Fear of Unknown and Almighty $ = Turn off Your Phone After Boarding

(H/T Instapundit)

Every time I fly, listening to the flight attendant's sincere directions containing the simplistic assertion that personal electronic devices (PEDs) may interfere with aircraft operations and directives that I must turn off my electronic devices ALMOST makes me forget I had just played a bit role in the latest episode of Security Theater. There is an ABC News piece with the headline "Is It Really Safe to Use a Cellphone on a Plane?" that attempts to build a mountain, not out of a molehill, but from a couple of grains of sand.

I have DECADES of avionics systems laboratory and flight test experience, including conceiving, developing, and executing System and Subsystem EMI, ALT, HALT, Functional and Failure Mode Effects Test procedures. IMHO, this issue is about lawyers, liability law and the inherent imperfection and fallibility of ANY man-made device, and the certainty of failure given enough time. From this perspective, I have multiple beefs with both the article and many of the comments (44 of them at the time I read the article).

1. All 'incidents' presented are anecdotes about occurrences in either uncontrolled or unrealistic/simulated  environments. There is NO evidence presented as to ‘root cause’ nor even enough evidence to dismiss the possibility that any might have been random events. Certainly the almost immeasurably small number of possible incidents identified ("75 separate incidents of possible electronic interference") globally over a 6 year period, is for all practical purposes statistically insignificant,

2. Events presented may or may not have had something to do with operation of the personal electronics devices, but even if they did, they still not point towards root cause. The problem could be with the electronic devices OR aircraft systems, as the possible failure modes for either, while not infinite ARE inestimable.

3. Airframe manufacturers and airlines have a vested interest in pointing at the PEDs as the ‘problem’. It prevents them from having to deal with additional design requirements, testing and the associated costs or having to improve designs in existence for operating in the modern environment and servicing the 21st century public.

4. Funny that the article suggests that ‘older’ planes may be more of a problem. The author should bum a ride in the back of GE’s engine test bed. It is one of the oldest 747s still flying, and during test missions you will find the back end filled to the max with rows and rows of equipment racks with panels off running at full tilt, ad hoc instrumentation data lines, laptops up and running, and guys on cell phones and radios talking to the data download facility, and the last I heard (from THE guy who would know) they’ve never had a problem.

5. RE: Commenter ‘spsooz’s “Most of us aren't impressed with the common sense of the traveling public, nor do we appreciate the hostile reactions we get when we are just doing our jobs.”

That’s alright 'spsooz'. While I can’t speak for ‘most of us’ on the other side, I stopped being impressed with cabin crew performance right after they stopped turning into Kiwis and started turning into crones (and I’m not talking about ‘age’ here). It’s HOW one does their job that makes the difference, and today the traveling public gets to see a broad range of what gets defined as ‘professionalism’.

"If an airplane is properly hardened, in terms of the sheathing of the electronics, there's no way interference can occur."
The best quote in the article comes from ABC's aviation expert (who unlike most in the news game actually has experience on the subject beyond observing real experts):

There are still doubters, including ABC News's own aviation expert, John Nance.

"There is a lot of anecdotal evidence out there, but it's not evidence at all," said Nance, a former Air Force and commercial pilot. "It's pilots, like myself, who thought they saw something but they couldn't pin it to anything in particular. And those stories are not rampant enough, considering 32,000 flights a day over the U.S., to be convincing."
Nance thinks there are alternate explanations for the events. "If an airplane is properly hardened, in terms of the sheathing of the electronics, there's no way interference can occur."

After this passage comes a "yes, but" follow-on from Boeing's experts that provides another but not necessarily contradictory POV. Nance's last statement is irrefutable.

First Rule of Problem Solving: Is it My Problem?
It makes perfect sense to require PEDs to be turned off during critical flight phases, but stop blaming the PEDs in advance. This tactic allows the airline and airframe manufacturers to continue to assert a defacto  loophole from being held liable and allows them to continue to not deal with a possible problem that should be their responsibility.  Any ‘incompatibility’ can be due just as easily to insufficient or unfortunate aircraft systems design, installation or maintenance as anything else. IMHO, the problem should be considered to be on the ‘airplane side’ since the purpose of the plane and airline is to serve the 21st Century travelling public vs. the other way around.

Bob Cox Still Milking the 8 April 2000 MV-22 Crash

"I know little of military aviation, and even less of experimental flying, which is perhaps the most inspiring and yet fateful of all".

