DT, Winslow Wheeler and 'Manufacturing' Problems

Defense Tech is 'moderating' a comment of mine I tried to post on this thread. The last time they did this my comment disappeared into the Ether. I suspect it is an administrative thing where they don't like a .com, or an acronym vs. malevolence (how petty would it be otherwise?), but no matter-- I saved a draft first. I tried to post:

Stop the presses! Winslow Wheeler has discovered that the entire logistics support package for the F-35B was not prepositioned on the Wasp. Someone tell Winslow that the WASP is cruising about 80 miles from F-35B home base in Pax River and that this is NOT a supportability test. Then ask him exactly DoubleU Tee Eff is his point?  I would also suggest the unattributed 'author' of this piece refer to earlier Mil.com articles that note the 2 weeks was the shortest(!) expected period expected for this round of shipboard trials and that the WASP was booked for much longer. Are 'we' now beating up programs for accomplishing tasks slightly slower than the fastest possible time?

And this is what I got:

Update at 2005 Hrs: My guess is is that ol' Winslow Wheeler just couldn't let positive news get out on the F-35 without a little caviling. This fey attempt at shaping the budget battlefield is pathetic in light of the real story:

Bloomberg: The F-35B short-take off and vertical landing version finished three weeks of tests on the Marine amphibious assault ship USS Wasp, achieving “all planned flight envelope test points,” Joseph DellaVedova, a spokesman for the Joint Strike Fighter program, said in an e-mail. “We’ve been pleased with the initial sea trials” and the aircraft “performed to predictions.”

Update 25October2011: Eventually my comment appeared at DT sometime today with the original time tag from last night.

AR Project: It Has Begun

As I've noted elsewhere, I've never been a huge fan of the AR-15/M-16 family of rifles. Not because of the issues (largely mythical or self-inflicted) surrounding the AR, but because my experience was only with full-stocked M-16s on active duty. Aside from the fact that we qualified on some pretty worn-out armory queens every year, I never liked how the M-16 'fit' me. My attitude towards the ARs started changing some when a friend stuck behind the Moron Curtain in the People's Republic of Kalifornia let me try on his custom AR with an adjustable stock. Hey! - for once it didn't feel like I was holding a 2x4.
I couldn't rationalize buying/building one though just to have a .223, and I already have (almost) enough rifles in the larger calibers for hunting so I couldn't see shelling out the bucks for one.
Then the .300 Blackout round came to town. Suddenly, I could have a rifle to take to the range all year and shoot on the 'cheap' and just either swap out the barrel or more likely the 'upper' and take the same weapon hunting.
So today I went shopping for a 'lower' at the Ft Worth Gun Show. I had a goal to get a populated Mil-Spec 'lower' for under $200. I succeeded thanks to the folks at the SOG Armory table. I also got quite a few leads on the rest of the parts that I'll need as I go along.

No hurries and no worries on this build. I'm not looking to create the UberAR, just a useful one. Anyway, my deer rifle for this year is re-stocked, re-scoped, all 'snapped in' and Good to Go.

F-35B: an 'Audacious Display'

Dave Majumdar with Defense News reports:
"In an audacious display of confidence, the U.S. Marine Corps and the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program office demonstrated short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) tests of the F-35B Lightning II to reporters onboard the amphibious assault ship Wasp on Oct. 18."

 Sorry Ladies!
Audacious? I suppose in some people's minds. I'd say the opening of the article smokes the 'no news is bad news' angle I've read in the comments at other sites. The rest of the article pretty much debunks darned near every negative speculation I've heard or read about the plane on the 'major' websites and their peanut galleries.  Oh! What shall we EVER fret over next?

Lucky

Or: How I flew on C-130B 57-0526 to the very end and lived to tell the tale.

Going through the web looking for planes I flew on, tested, or supported-- and C-130B S/N 57-0526 at the Hill AFB Museum came up on the search engine.

