Introduction:
It has been written that “What If?” is historian’s “favorite secret question”. Would the B-52 have become the venerable icon of airpower that it is ‘then’, if American communications and norms had been different?What if’ 1946-1952 was anything like 2006-2012?
1950
 |
| XB-52 (Model 464-67), Source: Boeing |
--Peacenik Objectors Gone Overboard (POGO) 1950 Press Release
Air Force Leadership Suppresses Competition At Taxpayer’s Expense
The Air Force, in a move indicative of the utter contempt for the American taxpayers has killed the possibility of holding any meaningful competition to fulfill the requirement for a new heavy bomber. With the problems found with the new newly fielded B-50 and B-36, the Air Force should be exerting its energies in fixing existing problems rather than seeking to field even more advanced technology. The Air Force is now openly speaking of the new B-50s and B-36s as ‘interim’ designs whose hundreds of millions or perhaps billions of dollars in development costs will now have been wasted fielding aircraft that will only fly for a few short years if the Air Force has its way. Congress should act now to force the military to clean up their existing messes before they are allowed to proceed with production of their newest unneeded weapon.‘Wheels’ Wincelow: Centre of Defense Disinformation (CDI) Press Release
The Bomber Forces ‘Death Spiral’
The Air Force now plans to retire their entire fleets of B-50s and B-36s with new bloated bomber program. It is alleged that General Lemay has stated he fears the costs of the new bomber could prevent acquisition of more than 100 aircraft. This new, overly complex and overly ambitious bomber design bought in such small quantities cannot match the capabilities of the more than 700 B-50s and B-36s now delivered or planned could provide.Phil Sweetham (Aviation Leaks)
The design of the Air Force’s new bomber, now identified as the XB-52 is STILL changing. If this plane is ever fielded (doubtful), expect it to be many years from now and in even smaller quantities than the 100 currently feared as unit costs will undoubtedly continue to skyrocket.1951
 |
| Final Design Evolution to Production Configuration |
Derek Palmetto – Letters to the Editor, Sydney Daily Herald
Well, the Americans have decided to waste hundreds of millions of US Dollars not only fielding an unnecessary bomber, but the first batch aren’t even representative of the production standard, and later versions will be incorporating fixes to shortcomings already known to exist, These ‘mistake jets’ will have to be fixed later, or more likely retired early further adding to the magnitude of wasted taxpayer dollars. The early retirement of the B-36, which it has been announced that the B-52 will be replacing, means many of the dollars and much of the effort to produce the Peacemakers have been wasted as well.
Phil Sweetham (Aviation Leaks)
The Air Force has much explaining to do as to why their nearly-new bomber fleet already needs replacement, if claims justifying the B-52 are REAL that is. We note that the Air Force has changed their tune as to the B-52’s purpose. Is its mission ‘reconnaissance’ or ‘strategic bombing’? What else will the Air Force claim its new plaything can do, if Congress doesn’t bite on their rationale this time around?
‘Wheels’ Wincelow: Centre of Defense Disinformation (CDI) Press Release
"Overkill: Too Many Nukes" Congress should trim the Air Force’s plans to acquire potentially several hundred B-52 Bombers. With the B-52’s massive payload and the ever-shrinking packaging of Atomic weapons, surely we will reach the practical upper limit of weaponry required to act as a deterrence and fielding more than the required number will only make other nations suspect us of ulterior motives. Please forget that ‘Death Spiral’ thing I mentioned earlier. I’ll let you know when we’re really serious about using it again.“Oh, the Controversy!”--Title of Stranger Room column, Dave Axiom, ‘Mired’ magazine
1952
1. The XB-52 and YB-52 take to the skies,
2. Some B-52A orders are converted to B-52Bs,
3. Critics yammer on….
9 comments:
Ah yes the 1950s, when men were men and stupid, spineless critics weren't allowed to kill great projects.
Note that this also explains why production B-52s supplemented large numbers of production B-49 flying wing bombers already in service and were later complemented by the widespread deployment of Navaho cruise missiles, both developed relentlessly despite technical problems, development delays and cost over runs.
