Thursday, May 31, 2012

“There are certainly those who would call this an ambush patent”

UK MoD Attempting to Coop American Ingenuity That Brought GPS to The World
And the rest of the world might get to pay MORE for GPS equipment and use of the system because of it.

I'd call this worse than 'ambush patent' activity.  I call it bureaucratic rent-seeking parasitism at it's Euro-finest. I would also call it a form of 'Lawfare'.

GPS III Upgrade: To Include Paying the UK for the privilege of using our own systems?
One solution: charge any b*stards who charge us the equivalent for whatever part of the GPS system that up until this point has been 'free'. Make it retroactive. 

No Doubt, This Will All Work Out in the End

One of MANY Artists Concepts of India's New Cruise Missile, Source: Wikipedia

On the one hand: First Test Of Indian Cruise Missile Looms

Unlike its Agni-V ballistic missile, do not expect New Delhi to draw a lot of international attention to upcoming testing of its Nirbhay cruise missile, even as the weapon holds far more significance to the Indian weapons program than is widely appreciated. 
In August, the country is scheduled to conduct the first test of its little known Nirbhay (“fearless”), a subsonic weapon with a maximum range of 1,000 km. Designated secret, the weapon’s development has remained concealed ever since its existence was first revealed in 2006.
And on the other hand: Pakistan Tests Nuclear-Capable Missile
The Hatf IX has a range of only 60 kilometers (37 miles) and can carry conventional warheads, the military said.
“This quick response system addresses the need to deter evolving threats, especially at shorter ranges,” it added in a statement.
Ahhh...Good old fashioned Saber Rattling.

What could go wrong?

CVN-78 Class Carrier: Other Shoe Drops on Radar Costs:

Everyone knew this was coming.

I got a 'head's up' it was 'here' at work today.

It was a conscious decision by the powers that be to break the linkage between the DDG-1000 and CVN-78 radar development and acquisition. You can read the whole report at the FAS (spit) site here, but the devil is in the footnotes on Page 9:
The information paper further states that of the $208 million in cost growth on the dual band radar, $54 million is a consequence of a decision to remove a part of the dual band radar on the Navy’s three Zumwalt (DDG-1000) class destroyers, and the remaining $154 million is due to cost growth in CVN-78-unique installation, integration, and test requirements for the dual band radar. For more on the decision to remove a part of the dual band radar on the DDG-1000 destroyers, see CRS Report RL32109 Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
If you are a tech history devotee as I am, look at the earlier versions of the CVN-78 report. they've been noting there would be additional costs from splitting the DDG-1000 and CVN-78 efforts for some time. This is the first time we're seeing numbers attached to the change. What we don't know is 1. What will the final 'tab' for the split effort be? and 2. What costs have increased that are now 'unique' but could have been 'shared' if the commonality had survived (for either/both class of ships)?

Note that I do not question whether or not the change was 'wise'. Some change is necessary and has benefits worth the costs to the users.  I only note these are the kind of cost increases that 'changing minds' generate, and we have no idea how many of the other costs are due to 'changes' in direction. 

Wednesday, May 30, 2012

The Borg Waits For No Customer

Flightglobal: "Israel runs out of time for more Apache upgrades"


Hey! If  Boeing couldn't be bothered to keep their 707 line open for the US Government to build new J-STARS airframes (and we know how big a headache that caused the Taxpayer) we can be pretty certain Israel expected no different for their Apache upgrade program:

A batch of three Israeli AH-64As are being worked on at a Boeing facility in the USA. They are scheduled to be redelivered between late 2012 and early 2013, with the first recently entering flight testing. 
Sources suggest Boeing will not commit to conducting additional upgrades from the A to D model which, if confirmed, will only leave Israel with the option of buying new-build Block III Apaches.


Pay for Play. No news here.

Monday, May 28, 2012

Memorializing Memorial Day

For those who "have fought the good fight" you will find us....

Flying the Flag....

Remembering the Fallen....

Honoring our Dead....

Thursday, May 24, 2012

F-35 and Concurrency: Steven Bucci at Heritage Gets It

(The Idiots Still Do Not)

H/T Solomon @ SNAFU!

From Bucci's post F-35: Slowing Down Production Makes No Sense we find:
The Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), as the F-35 is known, is designed to maximize both capability and survivability. Its production methodology was developed to allow for faster fielding of the aircraft and calls for incremental improvements in the design as early models roll of the line. Safety is not sacrificed, and the process known as “concurrency” puts the best available plane in the hands of the warfighters as soon as possible. It also allows for cuts in cost per copy as efficiencies build upon one another.
Unfortunately, forces that never wanted the nation’s pilots to have this aircraft in the first place are now trying to pull a bait and switch. They are saying that there is too much concurrency, and they want to slow down production of the JSF. This would drive up the cost per unit of each JSF and probably force some of our allies to cut the number of planes they have ordered. These cuts would further drive up cost, creating a vicious cycle of cost increases.

The clear goal here is to slow down production and drive up costs in a spiral that will eventually allow opponents of military modernization and proper readiness to call for killing the program altogether. Congress should not allow this to happen.

Solomon's right: Bucci nails it.

Nothing New Under the Sun

Good to see Heritage picking up on a theme I identified years ago. Ladies and Gents, time once again for a slide from SMSgt Mac's Acquisition 101 "Slash and Whine" Detractor Strategy course, first seen on the web in 2006 in reference to F-22 critics.
The 'Concurrency Bogeyman' is the 'Reason' this time
 'Concurrency' is the current lie being used by the detractors (including so-called 'reformers') being leveraged to pretend saving money is the objective. And let's not forget to mention (once again) how big a LIE the 'concurrency' angle is. See my post on Congressional Bloviation on Concurrency from about 9 months ago to get the total picture, but here's a sample as cited from a 2010 Defense AT&L Journal article:

What to Do About Concurrency?
So far, no conclusive evidence exists that concurrency (no matter how it is defined) is generally a problem. This does not mean that concurrency is never a problem. But most likely, concurrency leads to cost and schedule growth under very particular circumstances. What these circumstances are is not very clear just yet. Nor is it clear why in our study, the sweet spot for concurrency is somewhere around the 30 percent mark. What is clear is that there are definite advantages to concurrently designing and building a weapons system that most program managers take advantage of, to some extent or another.
The [1988] Congressional Budget Office study advised that “Congress may wish to take no further action regarding concurrent programs as a group,” given the very weak relationship between the concurrency and cost growth. Instead, the office argued that Congress should simply ask that DoD develop a consistent measure for concurrency to be published in a program’s acquisition report and then monitor programs to see how they are performing relative to their planned level of concurrency. More than 20 years later, this advice still seems to be appropriate.

The Concurrency Bogeyman is not going to disappear until people who use it get called out for their lies, so 'good on' Bucci and the Heritage foundation! 

Awww. The Usual F-35 Hatin' Suspects seem to have shown up at the Heritage site with their usual quiver full of lies, half-truths, and distortions. How quaint. They range from ignorant to stupid-but they're quaint. Around here people say 'Bless their hearts' when we see that kind of lunacy.

Tuesday, May 22, 2012

Why Suddenly I Find Myself Writing So Much About the LCS

Frickin' POGO is the reason.

I had to do a double-take of the top banner on the page to confirm I really was still at the National Defense Industry Association's website "National Defense" on one of their 'blogs', when I read a  piece titled "Navy to Consider Buying Only One Littoral Combat Ship Design".

I felt compelled to comment:

1. The title either is missing a question mark or is misleading. Nowhere in the body of the post does anyone in the Navy indicate that they are considering a single type buy. Only, when asked, under what conditions they might consider doing so. BIG difference. 
2. RE: Critics. Rule 1, There are always critics, and Rule 2, POGO is always a critic. And on this particular topic not a particularly effective one:

Eh. We'll see if the comment gets posted.

