dollar figures were probably mid-late FY 1990s when I used them in 2000. I notice TLAMS are even more expensive now, but JDAM kits are as well I suppose. As I noted at SNAFU in the comments, prices are very sensitive to lot buy quantities. So even if cruise missiles were 100% successful, and even if all aimpoints were suitable for cruise missiles, what would you spend your savings on using JDAMs?
Sheesh. First at SNAFU, we get a winners and losers list with the B-2 and Tomahawks reversed and on the wrong lists (Sorry Solomon - I still love ya' bud). It gets linked to AvWeek's Ares' Blog 'Frago' post which also links to a doozy at Information Dissemination which in turn has an extract from, and link to, a cruise missile puff piece at National Defense Magazine .
Time for a short course in economics and the application of long range strike.
Why I'm the Guy to Give it....
This is the first air campaign (using the term loosely) that I've not been at least a small part of since 1991, or a significant contributor to since 1999. Between moi' and the sources above I'm probably the only person who has actually launched and tested cruise missiles, as well as understands their strengths and limitations. I'm also probably the only one to have done long range strike 'bang-for-buck' analyses and what-if scenarios for DoD campaign planning efforts and/or wrote his Master's thesis or capstone on the subject of the proper methodology for top-level conceptual design of next generation LRS platforms.
Ready? Here we go!!!!!!!!!!!
Lesson 1. There is no ONE best weapon for everything and cruise missiles are only the one best weapon at attacking a very small subset of the total target set in any conventional (non-nuclear) campaign. There are efforts to make them more effective against a wider subset of targets but that will add cost and probably complexity to their designs. The very best subset of targets for conventional cruise missiles are taking out 'soft' nodes of Integrated Air Defense Systems and Command and Control networks/Power Grids. They are 'enablers' that allow the non-stealthy aircraft in the force-mix to operate more freely over the battlefield and do that killing hoodoo-that-they-do so well....instead of getting shot down before their 'magic' happens. Valuable? Within a narrow confine, yes. Wonder-weapon? No.
Lesson 2. Cruise missiles are VERY expensive.... unless you never use them or if you use them, you won't miss them. Complexity costs money, and increases the probability of failure. The farther and longer a system has to operate to get to the target, the more the system is likely to fail on the way (see TLAM in Desert Storm note in the slides below).
Lesson 3. As long as the attrition rates are low enough, (and they don't even have to be THAT low) Direct Attack is ALWAYS cheaper and more effective than stand-off attack even if standoff attack has a PERFECT success rate.
I've dusted off and sanitized an extract of publicly available and unclassified data from a circa-2000 briefing I gave after Operation Allied Force. The exact dollars are 'off' now, but the relationships remain the same. Cruise Missiles are orders of magnitude more expensive to operate than using precision direct attack. BTW: These charts were all based upon 2000lb JDAM usage. Smaller JDAMs would be relatively cheaper and just as,or more, effective than TLAM Tomahawks.
Enjoy.
The TLAM accuracy and reliability have improved since Desert Storm, but it doesn't make any difference. It is a more complex machine than a JDAM, and must operate reliably for a much longer period of time. That line waaaay down at the bottom is the JDAM cost line. The cruise missiles are so expensive their real value comes in reducing risk to other systems: use as necessary - and no more.
In Operation Allied Force, the B-2 was dropping JDAMs using developmental software and it still had a 95% hit rate. The B-2 had the highest percentage of first-pass 'kills' of all the aircraft employed.
These dollar figures were probably mid-late FY 1990s when I used them in 2000. I notice TLAMS are even more expensive now, but JDAM kits are as well I suppose. As I noted at SNAFU in the comments, prices are very sensitive to lot buy quantities. So even if cruise missiles were 100% successful, and even if all aimpoints were suitable for cruise missiles, what would you spend your savings on using JDAMs?
Saturday, March 19, 2011
All You Need To Know About the Sendai Quake Reactor Crisis
F-35 Development and Transparency
Steve Trimble has a post up over at the Dew Line titled Top Ten List of F-35 Flaws and Fixes . I tried to leave what follows as a comment but I can't seem to get the DEW Line site's 'Captcha' feature to load on my laptop at the moment. Since I put a lot of thought into what Steve had to say, I wanted to at least get it committed to electrons someplace.
Steve,
I love ya’ man. I think you probably have the best instincts of any non-aviator journalist on a major stage out there and when you keep your distance from the “Ragin’ Hedge Baby from the Shires” you do your best stuff. I would suggest however that you start ‘tightening up’ the thoughts a little more before you start putting fingers to keyboard.