 -Ernest K. Gann, in the preface to Fate is the Hunter 

US Marine Corps photo by Sergeant Mark Fayloga

There is just so much wrong with this hit piece posing as an  'article' I want to frickin' scream!

I want to ask the bereaved widows why it is a 'stain' on the memory of their husbands that 'human factors' were a finding in the crash, when the Marine Corps doesn't consider it a 'stain':

A Marine spokesman, Capt. Brian Block, said the finding of "human factors" as the cause of the accident should not be equated with pilot error or blaming the pilots.


"Whenever a mishap like this occurs, we owe it to our Marines to take an honest, dispassionate look at all possible contributing factors to ensure it does not happen again," Block said. "The investigations into this mishap revealed that human factors contributed to, but were by no means solely responsible for, this mishap.


"These findings in no way impugn nor denigrate Maj. Gruber and Lt. Col. Brow's reputations as Marine officers, Marine aviators, and MV-22 pioneers. Maj. Gruber and Lt. Col. Brow were selected as pilots for what, at the time, was a brand new airframe precisely because of their courage, skill, and impeccable records."


Navy spokeswoman Lt. Cmdr. Tamara Lawrence said Mabus reviewed the crash investigation reports and "determined their conclusions still stand: that it was a result of a chain of events which, taken together, resulted in the loss of very talented and brave Marines."


A spokesman for Fort Worth-based Bell said "it would be inappropriate to comment on an internal Marine Corps matter."

I want to ask Bob Cox:
1. What made him think asking the aircraft manufacturer for a comment on a human factors finding in a USMC accident investigations wasn't inflammatory and inappropriate in the first place? Or did he ask knowing it was? 
2. If he recognizes the contributing role he and other jack-jawed 'journalists' played in the pressure put on the program to perform since, as he wrote in the article, the V-22 was "In development since 1981, at a cost approaching $15 billion, the Osprey was a troubled program. It had been the target of critics inside and outside the Pentagon..."?

I want to ask Lt.Col. Shaefer how much of his desire to clean a record that does not need cleaning, comes from some guilt he (wrongly, I believe) carries inside:

From his position several miles away, Schafer said he knew the two aircraft were too high as they began to descend.

For safety reasons, any pilot or co-pilot on that mission could have called a halt to the plan.


"I could have stopped that crash. I could have called a wave-off. I was the most experienced [pilot]. I had the most hours in the V-22 of the test team," Schafer said. "I've been in their position and been too high in a V-22, and that airplane isn't friendly when you're trying to descend fast."

Most of all, the article gives me (again) the urge to kick Bob Cox's macabre little voyeuristic a**.

Speed vs. Stealth: Stealth Wins

“Speed Kills”… or "Low Observability Changes the Survivability Equation: Speed No Longer Reigns Supreme".


From a comment in a recent thread at DoD Buzz:

….The one thing stealth did not do is make speed less valuable in air warfare. It is unfortunate that we've forgotten the lesson "speed is life" in the interest of making aircraft stealthy. The SR-71 combined a limited degree of signature reduction with high speed and would still be difficult if not impossible for most countries in the world -- including the Russians and Chinese -- to shoot down. Even missiles that fly faster than the SR-71 cannot sustain those speeds for a long enough time to hit that airplane regardless of whether they carry their oxidizer on board or get it from the air around them….

Nope.

"Speed is Life” is an Enduring Myth.
I will provide evidence that ‘Speed is Life’ is ‘no more’. I provide only evidence (vs. ‘overwhelming’ evidence) because I will not go anywhere near where I cannot go in public forums. (As an aside, there is also just so much ‘wrong’ with the above assessment of the SR-71’s hypothetical performance against modern systems that we’ll just note here that the statement presumes a ‘late’ acquisition and a ‘tail chase’ and falls apart on that presumption alone.)

NOTE: This is not to pick on the commenter who made the above assertions – I’ve heard similar from professionals who really should have known better. Myths die hard.

“Speed is Life” is an example of an air combat concept that has outlived its status as a ‘maxim’ and should be modified to read accurately today as: “Speed is Life… to a limited extent…maybe…sometimes”. More often than not, against an integrated air defense system in today’s battlespace, a truer statement would be: “Go Faster – Die Sooner”.