The NDIA article caught my eye, because it is as out of sync as you can possibly imagine with other LCS news also recently out and floating around on the same topic .
From Navy Needs Both LCS Versions For War With China, Iran; Navy UnderSec Defends Program :

 While the Littoral Combat Ship is not suited for the front lines of a war with China, it would provide vital protection to US supply lines in such conflict, said Under Secretary of the Navy Robert Work, and against Iran, LCS would be in the battle from "day one," with eight LCSs ultimately operating out of Bahrain. Indeed, the two potential theaters of war are so different that the Navy may consider focusing the "much more maneuverable" Lockheed Martin version of the LCS on fighting fast attack boats in the narrow waters of the Persian Gulf, while the very different General Dynamics design, with its larger flight deck and fuel tanks, operates primarily in the vast reaches of the Pacific.
Source GD/Austal

And from another article covering what Under Secretary Work was saying either at that time or proximate to same titled LCSs Could Be Based in Gulf, Says U.S. Navy Undersecretary:

Freedom (LCS 1) is to make a demonstration deployment in 2013 to Singapore, which has offered to host four of the ships. The Freedom will return to the U.S. in late 2013 or early 2014 after a 10-month cruise, and the first ship to be regularly operating from the island state is likely to be the Fort Worth (LCS 3), second of the Freedom-class.  
The Navy has said it does not wish to mix both classes of LCSs in Singapore for this early effort, and aside from the Freedom, it will be 2016 at the earliest before enough LCS 1-class ships will be available to be based in Singapore.  
But LCS 1-class ships are better suited to operations in the Arabian Gulf, Work said.

Bonus Question: 

In the "Navy to Consider Buying Only One Littoral Combat Ship Design", what in your opinion is the most telling thing that Freeman is quoted as saying (if accurately quoted) that identifies him as thoroughly unqualified (no more or less than anyone else at POGO) to comment on the LCS program?

 My answer later...NOW! (UPDATE 23 May 12)

That quote, the one most telling thing that Freeman (if accurately quoted) say that identifies him as thoroughly unqualified (no more or less than anyone else at POGO) to comment on the LCS program is:

“It is hard to imagine two ships that do the exact same mission looking more different,” Freeman said. “Those differences go well beyond appearance and will be costly.”

If these were single-mission ships, they might possibly look more alike, but the diversity of missions and associated requirements without prioritizing one well above the others logically creates a broader design trade-space to meet those diverse requirements.

Three Missions, Three Sets of Requirements to Satisfy in a Design
The diversity of relatively equal design requirements allowed resultant designs to be divergent. If the two that were selected seem surprisingly diverse, you haven't seen all the contenders.

More than just having planform/shape divergence, the designs clearly differ in approaches to accomplish the same objectives functionally.

From the KPPs, we can tell an awful lot about the breadth of the design trade-space and use it to perhaps interpret why the competitors chose different paths. High speed/Long Range seems the 'tough' requirement, and Austal has a long history of high-speed multi-hull designs, so their attraction to this contract was obvious. There are very few ways you can go 40+ knots fast for any distance with a shallow draft vessel, and I think all of them may have showed up in competitor's designs, so what we see in the remaining two are just the survivors. There is really no surprise there. The rest of the KPPs, the competitors could decide upon freely.
If Competitor A decided "Conduct DTE Scenario" at the threshold and Interoperability would require more Core Crew Manning, that would affect the treatment of living spaces more than otherwise. If they decided the hull volume for mission payload was important, they might accept more 'Draft'. And so it goes, on and on in weighing every requirement.

If you are mathematically inclined, designing against requirements is akin to simultaneously solving multi-variable equations via matrices manipulation, only you get to pick your x,y,z-etc values within a range for each and your professor doesn't know what answer is 'right' until he sees it. The more diverse the requirements, the more variables you have to deal with.

If you are not mathematically inclined, it's like catering a family reunion such that everyone is willing to eat dinner.The more relatives, the more variables you have to deal with.

Sorry about the long update: I may break this out tomorrow as a separate post 

Source GD/Austal

Monday, May 21, 2012

Democrats playing games with National Defense: Rowan Scarborough Crochets (or something)

Great. Rowan Scarborough at the Washington Times (of all papers) channels the Democrat’s cognitive dissonance without a twinge of irony. Does he even realize it?
Congress does not appear close to reaching a deal that would head off $1.2 trillion in automatic spending cuts, $600 billion of which would strike the Pentagon over the next 10 years, bringing total reductions to more than $1 trillion.  
For now, that prospect is the proverbial elephant in the room
 Hey Rowan, you Doofus! That’s a fake elephant you’re pointing at! The Democrats are holding the leash to the real one.  
Not the Real Elephant In the Room. Source

The BIG ELEPHANT in the room: Democrats are playing sick games (away from scrutiny) with the National Defense to achieve their tawdry and socialistic political ends.

Since Rowan fails to Grok the very piece he wrote, let’s translate it for him.

  • Military ordered by the POTUS (D) via the SecDef (D) to not plan for sequestration to prevent ANY possibility, however faint, of a feasible plan to come forward. Not only that, the order prevents any chance of an ILLUSION of a feasible plan to come forward. Why?

  • The SecDef(D) has “warned of a “hollow” force if the automatic cuts occur”, and has said there is no alternative long-range budget” . The Services also see “dire consequences of sequestration, which would require deeper troop cuts and missions left undone.” So everyone is agreed that sequestration is a ‘bad’ thing. Or is it if you are a (D)?

  • The House of Representatives (Controlled by the Rs), the only entity that can actually authorize USG (and therefore DoD) spending is offering a budget that would ‘avoid’ sequestration.

  • The SecDef (D) asserts “that he cannot accept the current Republican 2013 budget that avoids sequestration”. If, as he has asserted, sequestration will result in a “hollow force” if it occurs, then why CAN'T he “accept” the current 2013 House (controlled by R but still ‘House’) budget?
“I’m grateful to the House for recognizing the importance of stopping sequestration,” he said. “But by taking these funds from the poor, middle-class Americans, homeowners and other vulnerable parts of our American constituencies, the guaranteed results will be confrontation, gridlock and a greater likelihood of sequester....
The key is to work together. Each side can stake out its political position. I understand that. But the fact is that nothimg will happen without compromise from both sides"
We finally get to the real story:
Hoping Nobody Notices As Long as the Press Covers For Him? Source: Michael Ramirez/IBD

The difference between a SecDef and a SecDef(D).

The SecDef(D) is willing to obey his Master and knowingly GUT the National Defense under the pretense of caring about the “poor, middle-class Americans, homeowners and other vulnerable parts of our American constituencies” while (and since 2009) the rest of the entire Obama Democratic machine has been working at gutting the economic engine that supports us all.

I ALMOST can’t tell which is more disturbing.

On the one hand we have The ‘Homicidal Democrat Uber Alles Clown Posse’ itself. On the other we have the fact that what made it all possible was the Republican Suckers getting PWND on the 2011 budget.

Ehhh,who am I kidding. Being Evil is worse than Stupid, even if by a nose. I call it for the Clown Posse. (But I still REALLY want to get rid of the Suckers).

Attention potential commenters: I added the Useful Idiot tag for anyone who might want to chime in and defend the sequestration lunacy or the train wreck created by Obama and his ilk.

Thursday, May 17, 2012

Ships and Sealing Wax: LCS and LPD

Updated and Bumped 5/17: Update at Bottom of Original Post

If a 'Cynic' is "A man who knows the price of everything and the value of nothing.”
What 'kind' of 'Cynic' is "A man who knows the price of one thing and the value of nothing.”?

Original Post

"The time has come," the Walrus said, "To talk of many things: Of shoes--and ships--and sealing-wax-- Of cabbages--and kings

With the high drama now playing out (or drumming up?) over the LCS program, in particular the raking over of Lockheed Martin's LCS 1, I thought about 'what is different?' about the LCS? Which led me to then ask myself: What was going on with the last so-called ship building 'disaster' that was burned at the stake by a polygot mob of the uninformed and inexperienced, including the usual villagers with pitchforks? 
That would be, for the folks not taking time to follow the links, the USS San Antonio (LPD 17).
USS San Antonio (US Navy Photo)
So what happened to the 'disaster'?  Why aren't the usual suspects STILL howling about this 'doomed' program?

SUCCESS is what happened. 

The same thing that happens 99+% of the time. 