Problems with the ‘Ten flaws and fixes’ list:
First problem: I count at most 5 ‘flaws’ (ranging from minor to significant and all fixable), 3 ‘Risks’ and 2 (at least) development/maturation challenges. You might have characterized the descriptions and actions a little more accurately as well, but in the vernacular of the day, that shortcoming could be an ‘artifact’ of journalism’s deadlines and processes.
1. Bulkhead cracks: Flaw (Design – Correct!). But the description of the remedy as a ‘7-8lb patch’ is more accurately described as a structural ‘doubler’ – the use of which is an extremely common technique in aircraft structural design. When you take as much weight as possible out of a plane for the obvious reasons, sometimes you have to put a little back in here and there. If some Lockmart PR guy used ‘patch’ to describe it to you I’d blame him for the misnomer and urge you to try asking for the engineering terms when you feel someone is dumbing something down for you -- because someone may have dumbed it down for the guy telling you. A good rule of thumb is If it is described in a single syllable word, it’s probably not the correct terminology. BTW: A ‘patch’ is ad hoc and ‘slapped’ on, A ‘structural doubler’ is designed and has analysis and test behind it before it is ‘integrated’ into the design. BIG difference.
2. Vertical lift bring-back (VLBB): Risk (Incorrect). If LM defines it as “the F-35B has all the vertical thrust it needs to "bring back" the required load of weapons and fuel onto an amphibious carrier right now, but is concerned” – then there is a ‘risk’ that it MIGHT become a ‘flaw’. As you describe it, there are apparently both alternatives to mitigating that risk: weight control and increased thrust availability – so the Risk is apparently manageable and is being managed.
3. Auxiliary air inlet (AAI) doors: Flaw (Design – Correct!) No contest on this one because the program obviously wants to have the doors operating at 250kts. But if the program determines they can live with lower operating speed it is potentially a ‘nothing’ issue. There are no ‘solutions’ in life or aerospace: only ‘tradeoffs’. If the users insist LM needs to fix it, then as you point out the flaw is fortunately a relatively minor one that is easy to fix.
4. Parts reliability: Risk...and a rather broad brush assertion at that (So, Incorrect). Every system experiences birthing pains (think R&M ‘Bathtub Curve’). But if it is worth mentioning, then it is also worth mentioning that the program intends and has plans in place to extract high reliability out of systems via PBL support approaches and techniques over the life of the program.
5. Wing roll-off: Development/Maturation Challenge or Risk (Incorrect). As you wrote, it is “still on the list of concerns for the F-35C carrier variant”. Concern = Risk. I suspect this is a matter related to both the bigger wing of the C and the Navy’s fears after their F-18E/F adventures. The “squirrelly” bit can be true for all aircraft depending on their wing design, AOA and airspeed. I also suspect it has more to do fears of steep pressure gradient shift over the top of the wing (the F-18E/F problem) than anything else. Wing falloff in and of itself isn’t new or scary – it’s when you don’t know which way, when or how fast it is going to fall that gets meat-servo panties in a knot.
6. Driveshaft: Flaw (Minor Design – Correct) but also could be considered a Development/Maturation Challenge, since the program is still in SDD, the concept and system is unique/new/never-been-done. Since until the system is flown enough hours and in different regimes with real loads all the designer has to work with is simulations and estimates to start with, perhaps the effort in this area should be judged by what was reasonably probable to get exactly right, out of the box and is it 'tweakable' vs. against what is found to be needed? (and especially if this contingency was anticipated as a possibility they were prepared to deal with). After all, as I seem to have to frequently remind others elsewhere, SDD stands for System DEVELOPMENT and Demonstration.
7. Roll-post nozzle: Flaw (Minor Design – Correct) but could be viewed as a Development/Maturation Challenge as in 6 for the same reasons.
8. Lift-fan clutch: Flaw (Minor Design – Correct) but could be viewed as a Development/Maturation Challenge as in 6 for the same reasons
9. Generators: Flaw (Very Minor Design – Correct!) And evidently a new problem easily undone.
10. Price tag: Risk (Incorrect) Aircraft in work are tracking the cost curve predictions. The Royal Navy’s buy change has to be viewed as delta impacts on both the B and the C. Given higher commonality between the A and the B than the C (the C being more of an outlier in the design mix), the Royal Navy’s change is more boom for the Navy’s C model than bust for the Marine’s B model. Minor nit: The Marine’s B buy is not a reduction, but holds at the earlier assumed 340 number according to Defense News. The Marine’s ‘extra’ Cs are evidently coming out of the earlier presumed 340 number for the Navy’s C model. It’s a ‘wash’.