   I have mixed feelings about this bird, which had a pretty unusual history-- even before my unit flew it. On the one hand, over the years it always got us home. On the other hand, I’m lucky it didn’t kill me and the rest of the crew in the end. I flew on the last test missions the bird ever flew, and then we flew it back to Hill AFB from Edwards AFB. After we brought it home it went into heavy depot maintenance. It never really came out, though it took a while for the powers that be to decide to pull it from service permanently.
   We took the plane to Eddy because we had done yet another modification to the plane and successful Performance and Flying Quality (P&FQ) testing was necessary before we would be allowed to use it under anything but the most benign flight conditions. I was Safety Observer and Flight Test Engineer in the 'backend'. My palletized crew station was positioned at the left paratroop door where I would have an unobstructed view of the ‘tufted’ shape we had hanging on an outer pylon, normally used to launch ‘stuff’. There was also a very large turret-shaped blister that was to be a camera fairing installed above and behind my station. My job was to run the backend test cards and observe and note the tuft behaviors as well as any unusual buffeting or other evidence of turbulent flows at all the different test points. I seem to remember two days of preparation and one very long flying day to hit all our test points. The reason we had to go to Eddy is that was where the Pacer aircraft were (A-37 on this mission). It was supposedly less hassle for us to go down to the Flight Test Center and coordinate use of the Pacers and crews than vice versa.     
   The ‘downside of this arrangement was that our (the 6510th) Wing Commander required us to use a local (Eddy) Test Pilot instead of one of our own on the reasoning that the local pilot would be most familiar with the local airspace, The fact that our test pilots flew down to Edwards (our parent organization) nearly every week seemed to escape the logic of the Wing King. The day of the mission we flew innumerable "Tower Fly Bys" (No top Gun BS: just like this video only slower and tighter) at different airspeeds while cinetheodolites tracked us on the ground, then we moved to higher altitudes for the ‘fun’ stuff. At varying airspeeds we followed the test card that took us through (among other things) Max Q rudder kicks, and other maximum control deflections to test the effect of the stability of the aircraft with those new large and unusual shapes glommed on to the left side. I dutifully recorded my observations (which probably helped me from getting airsick) throughout the mission. The rest of the backend of the C-130 was empty, as the Loadmaster had the good sense to sit up on the flight deck during most of the gyrating. As my station was just in front of the ramp, I was getting wild rides left and right and up and down as the pilot intentionally tried to add in energy and make the deviations as wide as possible before releasing the controls and observe the natural damping effects of the design return the plane to a stable flight condition. So far, it was a pretty long and boring mission.
   We returned to base, and when we entered the pattern, I could see the B-2 (in those days it was deep in flight test) beginning to move out onto the taxiway from its South Base facilities. Our ‘local’ test pilot landed a little longer than he wanted to, but no problem right? Heck, Edwards has one of the longest paved runways in the world! Except this runway was only as long as the turnoff the local Golden Arm wanted to make, and he leaned on the brakes- Hard. I’m on headset of course, and all I hear in short succession is our Pilot calling our ‘Easy!’, then ‘Load!’ The Loadmaster immediately chimes back “I’m on it”. He swings down off the flight deck and checks the inside of each wheel well using his gloved hand pressing against each side. The Load looks at me shaking his head and tells the flight deck. “Yeah we've got hot brakes”.
   The pilot informs the tower and then we sit and wait right where we are lest a fire breaks out. We have to wait for enough time to pass to be safe enough for the Fire Crews who come up to clear us for a taxi in. The B-2 in the meantime, turns around and goes right back to South Base because its mucho-expensive range-time window will close before he will get there. We eventually taxi in and are ‘welcomed’ by our superiors with the question: “How in the hell does a C-130 get hot brakes on a 15000 foot runway?” The ‘local boy’ has to do the Mea Culpa.
   We blast out for home later (I think it was the next day), and the next week C-130B 57-0526 goes into the depot, conveniently for us right there at Hill (Depot was moved from Kelly to Hill during the early BRAC rounds). I don’t think the plane was even finished in the teardown during the next week when we get word that the plane will never fly again for fear that the entire tail will fall off. There was "massive" hidden corrosion all around the bulkhead immediately aft of the paratroop doors (where my crew station was and where the ramp attaches). They told us it is the most severe case that had ever been seen. And I got to spend the week before as part of a crew trying to make it come apart.
Lucky.   

Occupy Fort Worth A Total Bust So Far

Or: 'Dude! If you are bald or gray ditch the ponytail - you're creeping out the children!
First - I'm not going to dive into the cognitive dissonance required for people to blame 'Wall Street' over the housing bubble bust  or the crap economy the last couple of years,  yet do not Grok the link between the Crony Capitalists and the Socialist-Left Democratic Party--Whom they SHOULD be blaming for most of our problems (with a relatively minor role played by the Quislings of the irritatingly clueless Republican Establishment).  I'm going to write a blurb here about the people involved in this 'Occupy' farce. A farce which I believe that when all is said and done, will be shown to have been blown all out of proportion, and someday someone will admit as having had the express purpose of furthering the Leftist subversion of America.

About 'Occupy Fort Worth'

So few people have showed up for this 'epic fail', the local newspaper was able to put a story up with pictures identifying by name what looked like a significant number of people (who weren't minors) who showed up. Article with photos here.

The cross-section was cliche. They had freshly-minted college grad 'filmmakers', angst-ridden musicians, full-bore vegans, retired 'teachers', and my favorite: Geriatric Hippies. I believe I've made it quite clear what I'm most looking forward to on the Hippie Question.

Geriatric Hippie 'Jack Smith' (If that is his real name)

(Crop of Star-Telegram/Rodger Mallison Photo. Find Original Here)

Outside enclaves of idiocy in Dallas, Houston, and most of Austin, Texas has an acute shortage of the type of people who have either the time or inclination to gather and bi*** about how unfair life is. This is true mainly because MOST people understand life IS unfair. From what I can tell of this so called 'movement' to date, it is largely populated by people who made life choices that didn't turn out as well as they thought they should have. Tough. There are some involved who ARE victims of fate, I'm sure - and creating a narrative to explain away misfortune is a human tendency and therefore understandable. Just don't expect the rest of us to buy into whatever story you built around your misfortune to cope with it. I'm more interested in being supportive of friends who are in dire straits and are working through the situation without giving up. My sympathy extends as far as your willingness to help yourself. Can't find a job where you live and there are jobs elsewhere? MOVE. Don't have the skills needed? Get them. I know people that are doing both and they're not wasting time at the park looking for handouts.

Same Old Scum Protest....UAVs?

This time at the Smithsonian Air & Space Museum.

They're pretty much the same sh**head losers that pop up at all the anti-this-or-that "protests" organized in support of the far left and DNC (but I repeat myself) policies. This time, they got 'maced' trying to penetrate the confines of the museum with their 'protest' paraphernalia. Seems the museum has an exhibit about military unmanned air vehicles (UAVs), and the scum took offense. The museum had to close because some of it got inside, so I wonder how many tourists had their day or vacation ruined because of the petulant little sh**s? Way to build support there morons!

My biggest beef is with the press who 'somehow' fail yet again to mention one of the biggest drivers behind this foolishness: INTERNATIONAL A.N.S.W.E.R.