Of course the striking power of the B-52 increased markedly with the successful introduction of the Skybolt missile, thankfully saved from cancellation for delays and cost increases by the fact that Bill Sweetman hadn't been born yet.
It was also the same gumption and refusal to let cost increases, development delays or changing tactical requirements affect procurement that later led to the successful replacement of the B-52 by fleets of B-70s escorted by the large numbers of production F-108s.
Yes, nothing with technical promise was ever cancelled, especially when on the brink of developmental success, back in the old days before people dared to criticize programs just because they were years late or wildly over budget.
1. ICBMs killed the B-70 and Navaho (and Snark BTW).
2. The B-52 path was selected INSTEAD of the flying wing design.
3. The Skybolt was as much a victim of the SLBM success, Hound Dog performance (satisfactory) and bigger land-based ICBMs as for it's own early failures in test.
4. The mission for the F-108 disappeared because the U-2 verified the Soviet bomber threat was not anywhere near as bad as had been feared when the program launched. It was not an escort fighter--it was an air defense fighter.
And it should be noted not one of these programs died because of ignorami carping or second-guessing on the sidelines, but by the defense establishment itself for 'best defense' policy reasons.
Your last paragraph is a 'Strawman'.
If it more correctly summarized my point it would read something akin to:
Yes, nothing with technical promise was ever cancelled as long as the mission need persisted and other alternatives were seen as either too risky or expensive. Whether early or late in a program, what mattered back in the old days was mission need and getting the right balance of program (schedule, cost, and performance)risk and the commensurate risk to national defense posture in pursuing selected alteratives to satisfy defense needs. This was a lot easier to do back then, when all political parties were interested in defense, and most people had personal memories of the last global conflagration.
Let's take your rephrasing of my 'strawman' argument at face value for a start.
First you mention schedule, cost, and performance as important variables. Thus criticism of programs that completely blow their schedule and cost goals, and perhaps have their performance goals reduced, even by small margins, are open to criticism on these grounds, correct?
Second, you mention alternatives twice and you are invoking the '50s when there were multiple contractors with many designs to keep Boeing honest. That model is correct but breaks down when either purposefully or as collateral damage DoD precludes alternative designs and even alternative contractors from the mix.
Ref "ignorami": does that include the GAO, all of whose evaluations of the F-35 program have been far more accurate than those of the program itself? Does it include the guys who wrote the QLR from within the program, which was fodder for the kind of Sweetman articles you evidently felt compelled to ridicule? Does it include the people within the program who write the last SAR, the analysis of which Bill was pilloried for without anyone factually refuting his claims in a 400 comment thread on Ares?
Finally, just because I am argumentative:
-- Ref the B-70, it's first flight was 5 years after the Atlas and about 3 years after the Titan II, so ICBMs were hardly a surprise that cancelled the program. Your thesis that ICBMs invalidated manned bombers also fails when the later B-1 and B-2 are considered. I also believe the history is that Kennedy and McNamara cancelled the B-70 over the objections of Lemay and you gloss over the revolt of the admirals as well in protest of the B-36. So much for consensus and the idea that everything was cancelled from within DoD.
-- The prop flying wing, first flight 6/46, and the jet flying wing, first flight 10/47 bracketed the B-36, first flight 8/46. The B-52 didn't fly till 4/52, much later than any of these planes. The flying wings were B-36 competitors, not B-52 competitors.
-- Here's a line from the National Museum of the US Air Force fact sheet on the F-108 "The North American F-108 was designed as a very high speed (Mach 3) interceptor and escort fighter for the B-70 "Valkyrie" bomber under development at the same time." So no, not just an interceptor.
Whoah. Missed your comment last night, found it in my mail after work. Too tired to correct you tonight, and since you are all over the place subject-wise I have to decide whether to respond here or in a separate post. Maybe split response: easy stuff here and the parts providing a teachable moment in a separate blog post as sort of a public service for future reference.
Tomorrow night at the latest, probably earlier.
G'night!
RE: First you mention schedule, cost, and performance as important variables. Thus criticism of programs that completely blow their schedule and cost goals, and perhaps have their performance goals reduced, even by small margins, are open to criticism on these grounds, correct?