To support my assertion that in effect ‘Speed Kills’ the following are releasable excerpts from a study (disclosure: mine, written in 2000 and updated in 2009) that included observations concerning the Aeronautical Systems 1999 ‘study’ “System and Operational Implications for Choosing Best Speed for Global Missions” (aka ‘Speed Study’ or ‘ASC Study’) and the treatment of ‘speed’ vs. ‘survivability’ in other publications as well.

Excerpt 1

….. The ‘weaponization’ section of the ASC Study report reviewed the study’s exploration of the interrelationship between aircraft speed, altitude, and the ability of a very fast platform to attack using large standoff launch distances from a target. The report includes the observation that the survivability of the weapons, like the candidate platforms, would be based upon a best-value combination of factors including speed, altitude, tell-tale signatures maneuverability, and countermeasures. The definition of best value was not included in the report. The report indicates that the study further explored the ramifications of such a launch technique on the standoff weapons’ conceptual designs, noting that a higher kinetic energy delivery could reduce the fuel fraction of powered weapons and allow the weapon to have a larger warhead.

The ASC Study report reiterated that to ensure adequate survivability, all platform concepts studied would rely on the employment of standoff weapons to keep away from dense threat areas during the initial phases of an air campaign until other assets could be brought into theater for support, and presented a chart (p. 58) showing the relative glide weapon ranges when launched from aircraft flying at various speeds and altitudes. It is worth noting that while large launch distances from the target can be achieved, for the various concepts, it is seen that all launch platform concepts close the gap between the threat area and their position significantly after launch. It should be noted that it also appears from the study data that the faster the platform speed, the greater the post-launch closure to the target and threat area. A theoretical example of this dynamic is illustrated in Figure 9.

Figure 9. Hypothetical Mach 4 aircraft post-launch closure to target and associated potential threat.


Figure 9 illustrates estimates and profiles provided in the report for a Mach 4 launch of a glide weapon. This specific example presents the geometry of launching a weapon from approximately 180 nm away from a target to deliver the weapon with a .85 Mach impact speed on the target. Using the Gravity-load (G-load) factor provided by the study report for a practical operational turn, the launch aircraft would approach within approximately 87 nautical miles of the target after the launch in executing a turn away from the target. The launch aircraft closes to less than half the original launch distance after weapon separation. A thorough examination of the synergy that comes from combining standoff weapons and stealth is available (Paterson 1999), illustrating how the combination of stealth and standoff weapons delivered using conventional launch techniques becomes a significant contributor to survivability. However, it cannot be determined from the ASC report if the net impact of the post-launch closure at stand-off ranges using higher kinetic launch events was considered or factored into the ASC study’s kinetic delivery survivability assertions. If the candidate platforms were maneuvered in a manner that exploited the modicum of reduced signature reduction they were assumed to employ, then performing turns at even smaller bank angles would generate even larger turn radii, and the post-launch flight path of the aircraft would bring it even closer to the target and perceived threat, further minimizing the advantage of kinetic standoff attack….

Excerpt 2…


SPEED, OBSERVABILITY, AND SURVIVABILITY

In the conduct of this study, a need for a better understanding of the relationship between aircraft speed, observability, and survivability in a complex threat environment became apparent. In one of the earliest published discussions on low observability and survivability, it was noted that aircraft flying “at the greatest speeds possible in high threat areas minimizes time at risk” (Paterson, 1997, p. 10). A similar point was made in the 2006 Committee’s report ‘Future Air Force Needs for Survivability’:

Clearly, when trying to shrink an adversary’s reaction time, increasing the weapon system’s speed for the same signature can reduce its exposure time in the adversary’s weapons engagement zone. From the Radar Range Equation one can derive the approximate ratio that increasing the speed by a factor of 10 is equivalent to decreasing the frontal radar cross section (RCS) by a factor of 40,000 to provide the same exposure time. (NRC, 2006, p. 24)

While the relationship of speed and observability is elaborated upon and clarified within the 2006 Committee’s report, the 2006 Committee statement as it stands is incorrect and misleading. The quote is only accurate if the quality of the exposure time is equivalent. As noted by Grant (2001), the F-117s in Operation Allied Force had difficulty in maneuvering within the confined airspace over Serbia and Kosovo to attack targets and managing their signature profiles. When discussing transiting high threat environments at the greatest speeds possible, this must include provisions for management of the penetrating aircraft’s signature in doing so. The faster the aircraft is moving through the threat environment, the more difficult it is to manage its signature. The probability of the faster systems being able to equally manage their flight profiles and in turn equally managing their signatures as well as slower systems in a high threat environment can be shown to be comparatively low. This is easily demonstrated using a variation of Figure 9’s Mach 4 scenario that was presented earlier. In Figure 19 below, time has been substituted for distances, and the target is now a threat.