Who is A.N.S.W.E.R.? Per discoverthenetworks.org , they are/are about:

Anti-war front group for the Marxist-Leninist Workers World Party
A major organizer of the massive anti-Iraq war rallies of 2002 and 2003
Opposes embargo against Communist Cuba
Supports convicted cop-killer Mumia Abu-Jamal

...frickin' COMMIES fer crying out loud. How.... 'last century'.

If you jerk any of these 'groups' chains they all go back to the same small set of leftards, whackos, and losers. It is not as if these morons keep it a big secret from the press - all they'd have to do is read the freakin' signs!

But the mainstream media seems to try to downplay the angle to the American public, and you have to pick through the more obscure (read 'local') materials to find any photos showing those signs
(photo WJLA):

 The two on the left want to 'feel' good about themselves and the two on the right just want to get laid. All four are 'tools', in more definitions than one.

You will still be hard pressed to find any references to the groups behind this idiocy in any actual texts of accompanying articles.

The one UAV on exhibit that the losers are probably most upset about is the direct descendant of a development program we (my unit) was involved with in the 1980's, Project Amber:

It was a brilliant design by Abe Karem ( I won't comment on the crowd he hired to build and integrate it.) and I'm proud to have played a very small role in it. The concept's strongest point was a phenomenal endurance that screamed 'surveillance missions'. I also will not comment as to how the follow on design was brought into the world by a privately held company that until that point had nothing to do with aircraft of any type.

One last shot (also from WJLA) of the Smithsonian yesterday. Visitors are leaving the building, having had their time at the museum ruined by the self-absorbed and hopelessly stupid 'activists.'

Dad: I don't know Son, I suppose it could have been human.

I've got a trip to DC coming up. Hope these A**hats have moved on to their next bath by then. 

F-35B Performed First At-Sea Takeoff Today

After slacking off all night. (Just kidding!)

Today,the aviation world is abuzz  over the F-35 landing on the USS WASP yesterday. Solomon at SNAFU! had the first pics and video that I saw (link here and the above photo from same) later in the same day it happened.
Today, Av Week's  ARES blog leads their story on the milestone with "NEW VIDEO UPDATE: F-35B Finally Lands on the Wasp!" .

Also today, Defense News reports the F-35 made the first STOVL takeoff. No video of the event...yet. 10/05 Update! Video here.--lots of takeoff and lamding angles.

But I wonder....will the ARES blog lead the story with "F-35B Finally Takes Off off the Wasp?" Depends on the editorial guidance (again?) I suppose.

Dead Terrorists & Stupid Politicians: Anwar al-Awlaki Edition

Updated and Bumped!
News reports today have now added a third significant 'kill' to the list of 'al-Qaida' operatives:
One "Ibrahim al-Asiri"



"--Top bomb maker Ibrahim al-Asiri 'killed' in triple hit drone strike Anwar al-Awlaki killed by same unit that took out Osama bin Laden
 --Al-Awlaki first American on 'kill or capture' list
-- Linked to 9/11 hijackers and the Fort Hood shooter
-- Officials say al-Awlaki planned to use WMDs on the U.S.

Read more.

100% confirmation would be nice, but I'll take what we can get.


Original Post:
My wife was going across the TV dial looking for news with details about the good guys winning one and killing Anwar al-Awlaki (earlier video of the loser in action here). Lo and behold! Gary Johnson (s*) was just on Fox News (video) claiming this is the first time we have killed an ‘American Citizen’ instead of giving him ‘due process’. (*Sack of Sh**)

NOT in war, you Effing Idiot!

From the AP Report:

In a significant new blow to al-Qaida, U.S. airstrikes in Yemen on Friday killed Anwar al-Awlaki, an American militant cleric who became a prominent figure in the terror network's most dangerous branch, using his fluent English and Internet savvy to draw recruits for attacks in the United States…..

Blah Blah Blah….‘Civil liberties groups’ have questioned the government's authority to kill an American without trial. Blah Blah Blah….’  

…The 40-year-old al-Awlaki was for years an influential mouthpiece for al-Qaida's ideology of holy war, and his English-language sermons urging attacks on the United States were widely circulated among militants in the West. But U.S. officials say he moved into a direct operational role in organizing such attacks as he hid alongside al-Qaida militants in the rugged mountains of Yemen. Most notably, they believe he was involved in recruiting and preparing a young Nigerian who on Christmas Day 2009 tried to blow up a U.S. airliner heading to Detroit, failing only because he botched the detonation of explosives sewn into his underpants.  

Yemen's Defense Ministry said another American militant was killed in the same strike alongside al-Awlaki — Samir Khan, a U.S. citizen of Pakistani heritage who produced "Inspire," an English-language al-Qaida Web magazine that spread the word on ways to carry out attacks inside the United States. U.S. officials said they believed Khan was in the convoy carrying al-Awlaki that was struck but that they were still trying to confirm his death. U.S. and Yemeni officials said two other militants were also killed in the strike but did not immediately identify them.  

Washington has called al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, as the branch in Yemen is called, the most direct threat to the United States after it plotted that attack and a foiled attempt to mail explosives to synagogues in Chicago.

Good. A traitor who was a key enemy operator and recruiter gets his due on the global battlefield and we get a traitor enemy propagandist as a bonus. Hey! That’s like a ‘50% off all Terrorists’ sale! Yea!
Go Modernity! Boo Dark Ages!

Johnson is one of those ‘Republicans’ who are more correctly described as ‘Business -Friendly libertarians’. Think ‘Ron Paul’… only more self absorbed and insufferable.

Graphic based on October 2008 AP File Photo/Muhammad ud-Deen)

F-35 to Begin Sea Trials Next Week

Defense News Reports:
"They start on 3rd October, and should last only two weeks," said Lt. Gen. Terry Robling, the Marine's deputy commandant for aviation. "But we have the USS Wasp for six weeks in case there are some anomalies."

