LCS Freedom ‘is fit for service’ (Sorry Ladies)

Excellent article up at Navy Times on the USS Freedom (LCS 1) passing her INSURV

Beginning.....

Some design problems persist, some fixes remain to be made, but overall, the littoral combat ship Freedom is moving ahead to meet its deployment schedule for next spring, the commander of the Navy’s surface forces proclaimed.
“My assessment is the ship is sound, the engineering plant is good, combat systems are good,” said Vice Adm. Richard Hunt. “The ship rides very well.”

Middle.....

“It was very pleasing to me to see several areas where we traditionally have problems with pop up pretty solid,” he added. “We had very solid scores on communications, information systems, medical, corrosion.”
The ship handled very well, he said. “Crash back and steering worked fine,” he noted, referring to an evolution where a ship goes from full ahead to full stop to full astern.
“From 35 knots or so, the ship just stopped,” Hunt said, describing the crash back. “It was like being in a Prius; you don’t feel anything. It just changed, settled down and stopped in the water. I’ve never seen anything like that. I’ve been on cruisers, destroyers and frigates, all shaking and things. This ship is just smooth.”
The Freedom, Hunt said, “is in pretty good shape. Fit for service. The stuff we’ve identified is fixable. I think we’ll do better as the crew becomes more comfortable and proficient with operating the system. It’s one of those things when you have to get out there and run it around, and they have not had that luxury.

End....

Hunt said he had seen a great improvement in the Freedom over the past 18 months or so. “I’m not sure I was a believer a year and a half ago, but I’m there now,” he declared.

Lots more details as to what is 'OK' and what still needs work with both the Freedom and the design  in the article. Read it all here.

USS Freedom (LCS 1) Passes INSURV: Full Speed Ahead (Source USN) 

PS: Skip the DoD Buzz hatchet job on the story. Ewing has dressed it up with the same sort of 'punk' journalistic snark you ought to have come to expect. (but read the comments - they're dee-lightful)

“There are certainly those who would call this an ambush patent”

UK MoD Attempting to Coop American Ingenuity That Brought GPS to The World? 
And the rest of the world might get to pay MORE for GPS equipment and use of the system because of it.

I'd call this worse than 'ambush patent' activity.  I call it bureaucratic rent-seeking parasitism at it's Euro-finest. I would also call it a form of 'Lawfare'.

GPS III Upgrade: To Include Paying the UK for the privilege of using our own systems?

One solution: charge any b*stards who charge us the equivalent for whatever part of the GPS system that up until this point has been 'free'. Make it retroactive. 

No Doubt, This Will All Work Out in the End

One of MANY Artists Concepts of India's New Cruise Missile, Source: Wikipedia

On the one hand: First Test Of Indian Cruise Missile Looms

Unlike its Agni-V ballistic missile, do not expect New Delhi to draw a lot of international attention to upcoming testing of its Nirbhay cruise missile, even as the weapon holds far more significance to the Indian weapons program than is widely appreciated. 

In August, the country is scheduled to conduct the first test of its little known Nirbhay (“fearless”), a subsonic weapon with a maximum range of 1,000 km. Designated secret, the weapon’s development has remained concealed ever since its existence was first revealed in 2006.

And on the other hand: Pakistan Tests Nuclear-Capable Missile

The Hatf IX has a range of only 60 kilometers (37 miles) and can carry conventional warheads, the military said.
“This quick response system addresses the need to deter evolving threats, especially at shorter ranges,” it added in a statement.

Ahhh...Good old fashioned Saber Rattling.

What could go wrong?

CVN-78 Class Carrier: Other Shoe Drops on Radar Costs:

Everyone knew this was coming.

I got a 'head's up' it was 'here' at work today.

It was a conscious decision by the powers that be to break the linkage between the DDG-1000 and CVN-78 radar development and acquisition. You can read the whole report at the FAS (spit) site here, but the devil is in the footnotes on Page 9:

The information paper further states that of the $208 million in cost growth on the dual band radar, $54 million is a consequence of a decision to remove a part of the dual band radar on the Navy’s three Zumwalt (DDG-1000) class destroyers, and the remaining $154 million is due to cost growth in CVN-78-unique installation, integration, and test requirements for the dual band radar. For more on the decision to remove a part of the dual band radar on the DDG-1000 destroyers, see CRS Report RL32109 Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.