Figure 19. High speed aircraft have less time to avoid sudden appearance of new RF threats than slower aircraft.

The implication here is that in negotiating a dense threat environment a high speed transit can reduce the time within a threat engagement zone, but increases the probability of entering an engagement zone in the first place. The reduced reaction time and increased turn radius of the high speed aircraft has negative ramifications in planning and negotiating a mission route through a dense threat environment. Thus any discussion of speed as a benefit to survivability must include the quality of the relative low observability and difficulties in executing a transit of a dense threat area at higher speeds.

Post Script (a gentle reminder): The very definition of ‘Stealth’ is Very Low Observables (VLO) AND Tactics. “VLO” is highly ‘reduced’ radar (RCS), IR (Radiant Intensity), visual (Contrast, Area), acoustic (Sound Pressure) and EME (Electromagnetic Emissions) signatures. VLO designs are tailored to balance those signatures based upon mission and threats. ‘Tactics’ are maneuvering, mission planning/routing, selected sensor operational techniques, and weapons application techniques. Tactics are applied to maximize the advantages of the tailored VLO design. If anyone makes any claims about ‘Stealth’ outside of, or ignoring its definition in toto, they haven’t got a clue.

External refs used in the above excerpts:

Grant, R. (2001). The B-2 goes to war. Arlington, VA: IRIS Independent Research Institute.

Committee on Future Air Force Needs for Survivability, National Research Council. (2006). Future Air Force needs for survivability. Washington, DC: National Academies Press.

Paterson, J. (1997).Measuring low observable technology's effects on combat aircraft survivability. SAE.

Paterson, J. (1999). Survivability benefits from the use of standoff weapons by stealth aircraft, AIAA.

F-35 Family Photos at Edwards AFB

Q: What happens when you're ahead of schedule during flight test and there's a long holiday weekend?
A:  See this set of pics sent by a friend from Eddy (Edwards AFB) this week.

I'd like to see a group picture or two of the Pax River branch of the family tree to go with these. 

Why India Passed on the F-18E/F Super Hornet and F-16IN Super Viper

I guess they weren't 'super' enough? Oh Well.

H/T Steve Trimble  at The Dew Line Blog

Update: If you want to view another, more 'typical' POV that (surprise!) uses the first 4-5 paragraphs to inject the F-35 (negatively) into the story you could also go here.   

Excellent analysis of India's decision (PDF) concerning its latest fighter acquisition program, AND the down-select to the Eurofighter and Rafale from an unlikely source. The elimination of the F-16IN and F-18E/F seems have boiled down to a few critical points:

1. India's requirements were dominated by ease of 'handling' (consequence of their Mig-23 experience?) with greatest maneuverability. Their Air Force is dominated by Fighter Meat Servos and they really wanted a 'yank and bank' plane.The F-16IN with the conformal tanks was at the bottom of the list in 'turning' and the F-18E/F is a 7.5 G airplane.

2. India's near-mechanical adherence to the selection criteria with little room for interpretation or recognizing and allowing for statistically 'bad data'.

3. The F-16 an F-18 were too 'long-in-the-tooth' to meet India's needs for an effective operational life of 30 years on the one hand, and some technology (F-18 engines) were too immature on the other. The F-35 and F-22 weren't on the table.

4. India was seeking greater growth potential in their new platforms AND wanted the technology transfer to  come with that growth. Neither 'winner' of this round has an AESA radar, and India is betting on the 'come' that one will be available when production begins.

Lots more info/details on the competition and logic applied therein at the link. Read it all.

I'm torn between the last two 'Eurocanards', but in the case of India, I know they really want 'numbers' as well as technology, so the edge in my mind goes to the MUCH cheaper Rafale. There's some possibility that the Indian Air Force and Navy could also get some synergy going with the Rafale, since it is already carrier qualified...

F-35 and F-18E/F: Wheels Within Wheels

Since the KC-45 clusterfark I've learned to always suspect Boeing of ulterior motives and deployment of Marketeer Maneuvering Par Excellence whenever they produce an announcement out of the blue - especially if they're claiming some 'slight'. That is why when this popped up the other day, I began waiting for the other shoe to drop.
It could be coincidence -- and if it were anyone but the 'Borg' I would insist it HAD to be just a coincidence -- but how odd is it that Boeing would pick a public bone with LockMart over F-35 vs F-18 cost claims, just days before another news item is released mentioning that up to 500 'Super Hornets' may eventually be replaced by F-35s as a possible option of future Naval Aviation recapitalization? Boeing plays the 'long' game. Do they play it this 'long'?