Looking forward to the reports, videos and pics.

(Photoshop/Artist Concept)

Centennial of Naval Aviation #2

Historic U.S. Navy PN-9 Seaplane, Circa 1925
Bumped: Find a new comment from a Grandson of the designer.

Here are some crops of another never-before-seen (or published) photograph that are presented in honor of the Centennial of Naval Aviation (Copyright Mine 2011)

The photo was taken by my Grandfather in 1925 in Hawaii while in port with his ship, the USS Langley. It had the simple caption “Navy Seaplane PN-9” in his Langley ‘Memories’ album. Note the evidence of repair on the upper wing


The ‘tail’ number was clearly visible, so I performed a quick search on the internet, and was surprised to find it was quite a famous AND one-of-a-kind seaplane.

BuNo A6878

From a 'Navy.mil' PDF file (p 681) :

The last PN-8 was converted by the Naval Aircraft Factory to the PN-9, a one-of-a-kind aircraft. It had redesigned tail surfaces and revised engine nacelles with large nose radiators. This aircraft set a world distance record for seaplanes in September 1925 when it flew from San Francisco to Hawaii under the command of Commander John Rogers. While it had to sail the last 559 miles after running out of fuel, the 1,841 miles covered by air was recognized as a new world seaplane distance record.

Crew: 4
Range: 2,550 miles
Power Plant: Two geared 475 hp Packard 1A-2500
Weight:
  Empty - 8,995 lbs
  Gross - 18,125 lbs
Dimensions:
  Wing area - 1,217 sq ft
  Wing span - 72 ft 10 in
  Length - 49 ft 2 in
  Height - 16 ft 6 in
BuNo: PN-9 A6878

From a photo taken after the aircraft had been towed into port, we can tell that my Granddad’s photo was obviously taken after many repairs have already been made. This is what the plane looked like when it reached Hawaii:

Rodgers' PN-9 After Ordeal, Source: State of Hawaii

The crew had been given up as lost after an extensive search. Rodgers and the rest of the PN-9 crew were able to monitor the radio without being able to transmit their location the entire time. They listened in as the searchers first coordinated their efforts and then decided to call off the search. They were ‘frustrated’ to say the least as they listened as the search unfolded. The Langley and the crew were part of the search effort. When Rodgers and his crew overheard that it was the opinion of the Langley’s aviators that the PN-9 and crew were ‘lost’… I imagine that made Rodgers and crew a little bit ‘more’ than just frustrated.


Rodgers’ navigation skills and the ability to ‘sail’ the seaplane using the fabric removed from the lower wings as sails brought them within a few miles of landfall when they were finally seen by a US submarine. They were towed past treacherous shoals and received a hero’s welcome both in Hawaii and eventually back on the mainland.

This same plane was apparently used to make another long distance flight attempt, and again forced to set down in the water (Caribbean) with its crew adrift. Again, it was found and the crew rescued but this time, it was seen as too risky to tow to safety and was sunk in place as a hazard to navigation. An unlucky, yet weirdly lucky bird if there ever was one.


Further Reading:

A 1925 ‘Flight’ article here.

Much more about the flight and the crew’s epic journey here, including many photographs and links to news articles of the day.

DDG-1000: US Surface Stealth News

I was wondering why there hadn't been any actual DDG-1000 "Zumwalt" photos on the web even though there were discussions about how much of it was complete. I should have known they were doing the bulk of the buildup indoors, since they are using the modular construction approach not unlike carriers (too big to do all inside) and submarines (that are built up under shelter).
 Defense News has the words and a photo.

Photo: GD/Bath Ironworks

So Far... So Good

The message is almost TOO positive:

"We're on time, we're on budget. We're within budget," Capt. James Downey declared during an interview earlier this month. "We're hitting the milestones within the program."

The Zumwalt's astounding completion level of 60 percent at keel-laying - once one of the earliest moments in a ship's construction - is a byproduct of the modern, modular building methods, Downey said.

"The ship is built in modules," he explained, including ever-larger elements known as ultra units. "When the first ultra unit is complete, that's when keel-laying is."

The forward midbody module, which includes the guns, weighs more than 4,000 tons - larger than a littoral combat ship, Downey said. The modules feature a high degree of outfitting, including smaller details like wiring, pipes, and control consoles to main and auxiliary propulsion engines and missile launchers.

As the ultra units are joined together, the Zumwalt will rapidly take on more of its ultimate shape. The composite deck structure, weighing more than 1,000 tons and now more than 75 percent complete, is expected to be barged from Mississippi to Maine in late spring, and the Zumwalt is scheduled to be launched in July 2013. Initial delivery is set for 2014, with completion of the combat system to follow in 2015.

Getting all the systems in all the modules to work well with each other will be the hard part, but they've done a lot of advance work already:

A DDG 1000 power plant at the Navy's Land-Based Test Site in Philadelphia conducted a successful, full-scale power test in May.
"We tested the complete propulsion system in local control," Downey said. "It pretty much passed with flying colors," although some test equipment needed upgrading. "We made no changes to any of our [ship] equipment."
The advanced induction motor (AIM) - heart of the integrated power system - "has performed very well," Downey said. "It met all the requirements at land-based testing. It exceeded the requirements."
Officers and crew of the DDG 1000 have already been reporting for duty, Downey said, with several members spending time this summer underway on British Type 45 destroyers, which also use AIM engines.
"We're learning what to expect out of the system," Downey said. "It's good for them to see a working system out at sea."
Tests of BAE's 155mm advanced gun system and its associated long-range land-attack projectile also have progressed "very well," Downey said. Two successful live-fire tests were held Aug. 30 at White Sands Missile Range, N.M., against live targets, which were hit at a range of 45 nautical miles. The round, he said, is hitting targets within "40-ish inches" of where it's aimed, against a requirement of 20-30 meters.