Kudos for framing the discussion with the positive ‘transparency’ point. Although there is no way the JSFPO or LM COULD conduct a program of this size and importance behind a veil, it’s good to give them credit for at least realizing it and using it as a philosophy.
Steve,
I love ya’ man. I think you probably have the best instincts of any non-aviator journalist on a major stage out there and when you keep your distance from the “Ragin’ Hedge Baby from the Shires” you do your best stuff. I would suggest however that you start ‘tightening up’ the thoughts a little more before you start putting fingers to keyboard.
Problems with the ‘Ten flaws and fixes’ list:
First problem: I count at most 5 ‘flaws’ (ranging from minor to significant and all fixable), 3 ‘Risks’ and 2 (at least) development/maturation challenges. You might have characterized the descriptions and actions a little more accurately as well, but in the vernacular of the day, that shortcoming could be an ‘artifact’ of journalism’s deadlines and processes.
1. Bulkhead cracks: Flaw (Design – Correct!). But the description of the remedy as a ‘7-8lb patch’ is more accurately described as a structural ‘doubler’ – the use of which is an extremely common technique in aircraft structural design. When you take as much weight as possible out of a plane for the obvious reasons, sometimes you have to put a little back in here and there. If some Lockmart PR guy used ‘patch’ to describe it to you I’d blame him for the misnomer and urge you to try asking for the engineering terms when you feel someone is dumbing something down for you -- because someone may have dumbed it down for the guy telling you. A good rule of thumb is If it is described in a single syllable word, it’s probably not the correct terminology. BTW: A ‘patch’ is ad hoc and ‘slapped’ on, A ‘structural doubler’ is designed and has analysis and test behind it before it is ‘integrated’ into the design. BIG difference.
2. Vertical lift bring-back (VLBB): Risk (Incorrect). If LM defines it as “the F-35B has all the vertical thrust it needs to "bring back" the required load of weapons and fuel onto an amphibious carrier right now, but is concerned” – then there is a ‘risk’ that it MIGHT become a ‘flaw’. As you describe it, there are apparently both alternatives to mitigating that risk: weight control and increased thrust availability – so the Risk is apparently manageable and is being managed.
3. Auxiliary air inlet (AAI) doors: Flaw (Design – Correct!) No contest on this one because the program obviously wants to have the doors operating at 250kts. But if the program determines they can live with lower operating speed it is potentially a ‘nothing’ issue. There are no ‘solutions’ in life or aerospace: only ‘tradeoffs’. If the users insist LM needs to fix it, then as you point out the flaw is fortunately a relatively minor one that is easy to fix.
4. Parts reliability: Risk...and a rather broad brush assertion at that (So, Incorrect). Every system experiences birthing pains (think R&M ‘Bathtub Curve’). But if it is worth mentioning, then it is also worth mentioning that the program intends and has plans in place to extract high reliability out of systems via PBL support approaches and techniques over the life of the program.
5. Wing roll-off: Development/Maturation Challenge or Risk (Incorrect). As you wrote, it is “still on the list of concerns for the F-35C carrier variant”. Concern = Risk. I suspect this is a matter related to both the bigger wing of the C and the Navy’s fears after their F-18E/F adventures. The “squirrelly” bit can be true for all aircraft depending on their wing design, AOA and airspeed. I also suspect it has more to do fears of steep pressure gradient shift over the top of the wing (the F-18E/F problem) than anything else. Wing falloff in and of itself isn’t new or scary – it’s when you don’t know which way, when or how fast it is going to fall that gets meat-servo panties in a knot.
6. Driveshaft: Flaw (Minor Design – Correct) but also could be considered a Development/Maturation Challenge, since the program is still in SDD, the concept and system is unique/new/never-been-done. Since until the system is flown enough hours and in different regimes with real loads all the designer has to work with is simulations and estimates to start with, perhaps the effort in this area should be judged by what was reasonably probable to get exactly right, out of the box and is it 'tweakable' vs. against what is found to be needed? (and especially if this contingency was anticipated as a possibility they were prepared to deal with). After all, as I seem to have to frequently remind others elsewhere, SDD stands for System DEVELOPMENT and Demonstration.
7. Roll-post nozzle: Flaw (Minor Design – Correct) but could be viewed as a Development/Maturation Challenge as in 6 for the same reasons.