Just asking.

Fathers: In Memoriam

The Chief and I went to put flowers on my Father's headstone yesterday, and all the (known) veterans in the cemetery had small flags already in place. While the 'Veteran's Section' was a sea of flags as one would expect, I was surprised at the numbers/percentages of flags placed throughout the cemetery.

In Memoriam, here's a couple of photos of our late Fathers.

First my Father-In-Law, 'Rusty' in DaNang Circa 1969, with the 366th 'Gunfighters' Fighter Wing, 4th Fighter Sq. 'Fujiins'. Another photo of him flying in a formation of F-89s was posted earlier.

Next a couple of photos of my Father. The first one is a group photo of the XH-40 flight test 'crew' during evaluations of what would become the ubiquitous 'Huey' in front of one of three XH-40s. Dad is third from left.

  

The second photo is of an H-37 with my Dad in the group of four in front of it, Dad is second from left, and the caption on the backs reads 'My first forced landing'. It looks like they did a little hedge trimming on an auto rotation. It was his first, but it would not be his last.

Space Coast Guard?

How Quaint. How Naive. How 'Commercial'. How.....'Civilian'.
(H/T Instapundit)
A 'space entrepenuer' and 'Anglophile' James C. Bennett, (with whom I doubt I would find too many disagreements with based upon his writings) steps WAY out of his area of expertise in a new piece at New Atlantis titled "Proposing a ‘Coast Guard’ for Space" where he 'surprise!' promotes his rationale for a Space 'Coast Guard' of sorts. I note that his central reference, what he (not me) describes as: " a thoughtful article published in the Aerospace Power Journal in 2000" in which a "USAF Lt. Col. Cynthia A. S. McKinley proposed the creation of a Space Guard on the Coast Guard model", commits many of the sins of  predecessors in that the superficial 'roles and missions' point of view is used.

Needless to say I prefer another paradigm as a more rational approach to any perceived 'space force' needs.

I would welcome any civil discussion on the strengths and weaknesses of the options as presented.

How Professionals Discuss "Airpower"

The future is coming fast. Embrace it...or develop better coping skills. 

Second Line of Defense (SLD) interviewed recently-retired Air Combat Command (ACC) Commander General John D.W. Corley on the future of Airpower. Although the .pdf file at the link mispells Airpower as two words (I kid -- I kid!), and also contains a small number of transcription errors, the discussion approaches the topics of Airpower, platform/system acquisition, and Airpower purpose, priorities and strategies quite well within a short document. General Corley, as ACC Commander was responsible to train and equip the nation's Air Force. Earlier, he was also the Combined Air Operations Center Commander ('Air Boss') in Operation Enduring Freedom. While I wouldn't agree with everything the General says without some qualification or clarification, I listen to guys who are 'Theorists' as well as 'Practitioners' more than the rest. General Corley qualifies (even though he was a fighter 'meat-servo').       

An extract:

SLD: We clearly are working in a relatively constrained fiscal environment, how do we maximize the air superiority effort in these circumstances?

Corley: The approach is to leverage extant legacy assets through building upon the foundation provided by F-22s and F-35s. For example, if I’ve got a fleet of F-15s, how can I leverage those F15s in a potential future environment at the challenging end of the scale with the range of military operations? F-15s today, or F-18s, or F-16s, do not possess the needed survivability inside an anti-access environment. One can say what you will, argue what you won’t, they will not be survivable.
    And from con-ops point of view, they're being pushed further and further out due to terminal defences or country wide or regional defences that exist. And this diminishes their utility, but they can still be effectively utilised.
    For example, you may take an existing platform, like an F-15 from the Air Force and begin to apply a pod to provide for infra-red search tracking, so that it could basically begin to detect assets and then feed that information back to other assets. Or, by providing for connectivity with some advanced tactical data link, that platform, in turn, could be directed to launch weapons from it.
    Even if we have the capabilities of platforms like F-35, F-22, B-2, or a follow on long range strike platform, they ultimately will be limited; limited by what? Limited by things such as, what is their capacity to carry weapons?
    If I’m going to be able to apply persistent pressure, then I have to have some capacity to employ others’ weapons. If I eventually run my F-35s out of SDBs, or out of JDAM’s, is there a way for them to still contribute to the fight because they're inside of that anti-access bubble, still using their sensors, still communicating? Can I contribute to weapons employment from other platforms, outside the anti access bubble to enable the concept of operations and apply persistent pressure?