Sounds promising. May the program realize every advantage and avoid every pitfall. Maybe we can get the Luddites that capped the program at three units to reverse the decision.

UAV as Satellite Backup

 Without passing any judgement on the technical approach, the idea of having an unmanned high flyer communications network in case our space assets are neutralized is a good one for two reasons:
1. The obvious one: We'd have a backup.
2. The less obvious one: It lowers the military utility, and therefor the likelihood of someone bothering to neutralize the space assets in the first place,

Inside the Pentagon: JSF Faces Potential $3 Billion Bill To Reconfigure Early Production Aircraft

...and it is NOT as big a deal as you might think, and is certainly less than the JSF-Haters fantasize. 

50th F-35 Center Fuselage Delivery Ceremony

20 July 2011 (Northrop Grumman Photo)

'Inside the Pentagon' reports on 'outside' estimates to bring LRIP F-35's to Production Baseline Standard (link Subscription Required-- sorry). The 'Teaser' at link contains the bottom line:

DefenseAlert - 09/16/2011 The Defense Department is facing a potential $3 billion bill to modify early production Joint Strike Fighter aircraft to final configuration, roughly an additional $10 million for each fighter jet that is not accounted for by Pentagon unit-cost estimates, according to the Senate Appropriations Committee.

This is the same Committee using 'Concurrency' as a red herring to recommend holding back the F-35 production ramp up discussed here. In fact, this 'story' is part and parcel with the 'concurrency' angle. Other tidbits:

...The Senate panel, in a report accompanying its mark of the Pentagon's fiscal year 2012 spending bill, estimates this cost by comparing the Air Force's experience developing the F-22 with the F-35. 

..."Based on F-22 experience, a common configuration modification for the Joint Strike Fighter program would cost approximately $10 million per aircraft resulting in a $1.67 billion to $2.29 billion modification program," the Senate panel's report states  

...These costs are in addition to the $771.2 million in additional costs -- disclosed this summer by the Pentagon -- to reconfigure the first three F-35 production lots. Combined, the Senate panel estimates the total retrofit bill could reach $3 billion.

 So, before the 'Oracles of Doom!' (Mainstream Aero Blogs and Boards) get a hold of this story and blow it into another 'F-35 Nightmare' fable, let's consider what these costs "mean" within context of  the estimates and the actual costs of aircraft delivered to-date:

Remember this chart from a Canadian briefing? (I first used it here in discussing the earlier $771M cost upper for weight reduction)

 Look at the LRIP 3 Contract Settlement and the LRIP 4 Contract values on the chart. What is the first thing you notice? That's right, adding the $10m+ costs to retrofit the LRIP 3 & 4 aircraft will bring the total production costs in line with the LOWEST cost estimate curve plus or minus a small percentage.

Any bets at least one mush head out there on the defense boards will add the "new mod costs" to the highest estimate cost curve line to make even more outrageous cost claims?  What are the chances that the Congressional estimates for the mods are high in the first place, given the crude F-22 parallels used?

And remember the earlier $771M was to cover the weight reduction effort. A Total Ownership Cost perspective was taken in discussing that change.

Was Lockheed Martin 'lucky' or 'good' in bringing the costs in so low on initial production that they can essentially include the mod program and still keep close to the lowest cost curve?

Deliver Us from Beancounters: Learning Curve Edition

Learning Curves and Production Breaks
Dancin' with 'Engineering_Economist' a.k.a. to me as 'EngeCon' again at Defense Tech, and again the DT comment limits prevent material responses (by design I'm sure - which is understandable on a couple of levels) to outrageous posts so here we are again.


This thread is related to my last post, so I don't mind expanding on the point here at all.


(Note: Ignore the Ad Hominem parts of the comments I repeat here, they are only included because I didn't want to be accused of selective editing)


At the DT thread below a post about the Senate Appropriations Committee recommending a two year extension on the current F-35 LRIP production rates, I made the comment:

No doubt in the future, if it is found that the costs of running a fighter factory in first gear for two more years exceeds the total lifecycle cost (or APUC for that matter) impacts that would have been incurred if the conventional alternative (of proceeding with increasing production rates and retrofitting fielded early aircraft) had been followed, that the good Senator (D-Hi) will be the first to admit the strategy was wrong and that he and the other Senators will be the ones to blame for the cost increases. I know that on the other hand, if such a delay does actually save total costs (vs, just playing a convenient ricebowl to plunder for the short term) and has no negative impact on the same costsI will be happy to publically proclaim I was 'wrong'

I won't bother with the preliminary back and forth and the early Ad Hominem but the thread rapidly got to EngeCon posting:

that wasn't even an ad homenim. i asked a question and expressed an opinion. once again the communication process has broken down. also according to learning curve theory it doesn't matter if the lot quantity increases, as long as there is not a production break. so no matter how much you misapply learning theory, you can't blame this on the Senate. the learning effects will not be achieved for a variety of other reasons, such as the unstable production configuration and inevitable obsolescence. there are probably some great introduction to logic and proof classes at your local community college which might give you an appreciation for axioms of math, science, and engineering. i'm sure if we keep repeating the educational process with you, sooner or later something may stick.