If you are a tech history devotee as I am, look at the earlier versions of the CVN-78 report. they've been noting there would be additional costs from splitting the DDG-1000 and CVN-78 efforts for some time. This is the first time we're seeing numbers attached to the change. What we don't know is 1. What will the final 'tab' for the split effort be? and 2. What costs have increased that are now 'unique' but could have been 'shared' if the commonality had survived (for either/both class of ships)?

Note that I do not question whether or not the change was 'wise'. Some change is necessary and has benefits worth the costs to the users.  I only note these are the kind of cost increases that 'changing minds' generate, and we have no idea how many of the other costs are due to 'changes' in direction. 

The Borg Waits For No Customer

Flightglobal: "Israel runs out of time for more Apache upgrades"

Source: DefenseIndustryDaily.com

Hey! If  Boeing couldn't be bothered to keep their 707 line open for the US Government to build new J-STARS airframes (and we know how big a headache that caused the Taxpayer) we can be pretty certain Israel expected no different for their Apache upgrade program:

A batch of three Israeli AH-64As are being worked on at a Boeing facility in the USA. They are scheduled to be redelivered between late 2012 and early 2013, with the first recently entering flight testing. 

Sources suggest Boeing will not commit to conducting additional upgrades from the A to D model which, if confirmed, will only leave Israel with the option of buying new-build Block III Apaches.

Ka.....Ching.

Pay for Play. No news here.

Memorializing Memorial Day

For those who "have fought the good fight" you will find us....

Flying the Flag....

Remembering the Fallen....

Honoring our Dead....

F-35 and Concurrency: Steven Bucci at Heritage Gets It

(The Idiots Still Do Not)

H/T Solomon @ SNAFU!

From Bucci's post F-35: Slowing Down Production Makes No Sense we find:

The Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), as the F-35 is known, is designed to maximize both capability and survivability. Its production methodology was developed to allow for faster fielding of the aircraft and calls for incremental improvements in the design as early models roll of the line. Safety is not sacrificed, and the process known as “concurrency” puts the best available plane in the hands of the warfighters as soon as possible. It also allows for cuts in cost per copy as efficiencies build upon one another.

Unfortunately, forces that never wanted the nation’s pilots to have this aircraft in the first place are now trying to pull a bait and switch. They are saying that there is too much concurrency, and they want to slow down production of the JSF. This would drive up the cost per unit of each JSF and probably force some of our allies to cut the number of planes they have ordered. These cuts would further drive up cost, creating a vicious cycle of cost increases.

The clear goal here is to slow down production and drive up costs in a spiral that will eventually allow opponents of military modernization and proper readiness to call for killing the program altogether. Congress should not allow this to happen.

Solomon's right: Bucci nails it.

Nothing New Under the Sun

Good to see Heritage picking up on a theme I identified years ago. Ladies and Gents, time once again for a slide from SMSgt Mac's Acquisition 101 "Slash and Whine" Detractor Strategy course, first seen on the web in 2006 in reference to F-22 critics.

The 'Concurrency Bogeyman' is the 'Reason' this time

 'Concurrency' is the current lie being used by the detractors (including so-called 'reformers') being leveraged to pretend saving money is the objective. And let's not forget to mention (once again) how big a LIE the 'concurrency' angle is. See my post on Congressional Bloviation on Concurrency from about 9 months ago to get the total picture, but here's a sample as cited from a 2010 Defense AT&L Journal article:

What to Do About Concurrency?
So far, no conclusive evidence exists that concurrency (no matter how it is defined) is generally a problem. This does not mean that concurrency is never a problem. But most likely, concurrency leads to cost and schedule growth under very particular circumstances. What these circumstances are is not very clear just yet. Nor is it clear why in our study, the sweet spot for concurrency is somewhere around the 30 percent mark. What is clear is that there are definite advantages to concurrently designing and building a weapons system that most program managers take advantage of, to some extent or another.
The [1988] Congressional Budget Office study advised that “Congress may wish to take no further action regarding concurrent programs as a group,” given the very weak relationship between the concurrency and cost growth. Instead, the office argued that Congress should simply ask that DoD develop a consistent measure for concurrency to be published in a program’s acquisition report and then monitor programs to see how they are performing relative to their planned level of concurrency. More than 20 years later, this advice still seems to be appropriate.