The USS San Antonio was awarded the "Battle E" in March for being especially effective:
San Antonio was recognized for superior performance over the past year, and for several significant achievements, displaying excellence in maritime warfare capabilities, engineering/survivability, command and control, and the type commander's Safety Award.  
The Battle E award is based on a yearlong overall evaluation of San Antonio accomplishments during training exercises, various command inspections and nomination by their immediate superior in command COMPHIBRON 4. 
"It's all of you that are making this ship succeed," said Capt. Peter Pagano, commander, COMPHIBRON 4, during a morning all-hands call aboard San Antonio. "It's the officers, chiefs and Sailors on this ship, down to the most junior seaman that will continue to do so through INSURV (Board of Inspection and Survey assessment scheduled to begin April 23). You all should be very proud to be San Antonio Sailors." 
Eligibility for the award required a consistent day-to-day demonstration of excellence and superior achievement during all certifications and qualifications conducted following departure from the shipyard last year.  
San Antonio may now display the big white letter "E" with the black shadow on its super structure along several other awards as a testament to the focus, teamwork, pride and ownership demonstrated throughout a rigorous maintenance and basic phase.
Anybody hear about this at the major 'defense' news sites? Anyone? The only 'commercial' newsy site that I recognized in the first three pages of a Google search was 'Soldier of Fortune'.

Designers build in the capability. The people who 'maintain' and 'operate' bring that capability out. As always. 

Many of the so-called 'reform' crowd are likely to either take partial credit for the turn-around or decry the time and effort it took to get the San Antonio to this point (or both). For MOST of them, a new favorite ( I think I'll be using it a lot more this year) quote applies:

Novices in mathematics, science, or engineering are forever demanding infallible, universal, mechanical methods for solving problems.-J. R. Pierce
The few non-novices in the minority of the 'reform' crowd SHOULD simply know better. That they do not is just....sad.

Updated 17 May @ 2230 Hrs CST

From the 'comments':
Hundreds of millions of dollars over budget, the San Antonio has cost nearly $2 billion. "On a per-ton basis, it is the most expensive amphibious vessel ever built for the military" - CBO report.

In addition to the $1.8 billion original price tag, the Navy paid at least $50 million for repairs. The service won't disclose the actual amount as it is still being negotiated with Northrop Grumman and other contractors.

Yay. What an amazing success
Let's accept the unit costs offered by the commenter, as they're close enough to the latest (and last!) LPD (San Antonio Class) program Selected Acquisition Report (SAR). The actual figure found there is $1.710827B per hull, (see Acquisition Cost extract below)  but we'll allow a mulligan for the rounding up ~$79M to get the $1.8B claim. Fine.  

2011 LPD Program Selected Acquisition Report: Acquisition Costs  

But 'Acquisition Costs' are only part of the cost side of the equation. In fact they're usually only about 1/3 of the costs to be considered. Sustainment is the other 2/3 of the cost, and the biggest chunk of that is operation and support (O&S) costs.  So what about the San Antonio Class O&S costs? 
Fortunately, the O&S costs are also included in the 2011 SAR:

2011 LPD 17 Class SAR: O&S Cost Estimate
The reader will note that the lifetime O&S costs of the LPD-17 class is much lower than the class of ships they are directly replacing (LPD-4 class). O&S costs for ONE LPD-17is estimated to be  $3.526Billion lower than one LPD-4 hull when using baseline year (1996) dollars. this is the LOW savings estimate. If we use then-year dollars (when the dollars are actually spent) the LPD-17's O&S costs per hull are estimated to be about $6.18B lower than the LPD-4s they will replace. I'll put any of those numbers on the balance sheet against the paltry (in comparison)  $1.8B cost to buy each of the LPD-17s

More 'Value' at lower total cost 

Now add the 'value' half to the equation. The LPD-17 is clearly superior to the LPD-4 in capability and capacity, and it replaces more than just the LPD-4 class of ships. It should therefore be easily seen by most why the Navy saw the time, dollars  and effort expended to bring the San Antonio class into the fleet as an investment worth making. 


 Yay, What an amazing success

Tuesday, May 15, 2012

F-35: Skaff vs. Brigante

Inside Promoter vs. Outside Discounter: Nobody's Perfect

SLD Info has a fairly decent piece up where they interview a Lockheed Martin Former-Viper-Meat- Servo-now-Systems-Engineer named Dr. Michael L. Skaff on what makes the F-35 different from all those 4-point-something-generation aircraft that the Giovanni de Briganti fellow over in 'Gay Paree' seems to think is 'just like' a fifth-generation F-35. 

You have to make yourself get past the rather contrived leading-question format SLD uses, and sift Skaff's techno-cliche' verbiage found on oh-too-many 'summary' PowerPoint slides , but it's worth the effort to just get down and digest the data.
The only place Skaff goes way outside the wire is when he gets a little 'giggly' about the YF-22 having better 'maneuverability' than the YF-23. Yes it is generally known that was the case, but the difference in maneuverability was relatively small, and due largely to the gamble Lockheed made in putting vectored thrust on the YF-22 when it was NOT a requirement.  The YF-23, in comparison to the YF-22 was NOT as Dr Skaff described (in discussing maneuverability):
Skaff: Agility from a fighter pilot point of view is fighter performance.  A classic example was the YF-23. It was a phenomenal interceptor, but that’s all it could do. It couldn’t turn. It didn’t have great agility, fighter performance. 
They [Northrop] went too far with the stealth enabler, and you had an extremely stealthy airplane, but they paid for it in lack of fighter performance.
He 'overstates' the F-23 agility advantage (by more than a 'tidge'). Let's just say I was 'AFFTC' at the time, been inside ear-protection range while both aircraft were running engines at the same time, and know AF guys who actually crunched data used to 'grade' the flyoff.

He also conveniently forgets to mention -- if he even knows-- that the YF-22 was officially selected for being seen as 'lower risk' design and more 'producable'. Those reasons often get guffaws from those of us who worked "Stealth Week" for reasons I don't care to explain.  IMHO. the ATF contract award marked the shift in the balance of 'performance' vs. 'lower risk' towards 'lower (perceived) risk'.   

Skaff''s little ATF side trip in the discussion might dissuade otherwise knowledgeable people from accepting the rest of his assertions concerning the F-35. He needs to stick with what he really knows (like, apparently, Pilot-Vehicle Interface).          

Monday, May 14, 2012

Bob Cox Buries Lede in Recycled F-35 'News'

The real news is the excreble Winslow Wheeler is now at POGO. I guess the radical trust fund baby cum 'photographer' got tired of paying his salary.
It's always helpful when targets bunch up. Even metaphorical targets.

Sunday, May 13, 2012

Av Week's LCS 1 "Hit Piece": Unintentionally Helpful anyone who has been paying attention (of course MOST people haven't been).

Seriously, go read the AvWeek 'Investigative' report on LCS 1.  Match up the timelines for faults, findings, corrective actions. Set aside the 'scandalous' structure and phrasing and it will illuminate on many of the open LCS 1 design/build process questions I posed earlier in parsing the POGO arguments.

As to LCS 1 specifically, I am only 'mildly' interested in the Fabey 'tour' in dry dock that the Navy says never happened (protecting 'sources' there Fabey?).  I'm a little more interested in the INSURVs recent evaluation of crew (non)readiness.

Wednesday, May 09, 2012

Giovanni de Briganti: Shillin' for Euros?

This is Giovanni de Brigante (with an 'e'):

Giovanni de Brigante. 1920s Air Racer Source: Corbis

He was one of the daring European air race pilots of his day. He probably understood his flying machine, how to extract the most performance from it, what was critical to the successful operation of the plane and where its technological standing was relative to the existing state of the aeronautical art in his time. He probably knew what he was talking about when it came to bleeding-edge technology of the day.  

This is Giovanni de Briganti (with an 'i'):

Giovanni de Briganti: Aero 'Jpournalist' (graphic by SMSgt Mac)
This Giovanni de Briganti is… none of the above.
This Giovanni de Briganti pens what is IMHO best described as Euro-propaganda with an aeronautics angle. He's written some incredibly stupid things about ‘some’ advanced aerospace projects. To this observer, it appears his targeted  ‘some’ projects are selected according to a ratio inverse to amount of advertising space purchased on his website. (Just Sayin'!)