The only thing worth noting in this comment was the part about 'Production Break' and 'Learning Curve'. This was funny: A guy trying to 'count coup' while demonstrating a lack of in depth knowledge of the point he was trying to use to refute my argument. I followed with:

Re: Fallacious Ad Hominem – I take the general and to-date unsupported “your obfuscated, hubristic, and biased views” as a personal (not to mention unsupported to the point of nonsensical) attack.
Re: ‘Production Break’ observation. Interesting, but your offhand dismissive use of the term indicates you probably have no idea that a ‘Production Break’(as the term relates to Learning Curves) does not have to be temporal or complete. In fact, your answer reeks of a ‘numerical’ and not ‘operational’ awareness of ‘Learning Curve’ [ I would note that it comes over as arrogance in your own ignorance, but that would mean bringing up “Hybris” again and I’ve noted how that seems to have rankled you some. So I won’t mention it. ] Now go back and try to conceptualize how many of the five categories of ‘Production Breaks’ as identified within the Anderlohr Method are relevant to an operation on the scale of the F-35 and the planned expansion to the manufacturing effort (scope) and speed (production rates). Hint: All of them are relevant.
Re the rest of your poor scratchings: Infantile projection

I don't know why, but I expected EngeCon to at least do a little research on the "Anderlohr Method" before he came back, but nooooooooo:

what is your reference for definition of the term 'production break'? then show how what has happened in the past or in the future indicates that a production break has or will occurr. Congress is not at fault for any production breaks. i understand the frustration in the Appropriations process, but in the F-35's case, Congress has faithfully appropriated billions of dollars into this caper per year, and the program should still be expending dollars that were obligated in past years. the whole experience is ANOTHER lesson in how foolish the concurrency approach is. you need to prove you are ready for production, via a MS C decision, before starting LRIP. what's the status of that DAB to rebaseline the program??

 Aside from the obvious fact that EngeCon hasn't gotten the latest word on Concurrency yet, and aside from attempting to shift the discussion back to the Milestone BS meme he so desperately clings to at the end...there's not much here.  I obliged him with a reference, and would have posted at DT all of what I'm about to post here, except it would have had to be broken into about 6-7 unconnected comments, subject to cherry picking. In 'replay' what I wrote at DT was:

Have you noticed that you often begin with challenging an assertion by asking for ‘support’, then attempt to preemptively refute (poison the well) any support provided in response? And before you have ANY idea what the response will be? Interesting. I assumed you would have just Googled up the ‘Anderlohr Method’. From the second or third hit on my computer: https://acc.dau.mil/adl/en-US/30391/file/5384/Learning%20Curve%20Workshop%20Production%20Breaks.pdf  

RE: MSC/DAB & other formalities. I'll refer readers to our earlier dance :http://elementsofpower.blogspot.com/2011/07/deliver-us-from-bean-counters.html            

What I WANTED to post in addition to the link was the actual categories of "Production Breaks":

My comments in brackets []; feel free to cavil away.

George Anderlohr…. divided all learning lost, by an organization, due to a break in production, into five categories:

"1. Personnel Learning: In this area , the physical loss of personnel, either through regular movement or layoff, must be determined. The company's personnel records can usually furnish evidence on which to establish this learning loss. The percentage of learning lost by the personnel retained on other plant projects must also be ascertained. These people will lose their physical dexterity and familiarity with the product and the momentum of repetition." [From my next door neighbor who works on the F-35 production line, I know that LM is (again) already shuffling key people around into less desirable (read: dirty or at night) work because the production ramp-up is being delayed (again). They are trying to retain the experience and skills of as many less-senior but more ‘F-35 experienced’ line workers as they can--in anticipation of possible layoffs which, given it is a unionized workforce, would otherwise be ‘out the door’ as the more senior ‘protected’ mechanics and electricians are retained.]     

"2. Supervisory Learning: Once again, a percentage of supervisory personnel will be lost as a result of regular movement. Management will make a greater effort to retain this higher caliber personnel, so the physical loss, in the majority of cases, will be far less than in the area of production personnel. However the supervisory personnel retained will lose the overall familiarity with the job so that the guidance they can furnish will be reduced. In addition, because of the loss of production personnel, the supervisor will have no knowledge, so necessary in effective supervision, of the new hires and their individual personalities and capabilities. [We should suspect this will particularly affect those people who were involved in planning the ramp up of production itself, some of whom will start the replan, and others who will now go fight other fires]

"3. Continuity of Productivity: This relates to the physical positioning of the production line, the relationship of one work station to another, and the location of lighting, bins, parts, and tools within the work station. It also includes position adjustment to optimize the individual needs. In addition, a major factor affecting this area is the balance line or the work in process build-up. Of all the elements of learning, the greatest initial loss is suffered in this area." [How much additional production infrastructure had LM and (hundreds of?) suppliers already put into place to support the coming ramp up and will now have to work around it or set it aside?  How much will have to change (do over) if the profile of the ‘ramp up’ has to change (steeper or slower – still a change)? How much more expensive will it be to work through the ramp up in later years, for all the categories and for all the suppliers?]

"4. Methods: This area is least affected by a production break. As long as method sheets [now computerized work instructions- see below] are kept on file, learning can never be completely lost. However, drastic revisions to the method sheets may be required as a result of a change from soft to hard tooling." [ not just ‘soft’ to ‘hard’ tooling – any tooling change driven by scale. BTW I disagree with this being ‘least affected’. The effect is dependent upon the availability of people who understood the intent of the instructions when they were written.]

"5. Special Tooling: New and better tooling is a major contributor to learning. In relating loss in the tooling area, the major factors are wear, physical misplacement and breakage. An additional consideration must be the comparison of the short run or so called soft tooling to long run or hard tooling and the effect of the transition from soft to hard tooling." [Unlike relatively simple manufacturing products, like a microchip or even some F-35 subsystem components, scaling up the tooling for high rate production involves more than just cloning a production line or station. Scaling up the F-35 production will involve reconfiguring and rearranging new tooling. I believe the process of transitioning to full rate tooling has already started with LM subs (remember reading about it in the last year someplace). Will they have to change their processes again to efficiently use the tooling at the lower rate?]