8. Lift-fan clutch: Flaw (Minor Design – Correct) but could be viewed as a Development/Maturation Challenge as in 6 for the same reasons
9. Generators: Flaw (Very Minor Design – Correct!) And evidently a new problem easily undone.
10. Price tag: Risk (Incorrect) Aircraft in work are tracking the cost curve predictions. The Royal Navy’s buy change has to be viewed as delta impacts on both the B and the C. Given higher commonality between the A and the B than the C (the C being more of an outlier in the design mix), the Royal Navy’s change is more boom for the Navy’s C model than bust for the Marine’s B model. Minor nit: The Marine’s B buy is not a reduction, but holds at the earlier assumed 340 number according to Defense News. The Marine’s ‘extra’ Cs are evidently coming out of the earlier presumed 340 number for the Navy’s C model. It’s a ‘wash’.
Kudos for framing the discussion with the positive ‘transparency’ point. Although there is no way the JSFPO or LM COULD conduct a program of this size and importance behind a veil, it’s good to give them credit for at least realizing it and using it as a philosophy.
Friday, February 25, 2011
Centennial of Naval Aviation #1
Thought I'd post something special to commemorate the Centennial of Naval Aviation. There may be more. Here's a crop of a photo (copyright mine) that's never been published anywhere before.
Three sailors are relaxing on the flight deck of the USS Langley en route from Hampton Roads to their new home port in San Diego, CA in 1924. In the photo, the sailor on the left is a machinist's mate who fabricated parts for the embarked aviation assets as well as the ship. A 'Journeyman' of History: an Aviation Machinist's Mate before they were given the title. He would leave the Navy just in time for the Great Depression. Hard times took him back to the home he had run away from in Durango, Colorado in 1912 -- when he was 12. There he would 'cowboy' on a ranch and start his family. When war clouds loomed, he took his young family back to SoCal, where he was a machinist,fabricator, and tool & die man for a shop that was a Lockheed subcontractor through the end of WW2. Among other things, he fabricated manifolds (intake/exhaust) for the XP-38.
He is my late Grandfather -- my late Father's Father. He introduced me to Logarithms and Trigonometry before I knew what they were - and made certain I would never get a tattoo by pointing to his own many inkspots as dire warnings every chance he had.
Three sailors are relaxing on the flight deck of the USS Langley en route from Hampton Roads to their new home port in San Diego, CA in 1924. In the photo, the sailor on the left is a machinist's mate who fabricated parts for the embarked aviation assets as well as the ship. A 'Journeyman' of History: an Aviation Machinist's Mate before they were given the title. He would leave the Navy just in time for the Great Depression. Hard times took him back to the home he had run away from in Durango, Colorado in 1912 -- when he was 12. There he would 'cowboy' on a ranch and start his family. When war clouds loomed, he took his young family back to SoCal, where he was a machinist,fabricator, and tool & die man for a shop that was a Lockheed subcontractor through the end of WW2. Among other things, he fabricated manifolds (intake/exhaust) for the XP-38.
He is my late Grandfather -- my late Father's Father. He introduced me to Logarithms and Trigonometry before I knew what they were - and made certain I would never get a tattoo by pointing to his own many inkspots as dire warnings every chance he had.
Thursday, February 24, 2011
KC-X: The Inevitable
Well, this post is only for the purposes of closing the loop (finally/hopefully/perhaps?) on the long drawn-out saga of the KC-X contract, in which we conclude that alas, Crony Capitalism wins another 'big one'. Sad.
The only good news is that the Boeing aircraft is tiny enough to almost make the KC-Y competition mandatory down the road. Of course that still sucks for the taxpayer.
Update: All I did was change my links to Will Collier's site instead. His quote from memory pretty much captures the entire saga within a paragraph. If you want the long story, click on my "Boeing BS Watch" link under 'Themes on this Site" to the right.
The only good news is that the Boeing aircraft is tiny enough to almost make the KC-Y competition mandatory down the road. Of course that still sucks for the taxpayer.
Update: All I did was change my links to Will Collier's site instead. His quote from memory pretty much captures the entire saga within a paragraph. If you want the long story, click on my "Boeing BS Watch" link under 'Themes on this Site" to the right.
Saturday, February 05, 2011
Performance Based Logistics vs. The Evil Empire
Military.com's DoDBuzz site had an interesting bit on a new projection for the F-35s support costs showing higher costs for the F-35 than the legacy systems it replaces. The article isn't entirely balanced (a sister site has a slightly less informative but more even-handed treatment of the topic) but it brings almost all of the major points out in the open. There are interests at the Government's depots that have a vested interest in killing F-35 PBL, and all similar PBL arrangements.