His latest (perhaps even “Euro-sponsored”?) piece is a doozy.  We could take him to task for trying to pass off the simplistic logic he uses to redefine fighter generations, or how he relates a simplified (for simpletons?) narrative on the state of the F-35’s HMD (a better one here). among other things. He manages to repeat every Euro-canard program’s PR trope on sensor-fusion and interoperability in going down the list of ‘5th Gen’ capabilities as well.  
But to save time and really highlight that Mr. de Briganti knows NOTHING about the key technologies involved and which he feels empowered to write about, let us use his own words concerning Low Observability, aka ‘Stealth’.
Only part of two paragraphs are necessary to show Giovanni de Briganti is a complete tyro when it comes to modern fighter technology.

de Briganti's first revelatory failure:  

In any case, detection by radar matters less and less because by switching on its radar a fighter becomes as visible as someone turning on a flashlight in a dark room.
Which seems almost verbatim what the once-highly respected Thomas S. Amlie* tried to claim concerning the B-2’s ‘Low Probability of Intercept Radar’ (LPIR).  F-22 and F-35 AESA radars are of the very latest generation of Active Electronic Scanned Array (AESA) systems. AESA’s are such a good idea, ‘4th Gen’ aircraft makers (including LM with the F-16) are scrambling to field AESAs on older aircraft. Installations on older designs can be problematic from a power/cooling perspective so there may tend to be more trade offs in radar performance to make the newer radars compatible with older systems, but that is beside the point. The point is, there is a tremendous effort going on to come up with ways that  would make AESAs more ‘detectable’ because finding them, tracking them, and locking on to them is for all practical purposes, nearly impossible to do reliably. And that my friends is NOT at all the same as becoming  “as visible as someone turning on a flashlight in a dark room”.

If Mr de Briganti had anything close to a clue concerning AESA radar technology, he seems to have lost it. Mr. Amlie was wrong because he didn’t know about new and then mostly classified technology. Mr. de Briganti apparently isn’t aware of twenty-year (plus!) old unclassified technology because....he's ignorant?    

de Briganti’s  second failure:  

So the preferred detection sensors are optical, like Infra-Red Scan and Track (IRST), and in this case the large and very hot exhaust plume of the F-35’s 45,000-lb thrust engine is as visible as a blowtorch in the same dark room.
Heh.  I’ll just repeat part of the observations I made over at Solomon’s SNAFU! blog a little while back (Typos corrected of course) :

IRST tracking is a short range capability. Just like for visible light digital detection systems, digital infrared detection requires at a minimum 1 pixel with detectable contrast to surrounding pixels. (Analog systems, such as the human eye require 1/2 arc-seconds 'width' contrasting against the field of view).These are clear-sky minimums. Any kind of moisture in the air between target and detector, or behind the target will reduce detection range. Typical operating altitudes commonly have a lot of this moisture equal or above them.
The total target contrast is attenuated by the physical properties of the atmosphere itself. The major constituent gases 'absorb' Medium IR frequencies, and those just happen to be the part of the bandwidth emitted by the jet exhaust. The Low IR and High IR bands aren't absorbed nearly as much, so the management of these emissions is accomplished by selection of outer mold line shaping, coating colors and surface textures. And then you get to F-35 formations, tactics and sensor fusion. Sneaking up on an F-35 with an IRST will be a very dangerous game for the attacker …

…. Just because you can see a LO asset doesn't mean you can engage it. If you can engage the LO asset, it doesn't mean you can actually hit it. Think about it -- there's a reason why we've [US have] never gone in big on IRSTs for air-to-air combat.

So much for the hyperbolic blowtorch.

He should read more. Suggested topic: Kill Chain. Then he couldn't help to write less drivel.

Now the only question is: are we prepared for the 'gems' he'll present in his "Part 2"?

*If you want to read where Amlie really ‘stepped in it’ (his failure was that his technical knowledge of radar was past its expiration date and he wrote his argument down for the world to see) get a copy of the book The "Pentagon Paradox" and read Appendix C (pp355-56) for his letter (with equations!) describing how a dish antenna system would always be detectable. Too bad a LPIR radar doesn't use a dish.  Mr.  Amlie passed away fairly recently, and I find it fitting that the obituaries seem to have overlooked this singular event, as it probably did not rise to be worthy of mention on the balance sheet of an otherwise outstanding career.

Tuesday, May 08, 2012

LCS 3 (USS Fort Worth) Passes Sea Trials

News release from Naval Sea Systems Command Office of Corporate Communications:
"Fort Worth performed extremely well during its trials," said LCS Program Manager Capt. John Neagley. "The ship's level of completion coupled with Marinette Marine's excellent craftsmanship resulted in relatively few material deficiencies."

During the four-day trial, the Navy conducted comprehensive tests intended to demonstrate the performance of the propulsion plant, ship handling and auxiliary systems. This improved performance in comparison to the first ship of the class is a result of design stability, facility improvements and production efficiencies by the shipbuilder.
Barring some attributed, authoritative information to the contrary from another source, I will conclude that LCS 1 Freedoms 'problems' were indeed 'First of Class' issues. 'Somehow' an acquisition disaster is averted by the aquisition system that 'some' claim is a disaster itself . Time will tell if the ship's reliability is what is required.
USS Fort Worth on Sea Trials (Lockheed Martn Photo)
Note: I assume there will be 'problems' these ships will encounter in the future, Navy crews would be much smaller on ALL its ships if it wasn't for that darned entropy.

Hull Complete, March 2009 (Lockheed Martin Photo)
Minor nit in passing: I'm kind of beaked that the first US warship to be named after one of my 'home towns' isn't a Capital Ship or if it had to be an LCS, I would have preferred the Austal design (although boat operatons might perhaps be less fun from the even-numbered LCS's. I don't know)

LCS 3 Christening 4 December 2010 (US Navy Photo)
Nothing like testing the ship's 'righting moment' right out of the box 

Sunday, May 06, 2012

Project on Government Oversight: Still Shrill After All These Years

Know Your ‘Reformers’: Episode 1 in potentially a long series


I’ve been toying for quite some time with the idea of maybe taking on a book project: a book about the modern era of so-called “Military Reformers” and the also so-called  ‘Military Reform Movement’. My interests in their activities reaches back to at least the late 70’s. As a byproduct of examining the output of the leading/most prolific ‘reformers’ in detail over the years I’ve managed to consume a great many of their screeds.  I have also acquired a fairly significant selection of their writings not available by other means (such as the internet).  Nearly all of the ‘reformer’ material I have acquired over the years has been either library remainder (free) or (mostly) purchased second-hand. The fine point here is this: as my research progressed and knowledge of the ‘Reformers’ increased, it became increasingly important to me to NOT subsidize their ‘work’ in any way, shape, or form.

Another Generation. Same Old Song and Dance.

In my ‘inbox’ earlier in the week was a link to an interesting piece posted at the Defense Professionals (DefPro) website (Although the publication of same calls the ‘Professionals’ part seriously into question). It is a classic example of the kind of thinking (or lack thereof) that goes into a typical POGO rant, but in this case, it offers the kind of transparency to POGO’s philosophy and modus operandi that I don’t think I’ve seen since Dina Rasor’s early effluences, back when she was cranking up POGO’s prior incarnation: the ‘Project on Military Procurement’.

Ben Freeman.
(A patriotic guy. Just ask him )
Source: POGO
The piece that follows was put together by one of POGO’s newest (and therefore greenest) ‘investigators’, one Ben Freeman, who has been rather prolific of late. The subject this time is the Littoral Combat Ship program, but it could be about almost any program. Indeed, as I read through the piece, which for our purposes Freeman conveniently structured in a ‘he said’-‘she said’ format, I was struck by the similarities in substance and tone that Dina Rasor used when she attacked (yes, a ‘trigger’ word, but that is what it was) the M-1 (tank and program) performance ‘back in the day’ without really understanding what a tank was for much less how it was to be used.  From the obvious parallels, it immediately became apparent that we could also use Freeman’s POGO piece to illustrate clearly the kind of philosophical, conceptual, and technical dissonance that exists between the worlds of those who ‘do’ things in the real world and those who ‘second guess’ from the trench lines of ‘Reformerland’.
Even better, we can accomplish this without having to deal with the more substantial issues of whether or not the LCS program is needed and justified and/or having to dissect the back-story motivations of the ‘second guessers’ for this go around and save just them for another time.
LCS 1 (Left) and LCS 2  (USN Photo)
I now present the DefPro piece in its entirety, with observations/commentary in [red brackets].     