Read it all. Contrast the expert view with some of those frothy rants on the red-meat threads at defense 'fanboy' sites.

End of the A-12 saga?

Let us hope.

The Supreme Court today reversed a lower court ruling that reversed an even lower court ruling, and I learned a new word: “nonjusticiable”.

Defense News has a copy of the ruling.
It ends as pretty much a “Draw”. Parties were left with an option to file for other cause, but who would be that stupid?
I was fairly sympathetic to the 'Contractors' (was GD and McDonnell Douglas - Is GD and Boeing) because I felt they had a good case that the Government did withhold 'superior knowledge' but  essentially the Supreme Court observed, that even though there was 'Prima Facie' evidence the contractors were correct, national security concerns trumped the civil case.

Here's a Google Earth shot of what I believe is the only A-12 mockup in existence.

  It is in the upper left with the outer wing panels removed. It looks like 'home plate'. They put a cover on it sometime in the last three years or so, and as you work past the old F-16s down to the lower right corner, you see Lockheed's JAST engine test article.

F-35 Haters Evidently Aren't Logicians

Been spending a little time the last couple of days trying to keep the JSF Haters at Military.com from hyperventilating over the latest F-35 'scare story' that broke Friday. See Here and Here.

From the Dod Buzz version of the story provocatively titled "The F-35’s legs might not be long enough", and based upon the deceptively-named Federation of American Scientists' release of the DoD's  F-35 Selected Acquisition Report for 2010, we discover that the F-35A model is apparently estimated to be 6 nautical miles short of its Key Performance Parameter (KPP) Combat Radius (584 instead of the KPP's 590 nautical miles).  In engaging the hand-wringers I purposefully did not make a point (but I dropped lots of hints and typed 'estimate' as often as I dared). The weekend has come and gone and no one I saw picked up on what the story was really about. Which is amusing, because the DoD Buzz story practically spelled it out at the end:

But programme officials are also debating whether to change how the range of the F-35A is calculated, the source said. The equation does not include a buffer margin of 5% of fuel capacity, which is intended to be preserved through the end of the flight test period in 2016. Eliminating the buffer margin adds another 72.4km to the aircraft’s combat radius, the source said.

 This paragraph could have been written in Linear A as far as the Anti-JSF crowd was concerned. Let's take a moment to decompose what the paragraph actually says and implies.

RE: But programme officials are also debating whether to change how the range of the F-35A is calculated, the source said. The equation does not include a buffer margin of 5% of fuel capacity, which is intended to be preserved through the end of the flight test period in 2016

So evidently:
1) The program had a conservative methodology in place to help ensure the KPP was achieved.
2) Part of that methodology was installing a 5% margin above and beyond that needed to achieve the KPP.
3) The Program planned to use the buffer until 2016.
4) It seems that the purpose of the extra 5% margin was established by the program to act as a tripwire for taking action.

RE: Eliminating the buffer margin adds another 72.4km to the aircraft’s combat radius, the source said.

Now we see:
1) In reality, even the 'estimated' combat radius really doesn't break the KPP metric based upon expected aircraft performance, but only breaks a program-instituted fudge factor.
2) This fudge factor when added to the KPP threshold means the REAL number 'not being met' via actual performance-based factors in the estimate is ~629nm and not the 590nm KPP.

So the JSF-Haters spent an ENTIRE weekend venting over a 'scare piece' claiming a KPP wasn't being met as it is currently measured, when in reality a fudge-factor based tripwire instituted by the program was barely breached and is still well above the KPP. Instead of observing and noting the wisdom of the program's  approach, the Anti-JSF crowd beats them up over a faux "issue" (vs. a risk being managed). I'll be interested in knowing what the program comes up with as a solution. I would think the fuel-level sensor adjustement (software or hardware) will be the most attractive. I can't help but think a realtively easy answer could be found in tweaking the FADEC at the margins, but the division of labor between Airframe and Powerplant contractors could make it impractical. In any case the program should continue to work to the current methodology and use the tripwire for the original purpose: as a reason to take action as the prudent thing to do.