The Concurrency Bogeyman is not going to disappear until people who use it get called out for their lies, so 'good on' Bucci and the Heritage foundation! 

Awww. The Usual F-35 Hatin' Suspects seem to have shown up at the Heritage site with their usual quiver full of lies, half-truths, and distortions. How quaint. They range from ignorant to stupid-but they're quaint. Around here people say 'Bless their hearts' when we see that kind of lunacy.

Why Suddenly I Find Myself Writing So Much About the LCS

Frickin' POGO is the reason.

I had to do a double-take of the top banner on the page to confirm I really was still at the National Defense Industry Association's website "National Defense" on one of their 'blogs', when I read a  piece titled "Navy to Consider Buying Only One Littoral Combat Ship Design".

I felt compelled to comment:

1. The title either is missing a question mark or is misleading. Nowhere in the body of the post does anyone in the Navy indicate that they are considering a single type buy. Only, when asked, under what conditions they might consider doing so. BIG difference. 

2. RE: Critics. Rule 1, There are always critics, and Rule 2, POGO is always a critic. And on this particular topic not a particularly effective one: http://www.elementsofpower.blogspot.com/2012/05/project-on-government-oversight-still.html

Eh. We'll see if the comment gets posted.

The NDIA article caught my eye, because it is as out of sync as you can possibly imagine with other LCS news also recently out and floating around on the same topic .

From Navy Needs Both LCS Versions For War With China, Iran; Navy UnderSec Defends Program :

 While the Littoral Combat Ship is not suited for the front lines of a war with China, it would provide vital protection to US supply lines in such conflict, said Under Secretary of the Navy Robert Work, and against Iran, LCS would be in the battle from "day one," with eight LCSs ultimately operating out of Bahrain. Indeed, the two potential theaters of war are so different that the Navy may consider focusing the "much more maneuverable" Lockheed Martin version of the LCS on fighting fast attack boats in the narrow waters of the Persian Gulf, while the very different General Dynamics design, with its larger flight deck and fuel tanks, operates primarily in the vast reaches of the Pacific.

Source GD/Austal

And from another article covering what Under Secretary Work was saying either at that time or proximate to same titled LCSs Could Be Based in Gulf, Says U.S. Navy Undersecretary:

Freedom (LCS 1) is to make a demonstration deployment in 2013 to Singapore, which has offered to host four of the ships. The Freedom will return to the U.S. in late 2013 or early 2014 after a 10-month cruise, and the first ship to be regularly operating from the island state is likely to be the Fort Worth (LCS 3), second of the Freedom-class.  

The Navy has said it does not wish to mix both classes of LCSs in Singapore for this early effort, and aside from the Freedom, it will be 2016 at the earliest before enough LCS 1-class ships will be available to be based in Singapore.  

But LCS 1-class ships are better suited to operations in the Arabian Gulf, Work said.

Bonus Question: 

In the "Navy to Consider Buying Only One Littoral Combat Ship Design", what in your opinion is the most telling thing that Freeman is quoted as saying (if accurately quoted) that identifies him as thoroughly unqualified (no more or less than anyone else at POGO) to comment on the LCS program?

 My answer later...NOW! (UPDATE 23 May 12)

That quote, the one most telling thing that Freeman (if accurately quoted) say that identifies him as thoroughly unqualified (no more or less than anyone else at POGO) to comment on the LCS program is:

“It is hard to imagine two ships that do the exact same mission looking more different,” Freeman said. “Those differences go well beyond appearance and will be costly.”

If these were single-mission ships, they might possibly look more alike, but the diversity of missions and associated requirements without prioritizing one well above the others logically creates a broader design trade-space to meet those diverse requirements.