Navy Defends $120 Billion LCS Program, POGO Publishes Rebuttal

08:27 GMT, May 2, 2012 POGO certainly caused a stir last week after sending a letter to U.S. Congress reporting that the USS Freedom, the first ship commissioned under the Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program, has been plagued with cracks, flooding, corrosion, and repeated engine failures. In response to POGO’s letter, Rep. Duncan Hunter (R-CA) amended the National Defense Authorization Act, “demanding that the Navy ‘fess up to Congress on problems with its Littoral Combat Ship,” according to AOL Defense. [First, note the self-promoting claim of causing a ‘stir’; we’ll get back to it later. The most interesting thing is how the quotation is used. If not read carefully, it might lead one to believe that Rep. Hunter was the one quoted, rather than a turn of a phrase that the author of the AOL piece -- one Sidney J. Freeberg Jr.-- used to punch up the opening of his article.]  
Hunter confirmed that our letter was the impetus for the amendment. “I didn’t realize the Navy had been so restrictive in its reporting even with DoD,” Rep. Hunter told AOL Defense. “We just want to know what’s going on.”

[Again, a carefully deceptive use of selective quotation.  One that rather carefully does NOT mention a more substantial quote a couple of paragraphs ahead of the ‘punchline’ Freeman lifted from Freeberg’s article. If Freeman had included the more explanatory quote ahead of this one, we would have read: "This simply makes the navy come to us and explain all the problems [and] all the good things about the LCS we need to know to conduct proper oversight," Rep. Hunter told the committee. "The Navy needs to be more forthcoming with us." But perhaps that more balanced description would have set the ‘wrong’ tone for what will follow? The claim of confirmation that POGO’s letter was the ‘impetus for the amendment’ is classic POGO: 
1) make claims where is not important whether or not they are ‘valid’, only that they cannot be ignored by legislators or administrators without risking escalation and appearance of indifference/malpractice.
2) Legislators/administrators move to at least pretend to examine the claims to avoid further complaint.
3) POGO then markets their activities as a ‘success’. “POGO gets results!” (as in the claim to have caused ‘a stir’)
Note: Expect mention of this ‘success’ in future POGO fundraising briefings/pleas to preserve and expand their donor base.]       
Rep. Hunter is joined in this bipartisan push for oversight of the LCS program by fellow House Armed Services Committee Members Hank Johnson (D-GA), who issued a statement supporting Hunter’s amendment, and Jackie Speier (D-CA), who sources confirm will be issuing LCS legislation of her own. And just yesterday, The Hill reported that Senators Carl Levin (D-MI) and John McCain (R-AZ), the Chair and Ranking Member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, respectively, have called for a Government Accountability Office (GAO) review of the program.

It all seemed to touch a nerve with the Navy, which quickly moved to defend the $120 billion LCS program, which calls for a new wave of nimble combat ships designed to operate close to shore. The beleaguered Freedom, manufactured by Lockheed Martin, is one of two LCS designs.

[Obviously Freeman is still trying to set up the right POGO vibe here. ‘Touch a nerve’? Will we perhaps see in a short while why a rapid response from the Navy should be considered so ‘remarkable’ or when viewed in context will it be actually ‘unremarkable’?]
The Navy issued a response to our letter so quickly that even Defense News remarked that it was delivered with “uncharacteristic alacrity.”

[Again, setting up the idea that the ‘Navy’ (yes, apparently ALL of it) was ‘unsettled’, by the machinations of the (apparently) ‘mighty’ POGO? If the previous comments serve any purpose other than casting the Navy in a less than flattering pose, it is not exactly clear what  they are here for, or otherwise why they would have been included in this POGO piece at all.]

One point the Navy protests is our statement that LCS ships will make up as much as half of the Navy’s surface fleet. The Navy cites a report to Congress that says the LCS will account for 22 percent of the “21st Century Battle Force.”

We can admit when we’re wrong. But in this case the “22 percent” the Navy cites is not accurate, either. The planned 55 LCS ships will account for 38 percent of the Navy’s surface combatant ships.

[So. POGO takes issue with the Navy’s ship count numbers. Is it because POGO has a better list of ships, more authoritative definitions of what constitutes a ‘surface fleet’ or ‘battle force’, or a better grasp of naval force plans than the Navy itself? Why is this example of what is really ‘communication at cross purposes’ included in this piece at all?  I think we are again left with the perception of some deceptive, and IMHO rather pissy, ‘battlefield prep’ on the part of POGO’s Freeman.]  
As for the rest of the Navy’s response to our letter, we’ll beg to differ and stand by our work.
Here’s a side-by-side comparison of the Navy’s response and our rebuttal:
“Senior Navy officials have publicly praised the LCS program. However, the Navy has been reluctant to share documents related to LCS vulnerabilities with entities such as the Pentagon’s Office of the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E).”
• The Navy’s Response:

This is not correct. The LCS Program Office has been working in close coordination with the DOT&E community since the early days of the program. DOT&E has been an active member of the T&E Working level Integrated Program Teams (WIPTs) since 2004 and most recently at the [Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)] level in the milestone-related Integrating IPTs (IIPTs) and Overarching IPTs (OIPTs) that occurred in 2011. Draft Detail Design Integrated Survivability Assessment Reports (DDISAR) were provided to DOT&E in the second quarter of fiscal 2012 to initiate discussions while modeling results and shot line selections are completed. DOT&E is working with the program office to complete the DDISARs and move toward developing Total Ship Survivability Trials (TSST) plans that assess Seaframe survivability in fiscal 2014. DOT&E will receive the final DDISARs prior to the planning and conduct of the TSSTs. Additionally, the LCS Program Office provided a draft of the 57mm Live Fire Test and Evaluation Management Plan to OSD/DOT&E on 29 March, and received comments on 3 April 2012. Comment resolution is in process.
• Our Rebuttal:

The only two documents the Navy confirms sharing with DOT&E are a “draft of the 57mm Live Fire Test and Evaluation Management Plan,” and a draft of the “Detail Design Integrated Survivability Assessment Reports.” Both of which were just recently received by DOT&E. As our letter indicates, the Navy possessed several documents related to the ship’s performance and equipment failures that it failed to share with DOT&E. Plans to create trials in 2014 do nothing to improve oversight of a ship that will be deployed to Singapore in 2012.
[Got that? First POGO accuses the Department of the Navy with not being forthcoming with DoD’s DOT&E organization using the unbounded term ‘reluctance’ to describe LCS document sharing concerning the LCS’s ‘vulnerabilities’ . In response, the Navy points out that DOT&E representatives are embedded participants within the LCS test community, and lists specific LCS Program draft reports that have been submitted on relevant activities (to the ‘vulnerabilities’ topic that POGO highlighted). It is also apparent from the statement these reports are being submitted on an event-driven schedule.
POGO’s ‘rebuttal’ ? Freeman chooses to ignore the statement concerning ongoing DOT&E participation with the cognizant LCS Test &Evaluation IPT, then Freeman carps about the low number of reports acknowledged to have been shared by the Navy. Does POGO/Freeman really feel entitled to a comprehensive list of communications between the Navy and DOT&E based upon a ‘letter’ they wrote, or are they just keeping on the offensive as the best form of defense? (The latter could be described as a typical ‘reformer’ move BTW: think Boyd’s OODA Loop)
LCS 1 USS Freedom replenishment with LHD 6 USS Bonhomme Richard  (USN Photo)
In this case though I believe the former was more ‘wished for’ than expected. This appears more likely to be, in the best POGO/Reformer tradition, a case of asking for information and then making the next move based upon the response. 1) If the information requested is not provided, make assertions of ‘reluctance’ (the cycle on this path eventually ramps up to accusations of ‘coverup’ or worse). 2) If the information requested IS provided, then interpret it to support the agenda in hand.