'The definitions presented by Anderlohr have been modified and expanded, since 1969, to accommodate today’s manufacturing environment. For example, some of today’s modern factories operate in a “paperless environment” where method sheets are no longer used. However, these factories normally produce all of their shop instructions on computer files, these computer files sometimes have the same “ability” to get lost as their paper counterparts. Therefore the Methods portion of learning may deal with these computer files (i.e. lost files, changes to files due to new equipment, etc.)." 

Thus it is shown that when the term 'Production Breaks'  is used in reference to 'Learning Curves' within the "Anderlohr Method" (the most widely used application in aerospace as far as I know) it does not just mean cessasion and restart of activity, but applies to any disruption in the current production system that renders prior knowledge ineffective of less effective for future application. As
1. the current F-35 production system had a plan and was executing to that plan, and
2. must now change their execution to meet the next plan's objectives, and
3. that the people and equipment they were putting in place must now change,
new learning will have to begin again or be refreshed.
As the learning curve will now be applied/achieved in later years, the curve can be expected to cost more 'then' than 'now'. If the production rate ramp up under the delayed plan is different from the previous plan, that too will require new knowledge and understanding of the impacts and used to develop the new plan.

Like I said: Cavil away! 

Congressional Bloviation On The 'Concurrency Bogeyman'

There's no 'There' there...
I was initially going to post on this when it was first announced, then I decided to just let this latest F-35 development lie where I thought it belonged (in the ‘Political Doublespeak ‘roundfile’) because the major blogs and news outlets weren’t giving it much play. I moved on to other interests, but should have anticipated that the more inflammatory of the pundit perches were merely saving up for a weekend rabble-rouser squawking. Defense Tech, in an unattributed piece started the red-meat varmint call early last Friday. The post itself was on the whole quite innocuous -if incomplete - but it was the rhetorical “we’ll see what happens next” at the end that calls out to the innumerate and the ignorant along with the casual observers to proffer uninformed opinions en masse. This would be, of course, perfectly acceptable as long as they are offered AS opinions. The problem with much of the DT/Military.Com crowd these days is that too often opinions and personal preferences offered are masquerading as absolute statements of fact without any specific evidence of same. Heck, we’re lucky if they even bother with a fallacious argument, and when they do, if one points out the argument is fallacious it will result in fallacious ad hominem thrown back reflexively. ( I'll check out the responses to my comment at DT after I get this up, but as I have noted before, JSF 'haters' are woefully short of logicians (link).

The WHOLE story and nothing but....
To quote the actual (and corrected) statement (link here)

"We recommend a $695 million reduction to the Joint Strike Fighter program. We continue to strongly support this program and believe that the F-35 is showing progress since it was restructured last year. However, excessive concurrency in development and production still exists. The test program is only 10 percent complete, yet the request continues to ramp up production of aircraft in fiscal years 2012 and 2013. We recommend maintaining production at the fiscal year 2011 levels for two more years in order to limit out year cost growth. For each aircraft we build this early in the test program, we will have to pay many millions in the future to fix the problems that are identified in testing.

Instead of employing a teaser ‘let’s see what happens next’ approach, how about we ask ourselves ‘What might this (Senate decision and rationale offered) really mean?”

I. Decomposing the Appropriations Committees’ Recommendations
Note: Readers may skip this section and proceed directly to Part II if they desire, and revisit this section if they have questions as to my summary of the Committee’s core argument. In fact, unless you are predisposed for classical rhetoric, I STRONGLY recommend it.

We can accept the statement at face value or assume there is deviousness and deception involved. Being a ‘Theory Y’  kind of guy, I would normally tend to look at a statement and first take it that Senator Inoue and the Committee really mean what is stated.  But are their assumptions and reasons given correct? Can we assess their logic and find it sound?

The Explicit…

First, let’s summarize what it is explicitly stated:

1. The Appropriations Committee recommends a $650M reduction to the JSF program budget.
2. The Appropriations Committee asserts that the F-35 program concurrency is “excessive”.
3. The Appropriations Committee continues “to strongly support” the Joint Strike Fighter program.
4. The Appropriations Committee believes the program has shown “strong progress” since last year.
5. The Appropriations Committee recommends maintaining the current production level at 35 aircraft per year for two more years (2012 & 2013) for the express purpose of “limiting out year cost growth”.
6. The Appropriations Committee asserts that each aircraft built “this early” in testing will require “many millions in the future to fix the problems that are identified in testing”

…and The Tacit

The above is rather straightforward, and normally not worth reiterating. I only took the trouble of identifying these explicit statements to help differentiate between what is expressed -- and what is ‘presumed’ or ‘implied’.  What presumptions and implications should we feel confident in deducing from the explicit statements? I assert that until contrary information is available, the following may also be seen as contained within the Committee’s statement.

 I assert that we can safely deduce, given the totality of the Committee’s statement, that:

A. All or the significant portion of the budget reduction is coming out of the proposed production budgets for 2012 and 2013. We should note here that the 2013 reduction could be reversed (or increased) next year, but that probably would not have a significant effect on the actual production because the dollars taken out now for 2013 will affect long-lead procurement items and you cannot accelerate their acquisition by simply turning on the ‘money tap’ again.   
B. The Committee believes that this delay in ramping up production will reduce “excessive” program concurrency.
C. The Committee believes that reducing program concurrency will save the program “millions of dollars”. 