Three Missions, Three Sets of Requirements to Satisfy in a Design

The diversity of relatively equal design requirements allowed resultant designs to be divergent. If the two that were selected seem surprisingly diverse, you haven't seen all the contenders.

More than just having planform/shape divergence, the designs clearly differ in approaches to accomplish the same objectives functionally.

From the KPPs, we can tell an awful lot about the breadth of the design trade-space and use it to perhaps interpret why the competitors chose different paths. High speed/Long Range seems the 'tough' requirement, and Austal has a long history of high-speed multi-hull designs, so their attraction to this contract was obvious. There are very few ways you can go 40+ knots fast for any distance with a shallow draft vessel, and I think all of them may have showed up in competitor's designs, so what we see in the remaining two are just the survivors. There is really no surprise there. The rest of the KPPs, the competitors could decide upon freely.

If Competitor A decided "Conduct DTE Scenario" at the threshold and Interoperability would require more Core Crew Manning, that would affect the treatment of living spaces more than otherwise. If they decided the hull volume for mission payload was important, they might accept more 'Draft'. And so it goes, on and on in weighing every requirement.

If you are mathematically inclined, designing against requirements is akin to simultaneously solving multi-variable equations via matrices manipulation, only you get to pick your x,y,z-etc values within a range for each and your professor doesn't know what answer is 'right' until he sees it. The more diverse the requirements, the more variables you have to deal with.

If you are not mathematically inclined, it's like catering a family reunion such that everyone is willing to eat dinner.The more relatives, the more variables you have to deal with.

Sorry about the long update: I may break this out tomorrow as a separate post 

Source GD/Austal

Democrats playing games with National Defense: Rowan Scarborough Crochets (or something)

Great. Rowan Scarborough at the Washington Times (of all papers) channels the Democrat’s cognitive dissonance without a twinge of irony. Does he even realize it?

Congress does not appear close to reaching a deal that would head off $1.2 trillion in automatic spending cuts, $600 billion of which would strike the Pentagon over the next 10 years, bringing total reductions to more than $1 trillion.  

For now, that prospect is the proverbial elephant in the room

 Hey Rowan, you Doofus! That’s a fake elephant you’re pointing at! The Democrats are holding the leash to the real one.  

Not the Real Elephant In the Room. Source

The BIG ELEPHANT in the room: Democrats are playing sick games (away from scrutiny) with the National Defense to achieve their tawdry and socialistic political ends.

Since Rowan fails to Grok the very piece he wrote, let’s translate it for him.

• Military ordered by the POTUS (D) via the SecDef (D) to not plan for sequestration to prevent ANY possibility, however faint, of a feasible plan to come forward. Not only that, the order prevents any chance of an ILLUSION of a feasible plan to come forward. Why?

• The SecDef(D) has “warned of a “hollow” force if the automatic cuts occur”, and has said there is no alternative long-range budget” . The Services also see “dire consequences of sequestration, which would require deeper troop cuts and missions left undone.” So everyone is agreed that sequestration is a ‘bad’ thing. Or is it if you are a (D)?

• The House of Representatives (Controlled by the Rs), the only entity that can actually authorize USG (and therefore DoD) spending is offering a budget that would ‘avoid’ sequestration.

• The SecDef (D) asserts “that he cannot accept the current Republican 2013 budget that avoids sequestration”. If, as he has asserted, sequestration will result in a “hollow force” if it occurs, then why CAN'T he “accept” the current 2013 House (controlled by R but still ‘House’) budget?

“I’m grateful to the House for recognizing the importance of stopping sequestration,” he said. “But by taking these funds from the poor, middle-class Americans, homeowners and other vulnerable parts of our American constituencies, the guaranteed results will be confrontation, gridlock and a greater likelihood of sequester....

The key is to work together. Each side can stake out its political position. I understand that. But the fact is that nothimg will happen without compromise from both sides"

We finally get to the real story:

Hoping Nobody Notices As Long as the Press Covers For Him? Source: Michael Ramirez/IBD

The difference between a SecDef and a SecDef(D).