No.
Even IF a program “completely” ‘blows’ schedule and cost performance goals (which BTW I can’t think of any I’ve written about lately that would qualify for that statement) what matters is the balance of the performance against what I stated and what you have either accidentally or selectively omitted the part concerning performance being viewed in balance “to”. Perhaps if I take out the parenthetical breakdown of program risk and add emphasis on a key word (with a corrected typo) :
Whether early or late in a program, what mattered back in the old days was mission need and getting the right balance of program risk AND the commensurate risk to national defense posture in pursuing selected alter[n]atives to satisfy defense needs.
Adverse cost, schedule and even technical performance developments must always be viewed in PERSPECTIVE, i.e. relative to the ability to satisfy a defense need, and the relative cost/benefit of proceeding with a path that was chosen or a change in technical or operational direction. Even on programs such as say, the F-35, where the bulk of real (vs. projected estimates of dubious value) cost and schedule impacts have been driven by CUSTOMER decisions to delay/defer progress for a variety of CUSTOMER preferences (rational or not), including 1) choosing to delay production in the belief (false or not) it gives the program an opportunity to reduce technical risk and 2) to slow down early production to cut total costs in early years though they know it will invariably impact per/unit costs in the out years.
RE: Second, you mention alternatives twice and you are invoking the '50s when there were multiple contractors with many designs to keep Boeing honest. That model is correct but breaks down when either purposefully or as collateral damage DoD precludes alternative designs and even alternative contractors from the mix.
Your phrasing reflects more of your own biases than acquisition ethics and laws of either now or in days of yore. It also reveals a limited understanding of the concept of ‘alternatives’ as I expressed it. Perhaps that is my fault for not making it clear, so let me expand on the point to note that by ‘alternatives’ it is meant alternative courses of action which may or may not involve the same type of weapon system, family of weapon systems, families of weapon systems or even tactics and strategies in the application or objectives of weapon systems to meet or retire a military need.
RE: Ref "ignorami": does that include the GAO, all of whose evaluations of the F-35 program have been far more accurate than those of the program itself? Does it include the guys who wrote the QLR from within the program, which was fodder for the kind of Sweetman articles you evidently felt compelled to ridicule? Does it include the people within the program who write the last SAR, the analysis of which Bill was pilloried for without anyone factually refuting his claims in a 400 comment thread on Ares?
1. ‘Ignorami’ refers to anyone with a strongly-held and vociferous opinion on a topic that has little to no knowledge (depth or breadth) on that same topic.
2. On ‘defense’ topics, the GAO a political tool that has never NOT ‘found’ precisely what it was sent in to look for. Based upon literally thousands of GAO reports I have had to consume and multiple experiences with GAO teams in the field. I concluded long ago that the GAO operation (again, as far as defense topics go) could be replaced by a one page form for the politicos to fill out, one junior college ‘Creative Writing’ instructor and a small staff of admin to do the word processing and publishing. The ‘Creative Writing’ position could be eliminated with a large enough list of synonyms for ‘Risk’ and ‘Uncertainty’ plugged in to a random word generator. The GAO ‘predicts’ NOTHING -- They are “Texas Sharpshooters”: http://elementsofpower.blogspot.com/2011/04/f-35-and-texas-sharpshooters.html http://elementsofpower.blogspot.com/2011/04/ragin-hedge-baby-on-loose.html
3. QLR was not from ‘within the program’. It was a CYA drive-by. http://elementsofpower.blogspot.com/2012/01/sweetman-goes-all-in-on-f-35-qlr.html
4. The SAR is a political accounting and CYA document of varying degrees of accuracy, depending upon how risk averse the OSD deputy is in office, and the political capital the SecDef allocates for the purpose of defending it. It reflects as much about the state of things outside a program than in it. Even with all the external factors, what is too often most remarkable about the SAR is the distortion of what is in the SAR by whoever wants to use it as a weapon for good or (usually) evil.