We can further deduce from the above that IF the Committee believes it makes economic sense to delay production, they must believe the savings from not having to retrofit the aircraft somehow exceeds the cost of maintaining the inefficient utilization of manufacturing resources for two years, and increased costs of production in the out years.  This must include the adverse impacts on hundreds if not thousands of suppliers, large and small.  Of course, if some of those suppliers are having difficulty meeting engineering and/or production schedules (typically a small minority in any program) they will benefit from such a delay (and there are simpler and more certain remedies for such problems other than slipping the entire program).

II.  The Senate Appropriations Committee’s Central Argument

Thus we see from all of the above that the Senate Appropriations Committee’s expressed rationale for cutting the F-35 budget rests solely on the following argument:

“High-concurrency programs involve having to ‘fix’ early production articles and the costs incurred in these programs can be minimized (i.e. monetary savings will be realized) by stretching out the production to make the program less concurrent.”

To evaluate this claim, I em>WAS going to proceed with a scholarly investigation of literature dissecting the pros and cons of program concurrency, its relationship to cost overruns and schedule delays. I assumed getting to the bottom of the story would be complicated.
It is not.
It is simple.
In spite of well over two decades of fear-mongering by detractors, 'Concurrency' in and of itself has been shown to be nothing to fear - only managed.

All you need to know to judge whether or not the Senate Appropriations Committee action made sense is found in the following few documents. You can look at others, but you wont find much difference among the earlier work and the last reference is the latest and most complete research on the topic.

Concurrent Weapons Development and Production, CBO, August 1988 (link)

In this study, the CBO went looking for the adverse effects of ‘concurrency’ and came away ….somewhat contrite (emphases mine):

This study examined concurrency, cost growth, and schedule data for 14 major weapons systems that were developed during the 1970s and have been subsequently produced and deployed. The systems include a variety of types of weapons from each of the military services, and all of them have been reviewed by the Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council (DSARC). The analysis showed that no strong relationship exists between concurrency and schedule delay (see Summary Table). A statistical regression analysis found that only a couple of percentage points of the variation in schedule delays are explained by concurrency. A modestly stronger relationship exists between concurrency and cost growth: approximately 14 percent of the variance in cost growth is explained by concurrency. (Page vii-iix)

The report noted all the changes that have occurred in years leading up to the report that reduce concurrency and its ‘effects’ –tenuous linkages or no – but that didn’t stop the authors from suggesting MORE limitations for Congress if they so desire:

Given the ambivalent statistical evidence concerning the effects of concurrency on costs and schedules, and the fact that current laws and regulations limit its use, the Congress may wish to take no further action regarding concurrent programs as a group. On the other hand, in view of recent problems with certain programs, the Congress may wish to have more information on high-priority programs that are employing concurrency (Page xi).

BTW: No data or detailed discussion of methodology was included in the report so it would be hard to really get your teeth in the study to judge its completeness and efficacy.
Then we get to Congressional testimony in May 1999 by Frank C. Conahan, Assistant Comptroller General, National Security and International Affairs Division of the GAO (link here):
Within, Mr, Conahan insists problems with 5 of 6 then-‘highly concurrent’ programs were related to concurrency (without any supporting rationale as to why concurrency is a problem) and took a swipe at the then-emerging DDG-51 program. His ardor was as palpable as his data was invisible. It drips with the fear that somebody must be doing something wrong someplace therefore the standard GAO response of 'more oversight' gets an entire section.

But there simply MUST be something to this concurrency thing, right?  Well people kept looking. A team of analysts from CNA reported in the Defense ATL magazine (link) late last year:  

Our results (located at [link fixed by me], based on examining 28 programs across all Services, are very similar to those of the Congressional Budget Office and RAND [example] studies with one surprising exception: While from a purely statistical point of view we found that the relationship between both planned and actual concurrency and cost growth was very weak, in both cases, there seems to be a “sweet spot” of about 30 percent concurrency. That is, programs that plan on spending 30 percent of RDT&E funds while concurrently spending procurement funds actually experience the lowest average cost growth. Similarly, those programs that actually do spend about 30 percent of RDT&E funds while concurrently spending procurement dollars, even when not originally planned, also experience lower cost growth. Furthermore, programs with planned or actual levels of concurrency below 30 percent experienced higher cost growth than those with higher levels of concurrency. In other words, lower levels of planned or actual concurrency were actually worse than higher levels of concurrency. This is the complete opposite of what many in the acquisition community believe. We speculate that lower levels of concurrency may expose the program to higher levels of external changes.  

At the end of the AT&L article, the authors Donald Birchler, Gary Christle, and Eric Groo close with the following:

What to Do About Concurrency?
So far, no conclusive evidence exists that concurrency (no matter how it is defined) is generally a problem. This does not mean that concurrency is never a problem. But most likely, concurrency leads to cost and schedule growth under very particular circumstances. What these circumstances are is not very clear just yet. Nor is it clear why in our study, the sweet spot for concurrency is somewhere around the 30 percent mark. What is clear is that there are definite advantages to concurrently designing and building a weapons system that most program managers take advantage of, to some extent or another.
The [1988] Congressional Budget Office study advised that “Congress may wish to take no further action regarding concurrent programs as a group,” given the very weak relationship between the concurrency and cost growth. Instead, the office argued that Congress should simply ask that DoD develop a consistent measure for concurrency to be published in a program’s acquisition report and then monitor programs to see how they are performing relative to their planned level of concurrency. More than 20 years later, this advice still seems to be appropriate.

Alas, I fear the CNA team’s sensible findings and advice will go unheeded – as long as the “Concurrency’ Bogeyman serves as a useful tool in the quiver of bloviating politicians.

Senators! – this time I’m talking to you!