PBL creates public-private partnerships that to-date have performed superbly: all systems have saved money by all estimates, while enabling equal or better weapon system readiness.
The GAO has taken a couple of shots at PBL on behalf of its masters. Nearly 6 years ago Steve Geary and Kate Vitasek, two research and faculty associates at the Aerospace and Defense Clearinghouse at The University of Tennessee called it for what it is: "A War of Ideas".
As to the F-35's PBL, the DoD brought in an outsider to help shape the program. they must have done an OK job-- Guess what program was selected by Defense Logistics as having the 'Best Logistics Strategy' for 2010?
Almost forgot. I had an interesting (and LONG ) exchange in the Buzz comments (may be still going on for all I know) with someone I've come to think of as "The Cost Accounting Kid". He's brimming with confidence in his ideas, hawking a self-published book full of them. Almost all of his ideas seem to be in common use already, with an exception that will require a change in the FARs - and we never got around to talking about it in detail as we seem to have gone everyplace else -even into "Bush"-es. He'll either learn or reality will break him. Yep... I was pig wrasslin' again. My favorite part was where he expressed gratitude that I didn't have the ear of 'politicians and generals'. Heh. One thing we do have in common is the opinion on cost accounting as it is currently practiced: It sucks. Beyond that, I'd just be happy if everyone played by the rules, including the laws of physics.
PBL creates public-private partnerships that to-date have performed superbly: all systems have saved money by all estimates, while enabling equal or better weapon system readiness.
The GAO has taken a couple of shots at PBL on behalf of its masters. Nearly 6 years ago Steve Geary and Kate Vitasek, two research and faculty associates at the Aerospace and Defense Clearinghouse at The University of Tennessee called it for what it is: "A War of Ideas".
The thing that I like about PBL, is that unlike a lot of other promising programs that come down the pike, we haven't had to get it right out of the box: it's working while we're still learning how to make it work. GAO may hate that they can't quantify the magnitude to their liking yet, but they can't ignore the vector.GAO recommended that the Defense Dept. should “demonstrate whether performance-based logistics contracts are resulting in reduced costs and increased performance, develop procedures to track whether program offices validate their business-case decisions and verify the reliability of contractor cost and performance data.” The Pentagon is facing a budget crunch of epic proportions, and the best the GAO can come up with after reviewing a slew of successful PBL programs is to add red tape?
GAO’s headline could just as easily read: “Defense Management: PBL Contracts Meeting or Exceeding Weapons System Performance Goals; Costs Appear to be on Track.” Like the GAO, we have looked into PBL across a number of programs and companies. Though challenges remain, the results delivered by many of these programs are as compelling as the available case studies. PBL can work, and that’s what GAO should be talking
about. It’s a war of ideas.
No matter how complicated an acquisition becomes, the essential beauty of PBL shines through. PBL contracts fundamentally align the interests of contractors with the Pentagon. If both do the job right, contractors make more money. To do this, they find ways to deliver better system performance at lower total ownership costs, so the Pentagon wins, too.
As to the F-35's PBL, the DoD brought in an outsider to help shape the program. they must have done an OK job-- Guess what program was selected by Defense Logistics as having the 'Best Logistics Strategy' for 2010?
Almost forgot. I had an interesting (and LONG ) exchange in the Buzz comments (may be still going on for all I know) with someone I've come to think of as "The Cost Accounting Kid". He's brimming with confidence in his ideas, hawking a self-published book full of them. Almost all of his ideas seem to be in common use already, with an exception that will require a change in the FARs - and we never got around to talking about it in detail as we seem to have gone everyplace else -even into "Bush"-es. He'll either learn or reality will break him. Yep... I was pig wrasslin' again. My favorite part was where he expressed gratitude that I didn't have the ear of 'politicians and generals'. Heh. One thing we do have in common is the opinion on cost accounting as it is currently practiced: It sucks. Beyond that, I'd just be happy if everyone played by the rules, including the laws of physics.
Friday, February 04, 2011
Happy Fifth Blogiversary!!!
Five years ago my first post was put up. This is #386. I have two major drafts in work. One IEDs/EFPs and Persistence, and the other is on Close Air Support Myths. Hope to get them out soon.
Thanks for all the comments. Roughly 96% are via e-mails. I may loosen up the comment rules to make it easier for those who've asked.
Saturday, January 22, 2011
"What Military-Industrial Complex?" Update
Just updated and expanded the What Military-Industrial Complex? post below.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)