The SecDef(D) is willing to obey his Master and knowingly GUT the National Defense under the pretense of caring about the “poor, middle-class Americans, homeowners and other vulnerable parts of our American constituencies” while (and since 2009) the rest of the entire Obama Democratic machine has been working at gutting the economic engine that supports us all.

I ALMOST can’t tell which is more disturbing.

On the one hand we have The ‘Homicidal Democrat Uber Alles Clown Posse’ itself. On the other we have the fact that what made it all possible was the Republican Suckers getting PWND on the 2011 budget.

Ehhh,who am I kidding. Being Evil is worse than Stupid, even if by a nose. I call it for the Clown Posse. (But I still REALLY want to get rid of the Suckers).

Attention potential commenters: I added the Useful Idiot tag for anyone who might want to chime in and defend the sequestration lunacy or the train wreck created by Obama and his ilk.

Ships and Sealing Wax: LCS and LPD

Updated and Bumped 5/17: Update at Bottom of Original Post

If a 'Cynic' is "A man who knows the price of everything and the value of nothing.”
What 'kind' of 'Cynic' is "A man who knows the price of one thing and the value of nothing.”?

Original Post

"The time has come," the Walrus said, "To talk of many things: Of shoes--and ships--and sealing-wax-- Of cabbages--and kings


With the high drama now playing out (or drumming up?) over the LCS program, in particular the raking over of Lockheed Martin's LCS 1, I thought about 'what is different?' about the LCS? Which led me to then ask myself: What was going on with the last so-called ship building 'disaster' that was burned at the stake by a polygot mob of the uninformed and inexperienced, including the usual villagers with pitchforks? 
That would be, for the folks not taking time to follow the links, the USS San Antonio (LPD 17).

USS San Antonio (US Navy Photo)

So what happened to the 'disaster'?  Why aren't the usual suspects STILL howling about this 'doomed' program?

SUCCESS is what happened. 

The same thing that happens 99+% of the time. 

The USS San Antonio was awarded the "Battle E" in March for being especially effective:

San Antonio was recognized for superior performance over the past year, and for several significant achievements, displaying excellence in maritime warfare capabilities, engineering/survivability, command and control, and the type commander's Safety Award.  

The Battle E award is based on a yearlong overall evaluation of San Antonio accomplishments during training exercises, various command inspections and nomination by their immediate superior in command COMPHIBRON 4. 

"It's all of you that are making this ship succeed," said Capt. Peter Pagano, commander, COMPHIBRON 4, during a morning all-hands call aboard San Antonio. "It's the officers, chiefs and Sailors on this ship, down to the most junior seaman that will continue to do so through INSURV (Board of Inspection and Survey assessment scheduled to begin April 23). You all should be very proud to be San Antonio Sailors." 

Eligibility for the award required a consistent day-to-day demonstration of excellence and superior achievement during all certifications and qualifications conducted following departure from the shipyard last year.  

San Antonio may now display the big white letter "E" with the black shadow on its super structure along several other awards as a testament to the focus, teamwork, pride and ownership demonstrated throughout a rigorous maintenance and basic phase.

Anybody hear about this at the major 'defense' news sites? Anyone? The only 'commercial' newsy site that I recognized in the first three pages of a Google search was 'Soldier of Fortune'.

Designers build in the capability. The people who 'maintain' and 'operate' bring that capability out. As always. 

Many of the so-called 'reform' crowd are likely to either take partial credit for the turn-around or decry the time and effort it took to get the San Antonio to this point (or both). For MOST of them, a new favorite ( I think I'll be using it a lot more this year) quote applies:

Novices in mathematics, science, or engineering are forever demanding infallible, universal, mechanical methods for solving problems.-J. R. Pierce

The few non-novices in the minority of the 'reform' crowd SHOULD simply know better. That they do not is just....sad.

Updated 17 May @ 2230 Hrs CST

From the 'comments':

Hundreds of millions of dollars over budget, the San Antonio has cost nearly $2 billion. "On a per-ton basis, it is the most expensive amphibious vessel ever built for the military" - CBO report.