5. RE: ‘400’ Comments on Ares blog. Birds of a feather flock together. ‘echo chamber’ . Your appeal is called the ‘bandwagon’ fallacy, or more traditionally: argumentum ad populum. But if you followed the links in #2 above you would have seen why all ‘400’ would not be ‘right’.
Finally, just because you are argumentative:
RE: -- Ref the B-70, it's first flight was 5 years after the Atlas and about 3 years after the Titan II, so ICBMs were hardly a surprise that cancelled the program. Your thesis that ICBMs invalidated manned bombers also fails when the later B-1 and B-2 are considered
My ‘thesis’ was not that ICBMs ‘invalidated’ manned bombers (which if you knew ANYTHING about me you would have found such an idea ludicrous.
I stated: “ ICBMs killed the B-70 and Navaho (and Snark BTW).”
There is NO assertion or indication in that statement that ICBMs came after the B-70-- only that their capabilities were chosen OVER those of the B-70
If we are to narrow the statement down to just the B-70, I would only add ‘in conjunction with the existing competency of the B-52’.
RE: I also believe the history is that Kennedy and McNamara cancelled the B-70 over the objections of Lemay and you gloss over the revolt of the admirals as well in protest of the B-36. So much for consensus and the idea that everything was cancelled from within DoD.
Again, ‘a strawman’. Nowhere do I indicate/assert that everything was cancelled only from within DoD. I must assume from what I’ve written so far that that this strawman arises from my statement:
“And it should be noted not one of these programs died because of ignorami carping or second-guessing on the sidelines, but by the defense establishment itself for 'best defense' policy reasons.”
The ‘defense establishment’ by any definition (past and present) that I have ever seen INCLUDES the SecDef office and the Commander In Chief (President). The McNamara/B-70 incident and the Revolt of the Admirals therefore all occurred within the defense establishment, up to the point that the ‘Navy’ took their squealing outside the DoD. (BTW: the real reason behind the revolt was some in the Navy resented subordination to a higher HQ (DoD) , and NOT over an aircraft carrier.
RE: The prop flying wing, first flight 6/46, and the jet flying wing, first flight 10/47 bracketed the B-36, first flight 8/46. The B-52 didn't fly till 4/52, much later than any of these planes. The flying wings were B-36 competitors, not B-52 competitors.
-- Here's a line from the National Museum of the US Air Force fact sheet on the F-108 "The North American F-108 was designed as a very high speed (Mach 3) interceptor and escort fighter for the B-70 "Valkyrie" bomber under development at the same time." So no, not just an interceptor.
1. Your reasoning by ‘first flight’ dates is simplistic: it overlooks relative complexities, varying development times, AND variants in development. The Flying Wing concept in various forms WAS a competitor to the B-52 as well as the aircraft you mention. Details here: http://elementsofpower.blogspot.com/2012/04/airpower-history-lesson-in-3-parts.html
2. You cite a ‘factsheet’ that states the Rapier was also to be an escort fighter. The factsheet more than slightly overstates the case. I asserted (and still do) that the Rapier was not an escort fighter--it was an air defense fighter. Details here: http://elementsofpower.blogspot.com/2012/04/airpower-history-lesson-in-3-parts.html
I did not say or imply it couldn’t or wouldn’t be an escort fighter if the need arose. I would assume it would do any ‘fighter’ mission it was assigned to varying degrees of success. I will say now that I would consider the ‘factsheet’ to be wrong in asserting an escort role (beyond possible for any fighter as a generic capability).
There can be little doubt that there was someone, somewhere in the entire AF command structure who thought it would be a good ancillary/alternate mission for the F-108, but it was not part of the F-108 design requirements NOR was it part of F-108’s operational concept. Most critically, given the nature of the operational concept envisioned for the F-108 and planned end strength, the use of the F-108 as an ‘escort fighter’ would probably be less likely than the F-106 it was designed to replace. This too is easily shown.
Details w/a blurb on why the B-70 was cancelled here:
http://elementsofpower.blogspot.com/2012/04/airpower-history-lesson-in-3-parts.html
BTW: If you must cavil some more, do it at the new post and keep it tight and pithy... lest ye be judged as engaging in egregious behavior.
Post a Comment