Be sure and visit the threads, they're a riot -- Including one little (OK, a 'complete') troll I 'Pwned' and his associated meltdown. He was last seen begging for my attention and futilely downrating my comments. If you run into him, and just can't or don't want to ignore him, call him 'Sweetheart'. He likes that.

BlackFive Clears Up F-35 Cost 'Confusion'

 and Ares Dances....poorly

Update 2: BlackFive has explained his interpretation of the chart he used, and as he uses it there is no error. I interpreted it differently (which makes it my error), and would have constructed the chart  somewhat differently to make it clearer. (But then, since I'm Retired AF, I'm a 'Powerpoint god' ...... Note the small 'g')


Updated and Corrected: There was an error in Blackfive's graphic that I missed and repeated here and am keeping for historical accuracy. Essentially the graphic lists RDT&E and MILCON as a part of APUC, when it is part of PAUC. The error does not materially change Blackfive's assertion that what is of importance is the URF, and not the other higher and scarier costs the F-35 detractors like to toss around. My corrections in RED below.
This error is regrettable, mostly because it will give disingenuous F-35 'haters' a hook to ignore Blackfive's larger point.

For the record, and per my DAU course materials, the following is true: 
APUC (Average Procurement Unit Cost) = total procurement dollars (in program base year dollars)/ total procurement quantity. APUC is calculated by dividing total procurement cost by the number of articles to be procured. Total procurement cost includes flyaway, rollaway, sailaway cost (that is, recurring and nonrecurring costs associated with production of the item such as hardware/software, systems engineering (SE), engineering changes and warranties) plus the costs of procuring technical data (TD), training, support equipment, and initial spares.

PAUC (Program Acquisition Unit Cost) = RDT&E $ + Procurement $ + unique MILCON $ (in program base year dollars)/Total procurement quantity + RDT&E prototypes that are production reps used for IOT&E (if any)

Original Post:  
I've been on the road to DC this week (two days and three flights to get back when it should have been a 2+ hr non-stop...another story) so am just catching up on BlackFive's post and the Ares Blog response,  all courtesy of Solomon at SNAFU! (This started out as a SNAFU! comment but the more I thought about it the more I wanted to call B.S. on the B.S.)

When it comes to F-35 ‘costs’ Sweetman is still playing it like he does when frequent commenter 'jackjack' calls him out on the Ares' abuse of F-35 cost numbers. In other words, he talks past the point being made to keep beating the "B.S. Anti-JSF Drum" (patent pending) and holding the JSF costs he does note as 'high' while carefully avoiding equivalent costs (if the info even exists) for other systems. While this Sweetman tactic has at times driven poor 'jackjack' around the bend in frustration, I doubt if it will be little more than mocked at BF for the fey strawman tactic it is. The part of Sweetman's Ares response that directly referred to and linked back to BF's post demonstrates either:
1. The Ragin' Hedge Baby from the Shires didn't really read Blackfive's post or
2. He's assuming a $ cost number used by BlackFive was directed only at Sweetman's use of it.
3. He read the BlackFive post, but thinks his interpretive dance schtick will keep foolin' the rubes.

Sweetman Channels Groucho: "Who are you going to believe? Me or your own lying eyes?"

NOWHERE does BlackFive claim what Sweetman says he does. To whit Sweetman’s parenthetic:

“Blogger BlackFive, for some reason, thinks that APUC includes lifetime O&S costs, and goes off to draw some predictably inaccurate conclusions”

Sweetman is apparently referring to BF’s statement at the link [bold emphasis is mine]:

“Whoa, wait a minute, you say, I’ve seen costs as high as $110 million a copy!


I’m sure you have. But they don’t reflect the URF. Instead they may reflect the Total Ownership Cost (TOC) - the cost of everything necessary to operate the aircraft over the span of its service life - or any of a number of other costs used in the project for various purposes, but it won’t reflect the one we should be most concerned with, the URF.

Yep. 100% accurate.

I find it interesting that Sweetman would assert BF is wrong, when in fact BF’s post includes a graphic (below) that clearly illustrates (with errors irrelevant to BlackFive's point) what gets counted within each 'cost' category and contains no assertions inconsitent with the graphic.

BlackFive's Point 
As I read it, the point of BlackFive’s entire post was about recognizing the URF cost for one airplane as the most relevant cost for discussion: the one people can understand that is similar to the cost they pay when they buy something like a car. The URF value is the value of one plane that comes closest to the expression of what it takes (the discrete value) to produce a unit/commodity that is at risk of loss, or of the value that could be consumed by wear and tear during use. It is a very sensible measure of cost for discussion by the general public and insiders as well.