In addition to the $1.8 billion original price tag, the Navy paid at least $50 million for repairs. The service won't disclose the actual amount as it is still being negotiated with Northrop Grumman and other contractors.

Yay. What an amazing success

Let's accept the unit costs offered by the commenter, as they're close enough to the latest (and last!) LPD (San Antonio Class) program Selected Acquisition Report (SAR). The actual figure found there is $1.710827B per hull, (see Acquisition Cost extract below)  but we'll allow a mulligan for the rounding up ~$79M to get the $1.8B claim. Fine.  




2011 LPD Program Selected Acquisition Report: Acquisition Costs  


But 'Acquisition Costs' are only part of the cost side of the equation. In fact they're usually only about 1/3 of the costs to be considered. Sustainment is the other 2/3 of the cost, and the biggest chunk of that is operation and support (O&S) costs.  So what about the San Antonio Class O&S costs? 
Fortunately, the O&S costs are also included in the 2011 SAR:


2011 LPD 17 Class SAR: O&S Cost Estimate

The reader will note that the lifetime O&S costs of the LPD-17 class is much lower than the class of ships they are directly replacing (LPD-4 class). O&S costs for ONE LPD-17is estimated to be  $3.526Billion lower than one LPD-4 hull when using baseline year (1996) dollars. this is the LOW savings estimate. If we use then-year dollars (when the dollars are actually spent) the LPD-17's O&S costs per hull are estimated to be about $6.18B lower than the LPD-4s they will replace. I'll put any of those numbers on the balance sheet against the paltry (in comparison)  $1.8B cost to buy each of the LPD-17s

More 'Value' at lower total cost 

Now add the 'value' half to the equation. The LPD-17 is clearly superior to the LPD-4 in capability and capacity, and it replaces more than just the LPD-4 class of ships. It should therefore be easily seen by most why the Navy saw the time, dollars  and effort expended to bring the San Antonio class into the fleet as an investment worth making. 

 So......

 Yay, What an amazing success

F-35: Skaff vs. Brigante

Inside Promoter vs. Outside Discounter: Nobody's Perfect

SLD Info has a fairly decent piece up where they interview a Lockheed Martin Former-Viper-Meat- Servo-now-Systems-Engineer named Dr. Michael L. Skaff on what makes the F-35 different from all those 4-point-something-generation aircraft that the Giovanni de Briganti fellow over in 'Gay Paree' seems to think is 'just like' a fifth-generation F-35. 

You have to make yourself get past the rather contrived leading-question format SLD uses, and sift Skaff's techno-cliche' verbiage found on oh-too-many 'summary' PowerPoint slides , but it's worth the effort to just get down and digest the data.

Source: SLDinfo.com

The only place Skaff goes way outside the wire is when he gets a little 'giggly' about the YF-22 having better 'maneuverability' than the YF-23. Yes it is generally known that was the case, but the difference in maneuverability was relatively small, and due largely to the gamble Lockheed made in putting vectored thrust on the YF-22 when it was NOT a requirement.  The YF-23, in comparison to the YF-22 was NOT as Dr Skaff described (in discussing maneuverability):

Skaff: Agility from a fighter pilot point of view is fighter performance.  A classic example was the YF-23. It was a phenomenal interceptor, but that’s all it could do. It couldn’t turn. It didn’t have great agility, fighter performance. 

They [Northrop] went too far with the stealth enabler, and you had an extremely stealthy airplane, but they paid for it in lack of fighter performance.

He 'overstates' the F-23 agility advantage (by more than a 'tidge'). Let's just say I was 'AFFTC' at the time, been inside ear-protection range while both aircraft were running engines at the same time, and know AF guys who actually crunched data used to 'grade' the flyoff.

He also conveniently forgets to mention -- if he even knows-- that the YF-22 was officially selected for being seen as 'lower risk' design and more 'producable'. Those reasons often get guffaws from those of us who worked "Stealth Week" for reasons I don't care to explain.  IMHO. the ATF contract award marked the shift in the balance of 'performance' vs. 'lower risk' towards 'lower (perceived) risk'.   