The ‘tell’ this time is the importance Freeman mentioning “several documents related to the ship’s performance and equipment failures that it failed to share with DOT&E”. Aside from the inflammatory ‘failed to share’ phrasing, from a systems Reliability, Maintainability and Availability (RM&A) point of view, it would be fundamental nonsense to analyze failure data and draw any final conclusions as to failure significance or trends, and in some cases even root cause, this early in a program. The mixing of complaint about structural performance and system performance is either shotgunning the target hoping to hit something, or indicative that like many ‘reformers’ Freeman doesn’t know enough to distinguish between the two. Modern complex systems typically require tens of thousands of operating hours before system reliability can be ‘graded’ against specifications.  The only purpose for outside and uninformed interests to acquire such data this early is for target practice and laying groundwork for further misadventures in furthering their agenda. 

– “… (LCS-1, the first LCS ship) has been plagued by flawed designs and failed equipment since being commissioned, has at least 17 known cracks.”

– “Before and during the ship’s second set of rough water trials in February 2011, 17 cracks were found on the ship’…”
– “Another crack was discovered “below the waterline and is currently allowing water in... When discovered there was rust washing onto the painted surface. It is thought this is rust from the exposed crack surface. It is unknown how long this crack existed prior to being discovered.”

– “Similarly, cracks in the deck plating and center walkway on the port side were mirrored by corresponding cracks on the starboard side. Fifteen experts, including a source within the Navy, have informed POGO that the cracks in nearly identical locations on opposite sides of the ship may be indicative of systematic design issues.”
– “Last May, the LCS program manager issued near term operating guidance for LCS-1, which placed significant constraints on the ship’s safe operating envelope (SOE).”

– “Specifically, the new guidance states that in rough water (sea state 7; 19.5- to 29.5-foot waves) with following seas, the ship cannot travel at speeds greater than 20 knots, and cannot travel into head seas at any speed. Even in calmer seas (sea state 5; 8.2- to 13.1-foot waves) the ship’s peak speed into head seas is capped at 15 knots, relegating the Navy’s “cheetah of the seas” to freighter speeds.”

• The Navy’s Response:

Speed restrictions for LCS 1 have been lifted. With regard to the cracking discussion, these are not new findings. LCS 1 has experienced minor structural issues. The details of the cracks found on LCS 1 were briefed to the defense committees, including the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) over a year ago (March 2011). All repairs were conducted using approved repair procedures and satisfactorily inspected by American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) and the appropriate Naval Technical Authority. Thorough analyses and reviews of the designs and construction documentation were conducted, with the goal of improved production processes. Design changes, as necessary, have been incorporated in future hulls to resolve noted issues. Production processes were modified as needed, to prevent future issues. These design changes were implemented into LCS 1 throughout her post delivery period, the ship has been approved to operate with the full scope of the approved Safe Operating Envelope (SOE) since completion of the repairs.
• Our Rebuttal:
The Navy’s claim that the cracking issues have been reported is partially correct. The cracks were reported, but the extent of the cracking was not. These cracks have been repaired, but the cracking problem continues according to sources close to the program. Faulty welds and construction continue to cause new cracks on the ship that the Navy has yet to report.

The Navy also claims “the ship has been approved to operate within the full scope of the approved Safe Operating Envelope (SOE) since completion of the repairs.” But, being approved to operate within the full scope of the SOE and actually operating are completely different. The simple fact is that since completion of these repairs the ship has been unable to successfully perform at the upper end of its SOE.
[POGO first makes a litany of assertions related to structural cracks and their consequences, including a rather humorous appeal to authority  in employing ‘Fifteen experts’ stating a rather obvious  factoid ‘may’ be true. One would think one expert would have sufficed for such a weak assertion of something not likely to be disputed. Once you get past the unintended humor, the first questions that come to my mind are:
1) Is the discovery of the need to make structural tweaks a normal part of wringing out a new ship?
2) Is the scope and impact of the cracking to date typical, lower or higher than might be reasonably   expected?
3) Does the Navy (or ship builders in general) employ a methodical strategy for identifying, tracking and fixing structural issues/problems?
4) If they do not, why isn’t POGO raising a holy stink over the absence of same?

But we don’t need to get too deep into the topic of what the norms are because of the Navy response: Ummm. We fixed all those problems.

POGO’s rebuttal: There’s more problems that have occurred, and an unsupported assertion that the LCS in question has been unable to ‘perform at the upper end’ of its operating environment, which even if true, from the sound of it this is unrelated to structural problems, so why bring it up at all on this subtopic, except as sort of a ‘yes but’ deflection? ] 

“From the time the Navy accepted LCS-1 from Lockheed Martin on September 18, 2008, until the ship went into dry dock in the summer of 2011 — not even 1,000 days later — there were 640 chargeable equipment failures on the ship. On average then, something on the ship failed on two out of every three days.”

• The Navy’s Response:
As with any ship, all equipment failures on LCS 1, regardless of how minor the impact to mission, have been meticulously tracked, and this data has been invaluable in improving the reliability of ship systems. The 640 chargeable equipment failures from Ship Delivery until the summer dry docking, tracked in the LCS 1 Data Collection, Analysis, and Corrective Action System (DCACAS) represent all equipment failures to the ship for all systems (propulsion, combat systems, auxiliaries, habitability, C4I, etc) regardless of whether the equipment was repaired by the crew or off ship maintenance personnel.
The 640 failures referenced include multiple failures on a piece of equipment (38 for the Main Propulsion Diesel Engine) and single failures to equipment (one Man Overboard Indicator). From the DCACAS report dated 31 Aug 2011, approximately 12 percent of the equipment failures since delivery can be attributed to the Ship Service Diesel Generators (SSDGs). In May 2010 the Navy and Lockheed Martin instituted a Product Improvement Program for the SSDG. The resulting effort increased Mean Time Between Failures (MBTF) for the equipment from less than 150 hours (October 2008) to over 500 hours (April 2011).
This is a case of how the DCACAS data is used to improve the reliability of the ships early in the acquisition program. Overall the DCACAS data is a mechanism to evaluate every failure on the ship to determine if it can be attributed to infant mortality of the equipment, normal wear and tear for that equipment/component, or is a trend that needs to be addressed via design changes or reliability growth efforts.

• Our Rebuttal:
The Navy does not dispute the 640 failures, which had not been previously reported. The Navy mentions that the DCACAS data is used to determine if failure can be attributed to infant mortality, normal wear and tear, or is a trend. Their file confirms that nearly a third of these failures were potential or confirmed trends, which, according to the Navy should “be addressed via design changes or reliability growth efforts.” This is precisely our rationale for questioning this ship’s design.

[ POGO’s Freeman first commits the ‘fundamental nonsense’ I mentioned earlier. The Navy pretty much responds as if helping a child with their color matching skills. Freeman double-downs on the 640 failures as not being reported’ yet they must have been reported somewhere for Freeman to have been aware of them. Then Freeman takes the point that the Navy notes that failures where trends have been identified (obviously either simple systems or related to simple installation, or operating factors or problems anticipated via earlier analysis and test) should “be addressed via design changes or reliability growth efforts”. Freeman then makes the illogical claim that the existence of problems, the scope of which he has failed to establish are truly worrisome or even out of the expected norm “is precisely our rationale for questioning this ship’s design”. 
The fact that Freeman believes technical problems or issues arising on the introduction of a new weapon system (on which he has no expertise or just as important, no experienced perspective to judge the significance of) into its operating environment SHOULD give him cause to be “questioning this ship’s design”, would normally cause the recreational sailor in me to suspect that Freeman apparently has never been around a ‘boat’ much less a ‘ship’ long or often enough to be a proper judge of ship systems reliability and performance, and this last passage would seem to be evidence enough to suspect his qualifications to even ask the RIGHT questions concerning same.