Sweetman's Fetish
Sweetman’s fetish for APUC and the relevance he assigns to it on the other hand is not nearly as appropriate or useful, unless you like being obtuse for some reason. APUC includes not only the cost of value gained that will not be worn out or lost, but includes costs over which the program has no control, such as military construction, which might not actually occur or will even be ‘gamed’ (now irrellevant anecdote removed.) Even so, I would be comfortable discussing and comparing APUC for various programs IF they were adjusted for comparable-year dollars and even better, if adjusted in quantities for equivalent combat capabilities. associated with production of the item such as hardware/software, systems engineering (SE), engineering changes and warranties) plus the costs of procuring technical data (TD), training, support equipment, and initial spares. But there is one aspect of APUC that makes it VERY inappropriate for use, that I also note Sweetman is careful to avoid mentioning: it includes ‘sunk’ cost, most notably RDT&;E Production, Engineering, and Technical Data  costs that are already incurred.  Since the primary production line for the F-35 is pretty much already stood up, and all the suppliers' production capabilities are running in place waiting for higher production demand, this has to represent a huge chunk of APUC that is already sunk cost. I say Sweetman is “careful to avoid” because while I don’t know if he’s mentioned frequently or ever, it should be stated EVERY time APUC is used and he doesn’t. This failure to do so is, IMHO, a Lie of Omission: one that moves from ‘venial’ to ‘mortal’ the farther along a program is into development and as the increasing % of APUC associated costs become sunk costs.
BlackFive almost nailed it. So what if he cut the 10-ring instead of hitting dead center? Sweetman's response is just more of his pushing his precious and pathetic meme.

There. Didn't have to change all that much after all.

US Fish and Wildlife Needs a Good 'Purge'

H/T Classical Values
I want to make activist U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service biologists (Man!-I hate soft sciences) as 'Endangered' as the imaginary species they try to 'proclaim' into existence. I mean that. They should be too afraid of recrimination to ever consider using this kind of scientific fraud.

Hey A**hats! - the Dunes Sagebrush Lizard is a subspecies, not a species. There's less genetic difference between the Dunes Sagebrush Lizard and it's nearby cousins in New Mexico than there is between humans of different races. Are you saying humankind is made up of different species?

BTW: The F&WS has a long history of employees 'making' the data fit their religious beliefs...and the problem is clearly institutional.

Also, what is the biggest threat to the Lizard anyway? One Suspect.

On the Death of Evil Ones: Enemies Within and Without

H/T Michael Totten posting at Instapundit.

Being military-minded and somewhat experienced in these sort of things, I find no "joy" in Osama Bin Laden's death. I do find satisfaction and relief in the way his death was brought about, and wish my brothers-in-arms in the long continuum of those who have served, are serving, and will serve, continued safety and success in this long war against those who would bring upon us another Dark Age.
On the other hand, when this guy finally croaks (hopefully through natural causes) I'm throwing a freakin' party.

Read his opinion piece at the link. We could play either 'Logical Fallacy' or 'Delusional Leftist Meme' Bingo with his drivel.

 Noam Chomsky. Intellect not only held captive by Ideology, but Intellect perverted by Ideology. The ultimate Useful Idiot.
If you're too busy or lazy to follow the link at the top and read Totten's Yon's comment, it was a short one:

JUST ONCE I’d like to read an article by Noam Chomsky that isn’t faux brilliant in its moral and political idiocy, one that suggests he does, in fact, live in the same world as the rest of us, but he can’t even manage it after Osama bin Laden is killed

Don't hold your breath Michael..

19 Jun 12: Correction on source who was guest-blogging at Instapundit at the time. Thanks to the commenter who just pointed this out, .

Been Busy and Sans Computer

I've gotten a couple of e-mails from folks wondering where I'm at. Wish I could say someplace exciting, but I'm working killer hours and on top of that, my 3-year old laptop (probably about 10 years equivalent of normal use) went up in smoke almost two weeks ago and I've been waiting for one I ordered to show up, which it did today.  Thank goodnesss I back up my data, and buy hard copy software when possible. Now I won't have to beg CPU time on everyone else's systems just to check my e-mail. It'll take a couple of days to restore my pretty extensive list of programs on this system, but I should be 100% before the end of next week.
Anyway, it's not as if anything worth talking about happened in the last two weeks. ;-)