Skaff''s little ATF side trip in the discussion might dissuade otherwise knowledgeable people from accepting the rest of his assertions concerning the F-35. He needs to stick with what he really knows (like, apparently, Pilot-Vehicle Interface).          

Bob Cox Buries Lede in Recycled F-35 'News'

The real news is the excreble Winslow Wheeler is now at POGO. I guess the radical trust fund baby cum 'photographer' got tired of paying his salary.
Good.
It's always helpful when targets bunch up. Even metaphorical targets.

Av Week's LCS 1 "Hit Piece": Unintentionally Helpful

..to anyone who has been paying attention (of course MOST people haven't been).

Seriously, go read the AvWeek 'Investigative' report on LCS 1.  Match up the timelines for faults, findings, corrective actions. Set aside the 'scandalous' structure and phrasing and it will illuminate on many of the open LCS 1 design/build process questions I posed earlier in parsing the POGO arguments.

As to LCS 1 specifically, I am only 'mildly' interested in the Fabey 'tour' in dry dock that the Navy says never happened (protecting 'sources' there Fabey?).  I'm a little more interested in the INSURVs recent evaluation of crew (non)readiness.

LCS 1 at RIMPAC

Giovanni de Briganti: Shillin' for Euros?

This is Giovanni de Brigante (with an 'e'):

Giovanni de Brigante. 1920s Air Racer Source: Corbis

He was one of the daring European air race pilots of his day. He probably understood his flying machine, how to extract the most performance from it, what was critical to the successful operation of the plane and where its technological standing was relative to the existing state of the aeronautical art in his time. He probably knew what he was talking about when it came to bleeding-edge technology of the day.  

This is Giovanni de Briganti (with an 'i'):

Giovanni de Briganti: Aero 'Jpournalist' (graphic by SMSgt Mac)

This Giovanni de Briganti is… none of the above.

This Giovanni de Briganti pens what is IMHO best described as Euro-propaganda with an aeronautics angle. He's written some incredibly stupid things about ‘some’ advanced aerospace projects. To this observer, it appears his targeted  ‘some’ projects are selected according to a ratio inverse to amount of advertising space purchased on his website. (Just Sayin'!)

His latest (perhaps even “Euro-sponsored”?) piece is a doozy.  We could take him to task for trying to pass off the simplistic logic he uses to redefine fighter generations, or how he relates a simplified (for simpletons?) narrative on the state of the F-35’s HMD (a better one here). among other things. He manages to repeat every Euro-canard program’s PR trope on sensor-fusion and interoperability in going down the list of ‘5th Gen’ capabilities as well.  

But to save time and really highlight that Mr. de Briganti knows NOTHING about the key technologies involved and which he feels empowered to write about, let us use his own words concerning Low Observability, aka ‘Stealth’.

Only part of two paragraphs are necessary to show Giovanni de Briganti is a complete tyro when it comes to modern fighter technology.

de Briganti's first revelatory failure:  

In any case, detection by radar matters less and less because by switching on its radar a fighter becomes as visible as someone turning on a flashlight in a dark room.

Which seems almost verbatim what the once-highly respected Thomas S. Amlie* tried to claim concerning the B-2’s ‘Low Probability of Intercept Radar’ (LPIR).  F-22 and F-35 AESA radars are of the very latest generation of Active Electronic Scanned Array (AESA) systems. AESA’s are such a good idea, ‘4^th Gen’ aircraft makers (including LM with the F-16) are scrambling to field AESAs on older aircraft. Installations on older designs can be problematic from a power/cooling perspective so there may tend to be more trade offs in radar performance to make the newer radars compatible with older systems, but that is beside the point. The point is, there is a tremendous effort going on to come up with ways that  would make AESAs more ‘detectable’ because finding them, tracking them, and locking on to them is for all practical purposes, nearly impossible to do reliably. And that my friends is NOT at all the same as becoming  “as visible as someone turning on a flashlight in a dark room”.