LCS 2 Under Construction (GD/Austal Photo)
Except if you know how ‘reformers’ work, you would realize that this kind of faux indignance is their bread and butter.  Good engineers and program managers understand the challenges of complexity and can distinguish between necessary and unnecessary complexity, and they even know there is room for disagreement on same, one of the reasons for the term: Best Engineering Judgment.  Engineers and program managers know there will always be technical problems to solve when fielding any complex (and even simple) system. Engineers and program managers know that sources and remedies to the technical problems may be found in the design, the construction, the integration, or even the training and education of the operators. Engineers and program managers know that until you actually field a system--complex or simple--you will NEVER know about all-- much less be able to preclude all-- potential technical problems. Good Engineers and program managers see a technical problem as to be expected and solved. So-called ‘Reformers’ see technical problems as simply reasons to do something other than what is being done, something to be used in furthering their own agendas. And those agendas may or may not be what is publicly stated, but they are never FOR advancing a weapon system under development. ]  

“Secretary of the Navy Raymond Mabus told the Senate Armed Services Committee in December 2010 that both variants of the LCS were performing well, and that “LCS–1, the Freedom, demonstrated some of the things we can expect during her maiden deployment earlier this year.” Then-Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Gary Roughead echoed this praise for the LCS-1, stating “I deployed LCS earlier than any other ship class to assure we were on the right path operationally. It is clear to me that we are.”

• The Navy’s Response:
USS FREEDOM (LCS 1) arrived in San Diego on April 23, 2010, successfully completing her maiden deployment more than two years ahead of schedule and three to five years faster than conventional ship acquisition strategies. LCS 1 traveled 6,500 miles, transiting the Panama Canal. Highlights of operations in 3rd and 4th Fleet Areas of Responsibility include theater security cooperation port visits in Colombia, Panama, and Mexico, successful performance of strike group operations with the USS Carl Vinson Carrier Strike Group, joint maneuvers with the Mexican Navy, and counter-illicit trafficking patrols which resulted in 4 interdictions yielding over 5 tons of cocaine, 2 seized vessels, and 9 suspected smugglers taken into custody. The second phase of the early deployment included LCS 1 participating in the bi-annual Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise with 14 other nations, 34 ships, 5 submarines, 100 aircraft and over 20,000 personnel. The early deployment included the development of a coordinated logistics support plan. The lessons learned from the LCS 1 deployment have provided critical data to inform the permanent support plan for the 55 ships of the LCS class, as well as valuable information used in the construction of both LCS 3 and the Block buy ships.

• Our Rebuttal:
These quotes are not an “issue” that we raised. We mentioned them in context of the ship’s failures to show the disconnect between what Navy officials were telling Congress and what was actually happening on the ship.

[No. To be accurate, you might reasonably claim you “mentioned them in context of” of what POGO views as “the ship’s failures” in an attempt “to show” what POGO asserts is “the disconnect between what Navy officials were telling Congress and what” POGO views as “was actually happening on the ship”.

“Mabus and Roughead failed to mention that during the approximately two-month deployment when the ship traveled from Mayport, Florida, to its home port in San Diego, California, there were more than 80 equipment failures on the ship. These failures were not trivial, and placed the crew of the ship in undue danger. For example, on March 6, 2010, while the ship was in the midst of counter-drug trafficking operations and reportedly “conducted four drug seizures, netting more than five tons of cocaine, detained nine suspected drug smugglers, and disabled two ‘go-fast’ drug vessels,” there was a darken ship event (the electricity on the entire ship went out), temporarily leaving the ship adrift at sea.”
• The Navy’s Response:

Throughout its deployment, LCS 1 safely operated and conducted its mission. Few of the 80 equipment failures cited above were mission critical. The ship did experience a brief loss of power, however, it should be noted that many commercial and U.S. Navy vessels have periods of power loss due to plant set-up and operator control. In the event of power loss, there are specific U.S. Navy procedures documented in the Engineering Operational Sequencing System (EOSS) to quickly restore power throughout the ship. To address concerns documented with electric power generation, the LCS Program executed Electric Plant Reliability Improvement Programs on both ship designs to increase reliability of ship service diesel generators and the performance and management of the shipboard electrical systems. This has resulted in changes that have been implemented through post-delivery availabilities on LCS 1 and LCS 2 as well as captured for LCS 3 and follow ships. Additionally, sensors were installed to monitor performance trends.

• Our Rebuttal:
The Navy confirmed “the ship did experience a brief loss of power” while deployed, which again had not been previously reported or shared with Congress in any public testimony. In addition, the Navy claims that, “Throughout its deployment, LCS 1 safely operated and conducted its mission. Few of the 80 equipment failures cited above were mission critical. The ship did experience a brief loss of power…” The fact that other ships lose power does nothing to lessen the danger of unexpected power outages on a ship the Navy would have us believe can survive naval warfare.

In other words, the Navy admits there were mission critical failures, including a brief loss of power, on this LCS-1 mission. This stands in stark contrast to Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus telling Congress that this mission was a success and the ship “demonstrated some of the things we can expect.” Unless we are to expect rampant equipment failures, it appears that the Navy was misleading Congress about these issues.

[POGO says: Problems BAD! USN says: Problems Typical and Unremarkable. POGO says: Navy BAD for not reporting Typical and Unremarkable problems.

This reads more like POGO trying to manufacture the appearance of a cover up than anything else.]

“According to the DoD’s DOT&E FY 2011 Annual Report, the LCS is “not expected to be survivable in a hostile combat environment.”

• The Navy’s Response:
The LCS Ships are built to meet Joint Requirements Oversight Council-approved survivability requirements and include OPNAVINST 9070.1 Level 1 Survivability standards [note: OPNAVINSTs are instructions issued with the office of the chief of naval operations]. The LCS design specifically includes Level 1 plus additional tailored survivability enhancements (“Level 1+”). LCS survivability depends on a combination of ship design, ship numbers, and ship CONOPS [concepts of operations] which says LCS will:
– Operate as part of a networked battle force
– Conduct independent operations only in low to medium threat scenarios
– Operate as part of a networked battle force operation in high threat environments
– Create Battle Space/Avoid being hit
– Rely on networked battle force for threat attrition
– Rely on overboard systems
– Fight and survive if hit
– Ship design: Accept ship mission kill; keep ship afloat and protect crew after hit
– Battle force design: Maintain battle force fight-through capability through LCS numbers and mission flexibility
– Withdraw/reposition if hit

LCS is designed to maintain essential mobility after a hit, allowing the ship to exit the battle area under its own power. The LCS systems allow ship’s crew to navigate and communicate while repositioning after a hit all the while utilizing numbers (of LCSs), and CONOPS as force multipliers. LCS incorporates survivability systems to perform required missions in the littoral with an emphasis on crew survival.

• Our Rebuttal:
The Navy again confirms that the LCS has a “Level 1+” survivability rating. According to the Navy “Level I represents the least severe environment anticipated and excludes the need for enhanced survivability…in the immediate area of an engaged Battle Group or in the general war-at-sea region.” In other words, the ship is not expected to survive a true battle at sea. Additionally, given that the littoral combat ship will, by definition, be operating close to shore, it is also extremely vulnerable to land-based attacks, which it is ill-equipped to defend against.

The Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Greenert recently said the LCS was not prepared to “challenge the Chinese military” and you can’t “send it into an anti-access area.”
In short, this is a surface combatant that can’t truly engage in surface combat.

[POGO: DOT&E Report says ship not survivable, USN: Ship designed to be survivable where and when used as intended and BTW: here’s how, POGO: But the Navy can’t use it this other way-- so it doesn’t count. Neener Neener.
BTW: You just gotta’ love the ‘reformer’ chutzpa in rolling out their own definition of surface combat and insisting it overrides that of the USN’s.]

“Sources close to LCS-1 have now told POGO that after more than six months in port, the ship has been back to sea just twice. The sources also informed us about critical problems that surfaced on the ship during those two outings: several vital components on the ship failed including, at some point in both trips, each of the four engines.”

• The Navy’s Response:

LCS 1 had one of two gas turbines engines fail after over three years of operations (including post-delivery testing, fleet operations and ship early deployment). The root cause analysis of the engine failure revealed that the gas turbine intakes were allowing salt spray to be ingested into the engine intake structure during high seas evolutions, which lead to the eventual failure of a high pressure turbine blade. The salt water did not induce corrosion internal to the engine. However, it changed the air flow through the engine, which eventually led to the failure. As a result of the failure, a redesign of the intake structure along with improved mating seals was implemented on LCS 1 on post delivery and is in-line for LCS 3 and subsequent ships.
• Our Rebuttal:

The Navy does not dispute these previously unreported engine failures. They only discuss the results of an engine failure that occurred in 2010, which we do not mention in our letter.

[The USN blew off what smelled like a POGO fishing expedition, POGO doesn’t like it. That doesn’t make POGOs claims true or accurate and it doesn’t mean the USN even knew for certain what POGO was talking about (which would be just as valid a reason to not respond to POGO as any).]

“In addition, there were shaft seal failures during the last trip, which led to flooding.”
• The Navy’s Response:

During February 2012 sea trials LCS 1 suffered a failure of the port shaft mechanical seal (1 of 4 such seals). The remaining underway portion of the sea trial was ended and the ship returned to port unassisted. The failed boost shaft stern tube seal was analyzed by independent third party to gain insight into the failure. Repairs to the Port Boost Stern Tube Seal have been completed and the USS Freedom undocked on April 7. All other stern tube seals on FREEDOM were inspected and found not to have this issue. Due to manufacturing timelines and differences, it was determined that LCS 3 seals were not at risk of the same issue. In addition, LCS 3 seals have undergone extensive operation without failure.
• Our Rebuttal:

The Navy reports that shaft seals on the other engines of LCS-1 and those on LCS-3 were not at risk of this same failure. However, prior to this incident, the Navy was not aware the shaft seal that blew was at risk of failing either. [This is an incredibly stupid paragraph, isn’t it? What’s the difference between before and after? Hint: the Navy looked for the problem elsewhere after it occurred once. The Navy must understand the failure for them to state there is no risk for the same failure after looking at the rest of the seals.]

In short, the Navy has not taken any corrective action in response to this issue.

[POGO: Seal Problem! USN: After looking closely, seal failure seen as a onetime thing. Seal repaired! POGO: We don’t know the difference between a ‘repair’ for what appears to be a onetime issue and something that has to be fixed for all the ships (so we want to see a ‘corrective action’ plan?).

“The DOT&E’s FY 2011 Annual Report states that “[t]he program offices have not released any formal developmental T&E reports.” The report goes on to state that “the Navy should continue to report vulnerabilities discovered during live fire tests and analyses. Doing so will inform acquisition decisions as soon as possible in the procurement of the LCS class.”

• The Navy’s Response:
The Navy is actively developing the required reports documenting the results of all the Developmental Testing that has occurred on LCS 1. Once completed, these reports will be delivered to DOT&E as required.

• Our Rebuttal:

The Navy confirms the DOT&E’s statement, which we referenced in our letter, that “[t]he program offices have not released any formal developmental T&E reports.” In fact, the Navy’s response to this specific critique confirms that “the required reports documenting the results of all the Developmental Testing that has occurred on LCS 1” have not been completed. The Navy states that they will be delivered to DOT&E once they are, but offer no explanation as to why they have not been completed.
[Back to the ‘reports’ bleat eh? Notice how POGO conflates the fact there are no formal reports yet per 2011 DOT&E SAR, but conveniently fails to mention whether or not there were supposed to be any formal reports.  Now, if one bothers to actually read the report without bias, the reader will see that noting the absence of formal reports is not a critique, but a simple observation.  How typically ‘reformer’ of Freeman and POGO to twist facts to satisfy their purposes. ]

It is not unreasonable to ask the Navy to provide testing and evaluation reports for a ship that is scheduled to be deployed to Singapore and has already been deployed in the Caribbean. If the ship is performing as well as the Navy claims they should be eager to provide these reports.

[The assertion of belief as fact: more typical ‘reformer’.
Let’s correct this last paragraph:

POGO BELIEVES it is not unreasonable to ask the Navy to provide testing and evaluation reports for a ship that is scheduled to be deployed to Singapore and has already been deployed in the Caribbean. POGO BELIEVES if the ship is performing as well as the Navy claims they should be eager to provide these reports.

There, all better. ]


“The Navy has also repeatedly made significant changes to the program while giving Congress little time to evaluate these changes.”
• The Navy’s Response:

Configuration change management has been a key factor in controlling program cost. After incorporation of lessons learned from the lead ships into follow ships, the Program Office has controlled the design baseline closely in order to manage risk and cost.
The Program Office has captured and continues to capture data from these “first of class” vessels. The “first of class” discussion is an important perspective to add. USS Freedom (LCS 1) and USS Independence (LCS 2) not only are they “first of class” vessels but they were procured using research and development funds in a manner outside the bounds of previous ship programs. Previous combatant procurements leverage off of years of research and development, integration testing and validation of systems using surrogate platforms. Aegis Cruisers implemented a new combat system that was tested for over ten years on surrogate ships to a hull form that had already been tested and delivered. Aegis destroyers laid the same propulsion, power generation and combat system into a new hull form. All of these efforts did not preclude these ships from seeing “first of class” challenges.

The LCS programs however, took measures to instrument and collect data on the hull designs, execute design reviews/design updates and implement those findings into the follow-on awards. In addition, those findings have led to upgrades and changes on LCS 1 and LCS 2 to ensure that these research and development hulls are viable assets.
LCS 1 has traveled more than 65,000 nautical miles since it was delivered to the Navy in September 2008 and continues to meet our expectations.

• Our Rebuttal:

The Navy fails to respond to the actual issue we raised related to Congressional notification of program changes, specifically the shift from a down-select to a dual-award acquisition strategy. The Navy opted to instead discuss the “first of class” challenges on Aegis ships.
It’s true that all first of class ships will have problems. However, the extent and nature of the problems on this littoral combat ship are far more problematic than on other ships. Faulty welds, design, and ship construction are the root cause of many of this ship’s failings. These are not first of class issues; they are basic ship-building issues that appear to have been largely ignored on this ship.

[ Gee. We could have saved a lot of trouble by starting with this exchange.  POGO accuses the Navy of making changes that Congress can’t keep up with.  The Navy could have had some fun and just said “What do you mean?” or “Whose fault is that?’ but instead chose to detail why the LCS program is different. And from the Navy’s response we learn just HOW different the program is from previous programs (I had no idea how different anyway: sounds like a DARPA program that quickly turns into  production). The Navy details some of the ways the LCS had none of the advantages of previous classes (Aegis cruisers and destroyers) of ships and that those ships still had hurdles to overcome, then the Navy notes that the LCS ships are instrumented to find the kinds of things that might lurk in any design. This should be a hint to Freeman as to why the Navy apparently isn’t (and shouldn’t be?) too excited about the problems they’ve encountered. 
Freeman twists those observations into a “we’re not talking about the Aegis” snark and NOW he tells us that by ‘changes’ POGO meant the change from a downselect to one LCS to the continuation of both LCS designs. It turns out this is the one thing about the LCS I’ve watched with some interest.  
First we can throw out Freeman’s characterization of Navy decision-making concerning Congressional ability to keep up with the program and the change from a downselect to proceeding with a dual contractor approach. It is simplistic and reflects what I would call the Congressional Vanity POV (It was all about them!) found as part of a more extensive review of the issue in a Congressional  Research Service Report. Thus POGO’s carping over timing of requests and decisions in retrospect is pretty unoriginal as well as weak. Read the CRS report, and then ask yourself why it seems POGO would rather have the Navy going to Congress earlier with a half-baked plan, just to give Congress reason to refuse it because it was half-baked.  BTW: There were arguments being made as early as 2004 that the navy should buy two squadrons of competing designs and have them fight for supremacy. The ‘do we downselect’ or ‘do we continue with both designs’ question is hardly ‘new’    
Seems Freeman just can’t stop himself form asserting opinion as fact. He’s got the ‘reformer’ spirit within! With his last paragraph, he again tries to pass off ‘reformer’ POV as fact. Helping once again with a rewrite:

POGO agrees that what the Navy says is true: that all first of class ships will have problems. However, POGO believes the extent and nature of the problems on this littoral combat ship are far more problematic than on other ships. POGO believes Faulty welds, design, and ship construction are the root cause of many of this ship’s problems and are representative of failings in the program, design, and construction (that POGO believes should be seen as cause to kill this program? Notice the undeclared intent – we can only guess). POGO believes these are not first of class issues; POGO believes they are basic ship-building issues that appear to POGO to have been largely ignored on this ship
There. All better again]
FYI, and not that it matter one whit, I find the GD/Austal (LCS 2) design most appealing.
LCS 2. USS Independence (USN Photo)