If Mr de Briganti had anything close to a clue concerning AESA radar technology, he seems to have lost it. Mr. Amlie was wrong because he didn’t know about new and then mostly classified technology. Mr. de Briganti apparently isn’t aware of twenty-year (plus!) old unclassified technology because....he's ignorant?    

de Briganti’s  second failure:  

So the preferred detection sensors are optical, like Infra-Red Scan and Track (IRST), and in this case the large and very hot exhaust plume of the F-35’s 45,000-lb thrust engine is as visible as a blowtorch in the same dark room.

Heh.  I’ll just repeat part of the observations I made over at Solomon’s SNAFU! blog a little while back (Typos corrected of course) :

IRST tracking is a short range capability. Just like for visible light digital detection systems, digital infrared detection requires at a minimum 1 pixel with detectable contrast to surrounding pixels. (Analog systems, such as the human eye require 1/2 arc-seconds 'width' contrasting against the field of view).These are clear-sky minimums. Any kind of moisture in the air between target and detector, or behind the target will reduce detection range. Typical operating altitudes commonly have a lot of this moisture equal or above them.

The total target contrast is attenuated by the physical properties of the atmosphere itself. The major constituent gases 'absorb' Medium IR frequencies, and those just happen to be the part of the bandwidth emitted by the jet exhaust. The Low IR and High IR bands aren't absorbed nearly as much, so the management of these emissions is accomplished by selection of outer mold line shaping, coating colors and surface textures. And then you get to F-35 formations, tactics and sensor fusion. Sneaking up on an F-35 with an IRST will be a very dangerous game for the attacker …

…. Just because you can see a LO asset doesn't mean you can engage it. If you can engage the LO asset, it doesn't mean you can actually hit it. Think about it -- there's a reason why we've [US have] never gone in big on IRSTs for air-to-air combat.

So much for the hyperbolic blowtorch.

He should read more. Suggested topic: Kill Chain. Then he couldn't help to write less drivel.

Now the only question is: are we prepared for the 'gems' he'll present in his "Part 2"?

*If you want to read where Amlie really ‘stepped in it’ (his failure was that his technical knowledge of radar was past its expiration date and he wrote his argument down for the world to see) get a copy of the book The "Pentagon Paradox" and read Appendix C (pp355-56) for his letter (with equations!) describing how a dish antenna system would always be detectable. Too bad a LPIR radar doesn't use a dish.  Mr.  Amlie passed away fairly recently, and I find it fitting that the obituaries seem to have overlooked this singular event, as it probably did not rise to be worthy of mention on the balance sheet of an otherwise outstanding career.

LCS 3 (USS Fort Worth) Passes Sea Trials

News release from Naval Sea Systems Command Office of Corporate Communications:

"Fort Worth performed extremely well during its trials," said LCS Program Manager Capt. John Neagley. "The ship's level of completion coupled with Marinette Marine's excellent craftsmanship resulted in relatively few material deficiencies."

During the four-day trial, the Navy conducted comprehensive tests intended to demonstrate the performance of the propulsion plant, ship handling and auxiliary systems. This improved performance in comparison to the first ship of the class is a result of design stability, facility improvements and production efficiencies by the shipbuilder.

Barring some attributed, authoritative information to the contrary from another source, I will conclude that LCS 1 Freedoms 'problems' were indeed 'First of Class' issues. 'Somehow' an acquisition disaster is averted by the aquisition system that 'some' claim is a disaster itself . Time will tell if the ship's reliability is what is required.

USS Fort Worth on Sea Trials (Lockheed Martn Photo)

Note: I assume there will be 'problems' these ships will encounter in the future, Navy crews would be much smaller on ALL its ships if it wasn't for that darned entropy.

Hull Complete, March 2009 (Lockheed Martin Photo)

Minor nit in passing: I'm kind of beaked that the first US warship to be named after one of my 'home towns' isn't a Capital Ship or if it had to be an LCS, I would have preferred the Austal design (although boat operatons might perhaps be less fun from the even-numbered LCS's. I don't know)

LCS 3 Christening 4 December 2010 (US Navy Photo)
Nothing like testing the ship's 'righting moment' right out of the box